The idea that logically valid arguments are normative for theoretical reasoning has been, and continues to be, widely accepted. But what about practical reasoning? How can we understand the relation between practical reasoning and valid arguments? I discuss these questions by offering an interpretation of Anscombe's "Practical Inference" (PI). In Section 1, I distinguish reasoning and argument, and further, rationality of reasoning and validity of arguments. In Section 2 and Section 3, I reconstruct PI by means of these distinctions. In Section 2, I criticize two conceptions of the relation between practical reasoning and valid arguments by extracting the crux of Anscombe's criticism of von Wright's view. In Section 3, I present three claims from PI: (1) rationality both of theoretical reasoning and of practical reasoning depends on the validity of the corresponding argument; (2) these two kinds of reasoning have different roles; (3) they depend on the same argument in different orders. In Section 4, I show that the third claim is false by means of counterexamples; I conclude that we can reasonably accept the first and the second claims but not the third.

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