This paper attempts to elucidate some of the less known aspects of Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity. In the beginning, it is the objectivity of things that precedes intersubjectivity. But later, starting from the analysis of naturalistic objectivity, Husserl discovers the persons of the life-world (Lebenswelt). Here, it is rather intersubjectivity that has come to be the premise of objectivity, while the latter in its turn has reached its proper sense. There follow several analyses of the person in itself, among which the "Fifth Meditation" is the most systematic. Husserl, however, was dissatisfied with this work. He goes on to disclose the two-meaningness of subjectivity, and from there, through an analysis of the problem of time, comes upon the living present (lebendige Gegenwart). An absolute intersubjectivity is then reconceived as the mutual implication of world-constituting egos. Objectivity has gained a new foundation, and the problem of intersubjectivity develops into the problem of the cooperation of egos. Furthermore, it is made clear that the phenomenology which discovered this state of affairs was, in itself, motivated by intersubjectivity. Thus, the theory of intersubjectivity has found its last ground and newly oriented itself.