

Title	Conceptions of objectivity and truth in ethics : a survey of recent developments
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Abstract	<p>I enquired further into the problem of the domain specificity of truth and the claim, brought forward by Parfit and Scanlon, that in ethics truth does not involve correspondence so that there are no ethical objects such as values, while ethical judgements can nonetheless be true. One can call this approach "objectivism without realism", although the terminology is rather fluid, and some would still be prepared to call Scanlon's and Parfit's approach "realist". As far as terminology is concerned, perhaps Ronald Dworkin is the most important voice who dismisses realism in ethics, which -- in line with John Mackie's claims -- would in his opinion imply the existence of ontologically weird objects.</p> <p>In the course of this year, I considered a number of criticisms of "objectivism without realism". The most challenging one has been developed by Charles Larmore who -- and this is of course of special interest for me -- combines this criticism of this type of contemporary objectivists with a criticism of Kant. The discussion of objectivity in ethics, and of normativity in general, is conducted with reference to reasons and their status, and according to Larmore Kant rejects the idea that rationality consists in responding rightly to independently existing reasons. Rather, Larmore sees Kant's famous conception of autonomy as an attempt to construct rationality independently of such an idea of a response to something. In Larmore's opinion, Kant thinks that reason must be the author of its principles. This is where I disagree with Larmore. In my opinion, Kant's claim that rational nature has absolute worth is a point of reference which can be read in a realist way.</p>
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研究課題 (日本語)						
Conceptions of Objectivity and Truth in Ethics: A Survey of Recent Developments						
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Conceptions of Objectivity and Truth in Ethics: A Survey of Recent Developments						
1. 研究成果実績の概要						
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2. 研究成果実績の概要 (英訳)						
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3. 本研究課題に関する発表						
発表者氏名 (著者・講演者)	発表課題名 (著書名・演題)	発表学術誌名 (著書発行所・講演学会)	学術誌発行年月 (著書発行年月・講演年月)			