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AA10715850-00001006-0001.pdf
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Title |
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Mechanism design with limited communication : implications for decentralization
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Mookherjee, Dilip
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津曲, 正俊
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ツマガリ, マサトシ
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Tsumagari, Masatoshi
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Keio Economic Society, Keio University
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2010
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Keio Economic Society discussion paper series
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10
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6
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2010
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We develop a theory of mechanism design in a principal-multiagent setting with private information, where communication involves costly delay. The need to make production decisions within a time deadline prevents agents from communicating their entire private information to the principal, rendering revelation mechanisms infeasible. Feasible communication protocols allow only finite number of possible messages sent in a finite number of stages. An extension of the `Revenue Equivalence Theorem' is obtained, and used to show that an optimal production allocation can be computed by maximizing virtual profits of the Principal subject to communication constraints alone. In this setting delegation of production decisions to agents strictly dominates centralized production decisions, and decentralized communication protocols dominate centralized ones. The value of decentralizing contracting decisions depends on the ability of the principal to verify messages exchanged between agents.
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