One of the major problems in contemporary Philosophy of Religion is the problem of truth claims in religions. We can best probe this with a discussion of religious language. John Hick sees two possible ways to interpret this language: either it is meant to assert facts, or it is meant as a mythical expression. He juxtaposes fact and myth, and that which distinguishes between them is the criterion of verifiability. Hick thus makes distinction between religious fact and religious myth, or factual language and mythical language, and between the truth of each. It appears, therefore, that he holds twofold truth: the truth of facts, which can be confirmed or disconfirmed by an objective referent, and the religious truth, which can be substantiated by the human behaviour or disposition it evokes. An application of the theory of fact is Hick's concern with the language of eschatology, and an application of the theory of myth is his concern with the language of incarnation. I shall attempt to give an accurate and faithful account of his application of each, but with my own comments on his thinking process in view.