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A Nation and A People?

Notes toward a Conceptual History of the Terms *Minzoku* 民族 and *Kokumin* 國民 in Early Meiji Japan

Michael Burtscher

Abstract

This paper approaches the conference theme of “changing conceptions of 民 MIN” from the viewpoint of lexical and conceptual change in the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji Japan, with a focus on the concept of “nation”. It analyzes how senses associated with that English term could be read into Sino-Japanese character compounds. Early Meiji uses of the terms *kokumin* 國民 and *minzoku* 民族 are contrasted with each other and uses of terms such as *jinmin* 人民 (“the people”), *kokujin* 國人, *kokutai* 國體, *okuō* 國王, *ippō no tami* 一邦之民, *nēshon* ネーション and *zokumin* 族民, in conjunction with semantic analyses of the lexeme 民 MIN as a morpheme in the Japanese language.

I. Common “People” and Sino-Japanese *Min* 民

Every politically literate speaker of an East Asian language with a Chinese-derived political vocabulary shares a basic understanding of the lexeme 民 MIN (Mandarin Chinese: *mín* 民, Sino-Korean: *min* 민, Sino-Japanese: *min* 民).¹ This *basic* understanding has not changed since the Chinese Classics were composed. If a present-day East Asian reader takes to study a Confucian text, the lexeme 民 MIN will be among those posing the least difficulty to her or his understanding.²

That modern East Asian reader may well have an entirely wrong conception (or no idea whatsoever) of what being a 民 MIN (an individual belonging to “the people”) was actually like at the historically discrete times at which that Confucian text was originally conceived, commented upon, or variously read: Kinds of work performed and daily routines, social power relations including bondage and slavery, ownership of material goods and

status distinctions, marriage rules, practices of procreation and child-rearing, social group organization (including practices of social exclusion), external and internalized control of individual desire and emotions, socially countenanced forms of release thereof, local administration (including administration of punishments), religious practices, sacrificial rites and superstitions, artistic creations and forms of entertainment (or lack thereof), geographic mobility (or immobility) and regional distinctions, common bodily ailments, age perceptions and life expectations, leading causes of death, or even population size, density and location of major population centers. But this is a different point.

My point is that the question of how common “people” (民 MIN) lived their individual lives, to what conditions they were subject in their *individual* existences, is different from the question of what “the people” were *collectively* supposed to be, how they were conceived of as a “common” existence to begin with. If one does not recognize these two questions as distinct, one cannot even start to ask how the answers to them may be linked.

That common “people” can be conceived of in quite different terms is readily apparent if one looks at the considerable variety of linguistic terms used to refer to them, for example, in American English. If one comes to think of it, use of the term ‘common people’ to refer to “the people” (explicitly in their “common” existence) is comparatively rare.³ Consider the following expressions that can be overheard in contemporary American political and social debate: “the American people”, “the public”, “the nation”, “society”, “the common man”, “ordinary folks”, “the man in the street”, “the folks on Main Street”, “average Joe”, “the citizens of Middletown”, “the little people”, “the working classes”, “the crowds”, “the masses”, “the silent majority”, “anyone with common sense”, “Americans”, “We”, “the lowest common denominator”, “the voter”, “the taxpayer”, “the consumer”, “the market”, “the demographic”, “the hoi polloi”, “Johnny Six-pack”, “riff raff”, “rabble”.

These terms conceive of the “common people” in distinctly different terms. They are not synonyms of “the common people” in some sense of pre-established semantic equivalence.⁴ They nonetheless can be and are used by (particular) people to refer to “the people” in more or less conscious linguistic moves to make people conceive of “the people” as a subject of politics and socio-political debate in certain ways: to imply, for example, that common “people” are in truth “the little people” as opposed to “corporate managers”, “the silent majority” as opposed to “a vocal minority”, “ordinary folks” as opposed to “East Coast elites”, or “mean-spirited” in character as opposed to “aristocratic” in nature.

A considerable variety of terms could be called up to denote “the people” as the “common people” in pre-Meiji Japan as well. Consider the terms: *banmin* 萬民, *chōmin* 兆民, *heimin* 平民, *shomin* 庶民, *shūmin* 眾民, *kamin* (or *gemin*) 下民, *gumin* 愚民, *domin* 土民, *seimin* 生民, *jōmin* 蒸民, *ryōmin* 良民, *jinmin* 人民, *kokumin* 國民 and *shimin* 斯民, as well as *shimin* 四民. All of these terms have in common that they are formed by prefixing the morpheme *min* 民 (denoting “common people” or “commoners”) with a qualifier. To these might be added the term *minshū* 民衆 (民眾), which conceives of the

“people” as “common crowds” or “popular masses”.

Not all terms used to denote “the people” were formed in this way. The “common people” were quite commonly referred to as *hyakusei* 百姓, *sōsei* 蒼生, *sōmō* 草莽, *hitokusa* 人草 (or *aohitogusa* 青人草), *sekishi* 赤子, *shojin* 庶人, *shūjin* 衆人 (眾人), or *sejin* 世人 as well. And various characters such as 眾 SHŪ, 庶 SHO, 𡵓 BŌ, or 氓 MIN, could be pronounced *tami* たみ in addition to 民 MIN in a native Japanese reading. The same is true for characters like 生 SEI (“birth”, “life”, “generation”, “growth”), 草 SŌ (“grass”), and 子 SHI (“children”, “offspring”, or “subjects”) in poetic or figurative usage. Last but not least, “the people” could be referred to simply by *shimo* 下 as in *shimojimo* (or *shitajita*) 下々 and *shimozama* 下様 as opposed to *kamizama* 上様 or *okami* 御上, that is, those “below” in opposition to those “above” who rule – but also in conceptual vicinity to Heaven (*ten* 天), as populating “the realm” as “All under Heaven” (*tenka* 天下).

The morpheme *min* 民, nonetheless, is quite obviously of pivotal significance. While terms such as *hyakusei* 百姓, *shojin* 庶人 or *sejin* 世人 also refer to “the people” (wherever an attempt at translation calls for that English term), they do not conceive of these people in terms of their being “commoners” or common “people” (*min* 民) at the same time. It is only the terms ending in *min* 民 listed at the beginning that refer to “the people” or “common people” also as “common people” (by explicitly *referencing* them as such).

The difference between these compounds, as already suggested, is that the meaning of their substantial morpheme *min* 民 is qualified by a prefixed character (functional morpheme) in varying fashion. This sets them apart from another group of compounds ending in *min* 民, which identify subgroups of *min* 民 as defined by a specific vocation or plight. Examples for this latter group include terms like *gyomin* 漁民 (commoners engaged in fishery), *nōmin* 農民 (commoners engaged in agriculture), *sonmin* 村民 (villagers), *nanmin* 難民 (commoners suffering hardship), *kyūmin* 窮民 (commoners pressed to the brink of their existence), *gimin* 義民 (commoners sacrificing themselves out of a sense of communal obligation by supplicating to a lord or ruler), or *hyōryūmin* 漂流民 (commoners shipwrecked at sea and drifted ashore). In an agriculture-based economy, the term *nōmin* 農民 could be considered as belonging to the first group as well. As long as the idea that “common people” are by definition engaged in agriculture is not explicitly called into question – by use of the term *shimin* 四民, indicating “the four kinds of people” (that is: samurai, peasants, craftsmen and merchants), for example – peasants are marked off as *min* 民, while “merchants” (*shōnin* 商人), “craftsmen” (*kōjin* 工人), and samurai (*shi* 士), are not. There were no **chōmin* 町民 (“citizens”) as opposed to *sonmin* 村民 (villagers) in Tokugawa Japan, only *chōnin* 町人 (“townspeople” or “townspeople”) – although these *chōnin* 町人 were certainly included with the *nōmin* 農民 under the rubric of *heimin* 平民, that is “commoners” in contradistinction to samurai (*shi* 士) and court nobles (*kuge* 公家).

The prefixes in the first group of terms make one of various aspects under which common “people” (*min* 民) were conceived of as “common” stand out. The term *ryōmin* 良民, for example, is not to be understood as denoting a subgroup of “good people” as opposed to “bad people”. It rather expresses a Mencian confidence that people are “commonly” – in their intrinsic “nature” (*sei* 性) – good. The conceptual opposite of *ryōmin* 良民 is not **akumin* 惡民, but *akujin* 惡人 or *akuto* 惡徒 (“evil individuals” or “evil fellows”) and *akutō* 惡黨 (individuals grouped into “evil bands” or “factions”). One is easily reminded of the abhorrence against political “factions” in the European tradition of republican thought, which also played a constitutive role in the conception of the “general will” by Rousseau.

The term *gumin* 愚民, likewise, does not refer to “stupid” as opposed to “common-sensical” people. It refers simply to “the people” on the basis of an understanding that “common people” are not set apart, like noted scholars, socio-political elites, or cloistered monks, by education or insight of the kind that would qualify them for politico-moral leadership or spiritual self-government. In other words, the term *gumin* 愚民 is more fittingly compared with the medieval *idiota*, meaning simply a “layman” as opposed to a “churchman”, or a “private” person (the Greek *idios* is the Latin *privatus*) as opposed to a “public personality”, than with the modern “idiot”. The conceptual opposite of *gumin* 愚民 is not **kenmin* 賢民 or **tetsumin* 哲民 either, but *kenja* 賢者 or *kenjin* 賢人, an individual set apart by “uncommon” practical wisdom (or worldly circumspection and foresight), or *tetsujin* 哲人, an individual set apart by “uncommon” theoretical acumen (or spiritual mastery).⁵ A similar reading bringing out specific senses in which *min* 民 were conceived of as “common” can be performed on all of these terms.⁶

In other words, the meanings conveyed by these prefixes – *gu* 愚, *ryō* 良, *ban* 萬, *ge* 下, *sei* 生, *jin* 人, *koku* 國 and so on – brought out senses that were seen as *defining* for the meaning of *min* 民 in a common understanding of this morpheme already. Prefixing the morpheme *min* 民 thus performs, in *one* sense, the same function as prefixing “people” with the *definitive* article ‘the’ in English. The mentioned Sino-Japanese prefixes are certainly quite specific in their meanings, whereas the definitive article in English is not. But the latter is *specifying* as well. It emphasizes that the term following it is used in a specific sense associated with it in common, or else a prior usage already.

A decisive difference then is that these Sino-Japanese prefixes work to *reinforce* and *maintain* specific senses associated with the morpheme *min* 民 by explicitly spelling them out. If the senses commonly associated with this morpheme change, some of these terms are, by the same token, bound to disappear. At the same time, coining new terms or shifting the emphasis between them – by changing the way they are set into propositional contexts (including use as translation words for example) – can be effective tools to bring lasting changes in how the *min* 民 are conceived about. Similar effects can be achieved through repeated use of topical adjectives or qualifying phrases in English, such as in the case of

“the little people”, “the good people”, “the common people”, “normal people”, “the American people”, “the people out there”, “people who work for their money”, “the people in front of their television sets” and so on, or by using another expression altogether, such as “the taxpayer”.

The late medieval English term “common” is, needless to add, without historical connection to how the character compounds listed above were formed in Chinese antiquity. Why a translation of *min* 民 as “commoner” or “common people” yet works rather well to bundle a complex variety of meanings associated with this morpheme becomes immediately clear, if one looks at how the English term ‘common’ was morphologically formed instead. The Oxford English Dictionary comments on the etymological derivation of this term as follows:

< Latin *commūnis*. The derivation of the latter is doubtful; ? < *com-* together + *-mūnis* (< *moinis*) bound, under obligation (compare early Latin *mūnis* obliging, ready to be of service, and *immūnis* not under obligation, exempt, etc.); or ? < *com-* together + *unus*, in early Latin *oinos* one. The former conjecture is the more tenable, especially if *com-moinis* was, as some suggest, cognate with Germanic *ga-maini-z*, Old High German *gimeini*, Old English *geméne*, in same sense.

If the former derivation is correct, “community” is the opposite of “immunity” (as in “diplomatic immunity” or “immunity from prosecution”), while “immunity” from a “communicable” disease is a metaphorical usage. “Communication” would, in its most basic sense, denote a process of cooperation rooted in a joint obligedness. And communal rites such as Holy “Communion” would have been socially conceived as symbolic practices reinforcing such a sense of community in the individual, imparting a sense of communal belonging enacted as the joint partaking of a spiritual “body”.

The second etymological derivation recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary as “less tenable” conceives of the term “community” as simply denoting a *collectivity* of individuals looked at “together” (*com-*) as “one” (*unus*). False etymologies are frequently of even greater interest than possibly correct ones, because they reflect what people have been prepared to read into a term on other than linguistic grounds. This second reading of “community” is clearly the one Benedict Anderson, for example, presupposes in his reader. And if this second reading is given a legal meaning as a plurality of actors declared by contractual means to constitute a single person for legal purposes, this understanding shifts into that of a *corporation*. The two etymological derivations above correspond rather strikingly to the two views of a “corporation” that Iwai Katsuhito has suggested to distinguish by the names of “corporate realism” and “corporate nominalism” for a reason. This opposition is generated when a “corporation” is not conceived of as “a corporation” as

originally conceived (under Roman Law as a product of the need to accommodate the legal claims of the Roman Church) at all, but as either a “community” of persons bound up together in socio-economic co-dependency, or as a mere “collectivity” of market-rational or otherwise interest-guided actors instead. Iwai sums up the controversy surrounding this problem as follows:

In this so-called “corporate personality controversy”, one of the most celebrated controversies in legal theory and legal philosophy, two competing legal theories have emerged, each advancing diametrically opposed views on the “essence” of the corporation. They are “corporate nominalism” and “corporate realism”. The corporate nominalism asserts that the corporation is merely a contractual association of shareholders, whose legal personality is no more than an abbreviated way of writing their names together. In opposition, the corporate realism claims that the corporation is a full-fledged organizational entity whose legal personality is no more than an external expression of its real personality in the society. And both claim to have superseded the “fiction theory”, the traditional doctrine since the medieval times, which maintained that the corporation is a separate and distinct social entity but its legal personality is a mere fiction created by the state.⁷

II. *Kokumin* 國民 and *Jinmin* 人民

All of the above terms ending in *min* 民 for “the people” in general, with the exception of one, have fallen out of use today. If “the people” as opposed to “the government” are spoken of today, they are spoken of either as *kokumin* 國民, or as *minshū* 民衆 instead. Or they are not spoken of as “the people” at all, but as “society” (*shakai* 社会) or “citizens” (*shimin* 市民) in the “civil society” (*shimin shakai* 市民社会) sense of that term instead. The term *jinmin* 人民 is used today mostly in historiographic contexts (not least also in *jinmin shuken* 人民主權 for “popular sovereignty”), and in the term *jinmin kyōwakoku* 人民共和国 for “People’s Republic” as the exception that proves the rule. The most frequent application of the term *jinmin* 人民 in Japanese today is in references to the People’s Republic of China (*Chūka jinmin kyōwakoku* 中華人民共和國) and its national currency (*jinmingen* 人民幣).⁸ But during the early Meiji period, the term *jinmin* 人民 was by far the most commonly used when “the people” as opposed to “the government” were under debate.

The great majority of the other terms were still in standard use as well. In *Gakumon no susume* 學問ノススメ (An Advancement of Learning) of 1872-76 and *Bunmeiron no*

gairyaku 文明論之概略 (A Discourse on Civilization in Conceptual Outline) of 1875, Fukuzawa Yukichi uses terms such as *jinmin* 人民, *banmin* 萬民, *heimin* 平民, *shōmin* 小民 (rather than *shomin* 庶民), *kamin* 下民, *domin* 土民, *gumin* 愚民, *ryōmin* 良民, *kokumin* 國民 and *shimin* 四民 in close vicinity to each other. Consider a passage such as the following:

Since the imperial system was renewed (*ōsei hitotabi arata nari shi yori irai* 王制一度新ナリシヨリ以来), the ways of the Japanese government have greatly improved. In foreign affairs, we have regular relations with international law. Internally, the meaning of independence has been explained to the people (*jinmin* 人民), and the use of family names and horse-riding has by now been allowed to commoners (*heimin* 平民). These changes are the most commendable since the founding of the Japanese empire. The basis for making the statuses (*kurai* 位) of samurai (*shi* 士), peasant, craftsman, and merchant, that is the four [kinds of] people (*shimin* 四民), one and the same (*ichiyō* 一樣) was surely laid here.⁹

Before attending to Fukuzawa's use of the terms *jinmin* 人民, *heimin* 平民, and *shimin* 四民 in this passage, two other key terms in it, namely *kurai* 位 and *ichiyō* 一樣, merit a tangent, since the Sino-Japanese characters *i* 位 and *yō* 樣 coincide in meaning rather remarkably with the two senses associated in Latin with the term *status*.

The term *kurai* 位, needless to add, refers to a person's "status" or socio-political "standing" in the socio-politically shared "understanding" of the Tokugawa period, that served "Tokugawa society" – meaning "the Tokugawa state" as opposed to the Tokugawa Shogun's direct or indirect government and administration of the latter – as its constitution. The Sino-Japanese character *i* 位 incidentally exhibits the sense of an individual's "standing" if looked at as an ideograph as well.

But the Latin term *status* had a second meaning overlapping in sense with the morpheme *yō* 樣 or *sama* 様, as present not least in Fukuzawa's use of the term *arisama* 有様 to refer to a "state of being", "state of existence", or "state of things". Fukuzawa very frequently uses this term to refer to the general or overall "condition" in which Japan as represented by its "people" (*jinmin* 人民), in other words: "Japanese society" – Fukuzawa uses terms such as *sejō* 世上 here – would currently find itself. In other words, *arisama* 有様 means *status* or "state" as used in Republican Rome in the expression *status rei publicae* (signifying at times "the state of the republic" and at others one of several "forms of state")¹⁰ or in the United States in expressions such as the "State of the Union".

These two senses of *status* – present in the republican tradition of political thought on one side, and the status distinctions constitutive of "society" in medieval Europe on the

other – combined to form the “modern” concept of “the state” in the Renaissance, most notably in Machiavelli’s conception of *stato* where the socio-political “standing” (*status*) of “the prince” and “the state” (*status*) of his state (*res publica*) are made to coincide – in conceptual remove from any further questions of “principle” as formulated in universal moral or traditional legal terms, which would be brought to bear on this concept again in its subsequent history.

When Fukuzawa seeks to reconceive of the Japanese “people” as *ichiyō* 一樣 (“one and the same”) in socio-political “standing”, he is obviously concerned with the “state” of their “union” as well – in other words: with the question of how these *shimin* 四民 could be turned into a *kokumin* 國民 as a shorthand for *ikkoku no jinmin* 一國ノ人民 (“the people of one nation”). Needless to add, he is not concerned with the state of Japan as a federation of daimyates (*kuni* 國) presided over by a shogun, who is nominally but its “commander in chief” (*shōgun* 將軍). At the time of Fukuzawa’s writing, Japan had been reconstituted as a centralized state divided into prefectures already. What Fukuzawa is concerned with is much rather the “social state” of Japan as represented by its “people” in that sense in which Tocqueville uses the term *état social* to explain what he calls “the spirit” (*esprit*) of “the Americans” (*les Américains*), namely, the union of their individual minds as achieved by a joint outlook on things under the continued “strong hold” (*grand empire*) of a shared Christian conviction transcending doctrinal divisions.¹¹ Tocqueville had borrowed this idea of a “social state” (*état social*) from Guizot’s Lectures on the “History of Civilization in Europe”, which he attended in person.

The same lectures, as is well known, were also to profoundly affect Fukuzawa’s understanding of “state” formation. The idea of a *socially* constituted “state” inscribed into the term *état social* – as opposed to a *politically* and *legally* constituted one but not to the *institutional* “organization” of a state’s government (qua “self-government”) – was basic to Herbert Spencer’s *Social Statics* as well.

The influence of this latter work on Meiji political thought can hardly be overestimated. As Ishida Takeshi has pointed out, it was Matsushima Gō’s translation of this work under the title of *Shakai heiken ron* 社會平權論 (“A Discourse on Society’s Balanced/Equal Power/Rights”) starting in 1881 that established the term *shakai* 社會 as the term representing English “society” in common usage.¹² It was also this text, as Sekiguchi Sumiko has added, in which the phrase *kokumin no dōtoku* 國民ノ道德 first appears, as a translation of Spencer’s “national morality”.¹³

In Chapter XX of this work, “The Constitution of the State”, Herbert Spencer explains (with Matsushima’s Japanese translations [and English translations of these translations] added in brackets):

Whether in any given case a democracy (*kyōwa seiji* 共和政治 [republic]) is practicable, is a question that will always find its own

solution. The physiologist (*seirigakusha* 性理學者 [natural philosopher/psychologist]) shows us that in an animal organism (*oyoso dōbutsu* 凡ソ動物 [in all animals]), the soft parts determine the forms of the hard ones; and it is equally true that in the social organism, the seemingly fixed framework of laws and institutions is moulded by the seemingly forceless thing – character (*seishin* 精神 [spirit]). Social arrangements are the bones to that body (*shakai no kokkaku* 社會ノ骨格 [the skeletal stature of society]), of which the national morality (*kokumin no dōtoku* 國民ノ道德) is the life (*seimei* 性命); and they will grow into free, healthy shapes, or into sickly and cramped ones, according as that morality, that life, is vigorous or otherwise.¹⁴

In the present paper, owing to limitations of space, I will leave the question of the term *shakai* 社會 aside, to focus on conceptions of “the people” as *min* 民 instead. It should yet be noted that what finds a rather striking expression in this passage, is the theme of “corporation” as broached above, from a “corporate realist” point of view that crosses over into “corporeal” terminology.

That state formation requires giving “the people” a “corporate” existence is the one point on which Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau seem perfectly agreed. John Locke writes “Of the Beginning of Political Societies”:

MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community ... When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.¹⁵

But the theme of “corporation” runs like a connecting thread through Fukuzawa’s works as well. Let me trace this theme as it appears in his writings in very brief outline only.

In his translation of *Chamber’s Political Economy* added as an “Outside Volume” (*gaihen* 外編) to his *Seiyō jijō* 西洋事情 in 1868, Fukuzawa coins the term *shimin* 市民 (now used to render “civil society” as *shimin shakai* 市民社会) to translate the English terms “municipality” and “municipal corporations” as *shimin kaidō* 市民會同. Consider the following sentence:

Independent municipal corporations (*shimin no kaidō* 市民ノ會同), thus placed in the various provincial towns, form an important element in civil society (*sejō kōsai no kihon* 世上交際ノ基本).¹⁶

The Latin term *municeps* derives, like “common”, from the Latin *munis*. It refers to “a citizen” who accepts or “takes” (*-cipere < capere*) communal “obligations” upon himself. In the translation as *shimin* 市民 this meaning is supported by the morpheme *min*. The morpheme *shi* 市, on the other hand, would here seem to denote less a municipality (introducing a term like *chōmin* 町民 on the model of *sonmin* 村民 would have made more sense in this case), but a sense of “market” (*shi* 市) instead, as one form in which collective decision-making in a “corporate” body can be organized. Fukuzawa’s choice of the character *shi* 市 over a character like *chō* 町 is certainly in line with the emphasis placed by John Hill Burton as this book’s anonymous author on “society as a competitive system”, and his choice of the City of London as the prototype of a “municipal corporation” (serving as a blueprint for “civil society” in the larger sense) in the preceding paragraph.

It is also the concept of “corporation” Fukuzawa had in mind, when he explained the meaning of “civil society” in terms of the constitution of a *kaisha* 會社 in *Gakumon no susume* 學問ノススメ.¹⁷ The term *kaisha* 會社 had established itself as a translation word for “corporation” by that time. In introducing his subject in *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* 文明論之概略, on the other hand, Fukuzawa appears concerned with “corporation” as an ongoing developmental process instead:

文明論トハ人ノ精神發達ノ議論ナリ。其趣意ハ一人ノ精神發達ヲ論ズルニ非ズ、天下衆人ノ精神發達ヲ一体ニ集メテ、其一体ノ發達ヲ論ズルモノナリ。

“Discourse on civilization” means discussion of the spiritual development of men. Its main purport is not to debate the spiritual development of an individual, but to discuss the spiritual development of the multitudes throughout the realm gathered into a single entity, and the development of that single body.¹⁸

In his *Teishitsuron* 帝室論 (On the Imperial House) of 1882 finally, under the added influence of Walter Bagehot, Fukuzawa assigned the “corporate spirit” (*seishin* 精神) of the Japanese “people” (*jinmin* 人民) as a “nation” (*kokumin* 國民) a bodily presence in the Imperial House, while emphasizing a strict separation between the latter and the “corporate body” (*keintai* 形体) of “the people” at the same time: “Our Imperial House is the center that gathers and holds together the minds [or spirit] of the Japanese people” (*Waga teishitsu wa Nihon jinmin no seishin o shūran suru chūshin nari* 我帝室ハ日本人民ノ精神ヲ収攬スル中心ナリ).¹⁹ “[The Imperial House] does not touch upon the body of the nation

directly, but gathers together and holds its spirit” (*Chokusetsu ni kokumin no keitai ni furezu shite, sono seishin o shūran shitamau mono nari* 直接ニ國民ノ形体ニ觸レズシテ、其精神ヲ収攬シ給フモノナリ).²⁰

Matsushima Gō's translation of Chapter XX of *Social Statics* was published in December of 1881. There may be no more succinct illustration for why the early Meiji movement for “people’s rights” (*minken* 民權) collapsed so quickly under the double blow of the announcement of an Imperial Constitution to be worked out behind closed government doors and the theoretical attacks by Katō Hiroyuki on the idea of “human rights” in the same year – than the following item in the List of Errata inserted by Matsushima at that Chapter’s beginning:

總目次 國家ノ憲法ハ國家ノ組織

In the General Table of Contents (*Sōmokuji* 總目次) published with the first volume of his translation in June 1881, Matsushima had rendered the title of Chapter XX, “The Constitution of the State” as *Kokka no kenpō* 國家ノ憲法 (“The Constitution of the State”). But by the time his translation work had reached that Chapter, he changed the term *kenpō* 憲法 (Constitution) to *soshiki* 組織 (organization). Matsushima had initially assumed that Spencer was writing about a written document or “charter”. But what Spencer meant by “constitution” was quite obviously, since emphatically, an “organization” in the “corporate” or even “corporeal” sense of that term instead.

The reason why Fukuzawa uses so many terms for “the people” at the same time is that they do not mean the same. The terms used by Fukuzawa in the initial quote above – *jinmin* 人民, *heimin* 平民, and *shimin* 市民, all have the same conceptual *intension* insofar as they conceive of the set of their referents as the joint constituents of “the people” as a “common” existence. But they clearly do not have the same conceptual *extension*.

The term *shimin* 四民 explicitly includes the *shi* 士 as *shimin* 士民. And if the “four [kinds of] people” (*shimin* 四民) are made “one and the same” (*ichiyō* 一樣), all four of them become “equally” *heimin* 平民. But the “commoners” (*heimin* 平民) were defined in conceptual opposition to the *shi* 士 (the *samurai* as socially qualified for government service) to begin with. It is also not clear from this sentence alone whether “the people” (*jinmin* 人民) who, according to Fukuzawa, have finally been taught the meaning of “independence” (*dokuritsu* 獨立), are only *heimin* 平民, or include large sections of the *shi* 士 as well.

Even more important in this context is Fukuzawa’s use of terms such as *ryōmin* 良民 and *gumin* 愚民. The term *gumin* 愚民 (“the people” as “the commonly unlearned people”) clearly has a different *intension* than *ryōmin* 良民 (“the people” as “the commonly good people”). But the conceptual *extension* of these terms as simply referring to “the people” or “common people” would in classical usage, as argued above, have been the

same. In the premodern understanding of these terms, “unlearned” and “good-natured” were not conceived of as mutually exclusive attributes in people – at least if the question is confined merely to the ideo-logical import of these terms here, and the question of how “common people” were perceived or treated by local government authorities in Tokugawa times in historical fact is left aside. In Fukuzawa’s use of these terms, however, this begins to change. Fukuzawa opposes *gumin* 愚民 (“unlearned people”) and *ryōmin* 良民 (“good people”) as different kinds of “people” (*jinmin* 人民) to each other.

There are no men more pitiable and despicable than the ignorant (*muchi* 無知) and illiterate (*monmō* 文盲). And the height of ignorance (*chie naki no kyoku* 知恵ナキノ極) is to be shameless.... The method of rational persuasion is useless to control such unwise people (*gumin o shihai suru* 愚民ヲ支配スルニ). The government is forced to use power to intimidate them. It is because of this that a Western proverb says that there must be a harsh government over unwise people (*gumin* 愚民). It is not that the government is harsh; the unwise people have invited this misfortune upon themselves. Conversely, there should be good government over good people (*ryōmin* 良民).²¹

It is probably safe to assume that the “Western proverb” (*Seiyō no kotowaza* 西洋ノ諺) Fukuzawa had in mind here is: “The people get the government they deserve”. This quote has been variously misattributed to Alexis de Tocqueville, Thomas Jefferson, and Herbert Spencer. It is not known in what context, and what version, it had come to Fukuzawa’s attention. The prefatory “In a democracy ...”, frequently accompanying its possibly later pseudo-Tocquevillian rendition, in any case, is missing. But by whatever detours it may have found its way into the opening chapter of *Gakumon no susume* 學問ノススメ, this quote is owed to Joseph de Maistre. De Maistre wrote from St. Petersburg in 1811: *Toute nation a le gouvernement qu’elle merite*, to underline his conviction that political reforms of the kind pursued by Tsar Alexander I were misplaced in a “nation” such as Russia.

There is a major irony behind the habitual misattribution of this quote, but I will not pursue it here. Suffice it to note that the variation between its different versions – starting either with “Every people” or with “Every nation” – does not affect its sense. Fukuzawa was clearly using the terms *gumin* 愚民 and *ryōmin* 良民 to denote different kinds of nations or peoples, and not different kinds of *individuals* here. Otherwise the implied opposition of *a* people (*jinmin* 人民) to *its* government (*seifu* 政府) would not have worked.

Or, to be more precise, Fukuzawa is using the terms *gumin* 愚民 and *ryōmin* 良民 to refer to the individual constituents of “a people” (*jinmin* 人民) or “a nation” (*ikkoku* 一國), at the same time that he is not. Consider an individual who is willed to transform himself

from a *gujin* 愚人 into a *ryōjin* 良人. Assuming that he remains a constituent of “the people” (*jinmin* 人民) to whom common laws apply (as opposed to entering government service and being rewarded with privileges for that reason), would this person still have the government it deserves, if that government operates on the maxim that “there must be a harsh government over unwise people (*gumin* 愚民)” and if not all “people” (*min* 民) have transformed themselves into *ryōmin* 良民 at the same time? While Fukuzawa invests the terms *gumin* 愚民 and *ryōmin* 良民 with different meanings, their conceptual extension in *synchronic* terms is still “the people” as a whole. Fukuzawa opposes them to each other in *diachronic* terms of historical progress on a *national* scale.

Business between people (*jinkan no jigyō* 人間ノ事業) is not solely the government’s responsibility (*seifu no nin* 政府ノ任). Scholars and merchants also have their jobs to do, as scholars and merchants. The government is the government of Japan; and the people (*jinmin* 人民) are the people of Japan. If the people are shown that they can approach the government without fear and suspicion, they will gradually become clear about where they are headed, and the ingrained spirits of despotism and subservience of the government and the people (*jōge koyū no kifū* 上下固有ノ氣風) will gradually disappear. For the first time *shin no Nihon kokumin* 真ノ日本國民 [true Japanese citizens/a truly Japanese people/a true Japanese nation] will be produced who will be a stimulus to the government instead of its plaything.²²

Fukuzawa’s use of the term *kokumin* 國民 oscillates in meaning between the possibility of a singular and a plural reading. Consider his famous words:

In order to advance the civilization (*bunmei* 文明) of our nation (*waga kuni* 我國), it is necessary, first of all, to sweep away that old spirit (*kifū* 氣風) that permeates people’s minds (*jinshin* 人心). But it can be swept away by neither government decree nor private admonition. Some people must take the lead in doing things in order to show the people where their aims should lie. We cannot look to the farmers, the merchants, or scholars of Japanese or Chinese learning to personify these aims. The scholars of Western learning must fill this role.

... At the present time, most of this kind of scholars of Western learning have entered government service... Because they have become intoxicated with the spirit of the world (*yo no jinshin* 世ノ人心), they are unaware how contemptible their conduct is... No one has the sincerity of mind to be independent...

Newspapers being published at the present time, and various memorials, also illustrate this trend. ... That their insincerity reaches such extremes is due to there being no precedent for public advocacy of people's rights (*minken* 民權). They are ruled by a spirit of subservience. And resonating that spirit, they are incapable of showing the true colors (*honshoku* 本色) of *kokumin* 國民 (a citizen/citizens). It may well be said that in Japan there is only a government, but there are/is as yet no *kokumin* 國民 (citizens/people).²³

That Fukuzawa was using the term *kokumin* 國民 not least as a translation of the English "citizen" here, becomes clear if one compares his text with Francis Wayland's *Elements of Moral Science*, on which many of the passages addressing the question of *kokumin* 國民 in *Gakumon no susume* 學問ノススメ are based.²⁴ But the term *kokumin* 國民 still remains a term used to refer to "the people" as a whole in Japanese. And while *min* 民, as opposed to "the people" in English, can be read as a singular as well, it indicates a person on the receiving end of government.

Nonetheless, Fukuzawa's above usage subjected the term *kokumin* 國民 to fundamental conceptual change, in a similar manner as the terms *gumin* 愚民 and *ryōmin* 良民 discussed above. The premodern terms for "the people" ending in *min* 民 all represented different ways of conceiving of *min* 民, that is "common people" or "commoners" as such. In Fukuzawa's usage of the above terms, however, this is no longer the case. These terms now present different conceptions of *jinmin* 人民 – that is "the people" as opposed to "the government" – instead. The prefixes *gu* 愚 and *ryō* 良 thus cease to signify a sense of "common" as opposed to "uncommon", to signify the distinguishing quality of a "people" as composed of separate "persons" (*jin* 人) – or *kojin* 個人 in Fukuzawa's sense of "individual" – instead.

The term *kokumin* 國民 thus does not mean simply *kuni no tami* 國ノ民, that is "the people" populating a given "state" or "domain" (*kuni* 國) as its "populace" any longer. Nor does it mean *kokka jinmin* 國家人民 as understood for example by Uesugi Yōzan in the later Tokugawa period. In the latter case, a Mencian sense of *jinmin* 人民 prevails, where *jinmin* 人民 is not understood in a sense of "the people" as strictly opposed to "the government" (*seifu* 政府), but rather used to conceive of 民 MIN (as "the people" who are subject to government) in a certain way, namely as "human beings", and also as "human capital". The locus classicus for the term *jinmin* 人民 in *Mencius* is as follows:

孟子曰、諸侯之寶三、土地、人民、政事。寶珠玉者、殃必及身。
Mencius said, "The precious things of a prince are three: the territory, the people, the government and its business. If one value as most precious pearls and jade, calamity is sure to befall him".

Fukuzawa's repeated use of the phrases *ikkoku no jinmin* 一國ノ人民 and *kokuchū no jinmin* 國中ノ人民 throughout his texts, on the other hand, has amply prepared his reader to see in *kokumin* 國民 a shorthand for either of these two expressions.

However, *kokuchū* 國中ノ人民 and *ikkoku no jinmin* 一國ノ人民 do not signify the same. These expressions look at the intended *kokumin* 國民 in two different ways, namely as individuals or "citizens" dispersed throughout the "country" or "nation" on the one hand, and as a joint existence as "the citizenry" or a "nation" on the other. The terms *ikkoku* 一國 and *kuni* 國 served as Fukuzawa's translations for "nation" in *Gakumon no susume* 學問ノススメ, as seen not least in his use of *ikkoku no dokuritsu* 一國ノ獨立 to denote "national independence".

These different ways of looking at "the people" as a "body politic" correspond precisely to the two different ways of looking at a "corporation" thematized as "corporate nominalism" and "corporate realism" in the terms proposed by Katsuhito Iwai above. But "corporate nominalism" and "corporate realism" also share a common ground in that both result from a refusal to understand "corporation" as constituted in fact by a jointly maintained fiction sustained by either legal or sociopolitical means – in other words, to consider the possibility that the people do not and cannot exist in an actual *reality* as "the people" to begin with. Either of these two viewpoints can maintain an appearance of logical coherence only if they are constantly flipped onto their opposite sides. And this is most effectively achieved using a single term in an oscillating sense. In English, the term "society" fulfills that purpose – for example in the writings of John Stuart Mill, where "society" refers both to a totality conceptually opposed to the individual and to all individuals in their totality as such.²⁵

III. *Kokumin* 國民 and *Kokujin* 國人

I will not argue this point here, but I would go as far as to suggest that this logical co-dependency of "corporate realism" and "corporate nominalism" is behind the currency of the term "materialism" (originally formulated as a charge against both Hobbes and Descartes) as well. How else can the paradoxical fact be explained that the label "materialist" attaches to an insistence that subjects such as a "spirit" of enterprise (engaged in business with an "invisible hand"), or "class consciousness" (as overruling individual perception), or "phenomenal experience" (as transcending individual understanding) be recognized as *existential realities* in their own right and name, and discussed in separation from – because subsuming under themselves – the *physical existence* of individual persons?

Consider the well known reference contained in *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* 文明論之概略 back to the above quoted passage in *Gakumon no susume* 學問ノススメ from the viewpoint of the question of "corporation" as well:

Therefore, one might even say that Japan has never been a nation (*kuni* 國). If today an incident should break out which pitted the people throughout the Japanese nation (*Nihon kokuchū no jinmin* 日本國中ノ人民) against a foreign nation (*gaikoku* 外國), even if the whole Japanese populace took up arms and went to the front, we could calculate in advance how many would actually be interested in fighting and how many would be spectators. This is precisely what I meant when I once took the position that in Japan there is a government (*seifu* 政府) but there are/is no *kokumin* 國民 (*nēshon* ネーション).²⁶

It is widely taken for granted that the pre-existing term *kokumin* 國民 changed its sense to “nation” in the early Meiji period, as ultimately expressed by the fact that Fukuzawa added the English term “nation” in phonetic transcription in brackets to this Sino-Japanese term in the above passage. Thus it has become common to discuss the Meiji state as a *kokumin kokka* 国民国家, frequently with the English reading “nation-state” (*nēshon sutēto* ネーション・ステート) attached lest the meaning of the Japanese be misunderstood, or to rely on the Anglo-Japanese and supposedly untranslatable term *nashonarizumu* ナシヨナリズム to name the historical momentum behind the “Meiji Renovation” (*Meiji ishin* 明治維新) during a time in history when “Japan” acted as a proto-nation state (*puroto kokumin kokka* プロト国民国家) already, but was no “nation-state” (*kokumin kokka* 国民国家) yet.²⁷ But with one exception, to which I shall return, I have never seen the term *kokumin kokka* 國民國家 used in a Meiji text. If the Meiji state was a *kokumin kokka* 國民國家, the people of the Meiji period, not excluding their political leaders and state theorists, must have missed that fact, to mistake their state by terms such as *teikoku* 帝國, *kokutai* 國體, or *kazoku kokka* 家族國家 instead.

But was *kokumin* 國民 really a translation of “nation”? And has it ever been? Is it not rather the other way round? When Fukuzawa added the English term “nation” to the term *kokumin* 國民 in brackets in his *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* 文明論之概, was he not translating the Sino-Japanese term *kokumin* 國民 into the English term “nation” instead to begin with, in order to shift the understanding of this Sino-Japanese term in some sort of “English” direction?

Even if Fukuzawa’s reader should have had no idea what that strange looking, and decidedly not Japanese word *nēshon* ネーション signified, that reader would still have understood that *kokumin* 國民 in this instance was supposed to signify something else than it does normally in Japanese, something that represented a more “civilized” understanding of what “the people” of a country were supposed to be than readily intelligible to Japanese in their present “state” (*arisama* 有様) of national development. Otherwise, translating this term into English for the benefit of a Japanese reader would have made no recognizable

sense to begin with.

But before asking why Fukuzawa added this English term here, let me pose the question the other way round. Why would he have translated the English “nation” into Japanese as *kokumin* 國民, if “nation” in the sense indicated by the context given was what he wanted to convey. Other choices would have been available to him. Consider how the term ‘Nation’ was rendered by Hori Tatsukichi in his *Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language* published in 1862:

Nation 人民 國人

The idea that the Japanese of the Tokugawa period had no notion of themselves as inhabiting “Japan” as a country (*kuni* 國) with an identity of its own, as opposed to their own respective domain or province (*kuni* 國), has been shown as thoroughly mistaken by Watanabe Hiroshi.²⁸ But is it not the case that the term *kokumin* 國民 did not refer to people either from a given province or from Japan from an outside perspective to begin with? In this case, as evidenced also by the above dictionary entry, the term *kokujin* 國人 would have been the natural choice – just as “Japanese” are not **Nihonmin* 日本民 but *Nihonjin* 日本人. If one wants to conceive of “the Japanese” explicitly as *min* 民, one is bound to speak of *Nihon kokumin* 日本国民, *Nihon minshū* 日本民衆 or *Yamato minzoku* 日本民族 instead, depending on the political message one wants to convey.

The term *kokujin* 國人 would have suggested itself for another reason, namely its prior usage to denote not *tami* 民, as those on the receiving end of government, but individuals of elevated socio-economic standing, such as landholders, local power holders, or daimyō, who are the socio-political actors in negotiating and maintaining a socio-political order. In other words, *kokujin* 國人 was a term applied to that socio-economic stratum that would correspond most closely to the “freemen” or *homini liberi* in European history, who self-consciously opposed themselves to “slaves”, “villains” (being “villagers”), or “serfs”.²⁹

It was precisely not a socioeconomic elite of landed property holders on whom Fukuzawa called to defend their country:

[S]ince ancient times there have been wars in Japan... From their names you would supposed that they were wars between provinces, but this is not true. They were only wars between the warriors of different provinces; the common people had no part in them at all. Essentially, enemy countries class as wholes, involving the total consciousness of the people in each country, so that even though not everyone bears arms, the hopes and prayers of all are for the victory of their own country and the downfall of the other, and no one on either side forgets who is the enemy.

The patriotism of the people is stirred up at such a time. However, in the wars within Japan such a thing has never happened since ancient time... When the warriors of two houses clashed in battle, the common people merely looked on as spectators; friend of foe made no difference, they only feared whoever was stronger... Only if the regulation of the lord happened to be more lenient and he lightened their land tax burdens would they look up to and extol him.³⁰

But precisely Fukuzawa wanted to extend a permanent readiness to engage in warfare from sociopolitical elites with personal stakes in winning or losing a military conflict to the entire population purely in terms of personal and national honor, and not in terms of what was actually gained from fighting, the term *kokujin* 國人 would have made more sense, because it is the morpheme *jin* 人 and not the morpheme *min* 民 to which connotations of individual valor attach. And given the socio-economic changes evident since the late Middle Ages, the term *kokujin* 國人 has come to refer to all “Japanese” simply as a predicate for being Japanese, that is, “individuals” (*jin* 人) belonging to or being from Japan as a “state” or “nation” (*kuni* 国) today. It carried that sense in the Meiji period, as seen in Fukuzawa’s own writings, already.

Fukuzawa is clearly using *kokumin* 國民 as a shorthand for *kokuchū no jinmin* 國中ノ人民 in the above quote, but *kokujin* 國人 would have worked as such a shorthand just as well – and, as one might argue, better. The morphemes 人 JIN and 民 MIN clearly do not mean the same also in their Classical Chinese usage. Consider their use in *Mencius*:

曰：「使之主祭而百神享之、是天受之；使之主事而事治、百姓安之、是民受之也。天與之、人與之、... 《太誓》曰：『天視自我民視、天聽自我民聽』、此之謂也。

Mencius replied, ‘[Yao] caused [Shun] to preside over the sacrifices, and all the spirits were well pleased with them; thus Heaven accepted him. He caused him to preside over the conduct of affairs, and affairs were well administered, so that the people reposed under him; thus the people accepted him. Heaven gave the throne to him. The people gave it to him ... This sentiment is expressed in the words of The Great Declaration: ‘Heaven sees according as my people see; Heaven hears according as my people hear’.

Where Legge uses the same term “people” in his English translation, the original distinguishes between different concepts. It introduces “the people” as 百姓 HYAKUSEI at first, that is the socio-economic substratum organized along oiko-nomic lines, only to refer to 民 MIN on the one hand, and 人 JIN on the other then. 民 MIN and 人 JIN are

correlated with different predicates. The term 民 MIN is used in the phrase “the people accepted him” (民受之), while 人 JIN appears in the phrase “the people gave it to him” (人與之), with “Heaven gave [the throne] to him” (天與之) mediating between them.

Several scholars have suggested that 人 JIN and 民 MIN must have represented different groups of “people” in ancient China.³¹ For the purposes of the present inquiry concerning only the semantic import of these terms in Tokugawa and early Meiji Japan, the answer to that question is irrelevant. It appears to be clear that *jin* 人 were conceived of as the sociopolitical agents, and 民 MIN as the sociopolitical patients on the receiving end of government, whose activity was assigned to the economic realm. This does not preclude that one and the same person could be referred to under both aspects, as when a *shōnin* 商人 is conceived of as a *heimin* 平民.

Fukuzawa uses the term *kokumin* 國民 as an equivalent for “nation” (*nēshon* ネーション) certainly not least because he is referring back to the passage in *Gakumon no susume* 學問ノススメ discussed above. But Fukuzawa had not added the term *nēshon* ネーション in brackets then. And the meaning read into the term *kokumin* 國民 by the passage in *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* 文明論之概略 is quite different from the meaning that the earlier passage in *Gakumon no susume* 學問ノススメ had conveyed. If Fukuzawa had seen a need to add an English term in brackets then – to emphasize a reading of this term as referring to a “body politic” formed by citizens rather than “citizens” individually and severally – the English term “society” or “civil society” would have presented a much better fit.

In that earlier quote, Fukuzawa opposes “the people” and “the government” to each other as different (“corporate”) actors in their own names. But in the case of a “national war” – as opposed to a “civil war” or a revolutionary “uprising” – such a conceptual opposition is quite obviously not possible. It is not likely that Fukuzawa was hoping for Japanese *kokumin* 國民 to engage in military actions in the name of “Japan” prompted by feelings of personal and national “honor” on the model of the “men of high spirit” (*shishi* 志士) who engaged in military action under the slogan “Revere the Emperor and Expel the Barbarians” (*sonnō jōi* 尊皇攘夷) in response to the arrival of Commodore Perry. He is using the term *kokumin* 國民 rather than *okujin* 國人 for precisely that reason. A *shin no Nihon kokumin* 真ノ日本國民 does not engage in military action against other nations on his own whim, undercutting his government’s foreign policy. He rather waits until he is drafted, and as a soldier executes orders.

It is not that Fukuzawa would not have placed a strong emphasis on “national independence” in *Gakumon no susume* 學問ノススメ as well. To the contrary:

Again freedom and independence (*jiyū dokuritsu* 自由獨立) refer not only to the individual person (*hito no isshin* 人ノ一身), but to the nation (*ikkoku* 一國) as well... We should associate (*kō o musubi* 交ヲ結び)

with one another following the laws of Heaven and the Way of humanity (*Tenri jindō* 天理人道). Such an attitude implies acknowledging one's guilt even before the black slaves of Africa, because of reason (*ri no tame ni* 理ノタメニ). But it also means not being afraid of even the warships of England and America, because of principle (*michi no tame ni* 道ノタメニ). It further implies, that if this nation (*kuni* 國) is disgraced, every single individual of the people throughout the country (*kokuchū no jinmin ichinin mo* 國中ノ人民一人モ) must sacrifice his live to prevent the disgrace of her prestige and glory. That is what is called the freedom and independence of a nation (*ikkoku no jiyū dokuritsu* 一國ノ自由獨立).³²

But in this passage, a sense of “universal morality” (as supported not least by the Confucian connotations of the term *bunmei* 文明 chosen by Fukuzawa as his translation for “civilization”)³³ is still emphasized at the same time, whereas in the latter passage only a sense of “national morality” and of *bu* 武 (as in *bushidō* 武士道 as declared by Nitobe Inazō “the soul of Japan” two and a half decades later) appears to remain. If Fukuzawa had called in *Gakumon no susume* 學問ノススメ on the Japanese as *gumin* 愚民 to educate themselves into *ryōmin* 良民, in the above passage of *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* 文明論之概略 he seems to call on them as Confucian *shōjin* 小人 to translate themselves into Republican “minute-men”.

But ‘minute-men’ is not the term attached by Fukuzawa to *kokumin* 國民 in brackets either. Fukuzawa writes “nation” there – obviously to elicit a sense of “United we stand” or *Okuchō ishin* 億兆一心. There is another term that would have offered itself for that purpose, namely *kokutai* 國體・國体. This is the very term that was used to render a sense of “nation” – as defined not only in terms of military preparedness, but also of a nation-specific “ancient constitution” (in this case of Japan) – in subsequent Meiji usage. Fukuzawa uses this term in *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* 文明論之概略 as well, but only in the latter sense, namely as the nation-specific constitution of a state. The point of his use of the English term “nation” as *nēshon* ネーション may thus have been not least to refer his reader to the nation-specific constitution of *another* state, namely England as having preserved the “ancient constitution” of “the West”.

In the course of his discussion of *kokutai* 國體・國体 as a concept, Fukuzawa rather deposits the English term “nationality” in phonetic transcription in his text.³⁴ I will return to that point. But this quite obviously creates a conceptual problem as well. The English term “nationality” refers to a quality or “essence”, while the term *kokutai* 國體・國体 refers to a “body” as a quiddity or “substance” (*tai* 體・体). Consider the entries for “National” and “Nationality” found in the *Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language* of 1862 as well:

National	人民ノ 民間ノ 一般ノ
Nationality	民性 民情 民生

Clearly, it is a sense of *minsei* 民性 (*min-hood*) that a reader will find in the term *kokumin* 國民, but not in the terms *kokujin* 國人 or *kokutai* 國體・國体 instead. In one possible reading, this would stress a sense of communal engagement, carrying the sense of “commoner” from a local to the “national” level. This is the understanding of “nation” as an “imagined community” suggested by Benedict Anderson.

However, Fukuzawa could have arrived at this reading from the other sense defining for the meaning of *min* 民 as well – that is the sense in which a *min* 民 is opposed, in terms of European history, as a “villain” or “serf” to a “freeman”. The fact that Fukuzawa suddenly added the English term “nation” in brackets behind *kokumin* 國民 may well be owed to his reading of a text in the meantime, in which the English “nation” is explained in precisely such terms. Such a text is Guizot’s *General History of Civilisation in Europe: From the fall of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution*, which Fukuzawa had not only recently read in the English translation given below, but that had also served as a blueprint for his account of the history of “Western civilization” in the preceding chapter of *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* 文明論之概略:

One short observation before we reply. Both the Possessor of the fief and the priest, it is true, formed part of a general society; in the distance they had numerous and frequent connections; not so the cultivators – the serfs. Every time that, in speaking of the population of the country at this period, we make use of some general term, which seems to convey the idea of one single and same society – such for example as the word people – we speak without truth. For this population there was no general society – its existence was purely local. Beyond the estate in which they dwelt, the serfs had no relations whatever, – no connection either with persons, things, or government. For them there existed no common destiny, no common country – they formed not a nation.³⁵

Is it not possible that this passage reverberated in Fukuzawa’s mind as he was inserting the term *nēshon* ネーション into his Japanese text? Considered in these terms, Fukuzawa’s *jinmin* 人民 would have corresponded to Guizot’s “cultivators – the serfs” as opposed to “the possessor of the fief”. But in order to become “a nation”, Fukuzawa’s *jinmin* 人民 would have had to identify their own “common” interest and “destiny” as that of “the possessor of the fief” himself. In the place of the latter as a person, they would have had to regard this “fief” their own as constitutive members of a *corporation*. In other words, a “nation” (*nēshon* ネーション) would have to step into the place of individual “property

holders” or *kokujin* 國人. And this “nation” (*nēshon* ネーション) would have to be constituted as their *national* “corporation” (or *kokutai* 國體・國体), so to speak, by themselves as *kokumin* 國民. This reading would find support in how Fukuzawa conceived of the subject of his *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* 文明論之概略 in its first sentences quoted above already, and also in his attempt in *Gakumon no susume* 學問ノススメ to conceive of the constitution of a “civil society” in terms of a *kaisha* 會社. Guizot’s account of the formation of “nationality” in France was as follows:

Thus the nationality of France began to be formed. Down to the reign of the house of Valois, the feudal character prevailed in France; a French nation, a French spirit, French patriotism, as yet had no existence. With the princes of the house of Valois begins the history of France, properly so called. It was in the course of their wars, amid the various turns of their fortune, that, for the first time, the nobility, the citizens, the peasants, were united by a moral tie, by the tie of a common name, a common honour, and by one burning desire to overcome the foreign invader.³⁶

IV. *Kokumin* 國民 and *Minzoku* 民族

In *Gakumon no susume* 學問ノススメ, Fukuzawa addressed “the people”, as they exited the Tokugawa period, as *shimin* 四民 (the *four* kinds of people). But he used the term *sanmin* 三民 (the *three* kinds of people) as well, to thematize the “common people” (*heimin* 平民) in contradistinction to “the samurai” (*shizoku* 士族). In other words, he takes the “samurai” as *shimin* 士民 out of the “four *min* 民”, to now conceptually oppose them as “the samurai” (*shizoku* 士族) to the remaining “three *min* 民”:

Looking back upon the developments of recent times, we see that the three [kinds of] people (*sanmin* 三民) [peasants, craftsmen, and merchants] have risen in dignity a hundred times over their former statuses, and have gradually reached a point of standing on equal terms with the samurai (*shizoku* 士族).³⁷

Consider this conceptual encounter of *min* 民 and *zoku* 族 with a view to the term *minzoku* 民族. This term denotes “a people” or “a nation” predominantly in the “ethnic” sense in Japanese today. The Wilsonian principle of “national self-determination”, for example, is being rendered as *minzoku jiketsu* 民族自決 by this term. And Guizot’s “moral tie” that forms the “nationality” required for “the people” to form “a nation” is spelled out in *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* 文明論之概略 in English as well, with precisely the Great Way

(*daidō* 大道) of “the samurai” (*shizoku* 士族) serving as his illustration:

The samurai’s status, the honor of his house, and his lord (*shujin* 主人) was the Great Way (*daidō* 大道) on which the samurai (*shizoku* 士族) had to rely and the bond (*tsuna* 綱) binding their conduct through life. In Western terminology, it was a “moral tie”.³⁸

The samurai are referred to as *shizoku* 士族 here as well. If Fukuzawa was concerned to morally tie the “common people” (*heimin* 平民 qua *sanmin* 三民) into a “nation” (*nēshon* ネーション) on the model of the “moral tie” that provided the *shizoku* 士族 with “a common honor”, at the same time that the suffix *zoku* 族 provided them with “a common name”, would not the term *minzoku* 民族 have worked as well, or even better than *kokumin* 國民, as a translation of “nation” in the sense Guizot was giving to that term? Before considering that question, let us place that “other” term in contexts in which it is actually found in early Meiji Japan, and ask what Fukuzawa understood this term to mean in turn.

As Kevin Doack, pursuing a reference by Yasuda Hiroshi,³⁹ has pointed out, an early appearance of the term *minzoku* 民族 is contained in the Japanese adaptation of Alexandre Dumas’ *Ange Pitou* or *Taking the Bastille* published under the title *Furansu kakumeiki: Jiyū no kachidoki* 佛蘭西革命記 自由乃凱歌 (“A Memoir of the French Revolution: The Battle Cry of Liberty”) by Miyazaki Muryū in the *Jiyū shinbun* 自由新聞 from 1882 to 1883. Published in book form in 1883 as well, this political novel was not only the most widely read, frequently in the form of communal recitals, but also set into direct relation to contemporary popular uprisings such as the Fukushima Incident.⁴⁰ Doack writes:

Miyazaki’s innovation was genuine and powerful. While Miyazaki ... often employed the more neutral *jinmin* [人民] (read as *tami*) for people, he went beyond this general concept of the people to make an original and important contribution to nationalist discourse in translating Dumas’ ‘assemblée nationale’ as *minzoku kaigi* [民族會議].⁴¹

Doack suggests that Miyazaki may have coined this term in opposition to “the new class of Peers, or *kazoku* [華族], that were being institutionalized in the early 1880s” in Japan, in other words “that Miyazaki sought to frame a concept of the national people as *min-zoku* (民—族) in opposition to *ka-zoku* (華—族), and he found this concept in Dumas’ Third Estate”.

This interpretation is very farfetched. If Miyazaki had wanted to “frame a new concept” and “make an important contribution to nationalist discourse”, he would have had to use

this term more often than only once in passing – as opposed to referring to “the people” throughout as *jinmin* 人民, with several important exceptions where they are addressed as *kunitami* 國民 instead. And the intended reading of *jinmin* 人民 is clearly not *tami*. Not only would this have ruined the point of using this Mencian-connoted compound (as opposed to simply *tami* 民, which occurs as a separate term in Miyazaki’s text as well), but also because the furigana reading *jinmin* is explicitly given.

Miyazaki also does not render the French “nobility” as *kazoku* 華族, which would have made more sense, had his concern primarily been to suggest a parallel. He renders the English “nobility” as *kizoku* 貴族 instead, not least just one line earlier in conjunction with the clergy (*sōryo* 僧侶) as *sōryo kizoku* 僧侶貴族.⁴² Miyazaki clearly conceived of *minzoku* 民族 in conceptual opposition to *kizoku* 貴族.

But why would Miyazaki have chosen this term as a translation of “National”? There are two ways in which this character compound can be read, that are not mutually exclusive. The reason for this is simple. One can conceive of the morpheme *zoku* 族 either in terms of what it excludes, or in terms of what it includes. This is not too different from the term ‘common’, which can be construed to include all “people” in a shared existence, or applied to people considered “common” (as opposed to “noble” or invested with “spiritual” clout) instead.

If *minzoku* 民族 is set in opposition to *kizoku sōryo* 貴族僧侶 (the nobility and the clergy), it thus includes a reference to the Third Estate in pre-revolutionary France. The Third Estate, after all, was comprised not only of *citoyens*, but “the people” in general. In Diderot’s *Encyclopédie*, for example, it is spelled out as “le tiers-état ou troisième ordre, composé des magistrats municipaux, des notables bourgeois, & du peuple.” There is an important reason though, why Miyazaki could not have intended this reading primarily. He clearly uses the term *minzoku kaigi* 民族會議 to convey the sense of “National Assembly”, and not a sense of “the Assembly of the Third Estate” as such and alone. But that said, it was the Third Estate who proclaimed itself to represent “the Nation” in changing the name of its Assembly to “National Assembly”. Consider the corresponding passage in the English version of Dumas’ work:

On Wednesday, the 10th of June, Sieyès entered the assembly. He found it almost entirely composed of the Tiers État.

The clergy and nobility were assembled elsewhere.

‘Let us cut the cable’, said Sieyès. ‘It is now time’. [...]

A German and Swiss army surrounded Versailles. A battery of artillery was pointed at the assembly.

Sieyès saw nothing of all this; he saw the people, who were starving; but the Third, Sieyès was told, could not, of itself, form the States-General.

‘So much the better’, replied Sieyès, ‘it will form the National

Assembly’.⁴³

In Miyazaki’s Japanese version, the Abbé Sieyès, rather interestingly, has disappeared from the cast of this novel’s *dramatis personae* altogether. The above exchange is accordingly not reproduced as such. It is still more than likely that the possibility of reading into the term *minzoku* 民族 a sense of “the Third Estate” informed Miyazaki’s choice of this term.

The character *zoku* 族 was quite commonly used to render the French *ordre* or *état* in their (largely synonymous) pre-revolutionary meaning in Japanese at the time.⁴⁴ It was such an understanding of this term that informed coinage of the terms *shizoku* 士族 and *kazoku* 華族 in the early Meiji period as well. And in a sense, these two “estates” could be seen defined in “spiritual” and “noble” terms respectively. The former was mostly concerned with giving the samurai a new socio-psychological identity as testimonies to bygone military glory and honour, at the same time as they were abolished as a socio-political class. The Peerage (*kazoku* 華族), on the other hand, had its own representation in the House of Peers, and privileged institutions such as Peers’ Schools. It was open, however, not only to former daimyō and court nobles (*kuge* 公家), but also to “houses” (*ie* 家) that had earned this title by more “modern” forms of “public” (*kō* 公) service.

Use of the term *zoku* 族, in addition to the morpheme *min* 民, to render *ordre* and *état* in the pre-revolutionary senses of these French terms is attested to also by Nakae Chōmin. Chōmin, like Miyazaki from Tosa, had published his translation of Rousseau’s *Du Contrat Social* from the original French into Classical Chinese in 1881. He would contribute a Classical Chinese dedication to the later version of Miyazaki’s *Jiyū no kachidoki* 自由乃凱歌 published in 1886. In his own *Kakumei-zen Furansu nisei kiji* 革命前法朗西二世紀事 (History of the Two Reigns Preceding the Revolution in France) published also in 1886, Chōmin refers to the constituents of the Third Estate as *heimin* 平民, writing of “the division between the nobility, the clergy, and the *heimin* 平民” (*kizoku sōryo heimin no betsu* 貴族僧侶平民ノ別) for example.⁴⁵

But when Chōmin explains the problem of the vote count in the Estates-General that led to the ultimate break between the first two and the Third estates, he opposes “le vote par tête” as *jinbetsu no giji* 人別ノ議事 to “le vote par ordre” as *zokubetsu no giji* 族別ノ議事 as if self-understood. If one looks at the above string *kizoku sōryo heimin* 貴族僧侶平民, with the clergy as the exception upholding the rule in the middle, it is clear that either the term *zoku* 族, or the morpheme *min* 民, could be used to render the concepts of *ordre* and *état* (depending on whether one took the *kizoku* 貴族 or the *heimin* 平民 as the prototype). Choosing the latter would have followed the same logic as including the samurai, craftsmen, and merchants (as *shimin* 士民, *kōmin* 工民, and *shōmin* 商民) together with the peasants (*nōmin* 農民) under a single concept of “the people”, that is, *shimin* 四民.

Precisely this is what Chōmin did when he used the term *sanmin* 三民, rather than *sanzoku* 三族, to refer to the “three estates” as such. But his explanation of that term was as follows:

The people (*tami* 民) were divided into three orders (*monzoku* 門族), the first being the nobility (*kizoku* 貴族), the second the clergy (*sōryo* 僧侶), and the third the common people (*heimin* 平民). This were the so called Three Estates (*sanmin* 三民) ... The nobles therefore thought of themselves as the nobles, the clergy as the clergy, and the common people as the common people, as if they were different kinds of human beings (*jinshu* 人種). The entire country was strictly (*genzen* 儼然) divided into three *shuzoku* 種族 (separate societies/essentially different estates/tribes), which shared not the least common ground in outlook (*sukoshimo ikō o onajiku suru koto naku* 少モ意嚮ヲ同クスルコト無シ). And within each such estate (*zokurui* 族類), there were further distinctions between higher and lower.⁴⁶

From this perspective it becomes clear how Miyazaki on his part will have thought. While Chōmin, in referring to “the three estates” as *sanmin* 三民, brought the “nobility” down to the “common people” (*heimin* 平民), Miyazaki made the *jinmin* 人民 claim the place of the *kizoku* 貴族 in declaring themselves to represent “the nation”. “What is a Nation?” asked the Abbé Sieyès: “A body of associates, living under a common law (*un corps d’Associés vivant sous une loi commune*), and represented by the same legislature, etc”. It is this very general sense of “the people” (*min* 民) constituting “a body of associates” (*zoku* 族) proclaimed to represent “the nation” in the nobility’s stead, that Miyazaki’s use of the term *minzoku* 民族 suggests.

But this still leaves the question how Miyazaki could have conceived of this term as a translation of “National”. The answer to this question becomes immediately clear, if one does not contrast the term *minzoku* 民族 with the term *kizoku* 貴族 alone, but with a third term ending in *zoku* 族 found in his text. This term appears only once, but at its very beginning.

Miyazaki refers his reader in the third sentence of this work to *ōzoku gakushi* 王族學士.⁴⁷ What else can this term be taken to mean than an *Académicien Royal*? If one contrasts *minzoku* 民族 with this usage, it could still carry a strong taste of “Third Estate” given its immediate vicinity to *sōryo kizoku* 僧侶貴族 (the clergy and the nobles). But it also clarifies that the addition of *zoku* 族 (association), in any case if conjoined with *kaigi* 會議 (assembly), could suggest an adjectival instead of a substantive reading. After all, the morpheme *min* 民 carries a substantive sense to begin with, while the morpheme *ki* 貴 (“worthy” or “noble”) does not. Seen from this side, *minzoku* 民族 served as Miyazaki’s

translation of “National” in conceptual contradistinction to “Royal”.

V. *Kokumin* 國民 and *Kokuō* 國王

While this explains how a reading of *minzoku* 民族 as “National” was possible, it still does not explain why Miyazaki would not have simply used the term *kokumin* 國民 instead. After all, *kokumin gikai* 国民議會 is also how the present-day French *Assemblée Nationale* is rendered in Japanese. And by the time Miyazaki wrote, the term *kokumin* 國民 had found its way as a translation of “nation” into dictionaries already. The *Tetsugaku jii* 哲學字彙 (Philosophical Dictionary), for example, which exerted considerable influence on lexical and conceptual developments during the Meiji period, had the following entry for “Nation” in its first edition of 1881:

Nation 國、國民

Even more importantly, Chōmin renders Sieyès’ famous answer to the question “What is the Third Estate?” (*Heimin to wa nanzo ya* 平民トハ何ゾヤ): “Everything” as: *Iwaku kore sunawachi kokumin nari* 曰ク此レ即チ國民ナリ (“It is nothing else than the *kokumin* 國民”).⁴⁸ Let us consider this question in some further detail, before asking why Fukuzawa would not have conceived of “nation” as *minzoku* 民族 on his part.

There is a third term (in addition to *kizoku* 貴族 and *ōzoku* 王族) that would have called for the term *minzoku* 民族 rather than *kokumin* or *kunitami* 國民 as a conceptual opposite in this case, and that is *kokuō* 國王. Miyazaki uses *kokuō* 國王 throughout his work to refer to the French king. Given that France was constituted as a monarchy, “the people” of France as *kokumin* 國民 would not have been the “Third Estate” claiming to represent “the Nation”, but “the King’s people” instead. On the very page in Miyazaki’s novel where the “National Assembly” takes shape as a *minzoku kaigi* 民族會議, the king is still greeted by people in the street with shouts of “Long live the King! Long live the Queen!” (*Kokuō banzai joō banzai* 國王万歳女王万歳).⁴⁹

In the terms *minzoku* 民族 and *ōzoku* 王族 the morphemes *min* 民 and *ō* 王 are first. That makes for an important difference. These are groups, or “bodies of associates”, formed in the People’s and the King’s name respectively. The terms *kokumin* 國民 and *kokuō* 國王, on the other hand, oppose “the people” and “the king” to each other within the framework of a jointly inhabited “state” (*kuni* 國 or *kokka* 國家).

Chōmin renders Sieyès’ answer to the third of his three questions: “What does it ask?” (*ima yori iō heimin wa masa ni ikan naru beki ya* 今ヨリ以往平民ハ當サニ如何ナルベキ乎): “To become something” as: *Iwaku kore masa ni kokumin to naru beki nomi* 曰ク此レ正ニ國民ト爲ル可キノミ: “It must become the *kokumin* 國民”.⁵⁰ Miyazaki’s choice of terms can thus be explained also in terms of Chōmin’s translation of Sieyès’ “three

questions” as follows: The reconstitution of the assembly of the Third Estate as the “National Assembly” marks the point where the Third Estate has already ceased to be the *kokumin* 國民 of France that it has always been, but has not constituted itself as the *kokumin* 國民 it was supposed to become by Sieyès yet. Chōmin solves the question of how to translate *Assemblée nationale* in his own account of these events by simply calling it *keiyaku kaigi* 契約會義, that is *Assemblée nationale constituante*, to begin with.⁵¹

It is in the sense of *kokumin* 國民 that “the people” constituting the Third Estate had always been, that Miyazaki asks his reader to read this term as *kunitami*. This term is used thrice by Miyazaki in the context of his account of Necker’s dismissal. A corresponding passage is not found in the original. Necker is introduced by Miyazaki as having wanted “to restore [their] natural rights to the people” (*kunitami ni tenrin no kenri o mattō seshimen* 國民に天稟の權利を全ふせしめん). Accordingly, “the people” are “resentful” of “the government” as rumors of Necker’s dismissal spread: *uwasa kiku yori koko kashiko, seifu o uramu kunitami* 風評聞くより此地彼處、政府を恨む國民. Miyazaki then makes Camille Desmoulins, who, in the English text, “taking a pistol from his breast” had simply cried: “To arms!” give a speech, which is at some variance with his otherwise recorded words. Miyazaki’s Desmoulins begins with the words *wareware kunitami* 吾儕國民 (“We, the *kunitami* 國民”), where the historical Desmoulins reportedly shouted: *Citoyens!*⁵²

Miyazaki switches use of the term *jinmin* 人民 into use of the term *kunitami* 國民 where he refers to “the people” not as the “people” in the streets, or the “people” suffering hunger, but as “the people” claiming rights that belong to them collectively “by nature” (*tenrin* 天稟) as “the people” representing “the population” (*tami* 民) of that “country” (*kuni* 國).

This is also the sense in which the term *kokumin* or *kunitami* 國民 was understood in its pre-Meiji usage. The only entry in which the term *kokumin* 國民 appears in the already quoted *Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language* of 1862 is the following:

Unpopular 國民ノ爲ニナラス (“having no benefit for the people”)

The “state” (*kokka* 國家) as an encompassing oiko-nomic unit, even if represented by the house (*ie* 家) of the ruler, was seen as part of a larger order of Nature (*ten* 天) in which the *kokumin* 國民 had a “natural” place as well, if they were addressed as *kokumin* or *kunitami* 國民 to begin with. The function of this term was to highlight this sense of an encompassing unit (*kuni* 國) in which a lord and his people were bound up together.

In this reading, *kokumin* 國民 does not convey a sense of *ikkoku no jinmin* 一國ノ人民 but rather of *kokka jinmin* 國家人民, as in the daimyo of Yonezawa’s famous bequest to his descendants on the occasion of his retirement:

The state (*kokka* 國家) is inherited from one’s ancestors and passed on to

one's descendants: it should not be administered selfishly.

The people (*jinmin* 人民) belong to the state (*kokka* 國家): they should not be administered selfishly.

The lord exists for the sake of the state and the people (*kokka jinmin* 國家人民); the state and the people do not exist for the sake of the lord.⁵³

This was the culmination of one tradition in Tokugawa political thought starting with the possibly apocryphal “The realm is the realm of the realm” (*Tenka wa tenka no tenka nari* 天下は天下の天下なり), reported to have been uttered by Tokugawa Ieyasu on the occasion of his retirement.⁵⁴ The Daimyō has retired, long live the Daimyō! The Shōgun has retired, long live the Shōgun!

Yōzan's use of the term *jinmin* 人民 clearly harks back to Mencius' use of that character compound in the classical passage already quoted. But this term leaves a problem if the king is not perceived by “the people” to be in accord with such lofty propositions. Once Desmoulins calls “To arms!” the question of who “the people” (if not represented by a king and his nobles) are – as a collective actor in their own right – becomes all important. This is brought home to Billot by the De Launay, the commandant of the Bastille, in the novel's English version as follows:

“I say that I have come in the name of the people to demand that you surrender the Bastille”.

De Launay shrugged up his shoulders.

“The people are in truth very strange animals”, said he.

“Hey”, cried Billot.

“And what do they want to do with the Bastile [sic]?”

“They want to demolish it”.⁵⁵

This English translation quite interestingly missed De Launay's point. The French original has “C'est en vérité un étrange animal que le peuple, dit-il”, and: “Et qu'en veut-il faire de la Bastille? – Il veut la démolir”, instead. In other words, the question is whether “the people” can act in the singular, as an individual, to begin with:

“The king's cannon are here by the king's order, Sir! They can only be dismounted by an order from the king”. “Monsieur de Launay”, said Billot, feeling the importance of the moment, and raising his mind to the full height of it, with dignified eloquence, “Monsieur de Launay, the real king, whom I counsel you to obey, is yonder”. And he showed to the governor the gray crowd, some of whom were still covered with blood from the combat of the preceding evening, and whose undulating

movements before the ditches made their arms gleam in the sunshine.⁵⁶

Miyazaki renders the first of the above exchanges in literal translation, but recovers the original's sense. While singular and plural are not grammatically distinct in Japanese, the fact that Miyazaki turns *jinmin* 人民 first into the name of a thing or person (*jinmin to ka tonauru mono* 人民とか稱ふるもの), and then renders the sense of *un étrange animal* as *kimyō naru ikimono* 奇妙なる活物 (a strange living being) as opposed to *kimyō naru dōbutsu* 奇妙なる動物 (strange animals), achieves the same effect: *Sate mo sate mo jinmin to ka tonauru mono wa kimyō naru ikimono kana* 扱も々々も人民とか稱ふるものは奇妙なる活物かな.⁵⁷

De Launay's point here, obviously, is that "the people" (as opposed to "the king" representing "France" in his person) have no "corporeal" existence, and thus also cannot give orders. When he looked at "the gray crowd" that Billot pointed out to him, he will still have seen no king but only an army.

But where "the people" first appear as *jinmin* 人民 in Miyazaki's political novel they are found engrossed in reading Rousseau's "On the Social Contract" already:

If you ask what the general state (*arisama* 情況) of France at that time was, the learning of the people (*jinmin no chishiki* 人民の知識) had been advancing each day and month. But while their mood of independence (*dokuritsu no kishō* 獨立の氣象) flourished and they were engrossed in reading Rousseau's *Social Contract* (*Min'yaku-hen* 民約編), proclaiming theories of freedom and equality, a tyrannical and immoral nobility (*kizoku* 貴族) gathered in the government promulgated harsh and cruel laws, such as all kinds of ordinances regulating newspapers, [popular] assembly, and printing, impeding freedom and robbing rights...⁵⁸

In Rousseau's *Du Social Contrat*, the question of how "the people" could act as "a body" – by contracting to form a "corporate" rather than a "corporeal" entity – was the central theme. Rousseau writes:

A people, says Grotius, can give itself to a king. According to Grotius, a people is therefore a people, before it gives itself to a king. That gift itself is a civil act; it presupposes a public deliberation. Thus, before examining the act whereby a people chooses a king, it would be well to examine the act whereby a people is a people. For since this act is necessarily prior to the other, it is the true foundation of society.⁵⁹

In his translation of Rousseau's *Du Contrat Social* under the heading *Min'yaku yakkai* 民約譯解 into Classical Chinese in 1881, Nakae Chōmin renders *un people* in the above passage as *ippō no tami* 一邦之民, whereas he renders *une première convention* in "That it is Always Necessary to Return to a First Convention", as *kuni no moto* or *kokuhon* 國本. While both characters *hō* 邦 and *oku* 國 are read *kuni* 國 in Japanese, Chōmin clearly distinguishes between *kuni* 國 as a *politically* constituted state, and *kuni* 邦 as a *territorially* constituted one, in the sense that its "people" speak and claim their "own" rights in their "own" collective name as "the people" of that "territory" or "country" (*kuni* 邦).⁶⁰ In the first sense of Rousseau's *un peuple*, Chōmin's *ippō no tami* 一邦之民 would thus correspond to Miyazaki's *kunitami* 國民 as claimants of their rights as "the people" or "citoyens" of France.

But Rousseau uses the term *un peuple* in the phrase "whereby a people is a people" twice, once as the subject of this proposition and once as its predicate. This effect can be reproduced by a re-reading of *ippō no tami* 一邦之民 not as "the people of a [given] territory", but as "one people" (*un peuple*) – conceiving of the term *hō* 邦 as a count noun for "peoples" possessing a territorially defined identity, and situating themselves as the bearer of a "popular will" in such territorially defined terms, instead. The phrase *ippō no tami* 一邦之民 would then be understood to mean "one people" or "a people" just as *ippon no enpitsu* 一本の鉛筆 is understood to mean "one pencil" or "a pencil". The French *un peuple* allows for a reading in the sense of both "a people" and "one people" as well. In other words, Rousseau's above proposition could also be expressed in English as "whereby a people is *one* people".

In translating Rousseau's definitions of terms as contained in Book I, Chapter VI "On the Social Compact" (*min'yaku* 民約), Chōmin uses *kuni* 國 to render *cité* (in the ancient sense of this term as *polis*), and *kuni* 邦 to render Rousseau's *puissance*:

This public person (*kono tai* 是体), formed thus by union of all the others formerly took the name of *cité* (*kuni* 國), and at present takes the name *republic* or *body politic*, which is called *état* (*kan* 官) by its members when it is passive, *souverain* (*kimi* 君) when it is active, *puissance* (*kuni* 邦) when compared to others like itself. As to the associates (*associés*), they collectively (*sono shū o gasshite* 會其衆) take the name *people* (*tami* 民); individually they are called *citoyens* (*shi* 士), insofar as participant in the sovereign authority, and *sujets* (*shin* 臣), in so far as they are subjected to the laws of the state (*sono hōrei ni shitagau* 其循法令).⁶¹

There is only a single occurrence of the French term *nation* in the chapters of *Du Contrat Social* which Chōmin translated, namely in the following sentence:

[Every] act of sovereignty (that is, every act of the general will) obligates or favors all citizens equally, so that the sovereign knows only the nation (*kokumin* 國民) as a body (*zentai* 全体) and does not draw distinction between the members (*shūjin* 衆人) that make it up.⁶²

The term *kokumin* 國民 could be read as a shorthand for *ikkoku no tami* 一國之民 here, by exchanging the count noun *hō* 邦 for “peoples” that are constituted as such only in territorial terms (such as “the Japanese people”), by a count noun *koku* 國 for “peoples” who are *politically* constituted as “a state” (*kuni* 國) by virtue of a second convention with “a sovereign” already.

But this reading of the term *kokumin* 國民 would still be fundamentally different from Fukuzawa’s reading of the same term as *ikkoku no jinmin* 一國ノ人民, because *kokumin* 國民 in Chōmin’s sense would be a conception of *tami* 民 and not of *jinmin* 人民. In fact, what happened to Fukuzawa’s term *kokumin* 國民 when he attached the English reading “nation” (*nēshon* ネーション) to it, can be explained in the same way, namely by assuming that his reading of *ikkoku no jinmin* 一國ノ人民 changed from “the people of the nation” to “one nation” or “a nation” – as in “a nation and a people”, by conceiving of the term *koku* 國 in *ikkoku* 一國 as a count noun. However, Fukuzawa did not distinguish between “a nation” constituted simply by virtue of “a common name” as emphasized by Guizot, and “a state” constituted by a social contract between “the people” and a “sovereign”.

Chōmin did not translate the parts of *Du Contrat Social* beginning with Book II, Chapter VII “On the Legislator” for a reason. He must have realized that Rousseau is taking a turn there from an argument developed in contractual terms, conceiving of “the people” as a *legal* fiction, to an argument developed in terms of a “national morality” instead, conceiving of “the people” as a *national-moral* body. In Chōmin’s Chinese terms, when “the Legislator” is called in, Rousseau’s *un peuple* changes its sense from *ikkoku no tami* 一國之民 to *ikkoku no jinmin* 一國ノ人民. After all, what Rousseau’s “Legislator” is charged with is nothing other than turning a territory’s *jinmin* 人民 from *gumin* 愚民 into *ryōmin* 良民.

At the birth of societies, says Montesquieu, it is the leaders of republics who bring about the institution, and thereafter it is the institution that forms the leaders of the republic.

He who dares to undertake the establishment of a people should feel that he is, so to speak, in a position to change human nature, to transform each individual (who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole), into a part of a larger whole from which this individual receives, in a sense, his life and

his being; to alter man's constitution in order to strengthen it; to substitute a partial and moral existence for the physical and independent existence we have all received from nature.⁶³

It had never occurred to Rousseau – as it had never occurred to anyone else prior to the clash between the Rousseauans and the Physiocrats in the National Assembly over the meaning of the American Constitution which left both sides perplexed⁶⁴ – that one could conclude a social contract in writing such that “the people” in the *two* senses of this term (expressed by Chōmin in Classical Chinese as *kokumin* 國民 and *shūjin* 衆人 respectively) de facto come to constitute its *two* contracting parties.⁶⁵ In the U.S. Constitution this was not the case. There is only a collective “We, the People” that rules all. And in the Meiji Constitution it would not be the case either. Writing a text that could *not* be interpreted as a *kokuyaku kenpō* 國約憲法 (that is, a contract between “the people” and “the sovereign” as would be actionable in a Constitutional Court bound to this contract's letter) was Inoue Kowashi's guiding concern throughout as its author. But this was the *idea* behind the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which would survive the Jacobin Terror.

VI. *Minzoku* 民族 and *Nēshon* ネーション

There is another translation in Chōmin's text that merits comment, namely his rendition of Rousseau's *citoyens* as *shi* 士. Both Chōmin and Fukuzawa were thus looking at concepts of *sanmin* 三民 and *shi* 士 in conjunction, even if their points of reference were as different as the societies of pre-revolutionary France and of Tokugawa Japan.

Chōmin quite obviously did not employ the character *shi* 士 to read a sense of “samurai” into the French *citoyen*. He was using this term in the sense it carries in Classical Chinese, usually rendered in English as “literati”. In his vision of a socio-political elite that could claim the place of the *shi* 士 of Tokugawa Japan, Chōmin thus joined the Confucian idea of a scholar prepared for state service (*shi* 士) and the Enlightenment idea of a *philosophe* (rendered by Chōmin with the Confucian connoted term *rigakuka* 理學家) together – to conceive of a type of “public intellectual” who would be *publicly* thinking and *publicly* debating in the name of “the people” – outside “the government” (*kan* 官) but checking each other's as well as “the government's” contentions against a notion of *ri* 理, to which Chōmin affixed in his *Rigaku kōgen* 理學鉤玄, also of 1886, the French readings *principe* and *verité*. Chōmin consequently relies on the character *shi* 士 in rendering “delegate” as *daigishi* 代議士 as well.

Fukuzawa, on the other hand, uses the term *shi* 士 to refer to the *shi* 士 of Tokugawa Japan as such, or rather as reconceived as “the samurai” (*shizoku* 士族) in the transition to the Meiji period. It is the Great Way (*daidō* 大道) of “the samurai” (*shizoku* 士族) that he

sets up as an example for the “moral tie” needed to form a *kokumin* 國民 qua *nēshon* ネーシヨン out of “the people” qua *jinmin* 人民. But if it was this “moral tie” that provided the *shizoku* 士族 with their “common” identity and way or form of “association” (*zoku* 族), would the term *minzoku* 民族 not have lain close at hand to render the “nation” (*nēshon* ネーシヨン) formed once “the people” had made this “moral tie” their own?

The reason why this term would not have been an option becomes immediately clear if one considers how the term *minzoku* 民族 was used by Fukuzawa himself in his earlier writings. It appears twice in the Second Volume of his *Seiyō Jijō* 西洋事情, published in 1870. And the second occurrence of this term is in Fukuzawa’s account of the national history of France.

In his account of the history of France, Fukuzawa at one point deposits the following compound: *ōshitsu jūin kizoku minzoku* 王室寺院貴族民族. This would have to be: “the Royal House, the Church, the Nobility and *minzoku* 民族”.⁶⁶

Fukuzawa quite obviously uses the term *minzoku* 民族 for the French *le peuple* as constituting the Third Estate here. There is a decisive difference between Fukuzawa’s and Miyazaki’s uses of this term with this reference though. Fukuzawa is not concerned with the “National Assembly” here, nor does he have the Abbé Sieyès or even the French Revolution more generally in mind. Fukuzawa was deploying the above quoted compound in presenting the reader with an image of the entire French nation (*Furansu no kuni* 佛蘭西ノ國) as “on the brink of destruction” and “lying in shambles” (*gakai sezaruru mono naku* 瓦解セザルモノナク) – while setting the stage for Jeanne d’Arc, “one maid” (*ichi joshi* 一女子) from Orleans, to appear. In other words, Fukuzawa is not at all using the term *minzoku* 民族 in a sense approaching the French *nation* or *national* here. He is rather using the term *zoku* 族 to indicate a mere section of “the nation” that can never stand for the whole. At no point in his career was Fukuzawa advocating a revolution in the name of a Third Estate. His hopes were rather pinned on a “middle class” (*mizzuru karassu* ミツヅルカラッス) that would exhibit virtues of aristocratic leadership in a changed economic environment.⁶⁷

After Jeanne d’Arc has saved France from extinction, the “Third Estate” is assigned no further role in Fukuzawa’s account of the national history of France. His account of the French Revolution opposes the nobles and the clergy as *kizoku sōkan* 貴族僧官 to “the people” as common and indistinct “masses” (*shūsho* 衆庶). This term does not contain the morpheme *min* 民, and it does not suggest coordinated action. The term *shimin* 市民, obviously in a sense of *citoyens*, is used by him only once, when the latter are seen to form a “National Guard” (*gokokuhei* 護國兵) with the English “national guard” in phonetic transcription attached.⁶⁸

This sense of *zoku* 族 as constituting a *separate* group, rather than an *encompassing* whole, certainly informs the common reading of *minzoku* 民族 as an ethnic “people” as well. And it is interesting to recall that *le peuple* and *la noblesse* of France were actually considered not to belong to same “people” in pre-revolutionary France, but to represent

different “ethnic groups”, namely “the Gauls” and “the Franks”. Patrick J. Geary has described the emphasis placed by the “Frankish” nobility on “the free, Germanic identity of the *nation française*” as follows:

In the eighteenth century, aristocrats such as Louis de Saint-Simon, François de Salignac de Fénelon, and Henri de Boulainvilliers, agreed that the population of Gaul in Late Antiquity was essentially a race of slaves. In the fifth century, free Frankish warriors had acquired Gaul by right of conquest. They alone, and their descendants – the nobility – were the true French. The king should share power with them, as had been the case in the days of Charlemagne.⁶⁹

This discourse took a radically different turn, as political contention shifted from antagonism between the nobility and the king, to antagonism between the nobility and “the people”.

The French Revolution changed everything and nothing in this vision of the past. Particularly in France, the popular propaganda of the revolutionary period accepted this bipartite schema of Franks and Gauls, but reversed the values derived from it. In his influential pamphlet on the third estate, the French revolutionary theorist Abbé Sieyès accepted the Germanic origin of the nobility, but argued that this made them a foreign, conquering element in France. The true French people, descendants of the Gauls, had long borne the yoke of foreign servitude, first under the Romans and then under the Franks. It was time to send this alien race back to the forests of Franconia and return France to the third estate, the one true nation.⁷⁰

It is important to note that, in Miyazaki’s usage, the term *minzoku* 民族 does not appear to carry such ethnic implications at all. In other words, he does not read it in an exclusive, but rather in an inclusive sense. As seen already in the passage recounting the Abbé Sieyès appearance before the General Assembly, with the first two estates missing, the presence of “foreign troops” entering the country to assist the nobles is a constant theme of Dumas’ novel, and preserved as such in Miyazaki’s adaptation. But the “foreign nations” interfering with the struggle between “the French people” on the one hand, and “the nobility of France” on the other, are referred to as *gaikoku* 外國 in Miyazaki’s text, that is “foreign countries” for “foreign nations” – or concretely named as “Germans” (*Doitsujin* 獨乙人) and “German cavallery” (*Doitsu kihei* 獨乙騎兵).⁷¹ Had Miyazaki intended a sense of “French” as opposed to “German” with his rendition of “National”, a term such as *kokumin* 國民 or

kokujin 國人 (as opposed to *gaikokujin* 外國人) would have been the logical choice, and not *minzoku* 民族 as opposed to *kizoku* 貴族 and *ōzoku* 王族.

Fukuzawa, on the other hand, begins his account of the national history of France with the Franks, introducing them as a *ban'ya no shuzoku* 蠻野ノ種族 (barbarian tribe).⁷² This is interesting not least because he is giving them thus a markedly different treatment from the Scythians in the preceding chapter, which recounted the national history of Russia. The Scythians (*shichian* シチアン) who, in a remote past, would have inhabited the regions of Russia, are introduced by him as a *ban'ya no minzoku* 蠻野ノ民族 (barbarian people) there instead.⁷³

This use of the term *minzoku* 民族 as denoting “a people” that is not properly constituted as “a nation” – in the sense of “a state” (*kuni* 國) as viewed from an “inter-national” (*kokusai* 國際) perspective – is also found in Kume Kunitake’s record of the Iwakura Mission published in 1878 for example.⁷⁴ In fact, this could be taken as the basic sense that joins all of the three uses discussed together. In Miyazaki’s account of the establishment of the “National Assembly” the *kunitami* 國民 of France returned to a state of nature to reconstitute themselves as a “body of associates”, while the borders between France and Germany are crossed by French nobles and German cavallery in both directions. In referring to the *peuple* and the Third Estate of France as *minzoku* 民族 in the context of the Hundred Year’s War against England, on the other hand, Fukuzawa conceives of them as “a people” as well – not as set apart from other “peoples” but as set apart as “the people” from “the nobles”, “the clergy”, and “the royal house”, and thus neither forming “a nation” nor constituting “a state”. The Scythians, on the other hand, are “a people” as opposed to other “peoples” who have not constituted themselves as “a nation” (*kuni* 國) in terms of “statehood” yet.

There is another expression in Fukuzawa’s writings that supports this reading. That is his reference to “the Americans” in colonial times as *ichizoku no jinmin* 一族ノ人民.⁷⁵ They are obviously bound together by the “moral tie” of Protestant religion, but that this is not the meaning Fukuzawa associates with the term *zoku* 族 in this case is clear from the fact that he refers to the Pilgrim Fathers as the “forebears” (*senjin* 先人) of their *shuzoku* 種族 or “tribe”. In other words, the emphasis is again on their *separate* existence or “identity” as a different “species” or “kind” (*shu* 種).

But as in the case of Chōmin’s *ippō no tami* 一邦之民, the phrase *ichizoku no jinmin* 一族ノ人民 allows for a reading simply as “a people” or “one people” as well, if one rereads *zoku* 族 as a count noun for “peoples” established as such by *some* form of “association”. The phrase *ichizoku no jinmin* 一族ノ人民 would then acquire a sense strikingly similar to John Stuart Mill’s phrase “a PORTION of mankind”, which precedes his definition of “nationality” as its subject. As Anzai Toshimitsu has pointed out, Fukuzawa’s definition of “nationality” in *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* 文明論之概略 – with a view to the Japanese *kokutai* 國體 – is a more or less verbatim translation of Mill’s description of

“nationality” contained in his *Considerations on Representative Government* of 1861.⁷⁶ This *description* of “nationality” – which should not be confused with Mill’s separate *definition* of this term – could be used without any change, and with the same order of precedence, to explain the varying meaning of *minzoku* 民族 in a Japanese to English dictionary:

Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, and community of religion greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the position of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents of the past.⁷⁷

Mill’s *definition* of “nationality”, on the other hand, does not go beyond asserting that “nationality” is constituted by “common sympathies” and assuming that mankind could be neatly divided into mutually exclusive “portions” in that manner.

A PORTION of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united together by common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others – which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves, exclusively.⁷⁸

Mill divides “mankind” into separate “kinds” on the basis of shared “kindnesses” here, leaving the question of whether such “common sympathies” constitutive of “nationalities” are not (or even ought to be) reinforced by “mutual antipathies”, or at least “mutual apathy”, between “nationalities” aside. But if *ichizoku no jinmin* 一族ノ人民 is simply “a portion of mankind” as defined and described by Mill, it would make no more sense to read a *certain* kind of “association” into the term *zoku* 族 than reading a sense of “roots” or “origin” into the term *hon* 本 when used as a count noun for movies, cigars, or lengthy journal article submissions. Dilworth and Hurst’s translation of *ichizoku no jinmin* 一族ノ人民 as “a race of people” is quite obviously not intended in any “race-specific” sense either.

If *zoku* 族 can mean any form of “association”, its use as a morpheme is explained more easily than by assuming that it ultimately connotes kinship relations. Thus *zoku* 族 can be used to describe a “body of associates” not only when constituted by joint self-identification as *min* 民. It can also refer to “portions of mankind” constituted by other joint interests, such as “speeding” (*bōsō* 暴走) on motorcycles in open defiance of the law

for example. Existing blood relations or kinship ties are no more required for gaining admission into a *bōsōzoku* 暴走族 gang than they are actually desired in a husband and wife combining to form a *kazoku* 家族 (family).

VII. *Kokumin* 國民 and *Kazoku* 家族

These considerations open up another possibility of understanding Fukuzawa's switch from the term *ikkoku* 一國 to the term *kokumin* 國民 as his suggested translation for the English term "nation". As already noted, he may have reconceived of *ikkoku no jinmin* 一國ノ人民 as "a nation" by rereading *koku* 國 simply as a count noun, as also in the case of *ichizoku no jinmin* 一族ノ人民. But in this case, *kokumin* 國民 as his translation for "nation" would have been formed in the same way as *kojin* 個人 as his translation for "individual".

It is not the case that a term carrying a sense of "individual" did not exist in the Japanese language before Fukuzawa coined this term. The term *gojin* 吾人, in common use during the Tokugawa period, was replaced by it. But where the term "individual" is supposed to primarily connote an "I" as in "I think..." (*ware omou ni* 吾思フニ), the term *gojin* 吾人 would have provided a perfect fit. Fukuzawa's innovation was to conceive of the individual as a socio-political "unit" by relying on the unspecific count noun *ko* 個 instead. This certainly coincides with his interest in Statistics as well. But if *kokumin* 國民 as a translation of "nation" is understood in this way, as composed of a count noun prefixed to *min* 民, it is clear that *minzoku* 民族 could not have worked as a translation for "nation" in the same way. The shorthand for *ichizoku no jinmin* 一族ノ人民 would have had to be *zokumin* 族民.

The pivotal form of "association" (*zoku* 族) in Fukuzawa's understanding of "the West" (*seiyō* 西洋), in which the "moral tie" forming "a nation" was born, was neither "the individual" (*kojin* 個人) nor "the state" (*kokka* 國家) but "the family" (*kazoku* 家族). As Sekiguchi Sumiko has pointed out, the term *kazoku* 家族 is owed in all likelihood to Fukuzawa himself. Fukuzawa first uses this term to render "The Family Circle" as the title of a chapter in *Chamber's Political Economy*.⁷⁹ One might argue that his choice of *kazoku* 家族 as a translation for "family" – as explained by John Hill Burton in terms of an "association" formed by "natural affections"⁸⁰ with children grouped around a husband and wife – is odd. A term including *oya* or *shin* 親 would seem to have lain closer at hand. Hori Tatsunosuke in his already quoted *Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language* of 1862, for example, had opted for the term *shinzoku* 親属 instead, obviously avoiding the preexisting term *shinzoku* 親族 because this latter term was understood to mean an extended family. *Shinzoku* 親族 was Hori's entry for "Relatives" instead. But Fukuzawa was not writing a dictionary. He could have used *shinzoku* 親族 precisely if he wanted to change the way this term was understood, by placing it into different propositional contexts

and maybe adding the English term ‘family’ in phonetic transcription in brackets. The reason that he used *kazoku* 家族 instead clearly was that he was thinking in terms of the Japanese *ie* 家 (as the oiko-nomic unit of Japanese society) and “the state” as *kokka* 國家 – as opposed to “the government” (*seifu* 政府) – at the same time. John Hill Burton writes and Fukuzawa translates:

A family (*ichi kazoku* 一家族) may expand in the course of generations to a clan or sept (*ichizoku no jinshu* 一族ノ人種), or even to a considerable nation (*ikkoku* 一國).⁸¹

How that last step, from “clan or sept” to “nation” (*ikkoku* 一國) or “state” (*kokka* 國家) would have to be thought, still awaited further explication by Guizot. As Sekiguchi has emphasized, it was Guizot’s “moral tie” (*moraru tai* モラル・タイ) that would tie everything together.⁸² The role of the clan in elevating this “moral tie” from the bond uniting a family towards its eventual destination as the foundation of “a nation” was explained by Guizot as follows:

Let us look next at the *clan* – another family system, which now scarcely exists, except in Scotland and Ireland, but through which probably the greater part of the European world has passed. This is no longer the patriarchal family. A great difference is found here between the chief and the rest of the community; he leads not the same life; the greater part are employed in husbandry, and in supplying his wants, while the chief himself lives in idleness or war. Still they all descend from the same stock; they all bear the same name; and their common parentage, their ancient traditions, the same remembrances, and same associations, create a moral tie, a sort of equality, between all the members of the clan.⁸³

Guizot’s account on how the “nationality of France” was formed, already quoted, completes the story. But where does this leave “personal independence”, which after all was supposed to be constitutive of Western “civilization” to begin with? Guizot has a resounding answer to this question as well:

It was the rude barbarians of Germany who introduced this sentiment of personal independence, this love of individual liberty, into European civilisation; it was unknown among the Romans, it was unknown in the Christian Church, it was unknown in nearly all the civilisations of antiquity. The liberty, which we meet with in ancient civilisations, is political liberty; it is the liberty of the citizen. It was not about his

personal liberty that man troubled himself, it was about his liberty as a citizen. He formed part of an association, and to this alone he was devoted. The case was the same in the Christian Church. Among its members a devoted attachment to the Christian body, a devotedness to its laws, and an earnest zeal for the extension of its empire, were everywhere conspicuous: the spirit of Christianity wrought a change in the moral character of man, opposed to this principle of independence; for under its influence his mind struggled to extinguish its own liberty, and to deliver itself up entirely to the dictates of his faith... But the feeling of personal independence, a fondness for genuine liberty displaying itself without regard to consequences, and with scarcely any other aim than its own satisfaction - this feeling, I repeat, was unknown to the Romans and to the Christians. We are indebted for it to the barbarians, who introduced it into European civilisation, in which, from its first rise, it has played so considerable a part, and has produced such lasting and beneficial results that it must be regarded as one of its fundamental principles, and could not be passed without notice.⁸⁴

And, as he further elaborates:

There is another, a second element of civilisation, which we likewise inherit from the barbarians alone: I mean military patronage, the tie which became formed between individuals, between warriors, and which, without destroying the liberty of any, without even destroying in the commencement the equality up to a certain point which existed between them, laid the foundation of a graduated subordination, and was the origin of that aristocratical organisation which, at a later period, grew into the feudal system. The germ of this connection was the attachment of man to man; the fidelity which united individuals, without apparent necessity, without any obligation arising from the general principles of society. In none of the ancient republics do you see any example of individuals particularly and freely attached to other individuals. They were all attached to the city. Among the barbarians this tie was formed between man and man; first by the relationship of companion and chief, when they came in bands to overrun Europe; and, at a later period, by the relationship of sovereign and vassal. This second principle, which has had so vast an influence in the civilisation of modern Europe – this devotedness of man to man – came to us entirely from our German ancestors; it formed part of their social system, and was adopted into

ours...⁸⁵

Thus brought together by “common sympathies” in John Stuart Mill’s diction, mankind, according to Guizot, divided itself into appropriate “portions”:

Little societies every where began to be formed; little states to be cut out according to the measure, if I may so say, of the capacities and prudence of men. There, societies gradually became connected by a tie, the origin of which is to be found in the manners of the German barbarians: the tie of a confederation which would not destroy individual freedom. On one side we find every considerable proprietor settling himself in his domains, surrounded only by his family and retainers; on the other, a certain graduated subordination of services and rights, existing among all these military proprietors scattered over the land. Here we have the feudal system oozing at last out of the bosom of barbarism. Of the various elements of our civilisations, it was natural enough that the Germanic element should first prevail. It was already in possession of power; it had conquered Europe: from it European civilisation was to receive its first form – its first social organisation.⁸⁶

In his *Nakatsu Ryūbetsu no Sho* 中津留別之書 (Letter on Parting from Nakatsu) of 1870, Fukuzawa could write echoing the *Great Learning*:

一身獨立して一家獨立し、一家獨立して一國獨立し、一國獨立して天下も獨立すべし。士農工商相互にその自由獨立を防ぐべからず。

If an individual [or: one’s individual self] is independent his house [or: individual house] will be independent, if his house is independent his nation [or: individual nation] will be independent, if his nation is independent, All-under-Heaven can be independent. Samurai officials, peasants, craftsmen and merchants must not interfere with each other’s freedom and independence.⁸⁷

What made the Scythians both “barbarian” and a *minzoku* 民族 then, may well have been that – even though they formed an “association” of *min* 民 defined in terms of a jointly realized *minsei* 民性 or “*min*-hood” – their “form of association” (*zoku* 族) failed to be differentiated out into *kokka* 國家, *kazoku* 家族, and *kokumin* 國民.

But this logical succession – “If one’s individual self is independent one’s individual house will be independent, if one’s individual house is independent one’s individual nation

will be independent, if one's individual nation is independent All-under-Heaven can be independent" – also suggests a logical suggestion of self-standing "bodies", with "the family" and "the nation", and even "All-under-Heaven", conceived of on the model of an "individual self/person" or "one body" (*isshin* 一身). In other words, this Great Chain of political Beings from the bottom up would seem to be a succession of "corporations" on increasingly higher levels. Consider in this context the following observation that Kume Kunitake appended to his record of the Iwakura Mission's tour of inspection through Northern America and Europe from 1871 to 1873:

And if we pursue our examination further, the family (*kazoku* 家族) itself invariably takes on, to some degree, the character of a corporation (*kaisha* 會社). The forming of corporations is a trait with which Europeans of all classes are thoroughly imbued. The republican form of government arises from appointing the head [of state] by public election; the monarchical form is established by the practice of selecting through hereditary succession. Superficially, these differ immensely, but in fact neither is very different from a body corporate.⁸⁸

VIII. *Kokumin* 國民 and *Zokumin* 族民

But what about the frequently made assertion that the difference between the terms *kokumin* 國民 and *minzoku* 民族 would roughly correspond to a difference between the English "nation" and the German *Volk*?⁸⁹ The emphasis placed on the "Germanic" heritage of the English "nation" by writers such as Guizot still leaves the possibility that the English term "nation" and the German term *Volk* were conceived of differently in English and German in the nineteenth-century – maybe because the latter had somehow ceased to think in terms of that shared "Germanic" heritage. There is a text that posed the question of how the German terms *Nation* and *Volk* ought to be rendered in English and Japanese respectively to its Victorian and Meiji translators directly. The influence of this text on modern political thought, also in China, can hardly be overemphasized, although it has been largely overlooked in historiography.

The English version of this text appeared under the title *Theory of the State* in 1885, as a translation of Bluntschli's *Lehre vom modernen Stat* published in 1875-76. As far as I can see, this is the text in which the hyphenated term "nation-state" (which appears to have been first coined, in conceptual opposition to both 'national state' and 'city-state', by John Robert Seeley around 1881) appears for the first time in the sense in which it has been understood and used by its "theorists" since.⁹⁰ The title of this English translation incidentally suggests that the term "the modern state" (*der moderne Staat*) first launched into circulation by

Hegel,⁹¹ was not firmly established as a term and concept in English political thought at that time yet.

This English translation is from a different work by the same author than the Japanese translation that had been published under the title *Kokkaron* 國家論 (Theory of the State) by Hirata Tōsuke beginning in 1881 already.⁹² This Japanese translation, as Marianne Brastid-Brugière has clarified, was based on Bluntschli's *Deutsche Statslehre für Gebildete* of 1874.⁹³ Katō Hiroyuki's famous Bluntschli translation under the title *Kokka hanron* 國家汎論, published by the Monbushō in 1874, on the other hand, had been based on the earlier *Allgemeines Statsrecht* (1851-52) in four volumes.⁹⁴ However, these works largely overlapped in content. They mainly differed in presumed audience: scholarly, professional and general.⁹⁵

Hirata's translation is important for two reasons. On the one hand, it was rendered into Chinese under the title *Kokkagaku* or *Guojiaxue* 國家學 (圀家學 on the book's title page) by Azuma Heiji in 1899.⁹⁶ This attests not only to the importance it was attributed in Japan. As Brastid-Brugière has pointed out, it also was this work from which Liang Qichao drew, oftentimes verbatim, his ideas about "the state".

The works rendered into Japanese contain chapters titled *Volk und Land*, whose first section is titled *Nation und Volk*. The work translated into English contains a chapter titled *Nation und Volk* as well. How did the different translators solve this problem? This question is of major interest. *Volk* and *Land* in this combination after all directly correspond in meaning to the characters *min* 民 and *koku* 國 of which the term *kokumin* 國民 is composed.

Katō's translation published in 1874 did not contain a translation of this chapter (Chapter 2) at all, jumping from Chapter 1 to Chapter 6.⁹⁷ This is interesting as one should think Chapter 2 to be among the most important of this work, containing the definitions basic to its argument. Katō's omission can only be explained by assuming that he did not attribute much weight to the distinction between *Volk* and *Nation*, or the link between *koku* 國 and *min* 民, to begin with. His selections clearly indicate that he is mainly interested in Bluntschli's definition of "sovereignty" instead.

The same is true of Liang Qichao's early excerpts. One would think he would have jumped on this part. But precisely this is not the case. It is only later that he makes known what Bluntschli had to say in this regard in China.

But what about the English translation? If the English "nation" and the German *Volk* are substantially different, how did the English translators render *Volk* into English? The title of the chapter *Volk und Nation* in English translation is "The Conceptions 'Nation' and 'People'". That is not further surprising. But consider how the text begins:

VULGAR usage confuses the expressions "people" (*Nation*) and "nation" (*Volk*); science must carefully distinguish them. But even scientific

language is often confused by the fact that the same words are used in different senses by different civilised nations. In English the word “people”, like the French “*peuple*”, implies the notion of a civilisation, which the Germans (like the old Romans in the word “*natio*”) express by *Nation*. The political idea we rather express by “Nation”, which the Germans call *Volk*. Etymology is in favour of German usage, for the word *natio* (from *nasci*) points to birth and race, *Volk* and *populus* rather to the public life of a State (*πόλις*).⁹⁸

Where the English has “civilised nations”, “the notion of a civilisation” and “political idea”, the German original has *Culturvölker*, *einen Culturbegriff* and *Statsbegriff*.⁹⁹

The English translators of Bluntschli’s book rendered *Volk* as “nation” and *Nation* as “people”. That in English the term “nation” is frequently used where a German text has *Volk*, and “people” can be used where a German text has *Nation*, is correct, but this observation contains an oversight. When “people” is used in the sense of the German *Nation*, it is used in the sense of “a people”, that is in the sense of *minzoku* 民族 as opposed to *kokumin* 國民 in the various possible sense of that former term. But “the people” as opposed to “the government” is always *Volk* in German, and not *Nation*. *Volkssouveränität* is the same as “popular sovereignty” in English, as opposed to *nationale Souveränität* which is “national sovereignty”. Likewise, a “national assembly” is a *Nationalversammlung*.

Consider this conceptual opposition as explained by Bluntschli’s English translators:

If a whole Nation (*Volk*) or the main part of it belongs to one people, it is naturally pervaded by the common spirit, character, language and customs of that people [*in dem Kern der Statsbewohner auf nationaler Grundlage steht*]. If, on the other hand, it is composed of parts of different peoples, it has less community of feelings and institutions than a People [*Nation*].

On the other hand, the chief point which distinguishes a Nation [*Volk*] from a People [*Nation*] is that in it community of rights [*Rechtsgemeinschaft*] is developed in a more marked degree and is raised to the point of participation in the conduct of the State [*politischer Theilnahme an der Statsleitung*], and its capacity of expressing a common will [*Gesammtwillen*] and maintaining it by acts has acquired the proper organs in the constitution of the State: in a word, it is a collective personality, legal and political [*rechtliche und statliche Gesamtperson*].¹⁰⁰

To this then is added as a third point:

Nations, moreover, are organic beings, and as such are subject to the natural laws of organic life.¹⁰¹

The question of how *Nation* and *Volk* and “nation” and “people” are used cannot be explained in terms of a difference between the English and German language. They are used differently depending on an author’s political theory and on the way a state discussed is constituted. If a state is not constituted as “a state” but as “a union” of states conceived of as “one nation under God” reflecting its sense of identity in a “Declaration of Independence”, the terms “the people” and “the nation” will become synonyms, easily exchanged for each other in a Republican discourse.¹⁰² It is the question of how “a people” (as forming a separate “nation”) and “the people” (as opposed to an existing “government”) are related to each other in the vision of either an existing or an ideal state that is decisive. And Chōmin’s proposition, implied in his Classical Chinese translation of Rousseau’s explication of the “social contract” to conceive (as far as the constitution of a state is concerned) of “a people” (constituting a separate state) as *kokumin* 國民, but of “the people” governed by that state as *shūjin* 衆人, may merit more consideration than it has received, even if it is strikingly different from Fukuzawa’s opposition of *kokumin* 國民 and *kojin* 個人. The terms “nation” and *Nation*, and “people” (with singular concord) and *Volk*, in English and in German, in any case, signify very much the same – with one important different to which I will return: The English term “people” can be used with plural concord, while the German *Volk* and the French *peuple* cannot. In cases where the English uses “people” as a *grammatical* plural, the German and French have to switch to *Leute* and *gens* respectively. This is where a major confusion arises. And this also what made the English translator of *Ange Pitou* miss the point of the exchange between De Launay and Billot quoted above. But it is not the case that the German *Volk* and the French *peuple* would not be understood as a *logical* plural, that is, as denoting a *plurality* as well.

How did Hirata Tōsuke and Azuma Heiji solve the puzzle of *Volk und Land* and *Nation und Volk*? They translated *Volk und Land* as *Kokumin oyobi kokudo* 國民及國土 and *Nation und Volk* as *Zokumin oyobi kokumin* 族民及國民.¹⁰³ Liang Qichao, who slightly revised Azuma’s text, turned *zokumin* 族民 around, to introduce it as *minzu* 民族 into Chinese instead. This is interesting not least, as the term *zokumin* 族民 could be interpreted to be a contraction of *ichizoku no jinmin* 一族ノ人民 parallel to *kokumin* 國民 as a contraction of *ikkoku no jinmin* 一國ノ人民 on the model of *kojin* 個人 as a contraction of *ikko no hito* 一個ノ人, that is, by looking at both *oku* 國 and *zoku* 族 as count nouns, albeit counting “peoples” differently – as “peoples” constituted as “states” on the one hand, and “people” forming “bodies of associates” in some constitutionally undefined pre- or post-political sense.

Hirata used the term *minshū* 民衆 as the higher order concept that comprised *zokumin* 族民 and *kokumin* 國民 under itself. This is the term in which both *minshūshi* 民衆史 historians and “nation-state” theorists have vested their hopes of overcoming the “nation-state” (*kokumin kokka* 國民國家). But not only does the English translation of Bluntschli’s book contain, as far as I can see, the first use of the hyphenated “nation-state” in this sense in English.¹⁰⁴ Hirata’s *Kokkaron* 國家論 is also the only text, where I have ever seen the term *kokumin kokka* 國民國家 used in the Meiji period. My sense is that it was as widely used as the term *zokumin* 族民.

Bastid-Brugière also points out that Bluntschli’s trademark dictum *Kein wahrer Staat ohne Volk*,¹⁰⁵ translated into English as “No true state without a nation”, is rendered by Hirata as *Kokumin nakereba, mata shin no kokka nashi* 國民ナケレハ、亦眞ノ國家ナシ.¹⁰⁶ Azuma in his Kanbun version, on the other hand, writes *Minjin nakereba, sunawachi shin no kokka nashi* 無民人、則無國家.¹⁰⁷ Liang Qichao, on the hand again turned Azuma’s *minjin* 民人 around into *renmin* 人民, writing 無人民、則無國家. But Bluntschli’s *Volksstat*, which is rendered once as “nation-state” in the English version, is rendered on at least one occasion by Hirata as *kokumin kokka* 國民國家 in Japanese. This term is found in the following passage:

Zuletzt verbreitet sich dieses Statsbewußtsein über das ganze Volk. Dann erst entsteht der wahre Volksstat, in welchem alle Classen zusammen wirken zu der Ordnung und Leitung des Gemeinwesens.¹⁰⁸

My own English translation of this passage would be:

At last, this state consciousness spreads through the entire people (*Volk*). And only then arises the true people’s state (*Volksstat*), in which all classes act together in maintaining the order (*Ordnung*) and direction (*Leitung*) of the republic (*Gemeinwesen*).

The Japanese translation by Hirata reads:

遂ニ繁茂シテ全民ノ腦裏ニ蔓延スルニ及ンテ始メテ眞ノ國民國家ヲ成立シ全民ヲ擧ケテ公共ノ政務ヲ執行スルナリ¹⁰⁹

Would it not be possible to translate this sentence quite literally as follows?

Flourishing at last and spreading into the brains of the people (*jinmin* 人民), a true *kokumin kokka* 國民國家 is established for the first time, as the entire populace (*zenmin* 全民) is raised to [participation in]

public-qua-common (*kōkyō* 公共) governance (*seimu o shikkō suru* 政務ヲ執行スル).

Bastid-Brugière suggests that Hirata used *jinmin kokka* 人民國家 as his translation of Bluntschli's *Volksstat*, but Hirata clearly uses *kokumin kokka* 國民國家 in this instance. And leaving the question of the term “governance” aside, Bluntschli's use of the term *Gemeinwesen* as the German word for the Latin *res publica* here clearly suggests that the thought inscribed into *Volkstat* by him is just what the Ciceronian adage *Est res publica res populi* prescribes. The German term *Volk* means nothing else than the Latin *populus*. And the German word *Staat*, spelled by Bluntschli as *Stat*, is nothing else than the Latin *res publica* conceived of in terms of its *status* as such (*status rei publicae*).

Bastid-Brugière's suggested explanation of the conceptual relation between the Sino-Japanese terms *jinmin* 人民 and *kokumin* 國民 in terms of a “German semantic content infused” in the latter and “transferred” to the former en route to the People's Republic of China, thus calls for further scrutiny as well:

It should be pointed out that the German semantic content infused in the term *guomin* [國民] was later fully transferred, in the 1930s, to *renmin* [人民], a term that was perhaps a better technical equivalent for *Volk*. And it is the term *renmin* [人民] that has kept in Chinese political culture the special idealized shape of the *Volk* of mid-nineteenth century scientists, while ‘society’, *shehui* [社會], was distrusted as unpredictable, unruly, and confused. In mainland China, the use of the term *guomin* [國民] has been swept away with the Guomindang's defeat, and the notion hardly retains any meaning for present-day intellectuals.¹¹⁰

IX. *Populus* and *Populi*

As emphasized throughout this paper, it was the English term ‘nation’ that was widely asserted in the nineteenth century – certainly by such widely influential authors as François Guizot – to be somehow “infused” with a “Germanic” semantic content, supposedly representing a “spirit of personal independence” which the Roman *populus* and the Greek *demos* had lacked. The formation of the English term “the people” as constituting the English “nation” is much easier explained by considering what happened to the Roman *populus* in post-Roman times, as the plural form *populi* came to establish itself at its side, than by some “Germanic” essence. It was not least the Latin translation of biblical terms that led to profound shifts in how Latin terms such as *populus* were read. In post-Roman times, the Roman *res publica* had been replaced by the idea of a *Civitas Dei*.¹¹¹ If the

populus of Rome had been made to “coalesce” by Romulus, according to Livy, into a “unified body” (*unius corpus*),¹¹² the *populi* ruled by medieval Christianity were multitudes of congregated sinners. A change in how “bodies of associates” constituting a *political* “community” were conceived can also be seen in the shift of the Latin translation of Aristotle’s *koinonia politiké* from expressions involving “*communitas*”, “*communio*”, or “*communicatio*” – such as *communicatio politika* or *civilis communitas* in Moerbeke’s translations of the *Politics* (1260 and 1265) – to *societas civilis*. The former translations were part of the “incorporation of Aristotelian philosophy into Catholic thought” effected by Thomas Aquinas. The term *societas* on the other hand signified one of two forms of association (usually translated into English as “partnership”) recognized under late medieval Roman Law, and became standard in the Florentine Renaissance with Leonardo Bruni’s choice of *societas civilis* in his translations of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in 1416 and the *Politics* in 1438.¹¹³

Conceptions of “the people” underwent change last but not least with the development of political representation (initially pursued as “a mode of insuring or facilitating, and eventually obtaining, consent to the king’s government”) in England, a process which Edmund S. Morgan has traced under the heading: “Inventing the People”.¹¹⁴ But to revert to the Latin: one text where the plural form *populi* is clearly used not to denote plural congregations (as frequently in Christian usage), but plural “people” as such, is the following sentence printed at Prague in 1711:

Cælum enim in videndis & audiendis tum virtutibus, tum sceleribus,
juxta id quod populi mei vident & audiunt, videt & audit.¹¹⁵

This is François Noël’s Latin translation in his *Sinensis Imperii Libri Classici Sex* of the “Great Declaration” as quoted by Mencius:

天視自我民視、天聽自我民聽、
Heaven sees according as my people see; Heaven hears according as my
people hear.

Noël’s work was the first complete translation of all Four Confucian Books (including additionally the Classic of Filial Piety and the Lesser Learning) into Latin, and to leave a lasting impression on Enlightenment thought on the European Continent – not least on the Physiocrats, whose clash with the Rousseauans in the *Assemblée Nationale* first produced the idea of a “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen” as mentioned already above.

By looking at the Roman republican *populus* and the plural *populi* adopted in the Latin *Mencius* next to each other, the semantic difference between the terms *kokumin* 國民 and *jinmin* 人民 can also be explained as follows. *Kokumin* 國民 has taken not the place of

the Latin *natio*, but the place of the Roman *populus* (often explained as meaning “nation” in English today) representing the “oneness” of the Romans, while *jinmin* 人民 are in the first sense *populi* in the sense of “the people” on the receiving end of “government” in general, but conceived of as ultimately an assembly of individual human beings (*hito* 人). In other words, the problem posed by these two terms reveals is ultimately a set-theoretical one. And the difference in semantic behavior between these terms when placed in ideological opposition as rival translations representations of “the people” can then be explained as follows. “People’s Republics” (*jinmin kyōwakoku* 人民共和國) conceived under the heading of “Communism” and non-Communist “nations” (*kokumin* 國民) conceived of as actively constituting “republics” (*kyōwakoku* 共和国) in a continuing “political process” pronounce the same shibboleth of “the people” from its two opposing sides: to assert either a conceptually unified *populus* as being constituted by masses of *populi* (“the people”), or a joint consciousness of *populi* as constituting a common *populus* (“the nation”). The Latin term *natio* (qua *gens*) played a key role (as originally the opposite of *populus* in the Roman mind) in bringing this conceptual merger about. In the East Asian performance of this republican drama, it was the term *minzoku* 民族 that played, and continues to play, the part played by *natio* (qua *gens*) in Latin. The term *minshū* 民衆, on the other hand, as often opposed to *kokumin* 國民 and *minzoku* 民族 as a third possibility, could be compared in its role as a political player to the Latin *plebs*.¹¹⁶ But both *kokumin* 國民 and *minshū* 民衆 allow for a reading as *populi* in the sense of the “Great Declaration” as well.

The *min* 民 of Imperial Japan, in any event, were reminded of their duties toward the state neither as *kokumin* 國民 qua “nation” (*nēshon* ネーション), and also not as *jinmin* 人民 qua “the people”. They were called to national attention *individually* as imperial “subjects” (*shinmin* 臣民) and *personally* by the imperial pronoun of the second person: “You” (*nanji* 爾).

The first occurrence of the term *shinmin* 臣民 in Fukuzawa’s writings, incidentally, is found in his translation of the American “Declaration of Independence” contained in the First Volume of his *Seiyō Jijō* 西洋事情 (Conditions in the West) of 1866. Fukuzawa relies on the term *shinmin* 臣民 there to render the meaning of “the governed” in the line:

That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

人間（じんかん）ニ政府ヲ立ツル所以ハ、此通義ヲ固クスルタメノ
趣旨ニテ、政府タランモノハ其臣民ニ満足ヲ得セシメ初テ真ニ權威
アルト云フベシ。¹¹⁷

Notes

In the notes, the following abbreviations are applied:

FYZ = *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū* 福沢諭吉全集, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten 岩波書店, 1969-71.

NCZ = *Nakae Chōmin zenshū* 中江兆民全集, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten 岩波書店, 1984.

In the case of quotes from Fukuzawa Yukichi's *Gakumon no susume* 學問のすゝめ and *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* 文明論之概略, the available English translations by Dilworth and Ueda, and Dilworth and Hurst have been consulted throughout. However, I have frequently opted for a more literal rendition, without indicating these changes as such. The corresponding page numbers in the English translations are always added in brackets to the page numbers for the Japanese text as contained in FYZ.

(DUH) = Fukuzawa, Yukichi, *An Encouragement of Learning*, transl. David A. Dilworth and Umeyo Hirano, Tokyo: Monumenta Nipponica. 1969.

(DCH) = Fukuzawa, Yukichi, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*, transl. David A. Dilworth and G. Cameron Hurst III, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

In rendering terms and quotes in Japanese, I have used characters and script as found in the Meiji-period originals (viewable online in the National Diet Library's *Kindai raiburari* 近代ラブラリー) rather than reformed characters.

¹ I use the term “lexeme” to refer to linguistic entities (words or morphemes) for which dictionaries of a given language feel a need to create a separate entry. In the case of Japanese that would include not only dictionaries of Japanese, but also dictionaries of Sino-Japanese characters. Following that definition, not only Sino-Japanese terms like *kokumin* 國民>国民 or native Japanese terms like *tami* 民 or *kunitami* 國民(くにたみ), but also Sino-Japanese characters such as *min* 民 are here considered “lexemes” of the Japanese language as used and understood by its literate speakers.

The term “morpheme”, on the other hand, denotes linguistic entities entering into the formation of a word, such as the morphemes *oku* 國>国 and *min* 民 as constitutive elements of the term *kokumin* 國民>国民, for example, or *ta* た and *mi* み, when a possibility of the native Japanese word *tami* (民=たみ) being derived from *ta* (=田) plus *mi* (=身?) – as opposed to *o* [<*oho* (大)] + *mi* (身?) in the case of *omi* [<*ohomi*] 臣 is considered – suggesting that “the people” (*tami* 民) in native Japanese were originally conceived of not only as those “individuals” (*mi* 身) who were associated with rice-fields (*ta* 田), but also as “the little people” as opposed to “great” (*oho* 大) “individuals” (*mi* 身) constituting a socio-political elite.

Such etymologies, needless to add, are less secure and more easily controvertible than the

formation of a term like *kokumin* 国民 from *oku* 国<國 and *min* 民 – as would be speculation about a phenetico-semantic interaction (if not necessarily joint etymological derivation) of terms like *kimi* (君) or *kami* (神) with terms such as *tami* (民) and *omi* (臣) in ancient Japanese. Needless to add, even if the syllable *mi* in *tami* (民) and *omi* (臣) can be assumed to have been morphemes in ancient Japanese, they are no longer recognized as such in lexemes like *tami* 民 in either pre-modern or modern Japanese, and thus are ultimately important only where questions of etymology (regardless of their scientific merit) are introduced into political discourse, as in the case of the Tokugawa school of “National Learning” (*kokugaku* 國學).

² Since the focus of the present paper is on early Meiji Japan, Sino-Japanese characters are, as a rule, given in their Sino-Japanese readings spelled out in *italics*. If a character is referred to as a character in Chinese, Sino-Japanese readings are given as well, to avoid confusion, but following the character in SMALL CAPITALS.

³ Single quotation marks in this paper are used to indicate that an English term is explicitly referred to as a *linguistic* “term”, while double quotation marks are used to evoke “a concept” associated with that term in common usage, if not in a particular usage as in the case of a direct quote. The term “concept” is here understood to denote “an understanding” associated with a *linguistic* term in specific instances of its actual usage. From the viewpoint of a concept being processed in propositional thought, it is referred to as a *logical* “term” as well. To illustrate the difference between a “concept” or *logical* term and a *linguistic* “term”, consider the following example. The same (linguistic) term “table” in the sentence “Do you have a table?” will be associated with distinctly different understandings (*logically* distinct meanings) when uttered in the context of someone giving a presentation, while entering a restaurant, or while being guided to the counter. In the first case, it will be understood as signifying a schematic arrangement of pieces of information, in the second case as signifying a possibility of being served food, and in the third case as a certain kind of furniture.

⁴ “The market”, for example, is a distinctly different concept from “the people”. Consider a sentence like: “It’s the people, not the market, that should rule!” In this sentence “the people” are clearly not conceived of as “the market”. But consider people who say: “Let the market decide!” and mean thereby “the market” as opposed to “the government”. If they do so out of an ideological conviction that market regulation *per se* equals “big” in an added sense of “illegitimate government” or even a “socialist dictatorship” poised to curtail the individual “freedoms” of which American “democracy” is supposed to consist, “the market” is taken to represent “the people” as the only legitimate object of collective decision-making.

⁵ The lexemes 賢 KEN and 哲 TETSU, which signify the conceptual opposites of 愚 GU in Classical Chinese, were both brought into play at the turn to the Meiji period when Nishi Amane translated the English “philosophy” (and Dutch *wijsbegeerte*) with lasting success as *tetsugaku* 哲學, deriving the Greek term *philosophia* in his manuscript *Seisei hatsuun* 生性發蘊 (1873) from “*philo*- ‘to love’” (*firo ai suru* フィロ愛スル) and “*sophos* [sic] ‘a wise person’” (*sofosu*

ken ソフオス賢). Cf. *Nishi Amane zenshū* 西周全集, vol. 1, p. 30.

⁶ What makes “the people” as *banmin* 萬民 or *chōmin* 兆民 “common” is that they remain submerged as individuals in a very great number. What makes “the people” as *heimin* 平民, *shomin* 庶民, and *gemin* or *kamin* 下民 “common” is that they are not “uncommon” by virtue of an elevated status, individual excellence, or superior standing predestining them for government service. What makes “the people” as *domin* 土民 or *seimin* 生民 “common”, is that they jointly constitute the productive base of an agricultural economy, whose political state, from a Mencian perspective, will find its reflection in their “thriving” as *jōmin* 蒸民. What “the people” as *shimin* 四民, on the other hand, have in “common” with people primarily engaged in agriculture is that they all contribute their “share” (*shokubun* 職分) to the overall economic “ease” (*jiyū* 自由) of a “domain” (*kuni* 國), or “the realm” (*tenka* 天下) as a whole. What makes “the people” as *shimin* 斯民 “common” is that they partake as members of “this people” (*kono tami* 斯民) in the “civility” (*bun* 文) maintained by “this” qua “the culture” (*shibun* 斯文). The *locus classicus* for *shimin* 斯民 is Analects 15,25: “This people supplied the ground why the three dynasties pursued the path of straightforwardness (斯民也, 三代之所以直道而行也)”. What makes “the people” as *jinmin* 人民 “common” people is, quite simply, is that they are all *individual* “people” (*hito* 人) regardless of individual differences setting them *personally* apart. And what “the people” as *kokumin* 國民, finally, have in “common” is that they *jointly* constitute the productive and tax base of a domain (*kuni* 國) as an oiko-nomic unit (*kokka* 國家).

⁷ Katsuhito Iwai, “What is corporation? The corporate personality controversy and the fiduciary principle in corporate governance”, *Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions*. Ed. by Fabrizio Cafaffi, Antoino Nicita and Ugo Pagano, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 244.

⁸ The Japanese term for *rénmínbì* 人民幣 (RMB) is not its Sino-Japanese equivalent *jinminhei* 人民幣, meaning “the People’s money”. The term *jinmingen* 人民元 rather means “the People’s Yuan” as in “the Chinese Yuan” (CNY) instead.

⁹ FYZ III, p. 32 (DUH 4).

¹⁰ Cf. Suerbaum, Werner, *Vom antiken zum frühmittelalterlichen Staatsbegriff*, Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1970.

¹¹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Republic of the United States of America, and its political institutions reviewed and examined*, tr. by Henry Reeves [sic] Esq., New York: A.S.Barnes, 1856, Vol. 2, pp.1-4. The line “Christianity has therefore retained a strong hold on the public mind in America” (p. 4) is *Le christianisme a donc conservé un grand empire sur l’esprit des Américains* in the original French.

¹² Ishida Takeshi 石田雄, *Nihon no shakai kagaku* 日本の社会科学, Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai 東京大学出版会, 1984, p. 46.

¹³ Sekiguchi Sumiko, *Kokumin dōtoku to jendā: Fukuzawa Yukichi, Inoue Tetsujirō, Watsuji Tetsurō* 国民道徳とジェンダー—福沢諭吉・井上哲次郎・和辻哲郎, Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai 東京大学出版会, 2007, pp. ii and 92.

¹⁴ Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics: or, the conditions essential to human happiness specified, and the first of them developed*, London: John Chapman, 1851, p. 239. Matsushima Gō 松島剛 tr., Herbert Spencer 袍巴士・斯邊瑣, *Shakai heiken ron* 社會平權論, vol. 4, Tokyo, Hōkokusha 報告者, 1881, p. 406.

¹⁵ John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 330-331.

¹⁶ FYZ I, p. 429. *Chamber's Political Economy for Use in Schools, and for Private Instruction*, London and Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers, 1852, p. 32.

¹⁷ FYZ III, 70 (DUH 41).

¹⁸ FYZ IV, p. 3. Use of the character variants 体 and 體 for *tai* varies by edition. This quote is based on the first edition.

¹⁹ FYZ V, p. 265.

²⁰ Ibid., p.267.

²¹ FYZ III, p. 33 (DUH 5-6).

²² FYZ III, p. 53ff. (DUH 26-27)

²³ FYZ III, p. 52ff. (DUH 24-25)

²⁴ Cf. Itō Masao 伊藤正雄, “*Gakumon no susume*” *kōdoku* 『学問のすすめ』講読, Tokyo, Fūkan shobō 風間書房, 1968, especially pp. 305-309. However, Itō's suggestion that *shu* 主 translates Wayland's “member of society”, and *kaku* 客 “individual” in Fukuzawa's constitution of “society” as a “corporation” on the model of Wayland's “civil society” appears questionable to me. Fukuzawa's *shujin* 主人 would rather seem to take the place of Wayland's “principal” and “agent” at the same time. Cf. Francis Wayland, *The Elements of Moral Science*, New York: Cooke and Co., 1835, pp. 377 and 405-408.

²⁵ See also Joseph Hamburger, *John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

²⁶ FYZ IV, p. 154 (DCH 187).

²⁷ Mitani Hiroshi 三谷博, *Meiji ishin to nashonarizumu* 明治維新とナショナリズム, Tokyo: Yamakawa 山川出版社, 1997, Chapter 1.

²⁸ Watanabe Hiroshi 渡辺浩, *Nihon seiji shisōshi: jūnana-jūkyū seiki* 日本政治思想史「十七～十九世紀」, Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2010, p. 311ff. Watanabe Hiroshi: *Itsu kara 'kokumin' wa iru no ka: 'Nihon' no baai* いつから「国民」はいるのかー「日本」の場合, UP 39(2) 2010, p. 1-6.

²⁹ Cf. On the distinction between freemen and slaves, or *liberi homini* and *villani* (that is, “villagers” or “villains”) cf. e.g. the arguments in the Ship-Money controversy quoted in Quentin Skinner, *Hobbes and Republican Liberty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 82-89.

³⁰ FYZ III, pp. 153-154 (DCH 186).

³¹ Cf. Robert H. Gassmann, “Understanding Ancient Chinese Society: Approaches to *Rén* 人 and *Mín* 民”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 120 (2000), no. 3, pp. 348-359.

Gassmann attempts to explain the difference observable in how these terms are used in terms of clan structure. But considering the meaning of the ideographs as well, an explanations in terms of socio-political agents and socio-political patients as offered below may be more likely.

³² FYZ IV, p. 31 (DUH 3).

³³ Fukuzawa used the term *bunmei* 文明 to express the meaning of “civilization” as a (synchronic) state, but *kaika* 開化 to express the meaning of “civilization” as a diachronic process.

³⁴ FYZ IV, p. 27. Use of the character variants 國体 and 國體 varies by edition. The first edition has 國体.

³⁵ M. Guizot, *General History of Civilisation in Europe: From the fall of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution*, 2nd edition, Oxford: D.A. Talboys, 1838, p. 102.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 259-260.

³⁷ FYZ III, p. 33 (DUH 5).

³⁸ FYZ IV, p. 184 (DCH 226).

³⁹ Yasuda Hiroshi 安田浩 “Kindai Nihon ni okeru ‘minzoku’ kannen no keisei: Kokumin-shinmin-minzoku” 近代日本における「民族」観念の形成—国民・臣民・民族 *Shisō to gendai* 思想と現代, vol. 31 (1992), p. 62.

⁴⁰ Atsuko Ueda, *Concealment of Politics, Politics of Concealment: the production of ‘literature’ in Meiji Japan*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, pp. 59, 67 and 77-78.

⁴¹ Kevin Doack, *A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan: Placing the People*, Leiden. Boston: Brill, 2007, p. 76.

⁴² Miyazaki Muryū, “Furansu kakumeiki: jiyū no kachidoki” in *Meiji bungaku zenshū*, vol. 5, Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1966, p. 67.

⁴³ Alexandre Dumas, *Taking the Bastille; or, Six years later*, London: Darton & Co., 1859, p. 134.

⁴⁴ The term *tōzoku* 等族 is used by historians also today not only to render the *Stände* (or “Estates of the Realm”) primarily of the early modern German Reich, but also the medieval or early modern *Ständeverfassung* as 等族制 more generally. And while the Estates-General of France are commonly rendered as *sanbukai* 三部会 in Japanese today, the term *sanzoku kaigi* 三族会議 can be found as well.

⁴⁵ NCZ VIII, pp. 168-169.

⁴⁶ NCZ VIII, pp. 71-72.

⁴⁷ Miyazaki, *op.cit.*, p. 29.

⁴⁸ NCZ VIII, p. 142.

⁴⁹ Miyazaki, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

⁵⁰ NCZ VIII, p. 142.

⁵¹ NCZ VIII, p. 173.

⁵² Miyazaki, *op.cit.*, p.36.

⁵³ English translation as in Mark Ravina, *Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan*, Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 1.

⁵⁴ Cf. Kasaya Kazuhiko 笠谷和比古, *Shukun 'oshikome' no kōzō: Kinsei daimyō to kashindan* 主君「押込」の構造：近世大名と家臣団, Tokyo: Kōdansha 講談社, 2006, Chapter 4 *passim*.

⁵⁵ Dumas, *op.cit.*, p. 160.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Miyazaki, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 34.

⁵⁹ Jean Jacques Rousseau, “On the Social Contract”, *The Basic Political Writings*, tr. Donald A. Cress, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987, p. 147.

⁶⁰ NCZ I, p. 89. In a note to this passage, Chōmin quotes Grotius as saying *kokumin kimi o tate, kore ni takusuru ni sendan no ken o motte su* 國民立君、托之以專斷之權. He does so precisely to bring out the difference between Grotius and Rousseau, who was arguing that *before* a people “gave itself to a King” as a *kokumin* 國民, it had to be constituted as *ippō no tami* 一邦之民 acting in its own name. The point is that Grotius did not distinguish between these two senses of “un people”.

⁶¹ Rousseau, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-149. NCZ I, p. 92.

⁶² Rousseau, *op. cit.*, p. 158. NCZ I, p. 117.

⁶³ Rousseau, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

⁶⁴ Cf. Jürgen Habermas, “Natural Law and Revolution”, *Theory and Practice*, transl. John Viertel, Boston: Beacon Press, 1973, pp. 87-92 and *passim*.

⁶⁵ In this case, there would no longer be a reason why non-nationals residing in that state or interacting with it internationally ought not to be included among the *shūjin* 衆人, for all legal purposes that are not directly connected to status as a constituent of the *kokumin* 國民 at the same time.

⁶⁶ FYZ I, p. 564.

⁶⁷ FYZ III, p. 61 (DUH 32-33).

⁶⁸ FYZ I, p. 580.

⁶⁹ Patrick J. Geary, *The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 20-21.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 21.

⁷¹ Miyazaki, *op.cit.*, pp. 38-39.

⁷² FYZ I, p.557.

⁷³ FYZ I, p. 525.

⁷⁴ Cf. the quotes in Nishikawa Nagao, “Minzoku to iu sakuran” 民族という錯乱, *Hikaku bunka kenkyū* 比較文化研究, vol. 14 (2002), no. 1, p. 95.

⁷⁵ FYZ IV, pp. 45-46 (DCH 55).

⁷⁶ Anzai Toshimitsu 安西敏三, *Fukuzawa Yukichi to Jiyūshugi: Kojin-jichi-kokutai* 福沢諭吉と自由主義一個人・自治・国体, Tokyo: Keiō gijuku daigaku shuppankai 慶應義塾大学出版会, 2007, pp. 2-3.

⁷⁷ John Stuart Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government”, *On Liberty and Other Essays*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p.427.

⁷⁸ Ibid., The phrase corresponding to Mill’s “a portion of mankind” in Fukuzawa’s text is *ichi shuzoku no jinmin* 一種族ノ人民. Cf. FYZ IV, p. 27.

⁷⁹ Cf. Sekiguchi Sumiko, *Kokumin dōtoku to jendā: Fukuzawa Yukichi, Inoue Tetsujirō, Watsuji Tetsurō* 国民道徳とジェンダー——福沢諭吉・井上哲次郎・和辻哲郎, Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai 東京大学出版会, 2007, pp.12-13.

⁸⁰ *Chamber’s Political Economy for Use in Schools, and for Private Instruction*, London and Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers, 1852, p. 2.

⁸¹ *Chamber’s Political Economy*, p. 2, FYZ I, p. 390.

⁸² Sekiguchi Sumiko, *Kokumin dōtoku to jendā: Fukuzawa Yukichi, Inoue Tetsujirō, Watsuji Tetsurō*, Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2007, p. 66.

⁸³ M. Guizot, *General History of Civilisation in Europe: From the fall of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution*, 2nd edition, Oxford: D.A. Talboys, 1838.

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 61-62.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 62.

⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 94-95.

⁸⁷ FYZ XX, p. 50. Cf. Sekiguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁸⁸ *The Iwakura Embassy, 1871-73: a true account of the ambassador extraordinary & plenipotentiary’s journey of observation through the United States of America and Europe*, compiled by Kume Kunitake; ed. Graham Healey, Chushichi Tsuzuki, Vol.5, Matsudo: The Japan Documents, 2002, p. 159.

⁸⁹ Cf. e.g. Nishikawa Nagao 西川長夫, *Kokumin kokka no shatei: aruiwa “kokumin” to iu kaibutsu ni tsuite* 国民国家の射程—或は「国民」とう怪物について, Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō 柏書房, 1998, p. 79.

⁹⁰ Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, *The Theory of the State*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 22. The term appears only once. At other times, possibly because there were plural translators, the term is rendered as “national state” (which would be *Nationalstaat* and not *Volksstaat* in German).

The assumption that Seeley coined this term, is based on digital searches for it, and the fact that Seeley needed to distinguish between a “national state” and a “nation-state” given his argument.

⁹¹ Stephan Skalweit, “Der ‘moderne Staat’: Ein historischer Begriff und seine Problematik”. *Gestalten und Probleme der frühen Neuzeit: Gesammelte Aufsätze*, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1987.

⁹² Hirata Tōsuke 平田東助, transl., [Bluntschli] *Kokka ron* 國家論, Tokyo: Shimaya Kazusuke 島屋一介, 1882.

⁹³ J. C. Bluntschli, *Deutsche Statslehre für Gebildete*, Nördlingen: C. H. Beck’sche Buchhandlung, 1874.

⁹⁴ Katō’s translation, together with Hirata’s translations of missing chapters of the same work, are in *Meiji bunka zenshū* 明治文化全集 (Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha 東京日本評論社, 1971).

as Supplementary Volume (*hokan* 補卷) 2.

⁹⁵ For background on these Japanese and Chinese translations and various German editions, cf. also Marianne Bastid-Brugière, “The Japanese-Induced German connection of Modern Chinese Ideas of the State: Liang Qichao and the *Guojia lun* of J. K. Bluntschli, *The Role of Japan in Liang Qichao’s Introduction of Modern Western Civilization to China*, ed., Joshua Fogel, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004, pp. 106-124.

⁹⁶ Azuma Heiji 吾妻兵治 transl., [Bluntschli 伯崙知理] *Kokkagaku* 國家學, Tokyo: Zenrin yakushokan 善隣訳書館, 1899.

⁹⁷ Hirata Tōsuke later translated the second part of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 (published in 1888) as well, but not Chapter 2.

⁹⁸ Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, *The Theory of the State*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 82.

⁹⁹ J. C. Bluntschli, *Lehre vom modernen Stat: Erster Theil, Allgemeine Statslehre*, Stuttgart: Verlag der J. C. Cottaschen Buchhandlung, 1875, p. 91.

¹⁰⁰ Bluntschli, *op. cit.*, p. 87. Bluntschli, *Lehre vom modernen Stat*, pp. 97-98.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² The terms “society” and *Gesellschaft* would also have to be entered into consideration in such comparisons. As Emerich Francis has emphasized, in English the term “society” is frequently used in senses of the German *Nation* or *Volk*. Emerich Francis, *Ethnos und Demos: Soziologische Beiträge zur Volkstheorie*, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1965, p.27.

¹⁰³ Hirata Tōsuke 平田東助, transl., [Bluntschli] *Kokka ron* 國家論, Tokyo: Shimaya Kazusuke 島屋一介, 1882, vol. 2, p. 1: 族民ト國民トハ其意義甚タ相類似シ且相感通スト雖モ固ト全ク同一ナルニ非ス獨逸語ニテハ族民トハ種族ヲ相同クスル一定ノ民衆ヲ謂ヒ國民トハ同國土以內ニ居住スル一定ノ民衆ヲ謂フ.

¹⁰⁴ Bluntschli, *The Theory of the State*, p. 22: “The personality of the State is, however, only recognised by free people, and only in the civilised nation-state has it attained to full efficacy”.

¹⁰⁵ Bluntschli, *Deutsche Statslehre*, p. 11.

¹⁰⁶ Hirata tr. *op. cit.*, p. 22

¹⁰⁷ Azuma tr. *op. cit.*, p. 6.

¹⁰⁸ Bluntschli, *Deutsche Statslehre*, p. 28.

¹⁰⁹ Hirata tr. *op. cit.*, p. 70.

¹¹⁰ Bastid-Brugière, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

¹¹¹ Jeremy Duquesnay Adams, *The Populus of Augustine and Jerome: A study in the patristic sense of community*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971.

¹¹² Cf. Geary, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

¹¹³ Peter Hallberg and Björn Wittrock, “From *Koinonìa Politikè* to *Societas Civilis*: Birth, disappearance, and first renaissance of the concept”, *The Languages of Civil Society*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2006, pp. 30 and *passim*.

¹¹⁴ Edmund S. Morgan, *Inventing the People*, New York, London: W.W.Norton, 1989, p. 39.

¹¹⁵ Noel, P. Francisco, transl., *Sinensis imperii libri classici sex nimirum Adulorum schola*,

Immutabile medium, Liber sententiarum, Memcius, Filialis observantia, Parvulorum schola, e Sinico idiomate in latinum traducti, Prag 1711, p. 372.

¹¹⁶ On the *populus* and the *plebs*, cf. Henrik Mouritsen, *Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

¹¹⁷ FYZ I, p. 323.

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