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# Thomas Mann on Irrationality and Truth

Yoshiko Hayami

## Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine Thomas Mann's views on two key issues of the intellectual and political history of early twentieth-century Europe: irrationality and truth. This article focuses on two episodes from two novels from Thomas Mann's 'Weimar era', namely 'Snow' from *Der Zauberberg* (1924) and 'Journey to Hell' from *Joseph und seine Brüder: Die Geschichten Jaakobs* (1933). I argue that the episodes 'Snow' and 'Journey to Hell' provide major insights into Thomas Mann's stance towards the themes of irrationality and truth and thus enable us to better assess his position in the intellectual and political landscape of the Weimar Republic. In analysing the two episodes, I place special emphasis on how Thomas Mann used story-telling as a medium to probe the questions of irrationality and truth. Finally I compare the views of Thomas Mann to the views of contemporary intellectuals such as Max Weber, Walter Benjamin, Karl Mannheim and Erich Kahler to illumine Thomas Mann's place in the intellectual context of the time.

“Now it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just as I have described it, but that this or something like it is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal, I think he may properly and worthily venture to believe; for the venture is well worth while; and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms, which is the reason why I have been lengthening out the story so long.”<sup>1</sup>

Plato, *Phaedo*, 114D

## I. Introduction

The purpose of this article is to examine Thomas Mann's views on two key issues of the intellectual and political history of early twentieth-century Europe: irrationality and

truth.<sup>2</sup> My paper focuses on two episodes from two novels from Thomas Mann's 'Weimar era', namely 'Snow' (Schnee; written in 1921-23)<sup>3</sup> from *Der Zauberberg* (1924) and 'Journey to Hell' (Höllenfahrt; written in 1926-27)<sup>4</sup> from *Joseph und seine Brüder: Die Geschichten Jaakobs* (1933). I argue that the episodes 'Snow' and 'Journey to Hell' provide major insights into Thomas Mann's stance towards the themes of irrationality and truth and thus enable us to better assess his position in the intellectual and political landscape of the Weimar Republic.

After a brief survey on background, I analyse the two episodes. In this context, I place special emphasis on how Thomas Mann used story-telling as a medium to probe the questions of irrationality and truth. Finally I compare the views of Thomas Mann to the views of contemporary intellectuals such as Max Weber, Walter Benjamin, Karl Mannheim and Erich Kahler. I should stress that my objective in this paper is not to explore the direct influences of these thinkers on Thomas Mann or vice versa. Rather, I draw attention to their views to illumine Thomas Mann's place in the intellectual context of the time.

I begin with some general information about the political and philosophical background of the period. In 1922 Thomas Mann reported in an American journal the intellectual situation in Germany after its defeat in the First World War as follows.

We are an uprooted people. The catastrophes which have befallen us; [...] the stormiest of experiences have set the national mind in a key-up state such as it had not known for a long time. [...] Everything is in a condition of flux. The natural sciences which, it seemed at the turn of the century, had nothing left to do but certify and elaborate what was already discovered, stand in all points at the beginnings of something new; their revolutionary fantastic must make it hard indeed for the investigator to remain cold-blooded, and they produce a popular repercussion far and wide among the laity. The arts are lying at a complete crisis which sometimes threatens to lead towards extinction and at other times lets us look to the possible creation of new forms. Problems flow into one another; we cannot keep them apart, cannot exist simply as politicians without knowing something about things of the mind, nor as aesthetes, as "pure artists," content to let all matters of social consciousness go hang. The question of man himself, of which all the others are merely facets and side-issues, never stood more ominously, more imperatively, before the eyes of those who take life earnestly. [...] Reading has become a passion. And it is not done to amuse or to lull, but in the search for spiritual weapons and in the interest of truth.<sup>5</sup>

In such a period where "everything is in a condition of flux," as Thomas Mann stated, the question of how the irrationality of the world, which human reason cannot grasp completely, may still be accessible to the human senses was frequently raised among philosophers and social and natural scientists in the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century.<sup>6</sup>

In a lecture in 1934 the German physicist Werner Heisenberg, known for the uncer-

tainty principle of quantum theory, reminded his audience of an old question, namely whether it was possible to grasp reality by thought. He maintained that natural sciences were bringing epoch making changes. The old classical empirical rationalistic physics would be replaced by a new kind of physics which would take into account the inevitable destabilizing elements of observation.<sup>7</sup> In the same year, the German historian of philosophy Heinz Heimsoeth asserted that after an anti-metaphysical century, in which a rationalistic relationship had been the first priority, synthesis between the whole dynamic existence of human experiences and sciences was needed in the twentieth century.<sup>8</sup>

These two examples may be seen from a broader historical perspective as a reaction against Enlightenment rationalism as well as against the empirical methods and a mechanical world-image of natural sciences prevalent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In these times it was widely believed that with the progress of science, human reason would be able to grasp the world of phenomena. Certainly, this reaction had already begun with Romanticism and had been backed up by the intellectuals who developed critical feelings against the situation where existing life styles and value systems were melting down because of rapid industrialization. However, as a consequence of the defeat in the First World War, the existing value systems and life styles were completely collapsed and the interest in 'irrationality and truth' became widespread in German society in the Weimar era. The question appeared either in the form of 'the hunger for wholeness' (Peter Gay) or in the form of an interest in the origins of humankind and the world.<sup>9</sup> The 'philosophy of life' gained ground. Freud's concept of 'unconsciousness' was in the spotlight. Many mystic or rather occult societies were formed.<sup>10</sup> 'Monism' or 'social Darwinism', in which uncontrollable natural laws and the instinct of human beings were emphasized, became popular.<sup>11</sup>

All these developments attest to the increasing appeal of anti-rational ways of thinking.<sup>12</sup> It is broadly believed that the growth of anti-rationalism in the Weimar era conduced to the rise of National Socialism. Firstly, the distrust of human reason and of the Enlightenment was antagonistic towards the democratic and parliamentary government of the Weimar Republic, the image of which was associated with rationalism and Enlightenment traditions. As a result, people turned to National Socialism in order to overturn the discredited republic.<sup>13</sup> Secondly, the distrust of existing value judgements, such as Christianity, humanism of liberal tradition, faith in historical progress and confidence in positivistic sciences, allowed people to blindly believe in the irrational and intuitive 'decisions' or 'proclamations' of National Socialism. The last thing to be denied was, people felt, biological elements of human being or inescapable natural laws like racial theory.<sup>14</sup> Seen from this perspective, National Socialism captured the minds of people precisely because it offered a sort of answer both to the desire for totality and the interest in the origins of humankind. In addition, because it would have appeared that there were no other alternatives to satisfy these interests than anti-rational thinking ways.

During the Weimar Republic and the following period, intellectuals who recognized the danger posed by the rising anti-rational thinking ways attempted to turn the widespread

interest in irrationality into a weapon against anti-rationalism which was converged to National Socialism later on. As a novelist active in this age Thomas Mann (1875-1955) struggled with this theme as well.

## II. Thomas Mann's Views

### 1. Coming Value Judgments

Thomas Mann started to issue warnings against the rising anti-rationalism, by calling attention to its tendency to result in anti-human politics already in the early 1920s. While in 1919 he had been sympathetic towards a group, the thinking of which displayed irrational tendencies, the course of events made him soon change his mind.<sup>15</sup> In a letter in 1922, he confessed that the assassination of the Jewish foreign minister Walther Rathenau woke him up to the dangers of anti-rational ways of thinking.<sup>16</sup> In his 'Von Deutscher Republik' (1922) and in subsequent essays and lectures he explicitly supported the Weimar Republic and voiced his concern about the anti-rationalism of such contemporaries as Oswald Spengler and Alfred Baeumler.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, during the 1930s he argued that anti-rationalism provided spiritual support to National Socialism.<sup>18</sup>

Although strongly denouncing anti-rational ways of thinking, however, Thomas Mann did not yet completely abandon his earlier sympathy for irrationalism, which, in his eyes, was associated with the themes of death, Eros, sickness, past and Romanticism; Thomas Mann had been intrigued by these themes since his youth. In his view, an interest in the irrational elements of humankind and the world was an appropriate reaction against the naïve world view of progressivism of the previous century.<sup>19</sup> Thomas Mann rejected the notion of an alternative decision between rationalism and irrationalism and tried to distinguish between anti-rationalism and irrationalism with enlightenment intentions.<sup>20</sup> As he grappled with these questions, he expressed his belief in the advent of a new humanity (X 299ff., 335ff.).<sup>21</sup> The search for this new humanity forms the main subject of novels he writes in the Weimar era, *Der Zauberberg* and *Joseph und seine Brüder: Die Geschichten Jaakobs*.

Both novels address the same fundamental question: what are the criteria for value judgments and for human beings in a time when past criteria have no more power and new ones have yet to appear? In his essay on *Joseph und seine Brüder* Thomas Mann gives information about the historical context of his two novels. According to Mann, it was a period of uncertainty, adventure and suffering when no one could neglect the "Frage des Menschen, das Problem der Humanität selbst" (XI 657).

Hans Castorp, the hero of *Der Zauberberg*, was trapped in a mountain-sanatorium at a time when "die Zeit auf die Frage Wozu? eine befriedigende Antwort wüsste" (III 50). Through his interaction with his fellow-inhabitants of the magic mountain he undergoes a long spiritual adventure called "Regieren." As the author put it later on in his 'Joseph und seine Brüder: ein Vortrag' (1942), his adventure is dominated by his question for human nature and humanity, the question "nach sich selbst, nach seinem Woher und Wohin, seinem

Wesen und Ziel, nach seiner Stellung im All, dem Geheimnis seiner Existenz, der ewigen Rätsel-Aufgabe der Humanität” (XI 658). This very question is also explored in *Joseph und seine Brüder*. In his essay ‘Fragment über das Religiöse’ in 1931 Thomas Mann clearly states that in the novel he was writing at the time he treated the same subject as in *Der Zauberberg*, “das humane Problem, das Rätsel des Menschen” (XI 425). The two episodes I will discuss are closely connected with this question and can be regarded as summaries of each novel.<sup>22</sup>

## 2. Summary of Two Episodes

### 2.1. ‘Snow’

The two episodes, ‘Snow’ and ‘Journey to Hell’, not only tackle the same question, but also display striking similarities in terms of content and structure.

Thus in *Der Zauberberg* the narrator describes the landscape of a snow mountain in which the hero loses his way. It is extremely monotonous like an ocean or a beach. There is “[die] Totenstille” (III 656, 659), “das Urschweigen”(III 657), “d[ie] Urstille”(III 658), and the life of every visitor is indifferently claimed. This atmosphere of ominous silence overlaps with the atmosphere of controversy over the nature of human being between Nafta and Settembrini, Castorp’s fellow-patients in the magic mountain. In both cases it leads to the “Weglose und Hochgefährliche” (III 659). Hans Castorp finds, therefore, the snow mountain to be a fitting stage for fighting out the problem of his confusing thoughts, an appropriate place for one with the mission of “Regieren” and who has to find the “betreffend Stand und Staat des Homo Dei” (III 659).

As he moves forward amid the snowstorm, Hans Castorp loses both his way as well as the sense of time. Under the influence of wine, he becomes stupefied, falls asleep and dreams a long dream about death, life and humanity. At first, he sees happy, polite people in a sunny land evoking the Mediterranean. Invited by a wink of one of them, Hans Castorp enters a temple behind the sunny landscape and watches two ugly, half-naked, old women devouring a child.

Horrified, he runs away and wakes up. Half asleep and half awake he feels that he has already known what he has dreamed. He conjectures he is only a small part of the great soul and people dream not only from their individual souls, but dream “anonym und gemeinsam” (III 684). Then, he reaches a well-known view:

Mir träumte vom Stande des Menschen und seiner höflich-verständigen und ehrerbietigen Gemeinschaft, hinter der im Tempel das grässliche Blutmahl sich abspielt. Waren sie so höflich und reizend zueinander, die Sonnenleute, im stillen Hinblick auf eben dies Grässliche? Das wäre eine feine und recht galante Folgerung, die sie da zögen!...Tod oder Leben – Krankheit, Gesundheit – Geist und Natur. Sind das wohl Widersprüche? Ich frage: sind das Fragen? Nein, es sind keine Fragen, und auch die

Frage nach ihrer Vornehmenheit ist keine. Die Durchgängerei des Todes ist im Leben, es wäre nicht Leben ohne sie, und in der Mitte ist des Homo Dei Stand – inmitten zwischen Durchgängerei und Vernunft. ... ..denn er [(der Mensch)] allein ist Vornehm, und nicht die Gegensätze. Der Mensch ist Herr der Gegensätze, sie sind durch ihn, und also ist er vornehmer als sie. Vornehmer als der Tod... Vornehmer als das Leben... ..Ich will dem Tode Treue halten in meinem Herzen, doch mich hell erinnern, dass Treue zum Tode und Gewesenen nur Bosheit und finstere Wollust und Menschenfeindschaft ist, bestimmt sie unser Denken und Regieren. *Der Mensch soll um der Güte und Liebe willen dem Tode keine Herrschaft einräumen über seine Gedanken.* (Italics original) (III 684ff.)

Then, he thinks that he has reached the very end of the dream and decides to wake up (III 686).<sup>23</sup> Waking up, he regains energy and hurries back to the sanatorium. In the evening he forgets all he dreamed.

## 2.2. ‘Journey to Hell’

*Joseph und seine Brüder*, an over 2000- page long novel, begins with the question: “Tief ist der Brunnen der Vergangenheit. Sollte man ihn nicht unergründlich nennen?” (IV 9). In ‘Journey to Hell’, the introduction to this novel the narrator seeks the origin of human beings and the cosmos. The well of the past, however, is too deep for him to reach its bottom, and every so called origin is only a relative one (IV 18).<sup>24</sup> Faced with the unlimited depth of the past, the narrator decides to be satisfied with a relative origin (IV 38f.).<sup>25</sup> So he says and starts to talk about the myth of soul, spirit and matter (IV 40ff.).

In the beginning the “soul” lived near god in the superior world peacefully and happily. Stupidly, however, driven by the desire to mingle with matter and to acquire form, the soul went down to the formless world of matter. Matter refused the soul. The soul, however, could not resign. Both of them suffer. Seeing their struggles god took pity of the soul and decided to help it. Namely, he created the form-world, and gave the soul a body. In this way human beings who consist of material and soul were created. However, at the same time, god also sent the “spirit” to the human beings. Its mission was to let the soul captured by matter regret and recover its original status. Once the mission of spirit would succeed and the soul would abandon its body, both the soul and the material would lose their forms and the world would disappear. With this, the narrator declares, we have reached the end of the story of soul and the end of the attempt of “>Zurück<” (IV 42). The “höchste Vergangenheit des Menschen” is clarified and the knowledge about death, the place of paradise and the original sin regain their “reine Wahrheitsform”(ibid.).

Dispatched by god, the spirit, however, started to be disgusted with its own role in the activities of the world. Finally, the soul supports the world with forms, driven by “unerlaubte Verliebtheit” (IV 44). Moreover, even god himself had sympathy and pity for the betrayal of the spirit, which in the end he allows. The narrator concludes by maintaining:

“Dies also wäre als geheime Möglichkeit und letzte Deutung der Lehre in Betracht zu ziehen” (IV 49).

### 3. Humanity

Having presented a brief summary of ‘Snow’ and ‘Journey to Hell’, I would like to suggest that at a first level, they both put forward the same image of humanity: they depict a world of blind, irrational desire, represented by the blood-feast in ‘Snow’ and by the soul’s longing for material form in ‘Journey to Hell’. Moreover, in both, reason is portrayed as regulating the world of irrationality and human beings are described as having both a rational and an irrational side. We can see this conception of humanity in the image of the people of the sun who overcome blind desire through self-control (‘Snow’) and in the image of the reason and god which criticize and at the same time affirm the soul’s desires (‘Journey to Hell’).

Thus Thomas Mann puts forward an image of humanity which, on the one hand, recognized the existence of irrationality and yet, on the other hand, did not reject the power of reason. As has been widely remarked in scholarship, this conception of humanity and of the world was considerably influenced by the metaphysics of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.<sup>26</sup> In Schopenhauer’s metaphysics the most important principle in the world is ‘a will to live’ as a blind, uncontrolled and chaotic impulse. This will has the tendency to split up into various individual forms, which represent the world of phenomena. The will is thus always a kind of desire which endeavours to construct the world. This desire can never be satisfied and so the world is a place of suffering, pain and unhappiness. Humankind is, however, able to escape from this pain by objectifying the worlds of will. The ability to notice the representative character of the world, namely the ability of aesthetic contemplation enables us to objectify the blind will.<sup>27</sup> Drawing on Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, Nietzsche analysed Greek tragedy. He employed the dichotomy between ‘apollonian’ and ‘dionysiac’ and suggested that the nature of tragedy consisted in the combination of form which belongs to the apollonian principle and music which belongs to dionysiac principle.<sup>28</sup>

This view of humanity, which consists in the middle position between irrationality and rationality, is also expressed as one between nature and reason and can often be seen in Thomas Mann’s essays and lectures in this period.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, it is often said that this idea of humanity played an important role as Thomas Mann formed the basis of his political stance in the Weimar era.<sup>30</sup>

### 4. Truth

#### 4.1. Universal Original Type

At a further level, both episodes employ a similar methodology in order to reach their insights concerning the nature of humanity. In other words an epistemological question, how to reach the ‘truth’, is the matter at issue here.



This becomes clearer if we take into account the fact that the snow-vision takes place just after a long controversy ('operationes spirituales' III 646ff.) between Nafta and Settembrini, patients representing intellectuals in the magic mountain, and that, as we have mentioned, the landscape of the snow mountain overlaps with their debate. Settembrini, takes a progressive view of history associated with scientific knowledge, especially evolutionism, and believes that the role of science is to offer means to purposes. With the intention of grasping the natural structure and therewith to rule it, he says the objective truth can emerge by deconstruction and reconstruction (see mainly: III 217ff., 337ff., 523ff.). On the contrary, Nafta thinks there is no objective knowledge, and that all knowledge is based on belief. According to him, the belief which knowledge should be based on is the unique position of human beings in the cosmos (see mainly: III 550ff., 959ff.). And the unique position of humankind should be found in the conflict between nature and transcendental spirit. It is, therefore, to be expected that the snow vision provides an answer to this epistemological question.

Both episodes, 'Snow' and 'Journey to Hell', show a third possibility beyond Settembrini's scientific positivism or Nafta's religious voluntarism. They make a point of neither following 'scientific' methods such as observation of phenomena or examination of historical facts, nor following voluntary decision. Rather, they incline towards the position that there is a universal original type which human beings should regard as their norm in the world of irrationality like dream and intoxication (III 684ff., IV 38f.).

Let us recall the parallels in the structure of the two episodes. In 'Snow' Hans Castorp loses his way in the endless snow mountain, a location with overtones of death (III 656ff.). He falls asleep and has a dream. In his dream he sees a vision about human nature and regards it as the norm of humankind. He survives, wakes up and goes back to the sanatorium. When he arrives, he immediately forgets his vision. In 'Journey to Hell' the narrator loses his way in the course of an endless quest for the beginning of history (IV 18ff.). The metaphor of the 'bottom of the well' is used to describe it and to designate it as a place of death, hell. The narrator abandons the search for historical facts and instead tells a myth about human nature and this is regarded as the norm of humankind. The narrator comes back from the bottom of the well and starts to talk about Joseph (IV 49).

In both cases, the narrator, first of all, leads the readers into a kind of 'vague atmosphere' on the long way of seeking the truth and the beginning of humanity. Then, he leaves the realm of time by means of a dream or a myth, and develops the views of humanity described above on the basis of Schopenhauer's metaphysics. At the same time he declares that with this knowledge he has arrived at the final destination of the exploration. What is more, he considers this final destination as the norm for the future world as well as the universal type of the past world.

The idea that mythical things are typical and normative is repeated in other lectures and essays, such as 'Die Einheit des Menschengestirns' (X 751ff.), 'Joseph und seine Brüder: Ein Vortrag' (XI 656ff.).<sup>31</sup> Most important among these is a lecture held in 1936, 'Freud und

die Zukunft'. In this lecture Thomas Mann expresses his admiration for Freud for showing that reason and spirit were dominated by instinct and will as Schopenhauer had done (IX 484ff.). He then shifts the subject to myth (IX 492ff.). As is well-known, in his *Totem und Tabu* in 1912 Sigmund Freud expounded the method of psychoanalysis, in which unconsciousness is brought to consciousness by going back to the personal childhood, for understanding of history of humankind.<sup>32</sup> According to Thomas Mann, the concept of 'depth' in depth psychology has three different connotations. It is, firstly, the part of personal soul at every present moment, secondly, childhood in every personal history, and finally, origins in the history of human kind. Thomas Mann calls this origin original time, "Urzeit, jene Brunnentiefe der Zeiten, wo der Mythos zu Hause ist und die Urnormen, Urformen des Lebens gründet" (IX 493). In this depth of unconsciousness Myth plays the role "das zeitlose Schema, die fromme Formel, in die das Leben eingeht, indem es aus dem Unbewussten seine Züge reproduziert" just like a dream (IX 493). Such a form in myth is regarded as "der Blick für die höhere Wahrheit, die sich im Wirklichen darstellt, das lächelnde Wissen vom Ewigen, Immerseienden, Gültigen..." (IX 493).

Mann emphasised that this ultimate view of the world and of humanity cannot be reached by any scientific methods and that it exists in a sphere separated from daily life. This is why this insight into the nature of humanity is immediately forgotten in daily life by Hans Castorp in 'Snow' and why it is presented just as a relative beginning and finality from the standpoint of history in 'Journey to Hell'.<sup>33</sup> At the same time, however, the metaphysical sphere is not rejected in favour of empiricism. Because human nature has both an irrational and a rational side, and via its irrational side humankind is connected to the metaphysical sphere, which appears only in the world of irrationality. However, a question remains: if metaphysical truth can be accessed only by exposing ourselves to the danger of death, how can we express it and carry it down to others? With this question in mind, I will look at Mann's view of stories in the next section.

#### 4.2. Truth and Story

The first clue to this question comes from his 'Die Stellung Freuds in der modernen Geistesgeschichte' (1929). In this essay Thomas Mann distinguished irrationalism with the intention of Enlightenment from irrationalism with anti-rational tendency, and he advocated the former.

Thomas Mann introduced Sigmund Freud as an intellectual of irrationalism. According to Thomas Mann, Freud made objections against rationalism, intellectualism, classicism, and mechanical materialism, all of which were flourishing in the nineteenth and even in the early twentieth century. Instead of focusing only on the reason, he emphasized the importance of elements which are dominating human lives consist in the dark, demonic and nocturnal side of nature and one's mind (X 260, 275). In his view, in line with other intellectuals of irrationalism, irrationality holds hegemony over the reason (X 260).

Nevertheless, Thomas Mann found the crucial criteria to distinguish Freud from

anti-rational thinking ways, because unlike anti-rational thinking ways, Freud did neither grovel before irrationality nor despise reason (X 261). In psychoanalysis, superficial harmony of life which is unsteady on the unconsciousness are destroyed and then resolved through the process of analysis, and as a result, the genuine harmony of life which is constructed on the consciousness is achieved (X 265). Thomas Mann called such intentions of psychoanalysis, the intention toward the better future through analytical dissolution, as “Reaktion als Fortschritt” (X 265).

In this essay, Thomas Mann discusses about Proserpina, a Roman deity originated from Greek goddess Persephone, who belongs both to the chthonic world and world of light (X 267). The motif of Proserpina, who went down to hell and came back to this world, corresponds to those of ‘Journey to Hell’ and ‘Snow’. This motif is also found in the whole structure of the Joseph novel. In this novel Joseph falls into the well and is rescued in guidance of Osiris and Tammuz’s leitmotif, who share similar episodes of Proserpina in Egyptian and Babylonian mythology, respectively. Furthermore, this structure overlaps with that of *Der Zauberberg*, in which Hans Castorp visits the sphere of death and sickness, the sanatorium, and comes back to this world with the sense of new humanity.<sup>34</sup>

From the discussion above, the relationship between the metaphysical sphere and daily life in the two episodes becomes clearer. Thomas Mann found a common structure between the two episodes and psychoanalysis, where things can be revitalized by stepping back to their roots and past. Just like psychoanalysis verbalizes unconsciousness, by rationalizing irrationality, the metaphysical truth can be brought into the sphere of our daily life. In this meaning being forgotten is not identical with being lost. Truth may be found again, if Hans Castorp would go to the world of death and irrationality. And what conveys this truth is the story.

At the end of ‘Journey to Hell’ it is suggested that the very meaning of stories lies in the point that they can describe a universal type which is located in a sphere beyond the sphere of phenomena.

The narrator says the object of myth is a world of the past, in other words the world of the dead. Death means for a thing, however, to go outside time, that is to say, to obtain infinity and ubiquity. And infinity and ubiquity are the very character of life, for the essence of life is ‘there is’. From this point of view it can be said: “dass ihr [(der Allgegenwart der Seele)] das ganze Leben gehört, wenn der Tod ihr Einzelgefängnis brach” (IV 53). This secret of life and death, however, is too difficult for people to understand. So festival plays an important role, representing the secret of myth. Story is, so the narrator says, a sort of festival (IV 54).

The same idea is developed in more detail in ‘Freud und die Zukunft’. Here Thomas Mann cites an article of a researcher who belonged to Freud’s school (IX 491).<sup>35</sup> He takes notice of the fact that biographies in ancient folklores and legends repeatedly use the same typical anecdotes and features. His conclusion was that the repetition of existing forms played an important role in the credibility of ancient biographies. Thomas Mann concurs

with this opinion and argues that ancient people found rightfulness and dignity in their lives by bringing the super-temporal forms in conscious from unconscious and repeating them. The symbolized act for that is 'festival'. Reprising the opinion at the end of 'Journey to Hell', he defines festival as "de[r] Fest[] Wiederkehr als Vergegenwärtigung" (IX 497), "die Aufhebung der Zeit" (IX 497), and considers a story telling as a kind of festival. In a letter to Karl Kerényi this is more clearly stated. Mann maintains that "Das Fest im Sinne der mythischen Zeremonie und der heiter-ernsten Wiederholung eines Urgeschehens" is almost the grand motive of his novel. Mann indicates to Kerényi the fact that the hero of this roman is called just ">Joseph im Feste<" (XI 648).<sup>36</sup>

### III. Comparison with Contemporary Thinkers

I would now like to compare Mann's views to those of contemporary thinkers who, like him, postulated that there was a certain kind of power which human reason could grasp completely, and that human reason depended upon this power.

Above all, Thomas Mann's view of stories can be regarded as a way of thinking which considers the world of phenomena as a virtual one and insists that the universal truth exists in a metaphysical world. On this point, his view on irrationality and truth is clearly distinct from some of his contemporary thinkers. For instance, Max Weber, who thought that comprehension of social relationships and actions is impossible by only gathering empirical facts and deducing truth from them,<sup>37</sup> insisted though that sociological truth should aim at understanding of the phenomenal world in the sense that it "bleibt [...] Typen-Begriffe und sucht generelle Regeln des Geschehens."<sup>38</sup> He advocated using metaphysical 'ideal types' in order to understand social relationships and actions.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, he repeatedly stressed that these metaphysical ideas are just tools for the sake of understanding of phenomenal facts, from which people understand social phenomena by employing their abilities of sympathy and reasoning.<sup>40</sup> For Weber, truth means thoughts which establish order in a limited part of the world.<sup>41</sup> In this way, he tried to take into account feelings as irrational elements and, at the same time, avoid the question of wholeness because he believed that the unlimited existence could never been accessed as a whole by the limited human senses.<sup>42</sup> For Karl Mannheim, as well, the way to approach the truth is to be found not in a metaphysical sphere beyond space and time but in a historical and social sphere.<sup>43</sup> For him, truth concerns the congruence of one's consciousness with the whole reality of the world.<sup>44</sup> Every thought cannot help having a partial character, he maintains, because the reality of the world is dynamic and thus every static structure of consciousness inevitably either falls behind (as an ideology) or casts (as a utopia) behind the reality.<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless, he believed that it was possible to put the irrational and unconscious elements in the understanding of the world under the control of reason<sup>46</sup> inasmuch as, in his views, these irrational elements derived from the social and political situation of the observer of the world.<sup>47</sup> Thus by taking into account the social and historical backgrounds of each thought, people can break

through their limited frameworks of understanding and can strive toward the wholeness.<sup>48</sup>

Despite these sociological attempts, metaphysical approaches like Thomas Mann's were in vogue at the time. For example, in 'Erkenntniskritische Vorrede' to his *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels* (1928) Walter Benjamin objected to the view that truth can be found as itself in a phenomenal and experimental world.<sup>49</sup> He insisted instead on the existence of a world of ideas which cannot be grasped completely by human reason and regarded this ideal world as the truth.<sup>50</sup> In order to describe this world of ideas, he maintained, we should divide the phenomenal world into individual elements and make new connections among them.<sup>51</sup> For this purpose Benjamin suggested using 'concepts' which are built by human reason.<sup>52</sup> The relationship among the phenomenal world, truth and concepts is explained with a metaphor of the relationship between stars and constellations; namely as each constellation consists of individual stars, so each idea appears its figure as a constellation of their elements, constellation of the individual stars.<sup>53</sup> Likewise in his *der Beruf der Wissenschaft* Erich Kahler criticized the quest for truth in an empirical and phenomenal world.<sup>54</sup> The attempt to reach the beginning of time by going back in history, or the attempt to divide the phenomenal world into smaller and smaller parts to look for the smallest element of the world is, according to Kahler, endless and futile.<sup>55</sup> He held instead that the mission of science should be to search for the truth which consists of a metaphysical original figure, the idea of existence.<sup>56</sup> This original figure is concerned with the beginning of time as well as of the space.<sup>57</sup> The world of metaphysical ideas has a layer structure, in which each layer of ideas is topped by another layer of higher ideas, and so forth. This layered structure looks like a big dome.<sup>58</sup> This dome does not exist in the 'real' outside world but rather inside us.<sup>59</sup> Because the dome of the ideas is a part of one who recognizes, it is possible for him to see the vision of every idea and to grasp its structure if he employs feeling and faith.<sup>60</sup> In both cases, as in the case of Thomas Mann, it is insisted that truth exists by itself in a metaphysical world and that this world looks different from the world we usually see, the virtual world being divided from a phenomenal world. In this respect, his approach is reminiscent not only of Schopenhauer, but also of Kant's theory of thing-in-itself and Plato's theory of ideas which Schopenhauer was indebted to.<sup>61</sup>

In terms of how to approach truth, however, there are considerable differences among them. For Benjamin, truth, after all, cannot be completely grasped by anyone. The question for him is, thus not 'how to grasp the truth', but 'how to describe it'.<sup>62</sup> For this purpose, he insisted on using concepts, which are not regarded as truth itself.<sup>63</sup> For there is an unbridgeable abyss between concepts and truth; and the pause and discontinuity of describing it are emphasized.<sup>64</sup> By contrast, Kahler holds that a metaphysical truth can be seen, grasped and even united with individuals, with total men, through contemplation.<sup>65</sup> He rejects, in this regard, to use concepts and simple reason because they would destroy the organic connection of truth,<sup>66</sup> and insists on focusing on ideas and wisdom and feelings which can grasp living things.<sup>67</sup>

The position of Thomas Mann is, on the one hand, quite similar to Kahler's. Both of

them hold that truth as original type can be seen. Nevertheless, their differences should also be noted. Thomas Mann emphasized that truth was to be found in irrational contexts, namely through intoxication, in the unconscious realm or dreams, and insisted on bringing it into the conscious realm by narrating stories. In this way there is still a strict dichotomy between an unconscious, irrational, nocturnal and dionysiac realm and a conscious, rational, diurnal and apollonian realm; stories played a crucial role in bridging these two realms. In *der Beruf der Wissenschaft*, on the contrary, Kahler tries to combine them, rejecting 'rational' and 'abstract' concepts and adopting 'seeing', 'feeling' and 'wisdom' instead. The tension between the two realms is resolved here. In this sense, Thomas Mann's position is closer to Benjamin's, where the two realms are never fused. Thomas Mann wrote in his 'Fragment über das Religiöse' (1931):

Der Mensch hat nie angefangen und nie aufgehört, aus sein Antinomien seines geistig-fleischlichen Doppelwesens das Absolute, die Idee zu visieren, -- das ist eine Schwäche von ihm, eine Mitgift, ich weiß nicht woher, seht sie ihm nach, sie gehört nun einmal zu seiner Natur und Wahrheit, und er belöge sich selbst, wenn er sie verleugnete,--[...]. (XI 425)

Here he defines human being as an existence who is predestined to suffer from antinomies, yet continues to aspire to an absolute synthesis. Thomas Mann finds this nature as much weakness of human being as endowment for him and regards these as the truth of human being.<sup>68</sup>

#### IV. Conclusion

During the Weimar era Thomas Mann shared with his contemporaries an interest in the questions of irrationality, totality and what human nature was. Confronted with the rise of anti-rational thinking ways, however, he was alarmed by the potentially dangerous political implications of these questions. Hence, he sought to make the interest in irrationality fructify a new humanity, which could be a spiritual pillar of the republic and tried to win the hearts and minds of society with this humanity.

The two episodes discussed in this paper were closely connected with this effort. In 'Snow' and 'Journey to Hell' Thomas Mann advanced a view of truth in terms of original types which all humankind should share and actually shares. This truth becomes momentarily accessible in irrational contexts like dream or myth, in a world beyond time and space linked with the images of death and intoxication, but it is impossible to keep it in daily life. So, the truth should be conveyed by narrating, describing and representing it.

This view of truth is substantially different from that of sociologists like Weber or Mannheim in that it regards the phenomenal world we live in as a virtual one and calls for the recognition of a metaphysical world instead. Thomas Mann's position was not practical

but rather contemplative like Kahler's and Benjamin's. In contrast to Kahler, however, who fused the metaphysical and phenomenal worlds, Thomas Mann emphasised that metaphysical truth should be represented repeatedly through narration.

It is notable that these conceptions of 'metaphysical' truth were put forward at the very time when a 'commonsensical' conception of truth tended to be eclipsed from society. Additionally, in many cases, the very vanishing commonsensical value judgments are seen as the contents of metaphysical truth. As in the case of Plato and Kant, Thomas Mann's 'metaphysical' truth supports former 'commonsensical' value judgement.<sup>69</sup> The content of his 'truth' is almost the same as the vanishing commonsensical value judgments of the 'Bürgertum' supported by Humanismus and protestant Christianity. Holding the very vanishing commonsensical value judgments as metaphysical truths, the three thinkers mentioned here tried to rescue them. Seen in this light, their attempts have a conservative character not with logical necessity but with practical intentions.

Finally, in Thomas Mann's view of stories, the truth is regarded as what is known only to selected people. As a consequence, if transposed to the area of real politics, this approach nurtures the danger that the 'select' few who have access to the 'truth' will attempt to impose by force their metaphysical dogmata on the people. For instance, in a lecture on his *Joseph und seine Brüder* Thomas Mann turned to the political and social situation. In his eyes the gap between truth and reality in the Third Reich is so big that reality could not be called reality (XI 669). Thomas Mann tried to avoid this danger by employing the technique of 'irony', but this will be the subject of a future paper.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Plato, translated by Harold North Fowler, *Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 1* (Cambridge, Mass/London, 1966).

<sup>2</sup> Texts of Thomas Mann are quoted from: Thomas Mann, *Gesammelte Werke in Dreizehn Bänden* (Frankfurt a. M., 1974f.). Number of volume is shown with Roman numeral and pages are with Arabic numeral in parentheses.

<sup>3</sup> I could not define the exactly time when Thomas Mann started to write 'Snow'. In his diary on 26.5.1921 Thomas Mann says that he is organizing the materials for chapter six and seven which 'Snow' takes part of. On 21.12.1921, however, he says he is just finishing chapter six. Peter de Mendelssohn (Hrsg.), *Thomas Mann. Tagebücher 1918-1921* (Frankfurt a. M., 2003), S. 523, 555f.. Concerning the time when 'Snow' was finished, see: Thomas Mann. Hans Bürgin and Hans Otto Mayer (Hsg.), *Thomas Mann. Eine chronik seines Lebens* (Frankfurt a. M., 1980), S. 71.

<sup>4</sup> Concerning the time when 'Journey to Hell' was written, see: Thomas Mann an Erika Mann 23.12.1926, in Erika Mann (Hrsg.), *Thomas Mann. Briefe 1889-1936* (Frankfurt a. M., 1961), S. 261, Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram 28.12.1926, in *ibid*, S. 262f., Thomas Mann an Jakob Horovitz 2.6.1927, in *ibid*, S. 271.

<sup>5</sup> 'German Letter. November, 1922', in *the Dial, vol. 73, nr:6* (New York, 1922), p. 648. The similar sentences can be also seen in an essay in 1924, 'Über die Lehre Spenglers', (X 173).

<sup>6</sup> In this paper I define the concept of 'irrationality' in the broadest sense as existence of a realm

of the world and inner sphere of human mind that human reason cannot grasp. Some of these variations will be examined in the third section of this paper. The definition of 'truth' itself was a very polemical issue in the early twentieth century. As this paper will discuss below, Thomas Mann uses the word 'Wahrheit' as universal nature of the world and humanity and at the same time as a norm for individuals.

<sup>7</sup> Werner Heisenberg, *Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaft: drei Vorträge* (Leipzig, 1936), S. 5-26.

<sup>8</sup> Heinz Heimsoeth, *Metaphysik der Neuzeit* (München/ Berlin, 1934), S. 206f.

<sup>9</sup> Peter Gay, *Weimar culture: the outsider as insider* (New York, 1968), chapter 4, 'The Hunger for Wholeness,' pp. 70-101.

<sup>10</sup> Thomas Mann himself visited an occult meeting in 1922. 'Okkulte Erlebnisse' (1924), X 139ff..

<sup>11</sup> Daniel Gasman, *The Scientific Origins of National Socialism* (New Jersey, 2004).

<sup>12</sup> Kurt Sontheimer, *Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik : die politischen Ideen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 1918 und 1933* (München, 1978).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Carl Schmitt, *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus* (Berlin, 1926).

<sup>14</sup> Georg Lukacs, *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* (Berlin, 1954), Karl Mannheim, *Ideologie und Utopie, dritte, vermehrte Auflage* (Frankfurt a. M., 1952), Helmut Plessner, *Die versätete Nation: über die politische Verführbarkeit bürgerlichen Geistes* (Stuttgart, 1962), Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie und Praxis: Sozialphilosophische Studien* (Neuwied, 1963), Gasman, *ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Thomas Mann an Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, undatiert 1919, zit. in Barbara Beßlich, *Wege in den >Kulturkrieg<. Zivilisationskritik in Deutschland 1890-1914* (Darmstadt, 2000), S. 120. See also, Thomas Mann, 'Meine Zeit' (1950), XI 314.

<sup>16</sup> Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram 8.7.1922, in Inge Jens (Hrsg.), *Thomas Mann an Ernst Bertram. Briefe aus den Jahren 1910-1955* (Pfullingen, 1960).

<sup>17</sup> 'Briefe aus Deutschland. Erster Brief' (1922), XIII 260ff., 'Von Deutscher Republik' (1922), XI 840ff., 'Über die Lehre Spenglers' (1924), X 172ff., 'Die Stellung Freuds in der Modernen Geistesgeschichte' (1929), X 256ff..

<sup>18</sup> For instance, in 'Deutsche Ansprache. Appell an die Vernunft' (1930) he indicated: "der Nationalsozialismus hätte als Massen-Gefühls-Überzeugung nicht die Macht und den Umfang gewinnen können, die er jetzt erwiesen, wenn ihm nicht, der großen Mehrzahl seiner Träger unbewußt, aus geistigen Quellen ein Sukkurs käme[...]" (XI 876f.). See also: 'Die geistige Situation des Schriftstellers in unserer Zeit' (1930), X 299ff., 'Vom Beruf des deutschen Schriftstellers in unserer Zeit' (1931), X 306ff..

<sup>19</sup> For example Thomas Mann maintained in his 'Die Bäume im Garten: Rede für Pan-Europa' (1930): "heute wieder, da überall gegen den allzu reinen Intellektualismus, den nachtvergessenen Tages- und Verstandeskult abgelaufener Jahrzehnte, gegen das zugleich mechanistische und ideologische Weltbild, den seichten Fortschrittsglauben einer versinkenden oder versunkenen Epoche der vitalistisch-irrationalen, der lebensgläubigen, ja lebensmystischen Rückschlag an der Tagesordnung ist". (XI 865-866) See also: 'Die Stellung Freuds in der Modernen Geistesgeschichte' (1929), X 261, 'Die geistige Situation des Schriftstellers in unserer Zeit' (1930), X 303f., 'Deutsche Ansprache. Appell an die Vernunft' (1930), XI 877.

<sup>20</sup> 'Von europäischer Humanität' (1927), XII 637f., 'Die Stellung Freuds in der Modernen Geistesgeschichte' (1929), X 256ff., 'Die Bäume im Garten: Rede für Pan- Europa' (1930), XI 861ff., 'Die Wiedergeburt der Anständigkeit' (1931), XII 649ff..

<sup>21</sup> 'Die Stellung Freuds in der modernen Geistesgeschichte' (1929), X 268f., 'Die geistige Situation des Schriftstellers in unserer Zeit' (1930), X 299ff., 'Humaniora und Humanismus' (1936), X 339ff.



<sup>22</sup> On the relevancy of ‘Journey to Hell’ see: Thomas Mann an Tor Bonner 14.2.1933, in Hans Wysling unter Mitwirkung von Marianne Fischer (Hrsg), *Dichter über Dichtungen. Thomas Mann. Teil II, 1918-1943* (München/ Frankfurt a. M., 1979), S. 129f..

<sup>23</sup> “damit wach’ ich auf...Denn damit hab’ ich zu Ende geträumt und recht zum Ziele”. (III 686)

<sup>24</sup> The narrator says: “[dass] kein Ding zuerst und von selber ist, Ursache seiner selbst, sondern ein jedes gezeugt ist und rückwärts weist, tiefer hinab in die Anfangsgründe, die Gründe und Abgründe des Brunnens der Vergangenheit”. (IV 18)

<sup>25</sup> “Der Brunnen der Zeiten erweist sich als ausgelotet, bevor das End- und Anfangsziel erreicht wird, das wir erstreben”. (IV 38f.)

<sup>26</sup> Peter Pütz, *Kunst und Künstlerexistenz bei Nietzsche und Thomas Mann* (Bonn, 1963), Børge Kristiansen, *Uniform, Form, Überform: Thomas Manns Zauberberg und Schopenhauers Metaphysik* (København, 1978), Hans Wysling, *Schopenhauer-Leser Thomas Mann, in Schopenhauer Jahr Buch 64* (Frankfurt a. M., 1983), Kristiansen, *Schopenhauersche Weltansicht und totalitäre Humanität im Werke Thomas Manns, in Schopenhauer Jahr Buch 71* (Frankfurt a. M., 1990), Kristiansen, *Thomas Mann und die Philosophie, in Helmut Koopmann (Hrsg.), Thomas Mann Handbuch* (Stuttgart, 1990).

<sup>27</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Bd. 1, 2* (Zürich, 1977).

<sup>28</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geist der Musik* (Leipzig, 1872).

<sup>29</sup> For instance, he stated in his essay, which is a revised version of his same-titled essay in 1921, Goethe und Tolstoi: *Fragmente zum Problem der Humanität*, by punning for the famous expression of Kant, as follows. “Mühevolle Natur, das ist Roheit. Müheloser Geist ist Wurzel- und Wesenlosigkeit. Eine hohe Begegnung von Geist und Natur auf ihrem sehnsuchtvollen Weg zueinander: Das ist der Mensch”. (XI 138). See also ‘Fragment über das Religiöse’ (1931), XI 425.

<sup>30</sup> See Hans Wisskirchen, *Zeitgeschichte im Roman : zu Thomas Manns Zauberberg und Doktor Faustus* (Bern, 1986), S. 84-116; Frank Fechner, *Thomas Mann und die Demokratie : Wandel und Kontinuität der demokratierelevanten Äusserungen des Schriftstellers* (Berlin, 1990), S. 329-338; Herbert Lehnert und Eva Wessell, *Nihilismus der Menschenfreundlichkeit : Thomas Manns "Wandlung" und sein Essay Goethe und Tolstoi* (Frankfurt a. M., 1991), S. 37-45, S. 101-110. I would like to discuss the relationship of his idea of humanity and his support for democracy in my further paper.

<sup>31</sup> See also: “Denn das Typische ist ja das Mythische schon, insofern es Ur-Norm und Ur-Form des Lebens ist, zeitloses Schema und von je gegebene Formel, in die das Leben eingeht, indem es aus dem Unbewussten seine Züge reproduziert.” (XI 656).

<sup>32</sup> Sigmund Freud, hrsg. von Anna Freud, *Gesammelte Werke: chronologisch geordnet. Bd. 9* (Frankfurt a. M., 1968).

<sup>33</sup> As Hans Wysling states, the interpretation of the snow dream has been and will be a ‘Crux’ of Thomas Mann studies. (Hans Wysling, *Der Zauberberg, in Koopmann (Hrsg.), Thomas Mann Handbuch*, S. 411). Especially, the reason Hans Castorp forgets his dream is analyzed in various ways. For Kurzke, the fact the snow dream is forgotten indicates the moral contents of snow vision consists the moral of a political anesthetist, which is added momentarily and disappears in front of concrete political cases. Kurzke maintains, this political moral is achieved not through Hans Castorp’s own social experiences, but through mythical and ahistorical way. And this kind of moral is criticized by Thomas Mann himself in his *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*. Kurzke, *Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Irrationalität: Thomas Mann und der Konservatismus*, S. 153f., 173ff.. Kristiansen analyses that the structure of *Der Zauberberg* consists of the sweeping negation of every position its figures brought out. So, for Kristiansen Hans Castorp’s oblivion of his dream is one of these withdrawals. The vision of humanity in ‘Snow’ exists just as a hope, which does not contribute to solve the problem of ‘Regieren’. Kristiansen,

*Unform, Form, Überform: Thomas Manns Zauberberg und Schopenhauers metaphysisch: eine Studie zu den Beziehungen zwischen Thomas Manns Roman Der Zauberberg und Schopenhauers Metaphysik*, S. 276ff.. Tomoda focuses on the double-time-structure of *Der Zauberberg*. He argues that there is another sphere of time which appears only at the uplift moment. In this another sphere of time ideas of the coming period of time after the First World War are foreseen. Tomoda maintains that the snow vision is one of these foreseen future ideas. Kazuhide Tomoda, *Thomas Mann und die Zwanziger* (Kyoto, 2004), pp. 187-191.

<sup>34</sup> In the conversation between Settembrini and Hans Castorp at the second day of his stay in the sanatorium, Settembrini said that climbing up is identified with falling down. “>>Sie sind nicht von den Unsrigen? Sie sind gesund, Sie hospitieren hier nur, wie Odysseus im Schattenreich? Welche Kühnheit, hinab in die Tiefe zu steigen, wo Tote nichtig und sinnlos wohnen--<< / >>In die Tiefe, Herr Settembrini? Da muß ich doch bitten! Ich bin ja rund fünftausend Fuß hoch geklettert zu Ihnen herauf--<< / >>Das schien Ihnen nur so! [...] Wir sind tief gesunkene Wesen, nicht wahr, Leutnant”. (III 84)

<sup>35</sup> According to Wolters, the article mentioned here is: Ernst Kris, ‘Zur Psychologie älterer Biographik’ in *Imago Bd. 21, Heft 3*, (Wien, 1935), S. 320-344. Dierk Wolters, *Zwischen Metaphysik und Politik* (Tübingen, 1998), S. 144.

<sup>36</sup> See also: “Um was es mir geht, das ist das Wesen des Mythos als zeitlose Immer-Gegenwart; es sind die Ideen der Wiederkehr, der Fleischwerdung und des >Festes<[.]” (XI 628).

<sup>37</sup> Max Weber, Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, in Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen, 1922), S. 208f..

<sup>38</sup> Max Weber, *Soziologische Grundbegriffe* (Tübingen, 1960), S. 16. See also: Max Weber, Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, S. 177.

<sup>39</sup> Max Weber, Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, S. 190-192, Max Weber, *Soziologische Grundbegriffe*, S. 7.

<sup>40</sup> Max Weber, Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, S. 193-200.

<sup>41</sup> Max Weber, Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, S. 213.

<sup>42</sup> Max Weber, Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, S. 171, 177, 184, 206f., 213f..

<sup>43</sup> Karl Mannheim, *Ideologie und Utopie* (Bonn, 1929), S. 43-49, 63.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, S. 49-66.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, S. 49-54, 119.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid*, S. 54-66, 164f..

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, S. 74f..

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, S. 63-66, 119-121, 164-168.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*, S. 209, 213f., 215, 216.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, S. 209, 213f..

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, S. 214f..

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, S. 212, 214f..

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, S. 214f..

<sup>54</sup> Erich Kahler, *Der Beruf der Wissenschaft* (Berlin, 1920), S. 16f., 54.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, S. 17.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, S. 12f..

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, S. 12ff..

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, S. 14, 80ff., 94ff..

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, S. 98.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, S. 81f., 99.

<sup>61</sup> See also Thomas Mann's essay 'Schopenhauer' (IX 528-80).

<sup>62</sup> Walter Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, in *Gesammelte Schriften I. I.* (Frankfurt a. M., 1978), S. 208, 214.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, S. 214f..

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, S. 209, 212.

<sup>65</sup> Erich Kahler, *Der Beruf der Wissenschaft* (Berlin, 1920), S. 40, 80f., 98.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, S. 18ff..

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, S. 56f., 99f..

<sup>68</sup> I do not deny that Thomas Mann had strong intentions towards synthesis. Nevertheless, as I have examined above, in his view of humanity two realms are still separated, and Thomas Mann himself continued to be plagued in his own life, especially in regard to his political attitudes, by the contradiction between them. This would be discussed in my further paper.

<sup>69</sup> Concerning Plato, compare Hans Georg Gadamer, *Der Anfang der Philosophie* (Stuttgart, 2000), 54ff.; concerning Kant, compare Hans Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik Bd. 1. 6. Auflage* (Tubingen, 1990), S. 48ff..