Combining research and teaching, I have, together with my students, conducted intensive screening of recent papers and books on this topic. The main focus was on the debate about so-called deflationary and pluralist accounts of truth. According to deflationists, truth is not a substantial property in the first place; all important information about truths is already contained in its concept. Pluralists, on the other hand, maintain that truth is a substantial property, but that it varies across disciplines. In other words, for pluralists, truth is domain-specific. While this appears to be a convincing approach, it is not without difficulties either, though. One key problem is that there needs to be some sort of criterion to distinguish what one can call "respectable" and "not respectable" domains. While ethics should count as a respectable domain "fortune telling" and similar domains are not. One promising way to determine its respectability is to investigate its relation to domains which have already been established as respectable, such as natural science. "Fortune telling" pretends to make predictions with regard to an area which is also covered by natural science, so that the quality of these predictions can be tested by means of statistics, for example. Ethics, by contrast, is a normative discipline; it does not aim at predictions about the behaviour of human agents; rather, it tells as how people should act.
A further important question concerns the specific nature of truth in ethics; should it be construed along the lines of correspondence or not. Various proposals have been examined in this regard.