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“The Mind Is a Container”: Metaphoric Transfer from Space to Emotions as Cause in From and Out of*

Maki Sudo

1. Introduction
A lexical item has more than one meaning, which is called polysemy. Polysemy, one of the important topics in cognitive analyses of language, demonstrates that different meanings get associated by the process called metonymy and metaphor. Dirven (1996) shows the way in which the spatial meanings of English prepositions are extended to mean emotion that causes an action. This paper focuses on from and out of that are similar in that both of them are “source” prepositions, and discusses how meanings of these two prepositions are transferred from space to emotion as cause by the metaphor of “The mind is a container”.

2. Metonymy and Metaphor
This section shows how metonymy and metaphor work, providing some terminological frameworks. Figures 1. 1 and 1. 2 below diagram these processes respectively.

According to these figures above, metonymy is a cognitive process of a profile shift in a single domain, in other words, a meaning extension based on relatedness or contiguity. For example, in He has a lot of Shakespeares, Shakespeares refers not to one of the greatest English writers but to the works written by Shakespeare. Here, the producer
and his product is so closely connected that metonymy allows for the name of the writer to refer to his writings. On the other hand, metaphor is a process of mapping one source domain onto another target domain. The former domain is concrete and the latter is abstract. To put in other words, metaphor is a meaning extension based on similarity, and the similarity is made to be seen between the two domains by the process of mapping. In An argument is war, by mapping the source domain war onto the target domain argument and making similarity clear between argument and war, metaphor permits for us to understand clearly what an argument is. That is, one party attacks, while the other retreats, or one party wins and the other loses, or each party ends in a draw.⁴

3. Literal Meanings of From and Out of
According to many dictionaries such as Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (1995) (hereafter LDCE) and Kenkyusha's New College English-Japanese Dictionary (1994), the definition of from and
out of is spatial. Since the spatial concept is so fundamental for understanding the world around us, relating each other in physical space (Lee 2001), the most fundamental, that is, the prototypical meaning of these prepositions is that of space. Here, it should be noticed that these two prepositions that stand for space are different from each other. For example, *LDCE* defines the meaning of from, first of all, as "starting at a particular place, position, or condition", and out of as "from the inside of something". Similarly, Lindstromberg (1998) states that the basic meaning of from is "a path in terms of its starting point (Lindstromberg 1998: 39) and the prototypical meaning of out of is "across a perimeter and going farther from" (ibid.: 33). Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate these differences:

For example, in *Kay cleared the dishes from the table*, since the prototypical meaning of from is a source or a point of departure, in other words, zero-dimensional and with the medium of the metonymy of "the part for the whole" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 36) in which a group of the points refers to the surface, it further means Kay cleared the dishes from the surface of the table. On the other hand, in *The diary must have fallen out of her pocket*, as out of prototypically stands for an exit from the inside of a container, that is, three-dimensional, it means the diary must have fallen from the inside of her pocket.
4. Emotion as Cause and the Cause of Emotions

Dirven (1996) investigates the meaning extension from space to emotion as cause and the cause of emotions seen in English prepositions. Observe the following example:

(1) Bill bridled with anger at Hillary's remark. (Dirven 1996: 56)

According to Dirven, the prepositional phrase *with anger* denotes the emotion that causes Bill's physiological reaction of bridling, i.e. the internal force. On the other hand, *at Hillary's remark* denotes the event that causes the emotion of anger, that is, the external force causing the emotion. In addition, he calls the linkage between the *with*-phrase and *at*-phrase emotional causality. Observe the following:

(2) a. Hillary made a remark.
   b. This remark angered Bill.
   c. Bill bridled with anger. (ibid.: 57)

(2a–c) is a chain of emotional causality. (2a) denotes an event of Hillary's making a remark, (2b) denotes an emotional state that is triggered by the event (2a), and (2c) is a physiological reaction triggered by the emotional state (2b). Figure 3 shows the chain of emotional causality (2a–c):

![Figure 3. A chain of emotional causality](image_url)

*Hillary's making a remark*  *anger*  *bridling*

— 100 —
According to Dirven, it should be noticed that we find a reversal of the chain of emotional causality from an iconic sequence (3a) below to a salience sequence (3b). This results from the conceptualizer giving cognitive salience to the inner force, and thus it is expressed first:

(3) a. Hillary's remark angered Bill and he bridled at the remark.
   b. Bill bridled with anger at Hillary's remark.
      (Dirven 1996: 57)

Furthermore, he states that the physiological reactions and their emotional causes are by necessity contiguous. In other words, the one (reaction) indexically stands for the other (cause). (See Figure 3 again.) For example, in (2c) the anger is externalized by the physiological reaction of bridling. Thus, there is a metonymical relationship between the effect of the emotion and the emotion as cause.

5. Extension from Spatial Meanings
Dirven investigates the extension from spatial meanings of from and out of, and draws a distinction between them: "emotion as a controllable or an uncontrollable source of an action." (Dirven 1996: 61) Observe the following examples:

(4) a. *He went white out of fear.
   b. *I could have died from shame. (Dirven 1996: 61)

Dirven demonstrates that we can never use the two prepositions, especially out of for sentences that have a cause–effect relationship whereby the effect automatically follows from the cause. In (4a), fear
automatically causes the physiological reaction of going white, and thus *out of* can only be used in the expression with such actions as in (5):

(5)  

a. I concealed my feelings out of pity to him.  
b. They sent me here out of spite.  

(Dirven 1996: 61)

Dirven thinks that the actions of concealing or sending are deliberate and intentional ones unlike the physiological reaction of (4a), so *out of*-phrase denotes the controllable and rational motivation for the actions. The same interpretation is true of (5b). Dirven explains how a three-dimensional spatial meaning of *out of* is extended into emotions as a controllable and/or rationally explicable source of an action: the “free” movement out of a container as the spatial sense of *out of* is metaphorically extended into a controllable or free motivation for actions, and its container sense denotes more conscious or rational source of actions.

In contrast, *from* does not necessarily denote a proximate external cause of an emotional state as in (6) below, but denotes an internal type of cause as in (7):

(6)  

His face was aglow with terror from what had happened to them all.

(7)  

Had I refused out of fear as well as from resentment?  

(ibid.: 63)

*Out of*-phrase and *from*-phrase in (7) reveal that they are different from each other in the conceptualization of emotion as a source of an action. Dirven states that (7) is interesting in that it is self-interrogative: the speaker wonders whether, in addition to his full awareness of
having acted because of fear, there may also have been the less conscious motive of resentment. Thus *from* denotes less conscious and less free motivations. This explains why (8) is an even stronger self-interrogative that uses *from* rather than *out of*:

(8) Why am I acting from pride?  
(Dirven 1996 : 63)

According to Dirven, in (8), the speaker acts on the ground of pride unconsciously, and he is doubtful of himself acting like that, reproachfully stating this weakness. Dirven explains how a spatial meaning of *from* is here extended to mean emotional causality. The spatial sense of *from* denotes a source or point of departure. In this respect, *from* resembles *at* and *to* very much in their spatial uses, since both of them denote a zero-dimensional point. And this unspecified spatial environment of *from* is mapped onto the abstract domain of emotional causality and denotes “the abstract point of departure of our actions, which is therefore equally fully unspecified as to its being an inner or outer cause, or a conscious or unconscious one.” (Dirven 1996 : 64)

6. Metaphoric Transfer from Space to Emotion as Cause

In the previous two chapters (3 and 5), we have found prototypical meanings of *from* and *out of* and their extended meanings: *from* prototypically refers to a source or point of departure, and *out of* denotes an exit from a container. On the other hand, the extended sense of *from* from space is an unconscious and/or uncontrollable cause of an action, and that of *out of* is a conscious and/or controllable one. This chapter discusses how metaphoric transfer occurs from space to emotion as cause. In the case of *out of*, the general spatial notion of an exit from an open container also means a “free” movement out of a con-
tainer. The free exit out of an open container is then metaphorically extended into a controllable or free motivation for actions, and the container sense into a conscious cause. *From*, on the other hand, in its spatial sense, just denotes a source or point of departure. This unspecified spatial configuration metaphorically suggests the abstract point of departure of our actions that refers to an unspecified (that is, unconscious and/or uncontrollable) cause of the action. Here, I contend that the spatial meaning is extended into emotion as cause by the metaphor of “The mind is a container” that Dirven does not point out.\(^9\) *From*-phrase denotes “from a point of departure”, and because of the zero-

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<td>metonymy (the part for the whole)</td>
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<tr>
<td>from the surface of something</td>
<td>a free exit from the inside of a container</td>
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<td>metaphor (The mind is a container)</td>
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<td>from the surface of one’s mind</td>
<td>a free exit from the inside of one’s mind</td>
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| emotion as an unconscious/ uncontrollable cause | emotion as a conscious/ controllable cause |

Table 1. Linguistic linkage between literal meaning and metaphorical meaning
dimensionality that a point has and with the medium of the metonymy of "the part (point) for the whole (surface)" as we have seen in chapter 3, it further denotes "from a surface of something". And with the intermediation of this metaphor, it further refers to "from the surface of one's mind". This superficial image of from is related to abstractness, and also to an unconscious and/or uncontrollable cause. On the other hand, since out of -phrase denotes "a free exit from a container" and the container is three-dimensional, it further signifies "a free exit from the inside of a container". Then with the intermediation of the same metaphor as the case of from, out of extendedly refers to "a free exit from the inside of one's mind". The inside image of out of is concrete in contrast to superficiality in the case of from, and thus it is also related to a conscious and/or controllable cause. Table 1 shows the process of this metaphoric transfer.

7. Conclusion
Metaphor used to be viewed as a figure of speech, an unusual form of discourse characteristic of literature or limited in a particular kind of lexicon (e.g. Lee 2001; Taylor 1995). Cognitive linguistics views metaphor differently from other theories of language. Particularly Lakoff and Johnson (1980) propose a new view of metaphor and demonstrate that metaphor is an everyday use of language, that is to say, language is filled with metaphors that are not literary, and that it is systematic and cognitive in that our view of the world itself is so, too. Similarly, Hopper (1998) sees grammar as "the micro end of rhetoric", and proposes "Emergent Grammar", restoring the centrality of metaphor as rhetoric in modern linguistics.

In this paper, I have considered spatial senses of from and out of as prototypical examples that undergo a meaning extension as emotion as
cause by the help of metaphoric transfer: \textit{from} is transferred from a source or point of departure to an unconscious and/or uncontrollable cause by the metaphor of “The mind is a container”. The same metaphor, as in the case of \textit{from}, allows for \textit{out of} to transfer from a free exit from a container to a conscious and/or controllable cause. We have found that metaphors (and metonymies) are very helpful cognitive devices that connect senses that are related to but different from each other in the polysemous network (Dirven 1985), mapping basic and concrete domains (“space” in this paper) onto more abstract domains for conceptualizing the abstract notion of emotional causality.

Notes

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(1) For the discussion of polysemy, for example, see Taylor (1995)’s discussion on \textit{climb} and \textit{over}, and Lee (2001)’s investigation of extensions from spatial meanings in \textit{out} and \textit{up}.

(2) “Profile” is an especially salient part in a domain. See Langacker (1988).

(3) “Domain” is a cognitive base of a meaning that an expression has. For example, the concept of “elbow” is easily understood, being based on “arm”. That is, “arm” is a cognitive domain of “elbow”. See also Langacker (1988).

(4) According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) (hereafter L&J), though the metaphor \textit{An argument is war} highlights the offensive aspect of an argument, it also has a hidden aspect of an argument as a cooperative act: “Someone who is arguing with you can be viewed as giving you his time, a valuable commodity, in an effort at mutual understanding.” (L&J 1980: 10)

(5) TR stands for “trajector” that functions as “figure” perceived as a more salient entity. For further explanation, see Langacker (1987).

(6) LM stands for “landmark” that functions as “ground” perceived as a background of TR. See also Langacker (1987).
(7) It is difficult to understand “a point = a surface” without the medium of metonymy, mainly because it is quite natural for our cognition that a point is zero-dimensional and a surface is two-dimensional. In addition, L&J (1980) state that the metonymy of “the part for the whole” is “not merely a referential device” (L&J 1980: 36) and “which part we pick out determines which aspect of the whole we are focusing on.” (ibid.) For example, “good heads” refers to “intelligent people” in which intelligence is a particular characteristic of the person, associated with the head. I do not deal with this point here.

(8) L&J (1980) call both the conceptualization of a mental or emotional state causing an act or event of from and that of out of the “emergence metaphor”: “Here the STATE (desperation, loneliness, etc.) is viewed as a container, and the act or event is viewed as an object that emerges from the container. The CAUSATION is viewed as the EMERGENCE of the EVENT from the STATE.” (L&J 1980: 75)

(9) Although Radden (1985) states that by the medium of the “emergence metaphor” proposed by L&J out of is extended to mean a controlled motivation for actions, he does not point out “The mind is a container” metaphor, either.

(10) The metaphor The mind is a container is seen in the following examples in Japanese:

Kokoro o (man-zoku/kanashimi <emotional state> de) mitasu.
Kokoro ga (uresisa/hua-n de) ippai ni naru.

References


