This article is a prelude toward Philosophy of Names. Name is one of the most crucial notions in the construction of logical systems, as we see it in the deep difference between Frege-Russell type quantification theory and Lesniewski's ontology, as well as for the philosphy of language. In this article, the authors have taken out one outstanding line of theory of proper name which has developed in close connection of symbolic logic with philosophy of language. Three stages are here distinguished : 1) Frege-Russell, 2) Strawson-Searle, 3) Donnellan-Kripke. In explaining the first stage, the difference between the languages of the, two authors is accentuated, for sometimes, they are treated together as if their theories were almost the same. The second stage is explained from the point of the theory of Presupposition, and the authors tried to make explicit how the notion of "proper name" should appear if we take this point of view. We do not think that this theory is completely true, but not completely false, either. This theory has some point. The third stage is strongly and essentially connected with the modal logics and their so-called Kripke-model structures, and an explanation of causal theory of names is given using the notion of Kripke-model structures. The authors have described the theories as they stand, for it is needed, tiresome as it is, in order to develop further the theory of names from our standpoint of view.