This article tries to show how moral arguments can bear political significance in civil society through an examination of the recent debates over  pornography. It reflects critically upon a particular strand in recent anti-pornography feminism represented by Catharine MacKinnon, which adopts  a politics-centered approach to pornography. The article first identifies, through a consideration of Ronald Dworkin's critique, the ways in which  MacKinnon's case against pornography is weak as a political argument. Following Susan Mendus's critique of MacKinnon, it then argues that as a  result of her distinctive approach, MacKinnon is committed to taking an oppressive attitude towards both male and female sexuality. In turn, this  article suggests how a moral argument may be able to capture the wrongness of pornography while bypassing the problems MacKinnon's critics  point out. To this end, this article explores Rae Langton's argument of sexual solipsism, which claims that pornography can create a solipsistic  world by objectifying people, and her remedy to this problem – friendship. Finally, it shows how deliberative democracy offers a framework in which  the political relevance of this moral approach can be appreciated. Under this framework, moral arguments are not seen as second-class arguments  in public deliberations, but as arguments equally important in thinking about the shape of society.
 "Therefore the law is slacked, and judgment doth never go forth." (Habakkuk 1:4)