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KAKEN_17K04068seika.pdf
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:100.3 KB
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:Mar 5, 2021 |
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租税回避とセグメント情報開示の理論的・実証的研究
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ソゼイ カイヒ ト セグメント ジョウホウ カイジ ノ リロンテキ・ジッショウテキ ケンキュウ
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Sozei kaihi to segumento jōhō kaiji no rironteki jisshōteki kenkyū
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Theoretical and empirical research of tax avoidance and geographic segment disclosure
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村上, 裕太郎
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ムラカミ, ユウタロウ
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Murakami, Yūtarō
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慶應義塾大学・経営管理研究科 (日吉) ・准教授
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Research team head
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科研費研究者番号 : 30434591
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2020
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科学研究費補助金研究成果報告書
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2019
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本論文では、経営者の所在地別セグメントの開示選択と租税回避との関係を理論的に分析した。特に、どのような経営者がセグメント情報を合理的に非開示にし、かつ高税率国から低税率国へ所得をシフトさせることで租税回避するかを明らかにした。
分析の結果、以下のことがわかった。第一に、進出国の税率が等しい場合、租税回避インセンティブがないにもかかわらず、経営者はセグメント利益を合理的に非開示にする。第二に、SFAS131の適用後は、高税率国の収益の精度が高い企業は、セグメント利益を非開示にし、租税回避に積極的になる。第三に、国別報告書を課すことで、企業が自主的にセグメント利益を開示するようになる可能性がある。
This paper analytically investigates the relationship between tax avoidance and manager's disclosure choice of geographic earnings in a capital market setting. In particular, we identify the conditions under which managers withhold segment earnings and avoid tax payment by shifting income from high-tax to low-tax country.
Our analysis shows the following results. When the countries have the same tax rate, the manager rationally withholds segment earnings in spite of the fact that there is no tax-avoidance incentive for the managers. After the adoption of SFAS 131, the companies that face high precision of earnings in high tax country withholds segment earnings and increase the level of tax avoidance. Imposing CbCR may induce the companies to voluntarily disclose their segment earnings. Regarding the dynamic aspects, the manager engages more in tax-avoidance activity immediately after the turnover.
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研究種目 : 基盤研究 (C) (一般)
研究期間 : 2017～2019
課題番号 : 17K04068
研究分野 : 税務会計
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