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AN00234610-20160101-0037.pdf
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Title |
Title |
日米開戦前交渉過程のゲーム理論的考察
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Kana |
ニチベイ カイセンマエ コウショウ カテイ ノ ゲーム リロンテキ コウサツ
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Romanization |
Nichibei kaisenmae kosho katei no gemu rironteki kosatsu
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A game theory approach to the bargaining process between Japan and the U.S. in the pre-war Period
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塩澤, 修平
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シオザワ, シュウヘイ
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Romanization |
Shiozawa, Shuhei
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Affiliation |
慶應義塾大学経済学部
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Affiliation (Translated) |
Faculty of economics, Keio University
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慶應義塾経済学会
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ケイオウ ギジュク ケイザイ ガッカイ
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Romanization |
Keio gijuku keizai gakkai
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2016
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三田学会雑誌
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Mita journal of economics
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108
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4
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2016
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1
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Start page |
685(37)
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End page |
697(49)
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Abstract |
日露戦争終結から日米開戦までの期間について, 日米間交渉過程をゲーム理論の概念を援用して考察する。アメリカの排日移民法やホーリィ=スムート法, あるいはワシントン軍縮会議の結果がナッシュ均衡ではないため脱退したことなどにより, 日本の選択肢が次第に狭められていったことを示す。とくに開戦に至る数年間の日本の政策を, 対米戦が不可避という想定の下でのミニマックス原理に基づくと捉え, 展開形ゲームとしての定式化を試みる。
We analyze the political and military bargaining between Japan and the U.S. from 1905 to 1941, using game theory concepts. We conclude that the outcome of the Washington Naval Limitation Meeting was not Nash equilibrium since Japan had an incentive to deviate. After the war in Europe began, the U.S. seemed to begin an anti-Germany war. The decision-making process in Japan during that period could be viewed as a mini-max principle. We formulate a three-period game corresponding to historical evidence. In this game, the loss of Japan is minimized when Japan declares war on the U.S. in the second period since the ratio of Japanese naval power to that of the U.S. was maximized in that period.
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小特集 : 海の視点からの経済学 : 学際的検討の試み
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Jan 6, 2017 | | Modified; Free Keywords, Abstract, Edition, Document File. |
Oct 27, 2021 | | JaLCDOI を変更 |
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