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## FRENCH PRESENCE IN AFRICA

Koichiro HORIÉ

**SUMMARY:** In spite of the general trend towards decolonisation and 'politico-economic' independence in Africa, various aspects of collaboration, or collusion even, between African and West European countries are today flagrant still. French presence in Africa is a demonstrative case in point. In this paper, the formulation process of the EEC's Association Treaty (1957) will be taken up as a case study to look into the origin of the renewed French interest in Africa. Three factors are conducive, it is maintained, to French presence in Africa throughout the past decades in the sphere of African economic affairs.

### INTRODUCTION

How could France get away with her persistent involvement in Black Africa in the past two decades? One can venture to say even that this is one of seven wonders of the African international politics. Take the case of Lomé Convention and the role of France in this regime as an example. It appears that the amicable political relationship between France and her erstwhile colonies has, more often than not, prevailed over the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) solidarity. Elsewhere, in the course of formation and maintenance of the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), Nigeria, the main architect of the regional cooperation schemes in West Africa, was fully aware of French presence in the region as it was evident in her accommodating approach (i.e. to keep a low profile) towards her Francophone neighbours. Furthermore, a conspicuous French military intervention in Chad and Zaire in the recent years has again aroused controversy among the members of the OAU (Organization of African Unity) with regard to the issues of territorial sovereignty of African states. All these examples are likely to add up to the impression that France is there in Africa to stay with a great deal of patronage in her hands. Indeed, the style of French presence in Africa is quite contrasting to the one of Britain, the other rival metropole in the continent. But then, how was it possible? How did French perform the magic so arrogantly?<sup>1</sup>

I shall contend in this article that the combination of following factors, inter

<sup>1</sup> One of the most recent works on the French presence in Africa is by Francophone-Africa specialist, Tamar Golan, 'A Certain Mystery: How Can France Do Everything That It Does in Africa—and Get Away with It?', *African Affairs* vol. 80 no. 318 January, 1981 pp. 3-11. Here in this article, even she appears to be perplexed by the way France manages to maintain her political influence in Africa—plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose!

alia, were conducive to the French presence in Black Africa in terms of economic development of African countries, (i) the French approach of Grandeur towards Africa, (ii) the reluctant support by European partners of the Six to the French, and (iii) a sense of reliance upon France by *afrique noire*. Readers are reminded that the present article focuses on the formulation process of the EEC Association Treaty (1957) alone. And this is not without reasons. The combined conditions touched upon above are believed to have coloured the feature of French presence in Africa throughout the past decades, and to have their origin back in the mid 1950's when the development of nationalist movement in Africa became a pressing issue in Western Europe. Moreover, scarcely any works did scrutinize the structural dominance of France in *afrique noire* over the formation of Association Treaty. On the contrary, most of the previous works on the subject seemed rather to assume the French dominance as *fait accompli*. Accordingly, the EEC partners were given a mere subjugated role in the process. Indeed, it would be rare, if not non-existing, to discover the assertion that France managed to maintain or even fortified her influence within *Communauté française* with a tacit approval of the EEC partners and *afrique noire* countries (latter came increasingly dependent upon the former's aid package). The present article is one such modest attempt to clear the clouds with respect to the nature of French presence in *afrique noire* regarding the economic issues.

## I

It is not an exaggeration to state that the formulation of the Association Treaty of 1957 was overshadowed by the preponderant influence of French interests. In fact, France has incessantly played a vital role in the Eurafrican economic relation although her influence has steadily eroded. On the other hand, France d'outre-mer has heavily depended on France in making their demands heard in the Eur-Africa dialogue. In this sense, the relevance of the EEC for Africa has been intrinsically interwoven with that of France, their former colonial master. For France in the mid 1950's, there was indeed a clear base from which she insisted on associating her colonies with the proposed European Customs Union.

The French interest in linking the above two issues stems essentially from the following considerations: a) the problems arising from legal-technical procedure; France found it impossible to discharge her obligation both within the EEC and Franc Zone concurrently, b) France has carried "the Burden of an Empire" which has involved an enormous financial drain, particularly since the end of the Second World war, in assisting African colonies with their economic development. This had led, France maintained, to the diversion of economic resources away from the sphere in which the resources could have been utilised to strengthen the French economy *viz-a-vis* the competition from other European partners in the advent of the European Customs Union. The French have even felt deprived when some of the Western firms have demonstrated their immediate interest in in-

vesting in sectors where early profit returns are expected. And this is where French public investment provided all the required infrastructure, c) France has believed that she was fighting a political war for all Western Europe, and also that her involvement in Black Africa has served the interests of the Free World, d) in French eyes, France together with her colonies form a cultural and political whole, and France has, therefore, held to the principle that she would be prepared to resist any intra-European agreement which may jeopardize the existence of this entity. And as its corollary, France has been obliged to extract as many advantages as possible for her overseas territories (Kitzinger, 1961: 72–4). Let us now examine each point in detail.

Before the discussion between France and her European partners concerning the formation of the Common Market, the French government must have asked herself the following question, “how could France manage to be simultaneously a member of both the European Customs Union and the Franc Zone outside Europe? Provided that condition for the double participation held, how could France prevent her partners from re-exporting their products through France by preferential treatment, and how could she prevent the tropical produce from France d’outre-mer flowing into the markets of French European partners exempt from taxation?” (Kitzinger, 1961: 72)

To begin with, it was almost inconceivable for France to dissociate herself from economic relation with her overseas territories as M. Guy Mollet, then the prime minister of France, put it in the French parliament in December, 1956, “. . . France will join the Common Market along with her overseas territories. Obviously the regulations of European Customs Union cannot simply be applied to our France d’outre-mer, but the association arrangement should be studied for them. . . . And France will maintain her influence in these territories by offering their people a grand future. . . .” (*Marchés Tropicaux du Monde* 26 janvier, 1957). With ease, France dropped her policy option of divorcing her overseas territories, and as an alternative France chose bigamy. And since it was quite unrealistic to extend the application of the Treaty of Rome to French colonies automatically, the principle of “Association” emerged as a compromise solution (Cousté, 1957: 125). In the end, various agreements which France maintained with the African territories, were left intact from the provisions established under the Rome Treaty. The treaty itself, in addition, has not called on France to abandon the agreements between France and her colonies. This was indeed one of the most ambiguous aspects of the Rome Treaty. Moreover, France succeeded in shielding her overseas territories from an impact of the application of the Rome Treaty, by preserving both the traditional commercial trade and their invisible trade relation between France and her colonies (e.g. ‘Monopoly of the Flag; that is to say that the shipping of African produce was monopolised by French firms) (United Nations ECOSOC, 1960: 48).

The significance of the Franc Zone has also been pronounced as an effective means of reconstructing the war-torn French economy after World War II. The Zone was tightened up to enable France to secure her exports to and imports from

the overseas territories. In 1956, for instance, 23% of imports to France came from, and 32% of its exports went to, her overseas territories. Nevertheless, France had also tried to refund part of the profits accruing from their colonies by purchasing uncompetitive tropical produce (e.g. coffee, groundnuts, bananas) above the world price. This French approach to her colonies was, to be sure, carried out within the context of the 10-Year Development and Welfare Plan she initiated for her overseas territories under the Fourth Republic. The plan, in spite of the economic fragance, nevertheless, was intended to serve the overriding political goal of interlocking the colonies with metropolitan France (Nielsen, 1969: 94). However, an effort by France to reinforce the economic interdependence with her colonies is one thing, and the results she could expect from it is quite another. As for the results, France benefitted from an access to strategic minerals as well as tropical produce all payable in francs, or from exporting to her colonies French manufactured goods above world prices, or later on, even from aid disbursed by the EEC to France d'outre-mer for development projects which in turn will be added to French treasury reserves. But the system also permitted uncompetitive and protection-seeking French industries to survive.

The drawback of this case was manifest during the negotiation over setting up Customs Union in Western Europe. On the one hand, France was deeply involved in a development plan for her African colonies from which she could not possibly disengage. The Plan instigated the founding of FIDES (Fond d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Sociale) and CCFOM (Caisse Centrale de la France l'outre-mer) in which the state played a leading role, and also encouraged the establishment of the joint venture between the state and private capital for mineral industries. Because of the lack of accumulated capital in African markets, and given the emphasis laid by FIDES and CCFOM on investment in mineral industries and transport facilities for tropical produce (unlike British investment in Africa), the French have faced enormous difficulties in bringing the Plan into effect (Bourjol, 1961: 71-2).<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the French economy was traditionally geared towards maintaining cartels in order to restrain domestic competition and a high-tariff barrier against foreign competition. And the operation of the Franc Zone system was by no means conducive to suppressing this tendency on a regional scale. All these led to the inefficiency in allocating economic resources to industries, thus depriving them of the dynamism to compete and expand in the global capitalistic system. The French government and industry did not fail to be aware that the Franc Zone as a closed-system market was reaching a saturation point, and saw the Customs Union proposal in

<sup>2</sup> This should not conceal the fact that much of the financial resources expended by FIDES and CCFOM (incidentally, France is said to have transferred more than 1% of its GNP to the overseas territories through these institutions) went for the payment of French technicians and advisers as well as for the purchasing via government credits of materials and equipments by way of SURPRIX scheme. Richard Joseph, 'The Gaullist Legacy: Patterns of French Neo-Colonialism'; *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 6 May-August, 1976 p. 6.

Western Europe as a novel opportunity for both French oligopolies and petits entrepreneurs to enlarge their business who had colossal economic interests in overseas territories. How can French economic interest be preserved in Afrique Noire while extending it in Western Europe? The French government, in her attempt to reconcile the above conflicting desire, advocated Association as a constructive compromise.<sup>3</sup> The French proposal was then put forward to shoulder the burden of development assistance for overseas territories among the members of the Common Market, and in return, to unveil Francophone's market by degrees to her European partners. Obviously, the threat of German competition in the Eur-african continent was the cardinal factor in French formulation of this linkage strategy. For instance, at Paris Meeting in February 1957, France contended that "some European" private capital had already begun to invest in some sectors of the Franc Zone where a quick return was expected, and that unless European partners demonstrated their willingness to participate in the investment in the infrastructural sectors as well, they would be committing a double crime! (Kitzinger, 1961: 73).

The economic determinant was, nevertheless, not imperative for the French to help overcome her partner's apprehension over the objectives of the proposed association. In fact, politico-strategic as well as cultural elements formed twin pillars of the basic French argument during the negotiations which ushered in the establishment of the Association. At the Paris Meeting, the French embarked upon the Communist threat in the tropical colonies, and firmly maintained that unless Europeans could hold on to their sphere of influence, it would fall prey to communist intrigue (*The New York Times* February 19, 1957). Curiously enough,

<sup>3</sup> Interviews with desk officers at DG VIII of the European Commission in Bruxelles, March, 1981. This particular strategy by French seems to have gained success: the balance of payments between France and the overseas countries of the Franc Zone, for example, turned to France's favour after 1958 as the following table demonstrates although the qualification ought to be made about the effect of Association scheme as the dominant factor in precipitating this situation.

	1952	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64
Public transfer	<u>2875</u>	<u>2546</u>	<u>2738</u>	<u>3525</u>	<u>5267</u>	<u>5975</u>	<u>6237</u>	<u>6710</u>	<u>7557</u>	<u>8902</u>	<u>9348</u>	<u>4438</u>	<u>3308</u>
Private transfer	2578	2414	2498	2946	5091	4884	5758	6823	8103	9139	9544	4696	3554
( of which trade balance with the overseas countries )	2417	1762	1723	1924	1836	2492	2963	4080	4224	2992	935	1620	1396
General balance	<u>297</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>240</u>	<u>579</u>	<u>176</u>	<u>1091</u>	<u>479</u>	113	546	237	196	258	246

Figures underlined indicate an outflow from France.

Unit of figures in million francs.

SOURCE: Comité Monétaire de la Zone Franc, rapports annuaire, quoted in Teresa Hayter, *French Aid*, (London: Overseas Development Institute 1966) p. 57.

the German press has joined the chorus, "...the morale as well as political responsibility towards Africa still lies in our hands, and Africa's destiny may not be left to them without any preparatory works... So long as the former metropole finds herself unable to achieve the goal, it is the West Europeans collectively who should take over her task. Otherwise, Africa would be engulfed in the Communist bloc (*France Outre-Mer* no. 4, 1960). However appealing the use of the Cold War issue may be in persuading European partners to favour her cause, one cannot overlook the arrogance of the French attempting to wrap up their feelings of uneasiness towards the dramatically changing political situation within the Francophone region, namely the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the Suez fiasco, the process of power decentralisation in colonial rule and the intensification of the Algerian war. What France seemed to fear about her *afrique d'outre-mer* was not their political independence, but their rebellion and revolution against France, or the 'Algerianisation' of tropical Africa. She resisted boldly any move towards a collapse of the magnificent France-Africa whole, based on a community of cultural, economic and strategic interests. France, as a tactical move, avoided the use of the term *Communauté française*; instead, she preferred to use the phrase *Communauté eurafrrique*, which in essence, Jean Monnet and other Frenchmen had long been committed to by their concept of 'mission civilisatrice.' For example, just before the Paris Meeting, M. Christian Pineau, then the foreign secretary in the Mollet government, addressed the UN political committee on the Franco-Algerian war, "... Europe as a whole shall transfer capital and technology into Africa, which will enable a vast Africa continent turn into a basic factor in world politics. . . ." (*The New York Times* February 6, 1957). Here France made it implicitly clear that she intended to share the responsibility for economic development and political stability both in Algeria and Black Africa with European partners under the name of the eurafrican whole. Moreover, as it appears recurrently during the later negotiation, France also implied the significance of broader political cooperation between the two continents with those complementary economies which might play an influential role in the future global politico-economy. And these French attempts were by no means unsuccessful. One may say that the French skillfully surfed on the "Pan-European" wave. In fact, ever since the end of World War II when Europeans had to be content with a role subordinate to the Super Powers in international relations, they had not only striven for closer politico-economic relations among themselves, but also for strengthening ties with their African colonies (Lefèbvre, 1957: 29). Before 1958, numerous efforts had already been made to link the issue of African participation to the Pan-European movement. The most impressive examples of such attempts are found in the approaches made by CEEC (Convention of European Economic Cooperation), ECSC, EDC and Council of Europe (notably the Strasbourg Plan). On the other hand, one may contest that the French-proposed eurafrrique interdependence was antiquated (Mazrui, 1967: 61-2). In an attempt to spot the reason why it is so, we now have to explore the responses from the French's

European partners.

## II

The concept of eurafrique fell into disuse, not necessarily because Africa no longer was indispensable to Europe thanks to the technological advancement which has produced substitutes for tropical raw materials, but rather because the concept was unpopularly perceived as a tool for countering the trend of the decolonization process in Africa. Surprisingly enough, the fear of being involved in French 'neocolonial conspiracy' was expressed to a lesser extent by the Africans themselves than by the European partners, particularly by the Germans. In fact, the Germans strove to create themselves a new international image after the Second World war and also observed the setbacks the French and Dutch suffered in their colonies, and thus were hyper-sensitive to the French idea of '*association octroyée*' which, it was believed, might arouse criticism among African nationalists (Drouin, 1963: 300). Further more, the Germans almost turned away in distaste when she was offered a share of the burden in the development of France d'outre-mer, as it was considered a non-refundable deposit into the French Central Bank. Neither the grandeur of Communauté eurafrique nor an invitation to an opening of the African market seemed to offset the German attitudes towards the French proposal. Moreover, the Germans were concerned that the proposed trade preference scheme which would operate to the advantage of France d'outre-mer might hamper the traditional amicable relationship with German clients and suppliers, namely Branzil, Ghana, etc. For the Germans, the commercial relation with those countries was not insignificant. In fact, the bulk of her coffee and cocoa demands were met by these countries, and this in turn enabled German industrialised goods to be sold to them.<sup>4</sup> Her concern of losing a traditional supplier as well as market has partly stemmed from the nature of her aid policy

<sup>4</sup> The following table depicts the relative significance of German trade with Commonwealth Africa and Latin America, not to mention Asia, at the expense of her trade relation with French Africa.

	Imports	Exports
	1955	1955
Asia	2,600,000,000	2,500,000,000
Latin America	2,800,000,000	2,000,000,000
Africa	1,800,000,000	1,500,000,000
French Africa (including Maghreb countries)	416,436,000	190,811,000

Figures in Deutsch Marks.

SOURCE: Henry Didier, 'La participation de l'outre-mer, et notamment des territoires de l'afrique-noire, au marché commun européenne', *Nouvelle revue française d'outre-mer*, no. 2, février 1957 p. 74 et 78.



towards developing countries which is less philosophical and coherent than that of the French, and is oriented towards maintaining a commercial and amicable relationship with as many developing countries as possible. At the apex of the Association negotiation, France conceded to Germany that German imports of banana (another major tropical produce Germany imports) will be treated under a special trade regime and that nationals from anywhere in the Six would enjoy a principle of non-discriminatory right of establishment in the associates' region (Cosgrove-Twitchett, 1978: 13-4).

The regionalism-globalism issue has also helped to draw a line between German and French interests. This time, however, it was the Dutch rather than the German who were emphatic in criticising the eurafrica association as 'less European.' Holland herself, who sided with the Germans most of the time concerning the association proposals, has always held a view that the association might endanger her newly established relation with the other Asian and African states (Lee, 1960: 370). On the other hand, the German-Dutch alliance has not overlooked some politico-economic benefits accruing from the association. First is the possible solution to the problem of how to secure raw material supplies for Europe as well as market for industrialised goods. Besides, the lure of the Common Market was irresistible, serving as *quid pro quo* for the burden of the association. Furthermore, a formation of eurafrica in the long-run, it was conceived, might form a huge politico-economic unit capable of becoming a third power in world politics (Cousté, 1957: 125).

The negotiations over the policy of the association was concluded after a year of intensive debates between European partners. The general framework of the Association France desired remained virtually intact. Whatever the interests of the other Five negotiators may be (whether diverging or converging with those of the French), in the final analysis, their devotion (notably the Germans') to the *relance européenne* which the French craftily exploited was a decisive element in formulating the agreement very near to French wishes. Perhaps no one surpassed the ability of Dr. Conrad Adenaur in visualising the duty of Germany towards *relance européenne*, and his endeavour to achieve it (Alexander, 1967: 83). Consequently, the formulation of the association was monopolised by the Europeans. Africans had little role to play. Nonetheless, we still can pinpoint their responses towards French proposals and towards the negotiation process regarding the Association, and probe into the relevance of the association for them.

### III

Major criticism of the Association came from Commonwealth Africa (particularly from Ghana). They believed that the Association would clash with their economic and political interests. On the one hand, it discriminated against their trade interest in the European market in favour of France d'outre-mer. On the other hand, it assumed a challenge to the rising tide of African nationalism and an

attempt to insulate economically dependent French Africa from others. However, the uproar over the Association had not taken a definite shape until the time of British application for entry into the Common Market. In the meantime, apart from their shared anxieties about the adverse effect on the major exports of tropical produce, their attitude towards the Association has not grown bitter (Aluko, 1976: 195–6).

The attitude by the France d'outre-mer was much more submissive. Soon after the regime change in the Fourth Republic which brought Guy Mollet and his coalition government into power, *afrique noire* obtained an increasing role in their respective local government councils through the *Loi Cadre* (1956). However, the major decisions on local issues were still made in Paris, and in the case of the Association, Africans were only consulted indirectly or too late if approached formally. Formal approach took place when they were requested in a referendum to vote for or against joining the newly envisaged *Communauté française* in which they found the Association with the European Common Market being bound to the 'Yes' vote. An indirect approach involved fora such as at the Senate, national assembly or an ad-hoc French Commission (*Le Monde* 19 février, 1958), which provided opportunities for the *français noirs* to express their views. Leopold Senghor, Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Gabriel Lisette were among the most distinguished *français noirs* who later led their respective regions to political independence. The majority of the African political elites in Paris supported the French approach with some reservations on style and substance (*Le Monde* 25 juillet, 1957). Some of them were indignant about the way French leaders tried to bypass the African territorial assemblies as a forum to discuss the issue vital for Africans. They certainly felt uneasy also about the vagueness French officials showed regarding the African representation in the Association (Pattison, 1973: 73).

However, anxiety over the implication of the Association for France d'outre-mer outweighed their fury over procedural matters. They feared, to begin with, that the Association would bring about an influx of European goods as a result of the mutual agreement on the reduction of CET (Common External Tariff) coupled with the possible loss of revenue. Their apprehension was by no means soothed by the opening for their tropical produce into the whole European Common market. To be sure, they were excessively worried that the advantage of SURPRIX they were accustomed to receive from their metropole is slipping away from their hands, and asked their French partners even to replace the entire SURPRIX scheme.<sup>5</sup> Representing Chad, G. Lisette stated in the French Parliament, "... Our productive force is not yet capable of competing with the other overseas producers, and therefore needs protection by preferential arrangements.

<sup>5</sup> In 1954, the level of SURPRIX paid by France was calculated as follows: 75% on rough wine, 100% on raw sugar, 15–20% on groundnuts, 20–30% on groundnut oil, 15–20% on banana. And these amounted to approximately 80,000 million (old) francs. Pierre Moussa, *Les chances économique de la communauté franco-africaine*, (Paris: Colin 1957) pp. 80–86.

European partners should promise to pay SURPRIX, and set up their export quota for overseas territories. In addition, it is desirable that Europeans should not attach to their public as well as private investment in Africa terms and conditions which may bring apprehension to the embryonic political elites. . . .” (*Marchés Tropicaux du Monde* 26 janvier, 1957).

Their anxiety was not confined to the field of the export price stabilisation scheme alone. Fear of gradual French disengagement from assisting African development found a new form: they were alarmed that FIDES funds would yield to Community funds (later called FEDOM) without even guaranteeing previous level of the funds. They reacted as if they had encountered an ‘alien’ who intruded into the Union française, and who tried to disrupt the mutually dependent Franco-African relation. In spite of these reservations, French Africans upheld the Association half-heartedly. There was virtually no room for defiance against Paris. On the contrary, apart from expressing their troubled state to the European partners, they were far more preoccupied with the ‘assurance’ they would acquire from the French (Allen, 1972: 283). They were too dependent upon their metropole for the development assistance of, and their own political status in, their respective regions.

They were firstly heavily dependent on French economic resources for their internal development. For example, during 1947–57, capital investment in French West Africa totalled 170 billion CFA, of which more than 70% came from the French treasury via grants and loans. Since this credit was only granted to French businessmen, however, there was no way for Africans to take up any commercial activities. French dominance in the labour market was also palpable. In 1954, nearly 20,000 of the French work-force in West Africa occupied high to middle ranking position in the administrative apparatus and other public sectors as well as in private industry. Again, Africans were obstructed from obtaining access to technical and managerial skills which have been *sine qua non* for economic development of the region. Furthermore, the development programs in Africa were entirely dictated by the French which scarcely allowed the voice of Africans in the formulation of the policy. This, in effect, hindered the training of experienced African economic planners, and left the formulation process of the policy susceptible to the changes in French metropolitan politics. In fact, because of French public pressure, FIDES and CCFOM shifted their attention in 1952 towards improving the means of communication and encouraging production of export crops. Thus the Africans were offered SURPRIX which the French thought would be conducive to the cash-crop production (Ndongko, 1973: 221–9).

African elites were also heavily dependent upon their metropole for their political status and their own cultural identity. Houphouët-Boigny, for example, was deeply involved in the French decision-making process with respect to both the Association and French Community issues under Mollet and de Gaulle governments. He demonstrated his continuous and whole-hearted support for the Association in the following passage, “. . . Since my colleagues from metropolitan

France were no less eager than myself to defend the interests of the African territories, we succeeded together in overcoming a number of reservations which no territory acting individually could have dispelled. Thanks to the Franco-African community, our territories will enter the Common Market with more guarantees for their future than they could possibly have achieved if they were independent. We can continue to enjoy our liberties without fear that some economic enterprise will interfere in our political life, causing us to degenerate into neo-feudalism, as in the Middle East, or into dictatorship, as in Egypt..." (Houphouët-Boigny, 1957: 598).

The 'Eurafrican economic community' came to reality as part of the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957, which was to expire after a five-year period. France d'outre-mer was now privileged to compete with other tropical producers on advantageous terms within the Common Market. French Africa was also allowed to levy tariffs on goods from the European partners in order to protect their infant industries. The assistance from FEDOM amounted to 581 million US dollars to be disbursed between 1958–62, and was to be invested mostly in the unprofitable infrastructural sectors (e.g. railroads, ports, tele-communication networks) of the territories. France and West Germany were to contribute 200 million US dollars respectively, and France d'outre-mer were to receive 599 million US dollars (approximately 90% of whole FEDOM aid package). The provision clearly reflected the strength of the French bargaining power in relation to the other Five members in the 'association game.' If French foreign policy was conceived as a theatrical work for French domestic audience, it might not be wrong to say that the French Association policy could be regarded as a grand Eurafrican Festival in which European spectators were offered box seats to appreciate the show. French Africans, for their part, were not prepared yet to view the Rome Treaty as a symbol of the emerging Eurafrica, a terminology which the EEC Commission is apt to claim (The Commission of the European Economic Community, 1958: 99–100). They perceived it rather as an overture to the 'Internationalisation of the bilateral ties' between African territories on the one hand and the Western Europe on the other under a multilateral institutional setting. For Communauté française remained to overshadow their psyche.

#### *Concluding Remarks*

One will have to admit that the conditions, which enabled France to achieve her policy objectives in spite of the criticism by some African countries that she was "chauvinistic neo-colonialist," no longer remain totally valid. In fact, a loss of her grip particularly in the field of economic affairs since the turn of last decade is revealing. Nonetheless, it is a far cry to maintain that the French presence in Africa is now merely a myth. For the French intransigence to cling on to a dominant position in contemporary African affairs is glaringly evident, though in a disguised form.

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