This study proposes a virtue-based analysis of normative reasons. In metaethics, concepts such as rightness and goodness have been the focus of discussion so far. However, the view that the concept of reasons should instead be focused upon has recently become more mainstream. This is because certain types of reasons―termed “normative reasons”―have a property that supports or opposes an action (called “normativity”), and are considered more fundamental than rightness or goodness. Currently, the various positions seeking to define normative reasons are in disarray. To sort out this confusion and clarify the premise of the discussion, we first answer “what is the function of reasons?” and “what is an analysis?” (Section 2). Next, we introduce six previous analyses of normative reasons―Humeanism, Kantianism, Aristotelianism, Primitivism, Explanationism, and Evidentialism―and point out the problems with each (Section 3). We finally propose and validate a virtue-based analysis of normative reasons that modifies Aristotelianism (Section 4).
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