

Title	"This Culture of Ours" politics, confucianism, and East Asian identities
Sub Title	"文不在茲乎" 政治,儒學,與東亞的認同
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Publisher	Global Center of Excellence Center of Governance for Civil Society, Keio University
Publication year	2011
Jtitle	Journal of political science and sociology No.15 (2011. 9) ,p.1- 20
JaLC DOI	
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Notes	Articles
Genre	Journal article
URL	https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=AA12117871-20110900-0001

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“This Culture of Ours”¹ Politics, Confucianism, and East Asian Identities

“文不在茲乎”

政治,儒學,與東亞的認同

Mon-Han Tsai

Abstract

This paper attempts to explore the complex and dynamic relationships between political identity and cultural identity historically, with particular reference to East Asia between the 14th century and 19th century. This paper acknowledges there was no conceptualisation of Asia, let alone East Asia, until the end of 16th century, and the notion of Asia or East Asia did not really play any part in forming regional consciousness, political, cultural or otherwise, until the first half of the 19th century. None the less, it argues that there was a distinctively regional political identity shaped by China coterminous roughly with today's North-east and Southeast East Asia including Inner Asia and parts of Central Asia, though the geographical coverage as well as the membership of the shared political identity varied constantly over time. It also points out that there were at least two discernable regional cultural identities, one that included China, Korea, Japan, Ryukyu and Vietnam which existed prior to the period concerned, and another forged by the ruling Manchu elites of Qing China in the 17th century to tie Inner Asia, Central Asia and Tibet to China. Studying these 'East Asian' identities, and the interplay between political identity and cultural identity yield significant insights into the role of culture and identity in politics and conversely, the role of politics in cultural development and identity formation.

I. The Clash of Civilizations Revisited

Samuel Huntington argues that culture and cultural identity have shaped the global politics since the end of the Cold War.² The reason is not hard to understand; for the West's preponderance has declined relatively for a long time even though the West remains as of today unquestionably dominant in the world³, the rise of the rest has been solidly on the march. He considers the significance of the increasing re-assertion of cultural identity and its inexorable impact on global reconfiguration of politics along existing civilisational divides. He proposes that there are eight definable civilisations, namely, Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist and Japanese.⁴ He then goes on to enumerate instances of how these newly resurgent cultural identities are forming their respective political interests and areas of influence, and, how they are carving up the globe for the purported benefit of their civilisations and inhabitants.⁵ He warns unless these new developments are attended to and arrested, a grim future of intercivilisational fault line conflicts will be ever more probable.

There have been many criticisms of Huntington's thesis ranging from his idiosyncratic, if not conspicuously inaccurate, narrative of civilisations to his unpalatable political assumptions and egregious political orientation, at least as viewed from the left. What has been undeniably manifest is the hold of his thesis over political and intellectual discussions since the inception of his writing. Perhaps the incessant fascination stems in part from the fact that Huntington's picture of post-cold war global politics bears a remarkably resemblance to that of many Western domestic political scenes since the early part of the 1970's. With the advent of social liberations and multiculturalism, identity has, to a large extent, diminished, if not replaced, the old uniformity and solidarity in Western societies; gender, race, and ethnic culture, or in other words, identity politics is now driving the political agendas and reshaping the political dynamics. It is this domestic political reality that Huntington sees and, in turn, projects unto the arena of international politics.⁶ Therefore, his book is best seen as a call to halt the allegedly combined external and internal cultural-identity assault on the universal civilisation epitomised by Western civilisation.

The question remains whether the dynamics of identity politics in domestic politics of the West can be equally applicable to the anarchy of global or regional politics then *and* now. To phrase it somewhat differently, is the shared trans-border cultural identity trumping the exclusive claims of territorially-bound national political identity on our political allegiances and our global political future, or rather for our purpose here today; is regional international society, underwritten by the shared norms, culture and history, in various parts of the world emerging to dissipate the global international society of the Westphalian states? And for that matter, was there ever an East Asia regional international society with certain confluence of a shared political identity and a shared cultural identity?⁷ Furthermore, is East Asia finally coming together again as a regional international society based on a dis-

tinct historical civilisation? Last, if not the least, is this newly acquired regional political and cultural identity a good thing after all?

To respond to the aforementioned questions with any degree of rigour, it will be worthwhile to begin with an examination of the interplay between political identity and cultural identity in East Asian international politics between the 14th century and the 19th century. By doing so, we can gain some glimpses into the role of culture and cultural identity in politics and vice versa, the role of politics in cultural development and identity formation, political, cultural and otherwise. This period also coincides with the 500-year peace in East Asia as identified and argued by David Kang and Giovanni Arrighi.⁸

Political identity, as Charles Tilly defines it⁹, ‘[i]s an actor’s experience of a shared social relation in which at least one of the parties—including third parties—is an individual or organisation controlling concentrated means of coercion’. He further clarifies it by adding several more characteristics—just to mention a few relevant to the discussion hereafter in the paper—relational, collective, changing, validation by contingent performances with regard to the asserted relations and validation as constraining and facilitating collective action among those who share the identity.

The operational definition of cultural identity in this paper will be based on Huntington’s usage¹⁰; as he puts it, ‘people define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilisations’. Most pertinently, as he puts it, ‘People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity’. Before venturing into the next section, East Asia herein refers to the current geographical coverage of the states in ASEAN plus China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), Japan and the two Koreas as well as that of their predecessors during the period between the 14th century and the 19th century.

II. Before Asia Became Asia

Traditionally, China’s cartography and geographical knowledge of the world was very much informed by a cosmological-cum-astronomical view of round heaven and square earth (天圓地方). And, unsurprisingly, China, as its namesake (middle kingdom) suggests, was in the middle of square earth. The space of square earth, and, the areas ruled directly and indirectly by China constitute respectively broader and narrower definitions of Tianxia (the realm under heaven or all under heaven)¹¹. From *The History of the Later Han* (Hou Hanshu)¹² compiled in the 5th century by Fan Ye until the mid-19th century, all foreign countries were systematically categorised according to their positions in relation to China, as in the East, the South, the West and the North of China though such practices can be traced to earlier periods such as Western Zhou (1045BC-771BC) and can also be discerned to some degree as in *The Record of History* (*Shiji*)¹³ and *The Book of Han* (*Hanshu*)¹⁴.

Even after vast improvements in China’s geographical and navigational knowledge

extending as far as to the east coast of Africa, in today's Kenya, as demonstrated by Admiral Zheng He's seven illustrious ocean voyages in the first thirty years of the 15th century¹⁵, this cartographical practice persisted with little alteration. It certainly did not reflect on or change China's official view of the surrounding environments and international politics which continued to classify countries in the same manner, as seen in *the Assembled Canon of the Ming* (*Ming Huidian, Wanli edition*)¹⁶ released in 1587 supplanting the earlier Zhengde edition (1511), in which, to mention a few, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Malacca and Sri Lanka were grouped together under the heading, Eastern and Southern Barbarians (*dongnan yi* 東南夷)!

Curiously, just three years prior to the publication of the Wanli edition of the *Assembled Canon of the Ming*, the Jesuit priest, Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) published the first known *mappa mundi* in China, now lost, titled *Complete Map of the Earth's Mountains and Seas* (*Yudi shanhai quantu*). Subsequently, in 1602 he issued the third edition, now titled, *Complete Map of the Myriad Countries on the Earth* (*Kunyu wanguo quantu*)¹⁷, with help and a preface of the high Ming official Li Zhizao 李之藻, that eventually spread to Japan and Korea where it exerted a huge impacts.¹⁸ In Ricci's preface as well as in the map¹⁹, Asia was mentioned and explicated—it covered Luzon, Sumatra, Japan and Great Ming Sea (today's East and South China Seas). In short, apart from Li Zhizao's reminder—that many tributary states of China were not listed on the map²⁰, it gave a pretty unmistakable view of China-, Korea- and Japan-in-Asia.

Despite the popularity of Ricci's world map in Ming China as well as continuing presence of the Jesuit priests in the service of the Qing court involving the production of various world maps, Chinese and local maps after the fall of the Ming in 1644, when the Qing summoned scholars to compile and write the history of the Ming. The spherical view of earth and the division of the earth into several continents including Asia were not incorporated in the eventual publication of *The History of the Ming* (*Mingshi*)²¹ in 1739. The practice of the East-South-West-North classification employed by *Ming Huidian* prevailed in the section on foreign countries²², albeit with greater detail and with more countries included. Later in *the Assembled Canon of the Great Qing* (1764)²³, the same classification was also used to refer to China's tributary states. There was no discussion anywhere as to why the new view of the world based on Ricci's map was not used. Chinese cartographers remained reluctant to adopt fully the Jesuit *Mappa Mundi*.²⁴

On the other hand, the impact of Matteo Ricci's map began to be felt in Japan. It reached its first culmination in the works of Nishikawa Joken 西川如見(1648-1724), first edition published in 1695 and published in an expanded edition in 1708, in which China, Japan, Korea, Ryukyu, Vietnam²⁵ and many other Southeast Asian countries were all clearly marked under 'Asian countries'²⁶. Furthermore, by the early 19th century before the Western intrusion intensified, the use of 'Asia' had become quite common through the dissemination of Rangaku (Dutch learning). It did provoke some reactions as seen in the writ-

ing (1833) of Aizawa Seishisai (1782-1863), for the term, Asia, was a description by the other (*shishou* 私称, *tashou* 他称 and *soushou* 総称), not a self-description (*mizukara ou shosuru* 自らを称する or *jishou* 自称). Seishisai argued it was offensive to describe Japan (*shinshu*, literally divine land, 神州) as part of ‘Asia’, and instead, the terms such as Western, Northern and Southern barbarians, Far West and Wild West should be applied to the description of the world.²⁷ In spite of it, by the second half of the 19th century, ‘Asia’ had firmly established as a lexicon in Japan though not without some lingering sense of the otherness of the term.²⁸

It is thus most plausible to conclude that there was no *East Asian* consciousness in pre-20th century East Asia, for the term, ‘Asia’ or ‘East Asia’ had no particular bearing over political and intellectual elites across various political entities in East Asia until the mid-19th century, let alone any shape of *East Asian* identity, political, cultural or otherwise. However, it would be rather erroneous to infer from this that there was no any sort of regional grouping or identity derived from affiliation with a group of countries in East Asia before the 20th century. In the next section, I shall give a preliminary account of a regional political identity, covering most of East Asia for the better part of the 500-year peace between the 14th century and the 19th century, derived from participation in China-centred tribute system in East Asia.

III. A New East Asian World Order

Soon after Zhu Yuanzhang (henceforth, Ming Taizu, his posthumous temple name) established effective control over China proper as Emperor of the Ming, one of his first acts was to dispatch emissaries to various known countries and invite them to participate in or submit to, depending on the geo-political importance of the country and the power of the country concerned, an elaborate framework for organising the international political and economic exchanges centred on China. The framework is now known as the tribute system and according to John K. Fairbank²⁹ who popularised it as an academic term to describe the pre-20th century Chinese relations with foreign countries, it was the embodiment of the Chinese world view. At its heart was Sinocentrism compounded by a view of emperor as the Son of Heaven presiding all under heaven through his exercise of virtue. Foreign countries came to China to admire the culture of China and to be transformed accordingly. The interactions between China and foreign countries were regulated by the appropriate *li* (rituals or rites or ceremonies). Fairbank surmises that this system originated from the Zhou period and continued down to Qing China. At the very general level, this is not an entirely mistaken portrait of the ideal and rhetoric of the tribute system throughout Chinese history, but this also does not reveal very much about the significance and institutional innovations of the tribute system set up by Ming Taizu.

First of all, Ming Taizu’s wholesale invitation to participate in the new China-centred tribute system was actually a novel policy and it was certainly the first of its kind in China;

none of the founding emperor who ruled China proper had ever attempted that. Ming's predecessor, the Mongolian Yuan *ulus* seemed to have done something similar, but on a closer inspection, Yuan's invitations were, by nature and in practice, very different. Yuan's invitations were often no less than a call for surrender or subjugation—as in the case of Yuan's 'invitation' to Vietnam, Java and Japan. Yuan's notion of tribute was a form of tax payment by the tributary states; it was not a substitute for the exchange of goods, and, the domestic politics of tributary states were also subject to Yuan's intervention. Moreover, Yuan's invitation was often followed by the deployment of its awesome military might, in case; the call was not heeded.³⁰

Secondly, the messages contained in Ming Taizu's invitations deserve to be considered carefully. In his invitation, dated 1368 A.D., to Korea (Koryo), he actually began by arguing for the legitimacy of his government by pointing out that Yuan was a barbarian dynasty that usurped China for last one hundred years and at last, with the blessing of heaven, he had recovered and returned China to the Chinese. He hoped that the King of Korea would either submit to him or would be a friend of China.³¹

A similar message was reiterated in his letter to Japan dated 1369, except that, he stressed that if Japan did not desire to submit to China, he expected Japan would not bother China and that Japan would stamp out pirates based in Japan. Otherwise, he would order a fleet to set sail to arrest those pirates.³² Failing to receive a response from Japan, the next year he issued another letter with increased bellicosity, reminding Japan that Korea, Vietnam (Annam, today's northern Vietnam), Champa (central and southern Vietnam) and Java had responded to his mandate of heaven and even tribal heads in the Western Region (today's Xinjiang) had paid tributes to him. He warned that he had numerous well-fed veterans who were now doing nothing would be ready for a punitive campaign against Japan. However, as emperor of China, he appreciated the distinction between China and barbarians and was reluctant to follow the example of Yuan to wage war against distant barbarians. He ended by reminding Japan that while he was ready for war, he hoped to avoid it by establishing peace with Japan.

Ming Taizu's far more conciliatory message dated 1368 to Vietnam (Annam) proclaimed his unchallenged control over China proper and said that as emperor of China he had no intention of subduing Vietnam. He hoped there would be no trouble between China and Vietnam and that both countries would enjoy Great Peace (taiping) together.³³ Ming Taizu was obviously pleased when Champa sent a tributary mission to him before he had even sent out his invitation, he replied in 1369, rehearsing the legitimacy of his government on the grounds that he had recovered China from barbarian Mongols and wished the King of Champa would forever retain his throne.³⁴ In his 1372 letter to Ryukyu (today Okinawa prefecture of Japan), he again declared that he had no intention of subduing barbarian countries on the four sides of China and since many barbarian chieftains had submitted to him, he expected Ryukyu to follow suit.³⁵ Similar diplomatic missions were sent to Cambodia (Zhenla)³⁶ and Thailand (Siam)³⁷ in 1370 with successful results. An attempt to notify

Burma in 1373 failed to reach Burma because war had broken out between Champa and Burma. Burma did not send any tribute until 1393 when Yunnan was reincorporated into China.³⁸

Was Ming Taizu's peace message sincere? Or was it merely a rhetorical distraction buying time for Ming China to amass more financial resources and build up further military capabilities before flexing China's muscle? It has been suggested that Ming Taizu was merely doing what realism has been saying all along, that Ming Taizu's son, Ming Chengzu, more widely known as Yongle emperor, did not take long to launch campaigns against the Mongols, and, to invade Vietnam and other maritime countries as far as Sri Lanka.³⁹ How should we view the realist cynicism of Ming China's quest for a new East Asian international order? How could the invasion of Vietnam be compatible with the new doctrine of peace?

To understand the commitment of Ming China, it is crucial to remember that the peace rhetoric of the diplomatic messages Ming Taizu sent to Asian countries was not merely a device to gain the confidence of foreign rulers, for it was further enshrined in the clauses of his *Ancestral Instruction* (*Huangming zuxun* 皇明祖訓)⁴⁰ written on the west wall in his palace in Nanjing (preface to *Ancestral Instruction*). The clause clearly stipulated that his successors should not invade or conquer the countries listed: Japan, Korea, Vietnam (Annam), Champa, Greater Ryukyu (Okinawa), Lesser Ryukyu (probably referring to Taiwan), Siam, Cambodia, Burma, Java, Sumatra, Borneo (Brunei), Pahang (central peninsular Malaysia), Western Ocean, Baihua (cannot be located) and Srivijaya. It also provided the rationale for non-aggression as the foreign lands were useless and their people could not be used. It further cautioned the successors should not be tempted to mobilise the power and wealth of China to obtain glory, though barbarians in the war-prone Northern and Northwest regions would need to be watched vigilantly.

It might be handy for the realist sceptics if *Ancestral Instruction* could be effortlessly dismissed out of hand as merely de jure document with few actual ramifications. However, for imperial politics since Song dynasty, the notion of ancestral laws (*zuzong zhi fa* 祖宗之法 or *zufa* 祖法) had become increasingly semi-constitutional and pervasive; it was one of the few checks on the arbitrary power of emperor established by the founding emperors or the first two or three emperors of the dynasty in question.⁴¹ In fact, *Ancestral Instruction* was promulgated to the public in China as well as conveyed to tributary states. It sternly warned that anyone who dared suggest amendment should be regarded as a traitor or disloyal official (*jianchen* 奸臣).⁴²

While it is true that China occupied Vietnam from 1407-1428 following the successful destruction of the Ho dynasty, the usurper of the Tran dynasty in Vietnam, the reasons are far more complex than have been suggested so far. It has normally been assumed that Ming China invaded Vietnam under the pretext of restoring the Tran dynasty. The Ming *shi lu* makes clear that Vietnam had repeatedly violated non-aggression policy among tributary states since 1369 as Vietnam encroached upon Champa's territory intermittently. Ming

China had warned Vietnam and ordered a cease-fire between Vietnam and Champa on many occasions. But, to no avail, as Vietnam pressed on its absorption of Champa. In addition, there were border disputes between China and Vietnam and in 1397 Vietnam moved to occupy a local tusi or autonomous chiefdom (土司) along the Sino-Vietnamese border.⁴³ When Ming troops accompanied Tran Thien-binh, a Tran royal prince, to Vietnam to reclaim the throne from Ho Quy-ly (胡季犛), the court minister who had massacred most of the Tran royal family earlier killed Tran soon after he entered Vietnam. It was this public humiliation of the Ming that prompted China to send an 800,000 strong expedition troop to Vietnam. The relative ease of subduing Vietnam together with the absence of a Tran royal prince speedily changed the Ming's war aim from the restoration of the Tran dynasty to the annexation of Vietnam.

The occupation of Vietnam soon proved to be expensive and troublesome. *Ancestral Instruction* was swiftly and expediently invoked to advise the Ming's retreat from Vietnam and the Xuande emperor who, succeeded the Yongle emperor, agreed with it.⁴⁴ Fresh setbacks in 1426 with the routing of a large contingent of reinforcement troops from China in conjunction with a plea for truce and a request for recognition of the autonomy of Vietnam from the victorious rebel leader, Le Loi (黎利), led to the final withdrawal of the Ming from Vietnam. The episode which was not without some justifications, remains the only deviation from *Ancestral Instruction* concerning foreign relations and it was soon rectified. Over the course of the next 450 years, notwithstanding, China did not even conceive of attacking on, let alone attempt to incorporate, any of the 15 countries listed in the *Ancestral Instructions* as countries against which campaigns should not be launched. This perhaps was the core message of the new East Asia international order, a message well-received and thoroughly understood by countries participating in as well as abstaining from the China-centred tribute system.

IV. Regional International Society and Identity

While China strived to maintain peace among countries in the tribute system, it does not mean that there were free, multilateral and intense exchanges, political, economic and otherwise. On the contrary, Ming China conceived a very tightly regulated regime to organise interactions between China and the tributary states. Every tributary state was ranked according to its distance to China, cultural affinities with China, geopolitical significance and mutual economic benefits. Those with higher rank would enjoy more frequent interactions (shorter interval between each official tribute mission) and more trading permits (kanhe 勘合, one ship, one permit) with China.

In addition, the port or point of entry for each tributary mission was clearly designated and the route to Beijing was selected accordingly. The length of the stay and movement of each tributary mission in Beijing was also meticulously managed.⁴⁵ The tribute offering ceremony was further choreographed down to minute details as depicted in the *Ming*

huidian, *Da qing huidian* and *Da qing tong li*.⁴⁶ While in Beijing, tribute mission personnel, especially those from Korea, with Ming's acquiescence, actively sought to talk to other tribute missions, particularly from Ryukyu and Vietnam. In tandem with the ban on non-tribute related international trade and the maritime ban in China, the China-controlled tribute system became the only official, formal space for regional international society to thrive.

It is rather straightforward to point out that sinic countries such as Korea, Vietnam and Ryukyu derived their respective political identities vis-à-vis the regional political identity embedded in the tribute system. The Yi dynasty that replaced Koryo asked Ming China to anoint a new name for the country and China obligingly opted for Chosen (or Chaoxian in Chinese), because it was the name of the first recorded state established on the Korean peninsula by the Shang dynasty exile, Jizi (or Kijia in Korean). The name was embraced most wholeheartedly as it symbolised the enduring ties between China and Korea since the golden Three Dynasties, Xia, Shang and Zhou. The name, Chosen, is still used by North Korea today.⁴⁷

Vietnam was called Annam (Pacifying the South) from Tang China in the 7th century onwards, though it called itself Dai Viet after gaining independence in the 10th century. In 1803, after Nguyen Anh (Gia Long) toppled the short-lived Tayson dynasty, he immediately sent an envoy to inform Beijing of the change of government in Vietnam. Concurrently of seeking approval of his kingship, he requested China's permission to allow Vietnam to use a new national name, Nam Viet (Nan Yue in Chinese). However, this name was exactly the same of that of an ancient state in China's Guangdong and, Guangxi provinces and today's Northern Vietnam, so after some deliberations, the Qing court decided to reverse the order of the two characters and called it Nan Yue, literally, south of Yue or Viet, henceforth, Vietnam.⁴⁸ Although the name, Vietnam was not instantly welcome by Nguyen Anh, it nevertheless signified China's renouncement of any residual irredentist claim (as seen in Ming's expanded war aim in Vietnam) to the territory in northern and central Vietnam.

The Chinese investiture of kings of the tributary states reflects further development of individual political identities was linked to the deep participation of the states in the tribute system. It should be noted that there is a difference between Ming China and Qing China; during the Ming period, investiture envoys were dispatched to both sinic and non-sinic countries from Korea, Japan, Ryukyu to Siam and even Malacca. In Qing times, investiture became exclusively restricted to sinic countries such as Korea, Ryukyu and Vietnam, noticeably without Japan.⁴⁹ In the case of Korea and Ryukyu, the would-be kings or crown princes would only ascend to the throne after being enfeoffed by the investiture envoy from China.

In the case of Vietnam, the investiture process was less stringently observed and created frictions between China and Vietnam from time to time even during the height of Chinese power in the 18th century when the Vietnamese king of Le dynasty refused to kneel before the investiture envoy and refused to stand in the south facing north. Qianlong emperor

was furious with Vietnam's insubordination, but did nothing except downgraded the investiture of Vietnamese king and consequently, handed the matter to the Civil Commissioner of Guangxi (廣西布政使) that was hitherto the prerogative of the imperial court.⁵⁰

The best example to see the 'East Asian' regional identity and regional grouping in action is when Toyotomi Hideyoshi of Japan started to air about his intention to invade China via Korea since 1587 and Korea duly refused the requests for way of passage repeatedly. The Japanese preparation for war was quickly reported by both Korea and Ryukyu to the Ming court. It was also confirmed by reports from the king of Siam who simultaneously requested Ming China to let him help defend Korea against the coming Japanese invasion. There were talks between the Ming officials and Siam, they even came up with the idea of attacking the Japanese archipelagos in order to relieve the Japanese attack on Korea-the so-called, besiege Chen state in order to save Zhao state (weichen jiuzhao 圍陳救趙). Subsequent debates in the Ming court turned down Siam's offer and favoured a more conservative strategic approach to the Japanese invasion by sending the Ming army to the Korean peninsula to block off the Japanese advance.⁵¹

V. This Culture of Ours

Historically, there were two 'East Asian' cultural identities; the first was predominately 'Chinese'. It consisted of Confucianism, Mahayana Buddhism, and Taoism and stretched as far back as Han dynasty when China was expanding rapidly in East Asia and this culture or this cultural identity had been reasonably well-established by the beginning of the 10th century at the end of Tang China.⁵² The second East Asian cultural identity was created by the ruling Manchu house of Asin Gioro in China in the 17th century. This was based on Lamaism and a pastoral nomad tradition that included an alliance with the Mongols. Overall, the Manchu-Mongol cultural identity was very successful. For the first time in history, this shared culture tied together a vast crescent of disparate regions spanning Manchuria, Mongolia, Central Asia (Xingjiang), Tibet, and Beijing. Manchu's development and overall scheme has been well described by Pamela Crossley.⁵³ Among others, Peter Perdue⁵⁴ has written on the Qing's conquest of Central Asia, and Satoshi Hirano⁵⁵ has written on the Qing's co-optation of Tibet. I shall limit myself to the first and older 'East Asian' cultural identity. This identity was undoubtedly the product of the 'East Asian world' as eloquently developed by Nishijima Sadao⁵⁶ and his followers, including Hamashita⁵⁷.

As Nishijima defines it, the 'East Asian world' (higashi-ajia seikai) is based on four common elements; Chinese characters, Confucianism, (Mahayana) Buddhism and Ritsuryo-sei (Chinese legal and administrative codes 律令). He argues that the East Asian world developed in two periods; a period of political development from Western Han (2nd century B.C.) to the end of the Tang (early 10th century), followed by a period dominated by economic interactions from Northern Song (10th century) to late Qing (the end of 19th century). Nishijima's periodisation of East Asian history is more or less compatible with

Theodore de Bary’s periodisation of East Asian civilisations⁵⁸, in which he classifies Nishijima’s first period as the Buddhist and the second period as Neo-Confucian, though the chronology of the beginning and the end for each period differs somewhat from periodization of Nishijima. There is certainly a consensus that an age of Neo-Confucianism dominated from the 14th century onwards until the end of the 19th century.

The 500-year peace in East Asia stands in stark contrast to Europe. The period is unique, not only for the relative scarcity of inter-state warfare (by *any* definition), but also by the revival of East Asian high culture, it was a time when China as well as in other sinic states such as Japan, Korea, Vietnam and Ryukyu, produced their highest achievements in regard to art, literature and Confucianism. Vernacular writing and urban popular culture flourished during the same period, the use and the proficiency of classical Chinese writing extended its widest reach in history. It is important to bear in mind that Europe during the same period witnessed the decline of Latin as lingua franca as national vernacular languages came to dominate. A case in point is the greatest Japanese Confucian scholar and philosopher, Ogyu Sorai 荻生徂徠, who was known for his fascination with things Chinese. Nor was he alone. This was the *Zeitgeist* of Japanese society in the beginning of the 18th century. However, his writings in classical Chinese constitute no more than 50 or 60 percent of his output. Roughly a century later, Rai Sanyo 頼山陽 (1780-1832) became widely known for his *Nihon gaishi* (Unofficial History of Japan) and *Nihon seiki* (A Political Chronicle of Japan). Both books are *tenno* (emperor)-centric history-cum-political treatises of Japan, and are written entirely in classical Chinese. Another well-known figure mentioned earlier, Aizawa Seishisai 会沢正志斎 (1781-1863) penned his masterpiece, *Shinron* (New Treatise 新論, 1825), which popularised the term *kokutai* (national polity 国体), in classical Chinese. By most accounts⁵⁹, these two authors propelled the development of Japanese nationalism in general and ultra-nationalism in particular.

In the 17th and 18th century, the cultural exchanges between China and other sinic states began to shift from a one-way street running from China to other sinic states, to a multi-lane, multilateral, and multi-directional system connecting Japan to Korea and China, Vietnam to China, Korea and Ryukyu, Korea to Japan, Ryukyu and China, and Ryukyu to Japan and Korea. The exchanges of poems composed in classical Chinese and disseminated by the diplomatic corps on missions from Vietnam, Korea and Ryukyu, were extensive.⁶⁰ The most prominent development of the period was the surge of Japanese intellectual attainment and its spread to China, Korea, Ryukyu and finally Vietnam in the second half of the 19th century.

This trend began with the scholarly achievements of aforementioned Ogyu Sorai (1666-1728). By the end of the 18th century, Sorai’s works had spread to both China and Korea; in China, Sorai’s interpretation of Confucius’s Analects, *Rongo-cho* 論語微, became very influential and was incorporated in Liu Baonan’s (1791-1855) *Lunyu jishi* (Collected Interpretations of the Analects) and Sorai’s disciple’s Yamanoi Tei’s *Shichiikeimou-shikoubun* (Textual Examinations of Seven Classics and Mencius 七經孟子考文) was

even included in Siku quanshu (the Complete Collection of the Books of Four Genres 四庫全書).⁶¹ In Korea, previously Japan was scorned for lack of cultural sophistication and Confucian propriety, Chong Tasan 丁茶山 (1762-1836), the most profound and most learned Confucian scholar in the 18th century Korea, came to admire Sorai and in particular, Sorai's another student, Dazai Shundai (1680-1747) tremendously.⁶²

Japanese intellectual leadership in East Asia became very pronounced and widely recognised towards the end of the 19th century when Japanese translations of the Western concepts were to be adopted en masse by Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese. To name a few, the Western words such as politics (seiji, 政治), economics (keizai, 經濟), society (shakai, 社会), religion (shukyo, 宗教), philosophy (tetsugaku, 哲学), ethics (rinri, 倫理), and many more were all translated by Japanese Confucian or Confucian-trained scholars in last forty years of the 19th century and the first quarter of the 20th century.⁶³

The very first translation of Rousseau's *Social Contract* was translated into classical Chinese by a prominent liberal Confucian-trained thinker in the Meiji period, Nakae Chomin. Chomin's rendition was likely read by many Chinese and Korean scholars and students in Japan during that time. In short, these cultural exchanges were conducted under the premise of 'this culture of ours'. Unfortunately, the moment this East Asian cultural identity developed, and was embraced and ardently cherished by many in East Asia, it was challenged and dismissed by Japan's own search for a separate political and cultural identity from the rest of East Asia. This process was summarised by Fukuzawa Yukichi, the person still on the 10000 yen note, in his polemical editorial titled 'Leaving Asia' (Datsu-a-ron).

VI. When Culture Meets Politics or When Harry Met Sally

In the foregoing sections, I have discussed the formation of several East Asian regional political groupings and identities, and traced the development of a regional cultural identity with a smaller geographical coverage than its political counterpart. I show how the term "Asia" came into everyday use and began to shape how people in this part of the world saw themselves. I have stressed that the interplay between politics and culture, and conversely between political identity and cultural identity, is complex, shifting and often resistant to sweeping generalisations.

Political identity throughout the period, 1368-1895, was mainly hierarchical and bilateral, with a few near-equal multilateral interactions on the side. In other words, regional and national political identity in East Asia was mainly derived from the tributary state's relation to China and China's tribute system, rather from directly from its relation with other tributary states. Multilateral interactions remained meagre and insufficient to overpower the bilateral, multi-state international system driven by China. Japan's own version of the tributary system was not borne out of necessity. It mimicked China's tribute system in the name of the glory and awe of the Tokugawa bakufu (*kougi no goikou* 公儀の御威光)⁶⁴ and was not even sub-regional grouping in any genuine sense. Whilst Vietnam's tributary system in

mainland Southeast Asia resembled the one created by China rhetorically, it was part of a Vietnamese attempt to incorporate the territories of Cambodia and Laos in competition against Siam.

In the cases of investiture, high cultural identification went hand in hand with high political identification; a situation was most obviously true in the case of Korea and Ryukyu. However, it was not always so. In the case of Japan for most part of the 500-year period in question, and Vietnam from time to time or even Korea prior to the 14th century⁶⁵, high cultural identification did not necessarily generate high political identification with China-centred international order. In other words, while high cultural identification does, on many occasions, lead to high political identification, it may also produce political antagonism, indifference and resistance. Furthermore, the level of political identification does change over time for reasons too complex to be reduced to culture or cultural identity. As Charles Tilly has written, political identification is relational and collective and thus subject to constant validation.⁶⁶

On the other hand, what makes the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1590's illuminating with regard to political identity is that a non-Sinic country in mainland Southeast Asia far away from Korea, Siam, volunteered to defend (with China) a fellow tributary (albeit sinic) state in the interest of maintaining the security of China-centred tributary system. This clearly demonstrates that a country with modest or low cultural identification with other countries in the same regional group can still have high political identification with the countries within the system. Lack of cultural identification does not dampen the motivation to defend collective norms and interests. Japan's manipulation of pan-Asian sentiments, as well as Japan's exploitation of common East Asian cultural identity—a cultural heritage of many tranquil and prosperous centuries illustrates how national political interest and national political identity overwhelmed the role of East Asian culture and cultural identity after the end of the 19th century.

From the 14th century to the 17th century, 'East Asian' cultural identity shifted from a bilateral, one way relationship from China to tributary states, to a pattern of multilateral and increasingly equal interactions. As a result, Japan superseded China as a regional intellectual leader by the end of the 19th century. This transformation greatly enriched the sense of belonging to a common high culture based on classical Chinese and Neo-Confucianism, the so-called 'this culture of ours' (斯文), shared by many in Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Ryukyu and China. This shared identity later underpinned many of the various forms of Asianism or Asian political solidarity and integration that arose in the region. However, in the end, 'this culture of ours' failed to sustain any lasting political identity, let alone any political alliance in the face of the Western onslaught and a rising, ambitious Japan. With the dissolution of the Japanese empire in 1945, the last great political patron of 'this culture of ours' was gone. By the 1970's, 'this culture of ours' had become a distant memory, securely buried under respective nationalist discourses and histories for the sake of modernization and national pride.

Huntington assumes that high cultural identification generates high political identification.⁶⁷ In this paper I show that the relations between cultural and political identifications are far more complex, fleeting and are subject to constant negotiation than Huntington recognises. The clash of civilizations is thus hyperbole, un-grounded in history and not likely to bear up under scrutiny in the future. On the other hand, sceptics of East Asian integration often remark on the cultural and political diversity in the region and argue that that diversity is an impediment to regional political integration.⁶⁸ This paper demonstrates that regional/cross-border political identification does not necessarily rest on regional/cross-border cultural identification, though high degree of cultural similarities does enhance the cohesion of political identification. On the other hand, political antagonism does tend to exist between countries with high degree of cultural similarities. This argument is summarised by Figure 1:

Political Identification with China

High

<u>High political identification, low cultural identification</u> e.g.: Siam, Sulu, Champa (Ming) , Brunei(Ming) and Malacca (Ming)	<u>High political and cultural identification</u> e.g.: Korea, Ryukyu and Vietnam (Ming)
<u>Low political and cultural identification</u> e.g.: Burma, Cambodia(Zhenla) (Ming) and Laos (Nanzhang) (Qing)	<u>High cultural identification, low political identification</u> e.g.: Japan and Vietnam (Qing)

Cultural Identification with China

Low

High

Figure 1. Regional Political vs. Cultural identification

However, that the power of ‘imagined communities’, to borrow the phrase from Benedict Anderson⁶⁹, or nation-states, so to speak, still trumps any regional cultural and political identities today, is abundantly evident in East Asia. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine, only several years ago, stands as a reminder of how regional solidarity can be decimated overnight. While we can rest assured that this Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, will not visit the Shrine, we cannot know if there will be no visits by the Japanese Prime Minister in the future. We cannot know if Japan truly rethinks its position in Asia and embrace a common future that was once corrupted and then abandoned.

Equally, if not more patently so, the ultimate responsibility rests with China—a rising

power returning to the centre of regional and global politics. Will China endeavour to promote regional peace, stability and prosperity? Or will it let its obsession with national issues get in the way? What will be China’s vision for a common East Asian future? Will China lead the region and the world into true inter-civilisational conflicts? Or rather, will China bridge various parts of the world to create a truly global future and an authentic universal civilisation?

Acknowledgements

This paper began from my participation in the two “Commerce and Perpetual Peace” workshops at King’s College, Cambridge in December 2008 and July 2009 organised by Istvan Hont and Issac Nakhimovsky. I drew inspirations and hints from lively discussions of the workshops. I would like express my gratitude to Istvan for his intellectual guidance. The two trips to Cambridge were funded generously by the Research Center for Global Welfare, Chiba University and Center for Minority Studies, Kansai University respectively. I would like to thank Masaya Kobayashi of Chiba University, and Nobuo Kochu and Masataka Yasutake of Kansai University for their support. Both centers funded my research for this paper. This paper was first presented in the International Conference on East Asia as a Regional International Society on the 3rd and 4th of May, 2010 at the National Cheng-Kung University, Tainan, Taiwan. I would like to thank Manto Leung for his invitation and Ying-Wen Tsai for his introduction to Manto. I also benefited from Ken Yonehara’s comments in the same conference. Afterwards, I received a number of most helpful suggestions and corrections from Gregory Noble. Last, but not the least, I would like to thank Tim Sturgeon for rendering the text more readable. As in a customary disclaimer, all faults remain categorically mine.

Notes

¹ When under siege in K’uang, the Master (Confucius) said, ‘With King Wen dead, is not culture (wen) invested here in me? If Heaven intends this culture of ours to be destroyed, those who come after me will not be able to have any part of it. If Heaven does not intend this culture of ours to be destroyed, then what can the men of K’uang do to me’. The Analects, IX.5. 論語子罕第九 子畏於匡。曰。文王既沒。文不在茲乎。天之將喪斯文也。後死者。不得與於斯文也。天之未喪斯文也。匡人其如予何。 Also see Peter K. Bol, *This Culture of Ours: Intellectual Transitions in T’ang and Sung China* (California: Stanford University Press, 1992) for an articulate narrative of certain rising new intellectual trends in Tang and Song China which came to define ‘this culture of ours’ in sinic East Asia from the 11th century onwards until the beginning of the 20th century.

² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p.20.

³ Ibid., pp.81-91.

⁴ Ibid., pp.45-48.

⁵ Ibid., chapter 6-11.

⁶ Ibid., pp.304-306.

⁷ See Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999) for an exquisite exposition of ‘international society’; the usage of international society in this paper is loosely based on his outlines. For updated and learned debates on the notion of international society, see Andrew Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), especially, Chapter 1, 2 3 and 12.

⁸ Constructivism and the English school offer a more promising prospect of unlocking the culture-politics nexus, but its application to historical Asia or East Asia remains sparse. David Kang, *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), “War and Peace in Early Modern East Asia: Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems”, *The Research Group in International Security Working Paper 25* (2008) noticed the ‘uniqueness’ of the historical East Asian order without explicating the role of culture or Confucianism in shaping it. For a fuller account, see his latest book: *East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Giovanni Arrighi, *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of Twenty-First Century* (London: Verso, 2007), chapter 11’s approach is mainly a political economy analysis from a world-system perspective. Peter Katzenstein’s studies often concentrate on unit level, not structural or systemic level. On the other hand, realist approach to the study of historical East Asia has been prominent in recent years with some impressive results, such as Victoria Tin-bor Hui, *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), Yuan-kang Wang, *Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) and Zhang Feng, “Rethinking the ‘Tribute System’: Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics”, *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2, (2009), pp.545–574.

⁹ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD990-1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p.61.

¹⁰ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, p.21.

¹¹ The term, Tianxia was, to the best my knowledge, never used in connection with Asia, unlike the term, shijie (the world) which includes Asia, and later came to replace tianxia. Tianxia did not go out of fashion until the early 20th century, probably in 1905, see Quantao Jin and Qing-feng Liu, *Guannianshi yanjiu-Zhongguo xiandai zhongyao zhengzhi shuyi de xingchen* (Beijing: Law Press, 2009), chapter 6.

¹² *The History of the Later Han (Hou Hanshu 後漢書)* (1984 年、宏業書局)

¹³ *The Record of History (Shiji 史記)* (1982 年、中華書局)

¹⁴ *The Book of Han (Han shu 漢書)* (1992 年、宏業書局)

¹⁵ For a fascinating study of Zheng He’s voyages and the international and domestic politics of Ming China, see Masakatsu Miyazaki, *Teiwa no nankai daiensei: eirakutei no sekai chitsujyo*

saihen (Tokyo: Chuou kouronsha, 1997). 宮崎正勝「鄭和の南海大遠征－永楽帝の世界秩序再編」(1997 年、中央公論社)

¹⁶ *Ming Huidian (MHD) Wanli edition-The Assemble Canon of the Ming* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989) 「明會典 萬歷朝重修本」(1989 年、中華書局)

¹⁷ Benjamin A. Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China 1550-1990* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005), p.127.

¹⁸ Hirotada Kawamura, *Kinsei nihon no sekaizou* (Tokyo: Perikansha), pp 60-71. 川村博忠「近世日本の世界像」(2003 年、ペリかん社) 60-71 頁

¹⁹ Weizhen Zhu (ed.), *Limadou zhongwenzhuyiji* (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2001), p.219 and pp.242-244. 朱維錚主編「利瑪竇中文著譯集」(2001 年、香港城市大學出版社)219 頁、242-244 頁

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.225.

²¹ *Ming Shi (MS)-The History of the Ming* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974)「明史」(1974 年、中華書局)

²² *Ming Huidian (MHD)-The Assemble Canon of the Ming*, pp.8279-8627.

²³ *Da Qing Huidian (DQHD)-The Assembled Canon of the Great Qing* 「大清會典」

²⁴ Elman, *On Their Own Terms*, pp.131-132.

²⁵ Joken further separated sinic countries such as Vietnam, Ryukyu, Korea, Japan and China from the rest of Asia. He described these sinic countries as the countries that used Chinese characters and had three main religions/teachings (三教)

²⁶ Kawamura, *Kinsei nihon no sekaizou*, pp.93-97.

²⁷ Koichiro Matsuda, *Edo no chishiki kara meiji no seiji e* (Tokyo: Perikansha, 2008), pp.193-196. 松田宏一郎「江戸の知識から明治の政治へ」(2008 年、ペリかん社) 193-196 頁

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.199.

²⁹ John K. Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp.1-12.

³⁰ Fawu Zhu, *A Preliminary Discussion on the Establishment of Yuan's Tribute System and the Changes in Yuan's Foreign Policy* in Shangshen Chen, *Confucian Civilization and Traditional China Foreign Relation* (Shandong: Shandong University Press: 2008), pp.170-178. 朱法武「簡論元代封貢體制的建立及外交政策的變化」in 陳尚勝「儒家文明與中國傳統對外關係」(2008 年、山東大學出版社) 170-178 頁

³¹ *Ming Shi Lu Leizuan Shewai Shiliao juan (MSLLZSS)-The Veritable Record of the Ming :Volume on Foreign Relations*, edited by Li Guoxiang (Wuhan: Wuhan Chubanshe, 1991), p.78. 李國祥主編「明實錄類纂：涉外史料卷」(1991 年、武漢出版社) 78 頁

³² *Ibid.*, p.419.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.552.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.552-553.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.421.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.827.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.834.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.866.

³⁹ Yuan-Kang Wang, *Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp.209-215 and pp.223-232.

⁴⁰ *Ancestral Instruction (Huangming zuxun 皇明祖訓) in The Collected Statutes of Imperial Ming (Huangming zhi shu 皇明製書)* (Kyoto: Koten kenkyukai, 1967)「皇明製書 下卷」(1967年、京都：古典研究会)

⁴¹ Xiaonan Deng, *Zuzong zhi fa-Bei song qianqi zhengzhi lueshu -Ancestral Laws: A Brief Outline of Politics in the Early Northern Song Dynasty* (Beijing: Sanlian, 2006) 鄧小南 「祖宗之法-北宋前期政治述略」(2006年、三聯書店)

⁴² *Ming Shi (MS)-The History of the Ming*, p.53. (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1974) 明史 (1974年、中華書局)

⁴³ *Ming Shi Lu Leizuan (MSLLZ)-The Veritable Record of the Ming-Diplomacy*, p.571.

⁴⁴ *Mingshi Jishi benmo* (明史紀事本末) in *Lidai jishi benmo* (歷代紀事本末) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), pp.356-357. 「明史紀事本末」 in 「歷代紀事本末」 (1997年、中華書局) 356-357頁

⁴⁵ In reality, Korean and Ryukyuan members of the tribute missions in both Ming and Qing periods were rather free to roam in Beijing, a special privilege accorded in recognition of both countries' high degree of political identification (with China and the tribute system) and high degree of cultural similarities and attainments.

⁴⁶ *Da Qing Tongli (DQTL)-The Comprehensive Rites for the Great Qing* (Jilin chubanjituan, 2005) (欽定大清通禮 吉林出版集團 2005)

⁴⁷ *MS*, pp.8282-8283, and *MSLLZSS*, pp. 101-103.

⁴⁸ Alexander Barton Woodside, *Vietnam and the Chinese model (East Asia)* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp.120-121. Also see *Qing Shi Gao (QSG)-The Draft History of the Qing*, pp.14642-14643. (Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1977) 清史稿 (1977 中華書局)

⁴⁹ *DQHD juan* 56, pp.512-513, it lists three countries, Korea, Ryukyu and, Vietnam that received imperial investiture envoys, and *DQTL, juan* 43, pp.437-440, for a very details description of the investiture ceremony with regard to Korea, Ryukyu and Vietnam.

⁵⁰ Hironori Wada, 1. *Shin/Gen ryocho no chokou kankei no tokushitsu* in Chapter 9: *Gen cho chuki no shin tono kankei(1840-1885): Ahen senso kara shinfutsu senso made* in Tatsurou Yamamoto (ed.), *Betonamu chugoku kankeishi: Kyokushi no daitou kara shinfutsu sensou made* (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1975), pp.552-559. 和田博徳 第九章「阮朝中期の清との関係：アヘン戦争から清仏戦争まで」第一節「清・阮両朝の朝貢関係の特質」(山本達郎編「ベトナム中国関係史：曲氏の抬頭から清仏戦争まで」(1975年、山川出版社)、552-559頁。The precise dating of downgrading the rank and nature of the investiture remains to be determined. Wada attributes it to the end of the Qianlong period (late 18th century). It is fair to say by the early 19th century, the new practice (different from what was prescribed in DQHD) had firmly come into effect, see Gong Zizhen, a well-known Qing official and literati in the early 19th century, who worked on matters concerning tributary states wrote in 'zhugesi shulue' (A brief description of the Department of Managing Foreign Guests) that the practice of sending the civil commissioner of Guanxi to Vietnam began in the Jiaqing period (reign:1796-1820), in Gong Zizhen Quanj, pp.118-119. (Shanghai:Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1999) (龔自珍全集)(主客司述略)(1999年、上海古籍出版社)

⁵¹ *Mingshi jishi benmo* (明史紀事本末) in *Lidai jishi benmo* (歷代紀事本末), pp.963-981.

⁵² Hyung Il Pai, *Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Araeology, Historiography and Racial Myth in Korean State-formation Theories* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), especially chapter 5 and 6, and Charles Holcombe, *The Genesis of East Asia, 221 B.C.-A.D. 907* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001).

⁵³ Pamela Kyle Crossley, *The Manchus* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) and *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (California: University of California Press, 2002).

⁵⁴ Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*. (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).

⁵⁵ Satoshi Hirano, *Shin teikoku to chibetto mondai: taminzoku tougou no seiritsu to gakkai* (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2004) 平野聡「清帝国とチベット問題 - 多民族統合の成立と瓦解」(2004 年、名古屋大学出版会)

⁵⁶ Sadao Nishijima, *Chugoku kodai kokka to higashi ajia sekai* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1983) 西嶋定生「中国古代国家と東アジア世界」(1983 年、東京大学出版会), *Nihon rekishi no kokusai kankyo* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1985) 「日本歴史の国際環境」(1985 年、東京大学出版会), *Kodai higashi ajia sekai to nihon*, ed. by Son-Shi Li (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2000) 「古代東アジア世界と日本」(李成市編、2000 年、岩波書店)

⁵⁷ Takeshi Hamashita, Heita Kawakatsu (eds.), *Ajia kouekiken to nihon kougyoka, 1500-1900* (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2001) 浜下武志・川勝平太編「アジア交易圏と日本工業化 1500-1900」(2001 年、藤原書店), Takeshi Hamashita, *The Intra-regional System in East Asia in Modern Times* in Peter J. Katzenstein, Takashi Shiraishi (eds.), *Network Power: Japan and Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

⁵⁸ Wm Theodore De Bary, *East Asian Civilizations: A Dialogue in Five Stages* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988), Chapter 2 and 3.

⁵⁹ For instance, see new edition of Masao Maruyama, *Nihon seiji shisoushi kenkyu* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1983) 丸山真男「日本政治思想史研究」(1983 年、東京大学出版会)

⁶⁰ See Liam C. Kelley, *Beyond the Bronze Pillars: Envoy Poetry and the Sino-Vietnamese Relationship* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005) for a thorough study of Vietnamese tribute envoy to China and they exchanged poems in classical Chinese with Korean, Chinese and Ryukyuan.

⁶¹ Roy Andrew Miller, “Some Japanese Influences on Chinese Classical Scholarship of the Ch’ing Period”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1952), pp. 56-67.

⁶² Woo-Bong Ha, *Chosen jitsugakusha no mita kinsei nihon* (Translated by Atsushi Inoue) (Tokyo: Perikansha, 2001), pp.256-316. 河宇鳳(訳: 井上厚史)「朝鮮実学者の見た近世日本」(2001 年、ぺりかん社)

⁶³ Shinichi Yamamuro, *Shisou kadai toshiteno ajia: kijiku, rensa, touki* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001) 山室信一「思想課題としてのアジア - 基軸・連鎖・投企」(2001 年、岩波書店)

⁶⁴ Hiroshi Watanabe, “Goikou’ to shocho: Tokugawa seiji taisai no ichisokumen (rekishi ni okeru bunka - sharivari, shocho, girei)” “The Symbols and Rituals of Shogunal Authority in the

Tokugawa Period”, *Shisou*, Vol. 740 (1986), pp.132-154. 渡辺浩「御威光」と象徴 - 徳川政治体制の一側面 (歴史における文化 - シャリヴァリ・象徴・儀礼) (1986 年、思想 740) 132-154 頁

⁶⁵ Peter I. Yun, *Rethinking the Tribute System: Korean States and Northeast Asian Interstates Relations, 600-1600* (PhD Dissertation for East Asian Languages and Cultures, California: UCLA, 1998).

⁶⁶ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD990-1992*, p.61.

⁶⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.

⁶⁸ For an overview, see Gregory W. Noble, “Japanese and American Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 8*, 247.262 (2008).

⁶⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).