What are concrete particulars, such as an apple in front of me or a chair in which I am sitting right now? According to the instance view, a version of the bundle theory of universals proposed by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, concrete particulars are not bundles of universals, but instances of the bundles. This view, unlike the classical bundle theory, can explain Black's universe where there are two completely indiscernible spheres, but several questions can be raised against this view. In order to offer appropriate responses to such questions, I propose the mereological instance view, or MIV, which takes over the basic spirit of the instance view but reconstructs it from the viewpoint of the mereological bundle theory. By introducing some primitive but intuitively comprehensible relations including qualitative composition, MIV interprets bundles of universals and instances as "plurality of universals" and "qualitative fusion" respectively. Furthermore, MIV will advance the instance view's explanation for the relation of being constituent of particulars, the ground for the distinctness of bundles of universals and instances, and Black's universe. Finally, I argue that MIV points to one possible path for the development of the instance view.