I have connected this topic to my planned monograph of Kant's Molinism in which Kant's philosophy of history will be one chapter. The main point is that the foundational assumptions of Kant's philosophy of history belong to a practically grounded metaphysics and that this practically grounded metaphysics is of a Molinist persuasion.

An overview of the latest research trends in Kant scholarship suggests that the connection of Kant's approach to philosophy of history with his conception of metaphysics has so far been rather neglected. Also, the intellectual sources of the key ideas have so far not been acknowledged sufficiently.

It has for a very long time been assumed that Kant's critical thought is basically anti-metaphysical, while those who have read him as a metaphysician as early as in the 1920s were either ignored or discredited for reasons not immediately connected to this view on Kant.
There are of course exceptions, such as Yovel, but in general this is a fair point to make.

The key point is this: For a Molinist there is a specific kind of truths and a specific kind of knowledge attributed to God, and this knowledge concerns hypothetical scenarios, such as what would happen if he created the world. If we may say that creation has been carried out on the basis of this knowledge, we can in principle infer -- given certain properties the agent in question has -- that the overall aim of this action will be achieved.

To be sure, this sound rather challenging for the modern reader, but Kant is prepared to endorse this line of thought, but of course not a matter of theoretical knowledge.