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# Deliberative Democracy and its Implications for Environmental Politics

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## Abstract\*

The aims of this paper are (A) to clarify what deliberative democracy is and how it is new compared to conventional democratic theories, and (B) to explain the affinity between deliberative democracy and environmental politics. The arguments here unfold in three stages: first, in reflecting back on the deliberative turn in democratic theory, I will characterize deliberative democracy as a process of “the transformation of preferences.” Deliberative democracy that has become an active research topic since the 1990s is new compared to conventional democratic theories in the sense that it focuses on the function not so much of *representing* citizens’ preferences as of *transforming* them. Secondly, I will explain why the practice of deliberation leads to the transformation of preferences from the viewpoint of “the inclusion of the other” referring to Habermas’ discourse ethics. The practice of deliberation presses the deliberators to change their given preferences due to the “moralizing effect of public discussion” by which they are urged to take account of the views of others to provide a public reason that can be accepted by them. Finally, I will make clear an advantage of appealing to deliberative democracy when arguing about environmental politics in terms of the *spatial*, *temporal*, and *ontological* transboundariness of global environmental problems. What I want to show in this section is that environmental problems today are not solvable unless our own viewpoints are expanded spatially, temporally, and ontologically and that deliberative democracy that values the function of transforming preferences can give us a powerful tool for engaging in a more progressive environmental politics.

## I. Introduction

Since the 1990s there have been a growing number of studies on the “deliberative turn” in democratic theory.<sup>1</sup> This shows that a certain fundamental change is taking place in the form of democracy that is required and practiced today. In conventional models of democracy, citizens’ activities had been limited to voting or forming interest groups to

reflect their preferences in public policy. In contemporary democratic theories, by contrast, a new activity of “deliberation” takes on a growing importance. To borrow the words of John Dryzek, “The essence of democracy itself is now widely taken to be deliberation, as opposed to voting, interest aggregation, constitutional rights, or even self-government.”<sup>2</sup> What does it mean to attach importance to the process of deliberation in this way? One of the aims of this paper is to clarify this meaning through a comparison with conventional democratic theories.

When surveying studies on deliberative democracy, one will immediately notice that many of the theorists who are sympathetic to it willingly take up environmental issues as a concrete policy agenda.<sup>3</sup> This is also evident in the fact that Dryzek, one of leading deliberative democrats, is at the same time known as an authority of environmental politics. Why does the topic of environmental politics so often appear in studies on deliberative democracy? The second objective here is to try to provide a rough answer to this question by bringing out the key feature of deliberative democracy.

Thus, the purposes of this paper are (A) to clarify what deliberative democracy is and how it is new compared to conventional democratic theories, and (B) to explain the affinity between deliberative democracy and environmental politics. These aims also attempt to reexamine the practical significance of the theory of deliberative democracy from the viewpoint of a specific policy agenda. The arguments of this paper unfold in three stages: first, in reflecting back on the deliberative turn in democratic theory, I will characterize deliberative democracy as a process of “the transformation of preferences.” Secondly, I will explain why the practice of deliberation leads to the transformation of preferences from the viewpoint of “the inclusion of the other” referring to Habermas’ discourse ethics. Finally, I will make clear an advantage of appealing to deliberative democracy when arguing about environmental politics in terms of the spatial, temporal, and ontological transboundariness of global environmental problems.

## II. “Deliberative Turn” in Democratic Theory: From Representing to Transforming Preferences

The literal interpretation of democracy is “a form of government through which the people govern themselves” (*demos* meant “people” and *kratia* meant “rule” or “power” in ancient Greek). However, the role of people as political agents had not necessarily been given attention in most of the democratic theories in the twentieth century. Joseph Schumpeter, for instance, thought that the active role of powerful elites was indispensable to make democracy function in the age of mass society.<sup>4</sup> A post-war political scientist Robert Dahl paid attention to the role of interest groups as political agents to mediate between powerless individual citizens and political elites and regarded democracy as a competitive relation among plural interest groups.<sup>5</sup>

Certainly, there were a few examples which emphasized the active role of people as

political agents in conventional democratic theories. One of these was the theory of participatory democracy advocated by C. B. Macpherson and Carole Pateman, who drew this vision from the experience of the “new social movements” since the 1960s such as the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, the New Left movement, and the ecological movement.<sup>6</sup> They called for a more direct expression of popular will in public policy through informal political activities taking place in local society, schools, and offices in addition to conventional political activity through voting in election. This model, however, lost its influence with the decline of such social movements in the 1980s.

A new kind of democratic theory emerged in the 1990s, and it was the key term “deliberation” that played the central role in it. This term has already been used by some theorists in the 1980s,<sup>7</sup> and came under the spotlight in the field of political theory, thanks to Jürgen Habermas, a leading German critical theorist, and John Rawls, a leading Anglo-American liberal theorist, who at a simultaneous period admitted the importance of the practice of deliberation.<sup>8</sup> The attention on deliberation was accompanied by the practical concern of how to correct the shortcomings of purely preference-aggregative models (e.g. voting or opinion polling) and to reinvent the ideal of liberal democracy in an age of complex and pluralized societies.<sup>9</sup>

One can find several differences between conventional democratic theories including participatory one and deliberative democracy.<sup>10</sup> Here I want to point out the most important one: the functional difference between the vote-centered *representation* and the voice-centered *transformation* of preferences. A Japanese theorist on deliberative democracy describes this as follows:

To put it simply, deliberative democracy is an idea of democracy that values the transformation of people’s views, judgements, and preferences during the course of their conversations and interactions.<sup>11</sup>

Deliberative democrats emphasize the function of democracy not only to aggregate people’s *given* preferences but to form their *new* ones.

In conventional democratic theories, the function of democracy had been regarded solely as representing people’s various interests in public policy. In other words, the role of democracy had long been limited to how best to reconcile mutually incompatible self-interests. Deliberative democracy, by contrast, emphasizes the process in which people reflect upon their own preferences and form a mutual understanding through political deliberation in civil society. In the practice of deliberation, people are required to self-examine their preferences and to provide reasons for justifying their political claims that can reasonably be accepted by others. Deliberative democracy demands them to pursue this “reflection” through “interactions” with others. “The reflective aspect is critical,” Dryzek states, “because preferences can be transformed in the process of deliberation. Deliberation as a social process is distinguished from other kinds of communication in that

deliberators are amenable to changing their judgements, preferences, and views during the course of their interactions.”<sup>12</sup>

Deliberative democracy is a type of democratic theory that values the transformation, not representation, of given popular preferences. The next question that should be asked is how and why deliberation leads to the transformation of preferences. Why does the practice of deliberation move the deliberators to introspection? David Miller explains this as follows. “The process of reaching a decision will also be a process whereby initial preferences are transformed to take account of the views of others.”<sup>13</sup> In the course of deliberation people are urged to “take account of the views of others” and this pushes them to transform their initial preferences. In the next section, I want to clarify this process by referring to Habermas’ discourse ethics.

### **III. Why Does Deliberation Lead to the Transformation of Preferences?: Habermas’ Discourse Ethics**

Many theorists recognize the pervasive influence of Habermas’ social theory on studies on deliberative democracy.<sup>14</sup> The reason is that his discourse ethics which is developed from the theory of communicative act reveals “a process whereby initial preferences are transformed to take account of the views of others” by using the key term “deliberation.” Indeed, Habermas himself applies his discourse ethics to the field of democratic theory and acknowledges himself as a deliberative democrat in later works.<sup>15</sup> In what follows, I shall shed light on his discourse ethics and clarify what role the practice of deliberation plays in “taking account of the views of others.”

The idea of “the inclusion of the views of others,” also known as the Golden Rule, is found across diverse cultures and ages, and it is Immanuel Kant who defined it as a moral principle most clearly. This principle is summarized in his formula of the categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”<sup>16</sup> His attempt was part of “the project of modernity” to place the foundation of morality on the post-conventional rationality in the secularized modern world, and this unfinished project is carried on by R. M. Hare who interprets it with a utilitarian flavor, Rawls who reconstructs it in the framework of rational choice theory, as well as T. M. Scanlon who remakes it in a constructivist manner.<sup>17</sup> A common assumption for Kant and contemporary neo-Kantians is that to regard a certain principle as a moral one, it should be based not on private reasons like self-interest but on a public reason that can be accepted by all who come under the influence of that principle. In general, this is called the universalization principle or the universalization test.<sup>18</sup>

Habermas agrees with Kant and neo-Kantians regarding the point that only the principle that passes the universalization test should be considered to be a moral principle.<sup>19</sup> However, he does not think that Kant’s categorical imperative can be applied without modification in today’s pluralized society. “[T]his can no longer be assumed under

**Table 1 How do we take account of the views of others?**

	Kant	Habermas
<i>Mode of reason</i>	Practical reason	Communicative reason
<i>Way of reasoning</i>	Monological	Dialogical
<i>Form of moral principle</i>	Categorical imperative	Discourse principle

conditions of social and ideological pluralism. If we wish to preserve the intuition underlying the Kantian universalization principle, we can respond to this fact of pluralism in different ways.”<sup>20</sup> Thus Habermas proposes to move from Kantian ethics based on each individual’s *subjective* capacity to discourse ethics that aims at achieving a mutual agreement through the practice of *intersubjective* deliberation. The following is the Discourse Principle (D) Habermas presents in place of the categorical imperative.

Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses.<sup>21</sup>

A crucial difference between Kant’s categorical imperative and Habermas’ discourse principle is the fact that the former is performed monologically while the latter is performed dialogically (see Table 1). On Kant’s assumption, a person overcomes his or her self-interest and perceives the other’s viewpoints by exercising a subjective capacity of practical reason. Habermas, by contrast, does not recognize a moment for “the inclusion of the views of others” in each person’s transcendental consciousness. Instead, he finds that moment in the intersubjective process of deliberation open to everyone. “[I]n fact the reflective application of the universalization test calls for a form of deliberation in which each participant is compelled to adopt the perspective of all others in order to examine whether a norm could be willed by all *from the perspective of each person*.”<sup>22</sup>

The practice of deliberation can be an opportunity to take account of the views of others because the following three rules of discourse are inherent to it.<sup>23</sup>

- (1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.
- (2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.  
b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.  
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.
- (3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (1) and (2).

All people who participate in deliberation inevitably and presupposedly accept these conditions. To put it differently, those who deliberate cannot deny them without committing a “performative contradiction”: these rules are embodied in the very fact that they have decided to participate in and are actually practicing deliberation. The first rule requires the *publicity* of deliberation, the second rule the *equality* between deliberators, and the third rule the *non-coerciveness* of consensus, all of which must be satisfied in every act of deliberation as a way of convincing others.<sup>24</sup> The third rule is especially important here, because it puts the justifiability of consensus solely in the fact that its ground is reasonably (i.e. non-coercively) explicable to others. Thus to practice deliberation that aims at mutual consensus, those who deliberate need to offer a reasonable ground for their claims that can be accepted even if they put themselves in others’ shoes. This is what the Discourse Principle (D) I previously mentioned requires. Of course, a mutual consensus among “all possibly affected persons” is not easily achieved in a pluralized society such as ours. However, only this “regulative ideal” becomes a driving force that presses us to take account of the views of others.<sup>25</sup>

To summarize, “the inclusion of the views of others,” also known as the Golden Rule or as Kant’s formula of the categorical imperative, is achieved in Habermas’ discourse ethics through the cooperative exercise of communicative reason, not the solitary exercise of practical reason.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, according to Habermas, this *real* practice of deliberation is the only way to meet the universalization principle or the universalization test in today’s value-pluralized world. Thus, as Miller observes, “we have good reason to expect the deliberative process to transform initial policy preferences (which may be based on private interest, sectional interest, prejudice and so on) into ethical judgements on the matter in hand,” because “preferences that are [...] narrowly self-regarding will tend to be eliminated by the process of public debate.”<sup>27</sup> Deliberative democrats today apply Habermas’ discourse ethics to democratic theory and attach a new emphasis on democracy as a chance to broaden our shortsighted self-interests.

#### **IV. Implications for Environmental Politics: The Inclusion of Environmental Others**

Let me give a brief summary of what I have argued in the above sections. Deliberative democracy that has become an active research topic since the 1990s is new compared to conventional democratic theories in the sense that it focuses on the function not so much of representing citizens’ preferences as of transforming them. And the practice of deliberation presses the deliberators to change their given preferences due to the “moralizing effect of public discussion”<sup>28</sup> by which they are urged to take account of the views of others to provide a public reason that can be accepted by them.

Now, I want to return to the second question stated in the beginning. Why is deliberative democracy often taken up in the context of environmental politics today? The reason can of course be speculated in various ways, according to the definition of

deliberative democracy.<sup>29</sup> There seems, however, to be a common assumption that conventional democratic theories cannot appropriately respond to today's environmental problems. What are environmental problems today like, and why can conventional democratic theories not deal with them well? Why is deliberative democracy, by contrast, useful for solving them? In the following, I shall take up some characteristics of global environmental problems and argue that the idea of democracy understood as preference-transformation through deliberation is effective for tackling them.

The Environmental Agency Japan (the Ministry of the Environment since 2001) identifies the following nine global environmental issues: global warming; ozone layer depletion; acid rain; the decrease of tropical forests; the extinction of wildlife species; marine pollution; the transboundary movements of hazardous waste; desertification; environmental pollution in developing countries.<sup>30</sup> These "set of problems" influence each other mutually and closely and induce the global environment in a disadvantageous direction for humans, animals, plants, and nature (see Figure 1). Now, according to the analysis of Hironori Hamanaka, roughly two features can be recognized in the "set of problems" in global environmental issues: (1) they transcend national borders and thus exert a global influence, and (2) activities of the present generation will have an enormous effect on future generations.<sup>31</sup> These characteristics raise serious problems peculiar to environmental politics that do not arise in other policy agendas.

(1) First, global environmental issues are problems that occur across existing national and political boundaries. For instance, a waste product generated by the industry of a country X goes quite easily across river, sea, and the atmosphere and brings pollution to another country Y. Citizens in Y who bear the environmental damage do not have any way to represent their own will to X's industrial policy except by appealing to international organizations like the United Nations. In the set of problems stated above, acid rain, marine pollution, the transboundary movements of hazardous waste, environmental pollution in developing countries etc. contain this feature.

When grappling with such issues, deliberative democracy that accompanies "the inclusion of the views of others" offers a chance to expand *spatially* the scope of environmental others. For instance, X would not expect to gain the assent from citizens in Y, undoubtedly part of "all possibly affected persons," if X continues to expand their industry without regard to its environmental influence on Y. To meet the Discourse Principle (D), X must at least offer a reasonable ground that they would be able to accept even if they were in Y's position.

Along this line, Andrew Dobson states that "I see ecological citizenship as improving democracy's chances of producing sustainable outcomes" though putting at the same time a small reservation on the prospect that deliberative democracy is useful for environmental politics.<sup>32</sup> What Dobson bears in mind here is the characteristics of ecological citizenship as "non-contractuality" and "non-territoriality."<sup>33</sup> There is a clear asymmetry between victimizers and victims in global environmental problems and this asymmetry rises across



We, of course, cannot exchange deliberation directly with future generations as they have not been born yet. However, according to Robert Goodin, this problem is not limited to the case of future generations. Infants and mental incompetents suffer basically the same difficulty in that they are not actual participants in democratic deliberation. But this does not at all mean that the interests of infants and mental incompetents can be ignored in the process of policy making. The parallel argument applies to the case of future generations.<sup>35</sup>

The upshot of his argument is similar to the one I have developed earlier. That is, “[i]t might be empirically more realistic, as well as being morally and politically preferable, to think [...] of democracy as a process in which we all come to internalize the interests of each other and indeed of the larger world around us.”<sup>36</sup> The best solution is to let infants, mental incompetents, and future generations speak for themselves. Precisely because this is infeasible, their interests should be, as the second-best solution, incorporated into *our* enlarged preferences through the “moralizing effect of public discussion.”

(3) Finally, one might add an *ontological* expansion to the spatial and temporal expansions of environmental others mentioned above. Global environmental issues today have brought a more immediate, wider influence on animals, plants, and nature in general. The decrease of tropical forests and marine pollution damage the ecological system, and desertification narrows the native habitat of animals and plants in a definitive way. It is a plain fact that these natural beings have received a negative influence from man’s policy making.

There is plenty of room for controversy as to whether deliberative democracy can provide an effective solution for such environmental issues. This is partly because we are not certain about the appropriateness of considering non-human beings as a party to deliberation. It seems rather doubtful to think of non-human beings like animals, plants, and nature etc. as the hypothetical other whose interests should be taken into account in the course of deliberation. After all, what if any is the “communication with the nonhuman world”<sup>37</sup> like?

One of the answers to this question is to expand the width of the forms of assumed communication. Dryzek, for instance, proposes us to include not only a rational but also a non-verbal form of communication like gesture in the valid practice of deliberation. “Of course, human *verbal* communication cannot extend into the natural world. But greater continuity is evident in nonverbal communication—body language, facial displays, pheromones, and so forth.”<sup>38</sup> Non-human beings like animals, plants, and nature cannot speak a voice as a man does. However, once such behaviors are assumed to be “talking to us” in a wider sense, we can suppose a certain kind of communication between the human community and non-human nature. The form of communication expanded in this way will urge us to adopt environmental policies that take seriously the environmental damage to animals, plants, and nature.<sup>39</sup>

The discourse ethics Habermas himself posits does not intend such a widespread application

to environmental issues.<sup>40</sup> What I have wanted to show in this section is that environmental problems today are not solvable unless our own viewpoints are expanded spatially, temporally, and ontologically and that deliberative democracy that values the function of transforming preferences can give us a powerful tool for engaging in a more progressive environmental politics.

## V. Conclusion

In this paper, I have (A) specified the key feature of deliberative democracy as the transformation of preferences in the course of deliberation and (B) argued that it can provide profitable suggestions to environmental politics. Democracy is a mechanism of collective decision making. But there may always remain an imbalance or disproportion between those who make decisions and those who are subject to them. A fundamental idea of democracy, namely “a form of government through which the people govern themselves,” will not truly be achieved unless this disproportion is removed. In this sense, it can even be said that the logic of democracy involves the claims that the voice of others be heard and that their objections be treated carefully.<sup>41</sup>

Valuing the process of deliberation means to value a reflective moment of given preferences through interactions with others. Such a feature of deliberative democracy is especially valuable for tackling global environmental issues, because we should see beyond our narrow self-interests and expand them spatially, temporally, and ontologically. The Discourse Principle (D) clarified by Habermas gives us an opportunity to replace ego-centric private preferences with eco-centric public ones.<sup>42</sup> As Robyn Eckersley states, “risk-generating and risk-displacing decisions are less likely to survive policy-making communities and legislative chambers [...] when the deliberators are *obliged* to consider the effects of their decisions on social and ecological communities both within *and beyond* the formal demos.”<sup>43</sup> In an age of global environmental crisis, the forum of deliberation should be open to “environmental constituencies”: contemporary non-nationals, future generations, and even non-human nature.<sup>44</sup>

Finally, I want to raise some points concerning deliberative democracy and its implications for environmental politics that could not be addressed in this paper. The first point is about the reality of including “environmental constituencies” as a party of deliberation. Especially since Habermas’ discourse ethics presupposes that the views of others are disclosed not in a virtual but “real” communication,<sup>45</sup> ecologically sensitive deliberative democrats need to discuss the reality of “communication with the nonhuman world” in more detail.<sup>46</sup> The second point is about the institutionalization of the forum of deliberation for environmental politics. Due to the borderlessness that I identified as one of the features of present global environmental problems in section 4, ecologically sensitive deliberative democrats are inevitably confronted with the question of the feasibility of (deliberative) democracy at a global level.<sup>47</sup> The third point is about the affinity between

environmental politics and democracy itself. This paper has been based on the promise of the desirability of democracy as a mechanism of collective decision making, but whether accepting democratic politics is fruitful for solving environmental issues is the question that is to be answered separately from the feasibility of deliberative democracy.<sup>48</sup> These topics that remain to be discussed further, however, do not diminish the relevance of developing an ecological conception of deliberative democracy. Indeed, the very fact that many theorists have been actively working on them tells us the urgency and gravity of such a development.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Books that were published recently with the term “deliberation democracy” in the titles include Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí eds., *Deliberative Democracy and Its Discontents* (Aldershot: Ashgate Besson and Martí, 2006); James Bohman and William Rehg eds., *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997); John S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Jon Elster ed., *Deliberative Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Why Deliberative Democracy?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Graham Smith, *Deliberative Democracy and the Environment* (London: Routledge, 2003), to mention but a few.

<sup>2</sup> Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> John Barry, *Rethinking Green Politics: Nature, Virtue and Progress* (London: Sage Publications, 1999); Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, ch. 6; Robyn Eckersley, *The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2004) chs. 5–6; Smith, *Deliberative Democracy and the Environment*, chs. 3–5.

<sup>4</sup> Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942).

<sup>5</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

<sup>6</sup> C. B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

<sup>7</sup> Bernard Manin, “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation,” *Political Theory* 15 (3) (August 1987): 338–68.

<sup>8</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996); John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, paperback ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

<sup>9</sup> Cass R. Sunstein, “Preferences and Politics,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 20 (1) (Winter 1991): 3–34.

<sup>10</sup> Maeve Cooke points out the following five characteristics of deliberative democracy: (1) the *educative* power of the process of public deliberation; (2) the *community-generating* power of the process of public deliberation; (3) the fairness of the *procedure* of public deliberation; (4) the

epistemic quality of the *outcomes* of public deliberation; (5) the *congruence* of the ideal of politics articulated by deliberative democracy with “whom we are” (Maeve Cooke, “Five Arguments for Deliberative Democracy,” *Political Studies* 48 [4] [December 2000]: 947–69). The function of transforming given preferences this paper pays attention to is closely related to the first educative point.

<sup>11</sup> Tetsuki Tamura, *Reasons for Deliberation: Democratic Theory in Reflective and Divided Societies* [Japanese] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2008) p. ii; cf. ch. 2.1.2.

<sup>12</sup> Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, p. 1. As to concrete institutional designs of deliberative democracy, see James Fishkin’s deliberative polls, Jon Elster’s constituent assemblies, Simone Chambers’ constitutional conventions, Philip Pettit’s contestatory consultative mechanisms and so on (Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction*, 2nd ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002] p. 324 n. 16).

<sup>13</sup> David Miller, “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice,” in *Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West*, ed. David Held (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993): 74–92, p. 75; quoted in Tamura, *Reasons for Deliberation*, p. 34.

<sup>14</sup> James Bohman, *Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996) pp. 3–4 *et passim*; John S. Dryzek, *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) chs. 1–2; Elster ed., *Deliberative Democracy*, pp. 1 *et passim*; Tamura, *Reasons for Deliberation*, p. 4 n. 1.

<sup>15</sup> Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, ch. 7; *do.*, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, eds. Ciaran P. Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1998) pt. 5.

<sup>16</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 3rd ed, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, [1785] 1993) p. 30.

<sup>17</sup> R. M. Hare, *Moral Thinking: It’s Levels, Methods and Point* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) ch. 1; John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971) sec. 40; Thomas M. Scanlon, *The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) ch. 7.

<sup>18</sup> Habermas’ own formulation of the Universalization Principle (U) is as follows. “A norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of *each individual* could be *jointly* accepted by *all* concerned without coercion” (Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other*, p. 42; cf. *do.*, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen [Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990] pp. 65, 93).

<sup>19</sup> Note, however, that regarding the universalization principle Habermas owes much to G. H. Mead’s ideas of the “generalized other” and “ideal role-taking” rather than Kant’s categorical imperative.

<sup>20</sup> Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other*, p. 57.

<sup>21</sup> Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, p. 107; cf. *do.*, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, pp. 66, 93; *do.*, *The Inclusion of the Other*, p. 41.

<sup>22</sup> Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other*, p. 33.

<sup>23</sup> Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, p. 89.

<sup>24</sup> Masao Higurashi, “On the Integrative Program in Habermas’s Discourse Ethics,” [Japanese] *The Journal of Morioka College* 22 (March 2005): 49–62, pp. 55–6.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, “Moral Conflict and Political Consensus,” *Ethics* 101 (1) (October 1990): 64–88.

<sup>26</sup> The difference between practical and communicative reasons is, however, not reduced to the

way of reasoning alone. Rather, a more fundamental difference can be found in the *range* of subjects to which the respective forms of reason apply. “Communicative reason, unlike practical reason, is not itself a source of norms of right action. It spans the *full* spectrum of validity claims (of assertoric truth, subjective truthfulness, and normative rightness) and hence extends beyond the sphere of moral-practical questions” (Jürgen Habermas, *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics*, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin [Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993] p. 81). In a nutshell, practical reason is related only to the validity claim of normative rightness in the theory of communicative act, while communicative reason covers the full range of human actions that are oriented to reaching understanding.

<sup>27</sup> Miller, “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice,” pp. 82–3.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

<sup>29</sup> Manuel Arias-Maldonado summarizes (though not necessarily affirmatively) the affinity between environmental politics and deliberative democracy as follows. (1) Green values will emerge more easily in a deliberative context. (2) Deliberative procedure fits the public nature of environmental goods. (3) The inclusive character of deliberative democracy makes possible the incorporation of traditionally excluded actors and voices into the democratic process. (4) Deliberative democracy permits the enlargement of the political community, embodying natural world into it. (5) Deliberative democracy is the best institutional arrangement for developing ecological citizenship. (6) Deliberative democracy is the best way to combine expertise judgement and citizen participation in decision-making process, in the light of the technical side of environmental problems. (7) Deliberation and inclusion lead to more legitimate and efficient decisions on sustainability (Manuel Arias-Maldonado, “Green Politics and Deliberative Democracy,” Berkeley Workshop on Environmental Politics Working Papers. <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/EnvirPol/WP/13-Arias.pdf> (1994) (accessed on 28 December, 2008): 1–40, sec. 3.

<sup>30</sup> Environmental Agency ed., *Quality of the Environment in Japan 1990* [Japanese] (Tokyo: Printing Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, 1990) ch. 3 sec. 3.

<sup>31</sup> Hamanaka, Hironori 2007. “Introduction.” Lecture Videos Materials of Global Environmental Politics. [http://gc.sfc.keio.ac.jp/class/2007\\_25275/slides/01/](http://gc.sfc.keio.ac.jp/class/2007_25275/slides/01/) (accessed on 28 December, 2008): 1–24, p. 6.

<sup>32</sup> Andrew Dobson, *Citizenship and the Environment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 7.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>34</sup> This argument also implies that Dobson sees the potential of democracy for green politics in a consequentialistic (i.e. not proceduralistic) manner. “Our discussion of discursive democracy showed that it is possible to view democracy in partly consequentialist terms, and this enabled us to pull green and democratic thinking closer together” (Andrew Dobson, “Democratizing Green Theory: Preconditions and Principles,” in *Democracy and Green Political Thought: Sustainability, Rights and Citizenship*, eds. Brian Doherty and Marius de Geus (London: Routledge, 1996): 132–50, p. 141). See also note 47 below.

<sup>35</sup> Robert E. Goodin, “Enfranchising the Earth, and its Alternatives,” *Political Studies* 44 (5) (December 1996): 835–49, p. 843.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 844.

<sup>37</sup> John S. Dryzek, *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 235.

<sup>38</sup> Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, p. 149.

<sup>39</sup> Robyn Eckersley, “Habermas and Green Political Theory: Two Roads Diverging,” *Theory and Society* 19 (6) (December 1990): 739–76, pp. 748–57; Eckersley, *The Green State*, pp.

119–27; Smith, *Deliberative Democracy and the Environment*, pp. 61–6.

<sup>40</sup> Generally speaking, there is a tendency in Habermas' works toward drawing anthropocentric distinctions between the natural and the social realms, technical and communicative interests, and objective-cum-scientific and intersubjective-cum-normative spheres—in a word, the distinction between humans and nature. Indeed, he explicitly acknowledges that “this [i.e. ecological] problematic can be dealt with satisfactorily within the anthropocentric framework of a discourse ethic” (Jürgen Habermas, “A Reply to My Critics,” in *Habermas: Critical Debates*, eds. John B. Thompson and David Held [Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1982]: 219–83, p. 247). Thus, it is often suspected that “[u]nder Habermas's framework, ecological rationality (as defined by Dryzek) is merely a *potential* by-product of communicative rationality” (Eckersley, “Habermas and Green Political Theory,” p. 759). As to Habermas' own view on environmental issues, see Habermas, “A Reply to My Critics,” pp. 238–50; *do.*, *Justification and Application*, ch. 2 sec. 13.

<sup>41</sup> Amy Gutmann, and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996).

<sup>42</sup> As to some empirical evidences that the practice of deliberation leads to a more self-conscious and active commitment to environmental values, see Adolf Gundersen, *The Environmental Promise of Democratic Deliberation* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995).

<sup>43</sup> Eckersley, *The Green State*, p. 133.

<sup>44</sup> Smith, *Deliberative Democracy and the Environment*, p. 54.

<sup>45</sup> Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, p. 67.

<sup>46</sup> Robyn Eckersley, “The Discourse Ethic and the Problem of Representing Nature,” *Environmental Politics* 8 (2) (Summer 1999): 24–49; but see also Dobson, “Democratizing Green Theory: Preconditions and Principles,” pp. 142–6; Goodin, “Enfranchising the Earth, and its Alternatives,” pp. 840–4; Steven Vogel, “Habermas and the Ethics of Nature,” in *The Ecological Community: Environmental Challenges for Philosophy, Politics, and Morality*, ed. Roger S. Gottlieb (New York: Routledge, 1997): 175–92, pp. 184–6.

<sup>47</sup> Dryzek, *Discursive Democracy*, ch. 5; *do.*, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, ch. 5; Eckersley, *The Green State*, ch. 7

<sup>48</sup> For instance, Goodin states that the green theory of *value* should take priority over the green theory of *agency* when the two contradict with each other, arguing that “core green concerns are consequentialistic at root” (Robert E. Goodin, *Green Political Theory* [Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992] p. 120), although he adds some correction to this prospect in a later article (*ibid.*, ch. 4; *do.*, “Enfranchising the Earth, and its Alternatives,” pp. 844–9). For further discussion, see John S. Dryzek, “Ecology and Discursive Democracy: Beyond Liberal Capitalism and the Administrative State,” *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 3 (2) (June 1992): 18–42; Andrew McHallam, *The New Authoritarians: Reflections on the Greens* (London: Alliance Publishers for the Institute for European Defence & Strategic Studies, 1991); Robert Paehlke, “Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Environmentalism,” *Environmental Ethics* 10 (4) (Winter 1988): 291–308; Douglas Torgerson, “Policy Professionalism and the Voices of Dissent: The Case of Environmentalism,” *Polity* 29 (3) (March 1997): 345–374.

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