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KO12002001-20110331-0375  
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Title The triviality of existence questions : a note on the neo-Alistotelian conception of metaphysics  
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Name 北村, 直彰  
Kana キタムラ, ナオアキ  
Romanization Kitamura, Naoaki  
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Name 西脇, 与作  
Kana ニシワキ, ヨサク  
Romanization Nishiwaki, Yosaku  
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Tokyo  
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Name Centre for Advanced Research on Logic and Sensibility The Global Centers of Excellence Program, Keio University  
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Issued (from:yyyy) 2011  
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Name CARLS series of advanced study of logic and sensibility  
Name (Translated)  
Volume 4  
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Year 2010  
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Start page 375  
End page 381  
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Abstract
Recently, J. Schaffer conspicuously defended the neo-Alistotelian view of metaphysics, which characterizes metaphysics as centered on what grounds what, as opposed to the Quinean view, on which the task of metaphysics is to say what exists.1 In particular, he endorses the former coupled with a permissive stance on existence, according to which the Quinean existence questions are trivial. Against this claim, W. Swetly argues that they are not trivial at all, but they have substantial and informative contents, and cognitive signifi cance.2 In our opinion, however, this opposition is not a real one. This paper argues that Swetly's arguments fail, and that he misses the point of Schaffer's claim. Also, we suggest that the explication of this apparent disagreement sheds light on some important concepts of metaphysics.
In what follows, fi rst, we summarize Schaffer's general meta-metaphysical position and his argument for the triviality of existence questions (TEQ) (§1). Second, the core of the Swetly's arguments against TEQ is presented (§2). Third, the failure of them is shown and it is also shown that there is no real disagreement between Schaffer and Swetly (§3). Finally, we conclude with some clarifi cation of how this explication and further considerationscan elucidate the complicated matters in the neo-Aristotelian conception of metaphysics (§4).
 
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Part 5 : Logic and Informatics
 
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英語  
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Oct 24, 2011 09:00:00  
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Oct 24, 2011 09:00:00  
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/ Public / Keio University Global COE Program Center for Advanced Research on Logic and Sensibility / CARLS series of advanced study of logic and sensibility / 4 (2010)
 
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