The modern western political theory based upon the war model (politics as the continuation of war by other means) has presupposed 'free and autonomous agent', who is able to trace his action to his own will, and able to believe that he is responsible for his action. If this is so, the Hobbesian servile state, where the multitude who are equal in terms of strength are led by 'fear' and 'hope', is only to be expected. This paper is a proposal of an alternative theory not on the pursuit of 'power' or 'strength', but rather on our 'weakness' or 'vulnerability' from an East Asian perspective. A focus on the equality of weakness may lead people to the virtue based on the strength of mind, creating courage based not on battle but escape.

In this respect the post-war Japanese understanding of peace is noteworthy. It shaped under the circumstance of double bind, namely, the existing paradox between the ideal of the Japanese peace constitution, and the preservation of a military force, despite Japan's professed abandonment of such a force, in the form of the Self-Defense Force, and moreover, the turning of Okinawa into a US military base under the Japanese-US Security Treaty.
Give Peace a Chance

Yoshihisa Hagiwara

Abstract
The modern western political theory based upon the war model (politics as the continuation of war by other means) has presupposed ‘free and autonomous agent’, who is able to trace his action to his own will, and able to believe that he is responsible for his action. If this is so, the Hobbesian servile state, where the multitude who are equal in terms of strength are led by ‘fear’ and ‘hope’, is only to be expected. This paper is a proposal of an alternative theory not on the pursuit of ‘power’ or ‘strength’, but rather on our ‘weakness’ or ‘vulnerability’ from an East Asian perspective. A focus on the equality of weakness may lead people to the virtue based on the strength of mind, creating courage based not on battle but escape.

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1. Paradigm of the Modern Western Political Theories

In what follows, I shall first provide a summary of the paradigmatic characteristics of modern political theories, and then briefly sketch out the possibility of an alternative schema to them.

1-1. Modern Political Theories: The War Model
Politics seems to presuppose war, and seems to be a science built upon the logical structure that recognizes war as an inevitability. This can explain why the issue of peace was neglected in modern political theories, and prompted those who were dissatisfied with such a state of affair, to create peace studies.
In fact, both in Germany and Japan after World War II, from a fundamental reflection on pre-war politics, there was a momentum to rebuild the study of politics as a science of freedom with its object and goal as peace. However, this effort would effectively fail in the face of a great challenge. No matter how strongly we put our hope in peace, within modern politics, ‘politics’ itself was understood to be in a very close relationship with the idea of ‘war’.

We may take Masao Maruyama as a representative political scientist in Japan who attempted to rebuild politics in the above mentioned way. However, in the Seiji no Sekai (World of Politics), a political science textbook published in the early post-war era, Maruyama explained the phenomenon of politicization as a kind of state of war, where, as a result of intensified conflicts between social groups or states, all aspects of humanity are mobilized. Empathizing with Quincy Wright, he quotes: ‘Conflict is its [i.e. politics’] essence. People engaged in politics are engaged in a battle, if not of bullets then of ballots, it not of armies then of rhetoric, if not of strategy then of persuasion’.

This is not to say that Maruyama failed to grasp the political phenomenon. Let us look at Thomas Hobbes for example. For Hobbes, people pursue their own desires, and have a passion to set themselves above others. Given this nature, in a pre-political state, or ‘the state of nature’, competing over finite resources, human relationship is governed by mutual suspicion, fear, and competition. This is the ‘war of every man against every man’ (bellum omnium contra omnes). On Hobbes’s account, the duty of the state (which Hobbes’s calls the Leviathan after the sea monster in the Book of Jobs) resembles that of the ‘wolf tamer’, that is, to intimidate the Hobbesian man – the man as ‘a wolf to man’ (homo homini lupus) – by the fear of punishment and force him to observe the law.

Max Weber, who defines ‘politics’ as the act ‘to strive for a share of power or to influence the distribution of power, whether between states or between the groups of people contained within a state’, is clearly a descendent of Hobbes. This is because Weber defines ‘power’ – that which people try to get ahold of, and, if they cannot, strive even for the crumbs – as ‘the chance that an individual in a social relationship can achieve his or her own will even against the resistance of others’. Those who doubt this may also wish to consider Clausewitz’s following definition of war: ‘War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will’.

If this is so, the situation is far more shocking than Clausewitz’s all too familiar formula that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’. In other words, in modern politics, war is not seen as a means to achieving a particular goal, but rather politics is seen as ‘the continuation of war by other means’. War is not a ‘state of exception’ of politics, but is understood as the splendorous moment when the true nature of politics, which under normal circumstances is hidden, is revealed.

One who presented this view with uncompromising clarity was Carl Schmitt. Schmitt’s involvement with the Nazis has been the subject of much criticism, but his politics fully earns the title ‘diabolic politics’ with his ingenious originality and cold-blooded rationality.
According to Schmitt, the characteristic modern way of thinking that seeks for the nature of politics in power, while seemingly plausible, is simply defining the ‘state’. This brings about the question-begging explanation that the state is that which is political, and the political is that which concerns the state. If this explanation does not work, we must first identify the inherent marker of the ‘political’, which becomes the precondition of the concept of the state. At this point, Schmitt searches for the specific political distinction which becomes the cause of all political acts and motives in the ‘friend-enemy’ distinction. Here, the ‘enemy’ is neither an object of one’s hatred on the personal level, nor is used metaphorically. The ‘enemy’ is a public concept referring to the collectivity of people with whom one is fighting, and the ‘friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing’. For Schmitt, war is neither the goal nor content of politics. It is the precondition of politics. Therefore, to criticize issues of war from a moral, economical, or religious perspective simply misses the point (category mistake). It is a political problem. This is exemplified by the fact that only the state, which is established on the ‘political’, has the enormous power of waging war. Externally, war requires the killing of people of the adverse country, and from its own members, the readiness to die; internally, war requires the suppression of revolutionary forces and in this sense, war requires the state to have total control over people’s lives. This overwhelming, extralegal right that is given only to the state cannot be justified by religion, morals or law. This proves that politics has its own unique significance, or raison d’être. Put simply, for Schmitt, the world of politics is one where no justification is necessary and is governed by the motto of ‘kill, or be killed’.

At this point, we must ask ourselves whether it is possible to build in the idea of peace within political theory based on this war model. It seems possible to build a theory not on the pursuit of ‘power’ or ‘strength’, but rather on our ‘weakness’ or ‘vulnerability’. This is because most people do not have the power to fight back against the unreasonable violence confronting them. Even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan did not have the strength to raise a fist. Similarly, a wife that is beaten by her husband does not lash out against him. Why? This is because we feel completely powerless. Those who are powerless would be able to relate to this feeling. When we do not have strength to oppose, what should we do? This should be our starting point.

We might say that human equality is the equality of our weakness. That is, we are all equally powerless before nature. This ‘weakness’ may be juxtaposed against the ‘strength’ in Hobbes’s idea of equality. The fundamental concern for Hobbes’s modern sovereign state was the realization of peace. However, according to Spinoza, the Hobbesian state, where the multitude who are equal in terms of strength are led by ‘fear’ and ‘hope’, is a ‘servile’ (servus) state, and that this is simply a negative peace based on the ‘absence of war’. By contrast, a focus on the equality of weakness leads people to ‘the virtue based on the strength of mind’ (animi virtus seu fortitudo), creating ‘courage’ (animositas) based not on battle but escape. Through this, the external assertion of ‘strength’ by the state, and the
internal exclusion of the ‘other’ by the ‘strong’ may be conceptually avoided, and the horizon of positive peace without enslavement opens up. The reason why those who are relatively ‘weak’ have been excluded in democracies and continue to be excluded seems to be because people have placed a particular meaning to ‘strength’ and assembled power through this system, and to assert their own ‘strength’, they have labeled the different ‘other’ as the ‘weak’ and denied them public political power.

1-2. The Agent Presupposed by Modern Political Theories

The agent, the portrait of a person, presupposed by modern political theories, or indeed by most social sciences, is the ‘free and autonomous agent’. To be free and autonomous means to be able to trace one’s action to one’s own will, and to be able to believe that one is responsible for one’s action. The modern agent became independent from the pre-modern local and blood relation community, and acts according to individual free will, and as a result, takes responsibility for his own actions. Characteristic of the agent is that he considers the rationality of the goal, has the ability to make rational judgments, has within himself a certain standard of value, and based on this standard, is able to act consistently. Such an autonomous and strong agent is the precondition of the forming of the democratic world, but is such an agent possible?

This autonomous agent is also one who is self-forming. There is a separation between the ‘super ego’, which calls and judges (Freud’s super-ego), and the ‘empirical ego’, which responds to the call and obeys the judgment. As Michel Foucault says, this basic structure of the autonomous agent or the transcendental self and the empirical self can be found in the Christian idea of ‘calling’. The calling refers to God’s calling and salvation, and one way in which humans can respond to the calling is ‘confession’. Confession, that is, the act of confessing one’s sin to a priest or minister, forms a part of asking for forgiveness. The confessed sin is one’s truth, in other words, the truth of the empirical ego, and one who is confessing is the super ego. According to Foucault, confession functioned as a device to spread the idea of the self as the autonomous agent.

The idea of the autonomous agent was reflected in the enlightenment thought after the eighteenth century. However in the disenchanted modern world, gradually the belief that the super ego of the autonomous agent needed to be detached from the religious idea of God, and connected to ‘reason’ that was internal to humans, became widespread.

A Philosopher who feared this was Martin Heidegger. Because the autonomous agent transcends the self, he becomes blind to the existence of others, and becomes subject to egoism and anomie. Heidegger calls the way of life in which one becomes disinterested in others’ uniqueness and forgets one’s own uniqueness within a mass society ‘das Man’. Here, the super ego no longer has a measure to judge and reflect the empirical ego. Even if new gods such as progress or the development of science and technology replace God, that is, even if God is substituted, this merely replaces purpose of life with means to life, hiding the reason of human life, and creates a cult of scientism and science worship. Such a world
merely gives birth to a mass psychology where people fear conflicts in social relationships and passively act uniformly with others – ‘if we cross the red light together, there is nothing to fear’.

The psychoanalyst Gregory Bateson propounded the double bind theory. A typical double bind scenario is as follows. A mother says to her child: ‘You only do what you are told. You should be more independent minded. You shouldn’t be pushed around. You should learn to think and act for yourself’. The child is unable to do anything. If he tries to think for himself, this would mean that he was simply following orders. There is no exit. Bateson believed that this would lead to schizophrenia, but is this so?

Although it may sound strange, human beings are creatures that must bear the paradox of double bind. Just like performers on the stage, we live within the structures of double splitting and self-elimination. There is the person acting his role qua performer, and the person himself; but we live this double splitting structure without becoming schizophrenic. Heidegger states that the identity of our anxiety (Angst) is this schizophrenic structure. To live in this world requires us to live in a world of doubleness, thus creating a structural insecurity.

To be anxious, in other words, is for the one’s real self to raise a quiet voice of self-alienation that ‘this is not I’, against the complacent self on the stage. This quiet voice of self-alienation which creates a gap, is nothing other than the voice of conscience (Gewissen).

Put differently, what makes us human is our existence within the uncertainty in the absence of an essential nature. In this sense, our ability is simply a potential, the content of which cannot be determined unambiguously. Ability being potentiality, it may be the case that it will never be actualized. We are creatures that are able to speak, but at the same time, may be able not to speak. If we are to have a definite ‘nature’, then this is our existence as a potentiality.

However, the nature of all forms of social power being the construction of order, they hide contingency and oppress the world of possibility. Social order is created through essentializing people and necessitating the world.

Modern society is sometimes described as a ‘controlled society’ or ‘regulated society’. A controlled society is one which recognizes the humanly nature and tries to control this. But here, we may observe a similar deception common also to multiculturalism. That is, both a controlled society and multiculturalism 1) admit people’s plurality, but while denying the essentialization of particular elements, envisage a common horizon where the plurality of people can co-exist. Also, 2) while multiculturalism recognizes the plurality of cultures, it does not recognize the plurality of the individual. Under multiculturalism, the individual is identified and reduced to a cultural element.

A controlled society recognizes that people are an undetermined existence, and live within the world of possibility. Yet it constructs a social order and tries to control them. In other words, it does not really recognize that people are an undetermined existence.
Politics is not about building a community that has a single identity or an exclusive community of similars (this was the aim of the modern nation state building). The art of politics is to share the same space with others. To make this possible, we need to cultivate an imagination towards others. A controlled society is a distorted attempt at achieving co-existence without recourse to this imagination. It is based on an optimistic invisible hand assumption that society will necessarily function if the individuals simply think and act upon their selfish desires.

For Hannah Arendt, the public realm is where people appear as a political existence, and it is a space of appearance where ‘action’ is undertaken. People disclose their identity through speech (lexis) and action (praxis), and through making an effort to express their uniqueness, make an appearance in the human world.

Moreover, for Arendt, action involves disclosing who you are, and not what you are. However, we cannot express in words who we are. The moment we try to do this, the attempt, by the very nature of vocabularies, becomes a description of what we are. The problem is not about our inability positively to express who we are. What is always required is the existence of others who can read this off from our speech.

In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world, while their physical identities appear without any activity of their own in the unique shape of the body and sound of the voice. This disclosure of ‘who’ in contradistinction to ‘what’ somebody is – his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which may display or hide – is implicit in everything somebody says and does…[I]ts disclosure can almost never be achieved as a willful purpose, as though one possessed and could dispose of this ‘who’ in the same manner he has and can dispose of his qualities. On the contrary, it is more than likely that the ‘who’, which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the person himself.13

The reason why Arendt’s idea of publicness focuses on people’s personal identities (who we are) rather than qualities is because we cannot fully express this with words. We appear as a bearer of a personal identity in front of others, but never fully understand what this identity is. For the agent, the self is always in excess, and so cannot be fully accommodated. That is in other words the other in one person.

This is the reason why people can have an imagination towards others. Since I, the agent, cannot fully understand myself, the self, it can only be understood as one possibility, that is, as a contingency. Here, there will always be the possibility that the ‘I’ I understand is not ‘I’ I understood. This possibility, that is, this fundamental contingency, is the fountain of the imagination towards others.
When we think about solidarity, at the center of this idea, there is usually some kind of positive quality which people share. However, a solidarity based on the sharing of such a quality cannot become a universal public. Given the lack of a human essence, a solidarity based on sameness inevitably produces and excludes a ‘dissimilar’. A true universal public cannot be based on a positive identity. By contrast, this idea only becomes possible with the denial of individual identity, and the acceptance of fundamental contingency.

If the idea of the public is still possible today, this will not be achieved through a faith in a so-called universal value, but through a solidarity mediated by our fundamental contingency. Even though there may not be a value with a positively identifiable content, in the sense that every ‘I’ is fundamentally contingent (that is, that I can be an indefinite other), there will remain universality.

2. Long Peace of 65 Years: Japanese Experience
2-1. ‘When a War Begins, Will you Fight for Your Country’?

Now, let us consider Figure 1 and Figure 2. The two charts show the results in various countries to a survey question from the ‘Value of World’s Leading Countries’¹⁴: ‘When a War Begins, Will you Fight for Your Country’? This survey has been conducted since 1981, involving research teams from many universities and research institutes all over the world, for the purpose of comparing the attitudes of the citizens of the various countries using a common questionnaire. The surveys have been conducted every 5 years after 1990, and for each country, roughly 1000 samples of men and women over 18 have been collected.

Figure 1: 2000 Survey
In the 2000 Survey, Japan is particularly significant. In Japan, only 15.6% responded ‘yes’ to the question whether they would fight for their country, marking the lowest out of the 36 countries. The number of people who responded ‘no’ in Japan was only surpassed by Spain, which marked 46.7%. Only in three countries, that is, Japan, Germany and Spain, did the number of those responding ‘no’ surpass those responding ‘yes’. In the 2005 Survey, there was no marked shift in numbers both in Japan and Germany, while Iraq, the Netherlands, Italy and Andorra newly joined the list.

What can we infer from these results? One common feature we may note is that Japan, Germany and Spain in the 2000 Survey, and Italy and Iraq in the 2005 Survey, was a defeated nation or was on the side of the defeated nations in World War II, or wars after it. The trend is particular remarkable in the results of Iraq in the aftermath of the war, where fighting between regular forces officially ended in 2003. In the 2005 survey, Iraq was third at 30.3% following both top two countries in the previous survey, Japan and Germany for the number of people responding ‘yes’. Moreover, it was third at 51.1% with regards to the number of people responding ‘no’, following Andorra’s 57.3% and Germany’s 53.6%. We may see Andorra as an exception, since it is a small country that without its own forces, and relies on the French and Spanish forces for their national defense.

Generally speaking, the number of people who would fight for their country tend to be low in countries that have experienced defeat or civil war relatively recently. This attitude can reasonably be explained by the people’s weariness towards war; by contrast, we might
explain Vietnam’s high numbers of ‘yes’s in terms of the pride felt in their victory over a superpower as the US.

Also, the reason why the number of people who would fight for their country is relatively low in many developing countries that have recently experienced civil war such as Uganda and Zimbabwe may be because they don’t trust their government in the first place. We can readily assume that people would not want to fight for a country that does not ensure their peace and safety. The opposite might be true, as the results in the 2005 Survey show that a relatively high number of people responded ‘yes’ in the welfare states of Scandinavian, where people tend to have a higher degree of trust towards their government.

However, I want to draw the reader’s attention to a different point. That is, in Japan compared to the other countries, the number of people who responded ‘Don’t Know’ is remarkably higher. In the 2000 Survey, 37.7%, and in the 2005 Survey, 38.5% responded ‘Don’t Know’, which is significantly higher than the other countries.

Why do people respond ‘Don’t Know’? The answer lies in the Japanese Constitution. The Japanese Constitution is unique in that it contains articles renouncing war and prohibiting military forces, and it simply does not assume that Japan will start another war, or that civilians (as opposed to SDF members) would fight this war. The question whether you would fight for your country is for the Japanese in a double sense impossible, and can be compared to one asking a non-smoker ‘if you were to smoke, what brand of cigarettes would you smoke’?

Japan has consistently been put under a circumstance of double-bindness in the post-war era over this Pacifist Constitution. Against this double-bindness, Japan has neither abandoned the ideal, nor escaped from reality, but while given up the idea of a coherent account between ideal and reality, has deployed the ideal to control the reality. This is the characteristic of the Japanese Pacifist Constitution, and Japan in the post-war era has obstinately strived to survive the contradiction of the double-bindness.

2-2. Japanese Pacifist Constitution in Double-bindness

The war-renouncing and military-prohibiting Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has continued to be a focal point of debates over the peace and national security of post-war Japan. While some view this article as part of an attempt by the US to weaken Japan, others view it as a Japanese ideal built upon the tragic war experience never to start another war. In fact, neither is correct. Although Article 9 was devised as a result of General Douglas McArthur’s (who was the Commander of the GHQ) own judgment, he neither used the war-renouncing and military-prohibiting ideal to weaken Japan, nor tried to realize the no-war ideal simply as an ideal.

General McArthur vindicated a policy to preserve the Emperor as a symbol to facilitate the occupational policies. To achieve this, it was necessary to deal with the any existing suspicions of the other countries of the ‘Imperial army’, and to this end, he thought that Article 9 was necessary. He also judged that even if mainland Japan was de-militarized, if a
US military base in Okinawa could secured, then the security of Japan could be preserved. Therefore, to understand this problem correctly, we must not simply pick out the ideal incorporated into Article 9. The war-renouncing and military-prohibiting ideal in the Article 9 must be understood in terms of its relation with the preservation of the Emperor system in chapter 1, and the presence of the occupational forces, particularly the US army and the turning of the Okinawa Island into a US military base. These three elements have together shaped post-war Japan, and we may say that Article 9, under the condition of a symbolic Emperor and Okinawa as a US military base, was very realistic to help Japan to return to the international society.

However, it is also true that this Pacifist Constitution has left the Japanese people in a kind of a double-bindness. The war-renouncing and military-prohibiting ideal is indeed sublime and so must not be rendered banal. The Japanese Constitution describes peace as the state of affairs where ‘tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance’ are banished and all peoples are free from ‘fear and want’. In this sense, it can be interpreted as declaring not negative but positive pacifism à la Galtung. And it is not a ‘one-country pacifism’, but advocates the principle of international cooperation. The Constitution states:

We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal […] We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.

Nonetheless, this ideal was bestowed to Japan by McArthur, an outsider, and not included by the Japanese themselves. As ‘to be forced to be free’ is a contradiction, the Japanese ‘pride’ based on the ideal of the Pacifist Constitution, which they themselves did not choose by their own will, has rendered such a pride lukewarm.

Also, while maintaining a military-prohibiting policy, in the course of history, Japan created the Self-Defense Force (SDF). First, in 1950, five years after World War II, in the light of the Korean War, the National Police Reserved was assembled on the commands of the GHQ. The former navy became the Maritime Security Force via the Coast Guard. On August 1, 1952, the two organizations were brought together as the National Security Force. On July 1, 1954, the Self-Defense Force Act was enacted, and only ten years after the war, Japan came into possession of land, sea, and air force.

The Japanese could not help but to feel a kind of guilt towards the fact that while the Constitution declared that Japan would not be in possession of military force, in reality it did. This might explain why the post-war Japanese could not proudly boast the pacifist ideal as an absolute justice.

Is this double-bindness a contradiction to be overcome? Without overcoming this problem, it seems the Japanese would have to experience a kind of personality dissociation, that is, to allow Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde to exist within one person. I want to argue that this
double-bindness is precisely what has made Japanese pacifism possible. In making this claim, I will not be joining sides with the following two dominant discourses in Japan, which try to resolve the dissociation of the ideal and the reality, and claim that it is necessary to present a coherent stance to the world.

2-3. The First Solution: Absolute Pacifism of the Left-wings: Making the Reality Fit the Ideal
Traditionally, the Left in Japan, notably the Socialist Party, has strived for the complete realization of the pacifist ideal of the Constitution. They have tried as much as they can to shape reality according to the ideal depicted by the Constitution: ‘land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained’. To make this happen, on this view, it becomes necessary to de-militarize the SDF, re-organize this as a peace force,20 or an ‘International Rescue’ as in the TV series Thunderbird.21

I need not remind the readers that this view is built upon a sincere reflection of the harm and misery caused to other countries by the imperial forces in the past. However, what should the Japanese do if it were attacked by another country? The original McArthur Note denied the Japanese use of force even for preserving its own security. It was an expression of a sublime ideal not to surrender to the threat by force, but it has not been able to allay the anxieties of a foreign invasion. The government cannot remain silent in face of the people’s anxiety. Moreover, what would become of the Japan-US Alliance should we opt for absolute pacifism? The government has not been able to give a clear answer to whether they can realistically demand a full withdrawal of the US military base from Okinawa.

2-4. The Second Solution: Rearmament-argument of the Right-wings: Making the Ideal Fit the Reality
Against the Left, there are those who argue that we should change the Constitution, promote the SDF officially to an army, make possible Japan’s right of collective self-defense (under the present government interpretation, between the collective and individual self-defense allowed by Article 51 of the UN Charter, Japan may only exercise the latter), and through this, recover the consistency of the law.

This view has been advanced by Japan’s leading legislators such as LDP’s Junichiro Koizumi and DPJ’s Ichiro Ozawa, in the form of an UN-centered international cooperation. However, the reason why this view did not gain the high support of the Japanese people was because this image of Japan could not find a place as a national identity in comparison to the sublime ideal of the Pacifist Constitution. The ‘normal country’ advocated by Koizumi and Ozawa is a ‘country that can go to war’. However, no matter how we try to stir up a feeling of patriotism, this image being too normal, is not one that can be boasted to the rest of the world. It cannot replace the Pacifist Constitution. Above all, this option cannot respond to Japanese popular sentiments that never again do they want to invade another country. Article 9 has not lost its significance just because Japan has the SDF. It is the
contrary. It has been 60 years since Japan came into possession of an armed force, but during this time, Japan has not invaded another country, and neither have there been any foreign lives lost as a result of an attack by the SDF. This is because Article 9 has served as a deterrent. Without this article, it is hard to imagine how the SDF could have remained ‘a force that does not use force against another country’ for such a long time. As Tatsuru Uchida argues, the legitimacy of the SDF lies precisely in the fact that it is not legitimate.\textsuperscript{22} The SDF’s legitimacy as ‘a force that cannot engage in war’ and Article 9 is mutually complementary. The reality of Article 9 is supported by the SDF, and the SDF’s legitimacy is guaranteed by Article 9.

\textbf{2-5. Let It Be}

Tatsuru Uchida develops a unique theory of the Japanese from a very cynical point of view. Uchida first argues that the Japanese people, who see the existence of the SDF and Article 9 that prohibits the possession of a force as an incompatible contradiction, have unconsciously suffered a ‘multiple personality’ disease, and are trying to escape this psychological crisis. According to Uchida, Article 9 and the SDF are nothing other than a baggage left by the US, who opted for this policy for the purpose of subordinating Japan. So long as Japan resolves itself to remain a subordinate country of the US, that is, ‘to live in safety and happiness as a steward’ or as a ‘slave’ (\textit{servus}), then there will be no contradiction between Article 9 and the SDF; however, Uchida claims, the post-war Japanese have chosen not to remain ‘sane’ as a ‘slave state’ but rather ‘insane’ as a ‘schizophrenic state’: ‘the “internal contradiction” of Article 9 and the SDF is the shape of insanity we have chosen to minimize the traumatic stress caused by the fact that Japan is a “subordinate country” of the US’.\textsuperscript{23}

The Japanese are aware that Japan is a subordinate country of the US, but, Uchida claims, in fact they simply do not want to acknowledge that they know this. However, there are benefits in developing this insanity. Uchida calls this ‘benefits of malady’. As a result of developing schizophrenia, post-war Japan has acquired the benefit of ‘60 years of peace and prosperity in the post-war era’ and also the fact that ‘during this period, the Japanese force did not kill any foreign nationals in any other country’ – a very wise choice in Uchida’s view. What is unique about Uchida is that he claims that the best solution available to the Japanese is to continue to live with this illness. Uchida’s answer is therefore that we should maintain the \textit{status quo} based on Article 9 and the SDF and the Japan-US Alliance, maintain Article 9 leaving the gap between the ideal and reality. I think that he is right about the direction the Japanese government should take. However, in doing so, he is too easily enslaved by the logic of the state. What Uchida regards as the gap between the ideal and reality, however, in Okinawa is nothing but reality.

Peace, in the first instance, is not a ‘cool’ ideal, or at least, not a brave ideal. It is none other than the cleverness of the weak to have the courage to run away in the face of a dispute rather than to confront their opponent head-on. In this sense, we must realize that
we are presupposing the reason of state, as long as we talk about national defense or national security by the SDF. War is to fight for one’s country. In this sense, the real objective of peace is to cast doubt on the question at the beginning of this paper as something self-evident. The way of peace is to resist fighting for one’s country with all your heart.

2-6. Oath in Hiroshima: Who are ‘We’?

On the Cenotaph for A-bomb Victims at Hiroshima, the following epitaph is inscribed: ‘Rest in peace, for the error shall not be repeated’.

Justice Radhabinod Pal, who served as the Indian representative at the Tokyo Trial (International Military Tribunal for the Far East) and who was the only one to submit that all the Japanese defendants were not guilty, was infuriated when he saw the epitaph on a visit to Hiroshima after the war. As is typical of the Japanese language, the subject is missing in the epitaph. What is the error, and who is the subject swearing not to repeat it?

Justice Pal’s anger can be summarized thus. For Pal, it was the US that dropped the a-bomb, and in this sense, it was the Americans who committed the error and should therefore reflect on their actions, not the Japanese. Even if we assume that the error refers to the war that led to the dropping of the a-bomb, Japan cannot be held accountable. This is because the war was a result of the invasions of Asian countries by Western nations. Pal’s attitude towards this issue is consistent from the Tokyo Trial as an Indian that has experienced British colonial rule.

What was the error? And who was it that committed the error? It is ‘our’ error that we have given the state the right to wage war, and under the banner of self-determination and sovereignty created a universal and unrestrained power in which it became possible to destroy others, entire cities, and even more, an entire nation.

Tadayoshi Saika, Professor of English Literature at Hiroshima University, who wrote the epitaph, translated it as follows: ‘Let all the souls here rest in peace; for we shall not repeat the evil’. This ‘we’ does not refer to specific nations as the Japanese or Americans. To convey the meaning of the epitaph in response to the controversy, an explanation plaque was added on November 3, 1983, which reads: ‘The inscription on the front panel offers a prayer for the peaceful repose of the victims and a pledge on behalf of all humanity never to repeat the evil of war. It expresses the spirit of Hiroshima – enduring grief, transcending hatred, pursuing harmony and prosperity for all, and yearning for genuine, lasting world peace’. Errors tend to be imputed to others. It’s not our fault; it’s theirs.

However, peace begins first by discovering our own inner evil (what Kant calls ‘das radikale Böse’), and not to surrender to its temptation.
Notes

1 This paper is based on the presentation originally given to the Workshop concerning ‘East Asian Perspectives on Politics’, Keio University, 17-19, December, 2011.
7 Clausewitz, ibid., p. 119.
9 Spinoza, Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata. pro. 69 dem. et cor., p. 262.
15 To be exact, Spain is not a defeated nation. During World War II, due to domestic chaos after the civil war, Spain’s Franco regime maintained neutrality, but kept a friendly relationship with Nazi Germany while a hostile one against Russia. Therefore although Spain was not a defeated nation, it was on the side of the defeated. Moreover, Spain had experienced a devastating civil war, and this could explain the results in the survey.
16 Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
18 The Constitution states in its preamble: ‘We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the
peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want’.

19 Koseki, ibid., p.8. Although Koseki acknowledges that Kijuro Shidehara came up with the idea of renouncing war, he sharply distinguishes between coming up with the state’s political goal and political morality, and the fundamental ideals of the Constitution, thus rejecting other explanations that what is been asked is ‘Who was it that made war-renouncing a constitution article?’ as opposed to ‘who was it that came up with the idea of renouncing war?’.


21 (ed.) Asaho Mizushima, Kimiwa Sanndabado wo Shitteruka [Do you know Thunderbird: An Alternative Way to Keep the Earth], Nihon Hyoronsha, 1992.

22 Tatsuru Uchida, ‘Kennpo ga konomamademo nanika monndaidero?’ [‘Is there a problem with the Constitution as it is?’], in Kyujo Dodesho? [How about Article 9?], Mainichi Shinbunsha, 2006, p.10.

23 Uchida, Ibid., p.57.