We often say to a person who cannot enjoy Mozart's opera: "you ought to listen and enjoy Mozart's opera in correct manners". The 'ought' in this expression of ordinary language makes us assume that there is a deep connection between the aesthetic and the ethical. How can we think of this sort of aesthetic 'ought'?
The ethical consideration of 'ought' in respect of actions is called deontology. In analytical philosophy since 1980's, epistemic deontology which focuses on the propositional attitude of belief has been modeled upon deontology of actions. Now, aesthetic judgments could be regarded as propositional attitudes, and it seems to be possible that aesthetic deontology is modeled upon epistemic deontology.
According to Sellars-Chrisman's distinction between rules of criticism and rules of action, I find aesthetic 'ought' as rules of criticism which do not entail but imply rules of action for deontology. I also examine Davidson's concept of 'the partitioning of the mind' and Nagel's distinction between 'the perspective of a particular person' and 'an objective view', and situate aesthetic 'ought' in the tension and conflict between the personal taste of a particular subject and the normative taste of its community, both of which it has in its single mind.

特集 : 論集 美学・芸術学 : 美・芸術・感性をめぐる知のスパイラル(旋回)