<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Egyptians' consensus formation checked against their political culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub Title</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Tomita, Hiroshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publisher</td>
<td>Keio University School of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publication year</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>Hiroshi Tomita Retirement Special Issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genre</td>
<td>Journal Article</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Egyptians’ Consensus Formation Checked against Their Political Culture

TOMITA, Hiroshi

I. The July 23 Revolution and the Military-Led Political System
II. The Perceptions and Actions of the Egyptian Military in the January 25 Revolution
III. The Military’s Management of the Political Polarization under the Morsi Regime

In this thesis, the author analyzes the role played by the Egyptian armed forces in the political processes occurring since the January 25 Revolution. The author was residing in Cairo during the period from September 2010 to March 2011 to increase his reading comprehension of Arabic documents. He thus witnessed the January 25 Revolution where it happened. From his quarters in the district Zamalek on an island in the Nile river, near Tahrir Square in the middle of Cairo, he observed the spread of the Arab Spring from Tunisia, where it arose, to Egypt, then the 18 day course of the revolution from the demonstrations that sprang up on January 25, to the announcement of President Mubarak’s resignation and beginning of the provisional military administration by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) on February 11. As soon as the Egyptian army intervened in the revolution on January 28 (see Chapter II), SCAF issued a proclamation, saying that “the demonstrators’ demands were justified”; partially accepted some of the requests from the youth-led democratization movements such as the April 6 Movement, while maintaining a neutral stance; and let the revolution succeed for the time being, blocking the succession of Mubarak’s second son Gamal to the presidency, a long-standing issue to the army. From then until the June 30,
2012 inauguration of the Morsi administration with its Muslim Brotherhood (MB) ties, democratization measures were implemented under the provisional military administration with the aim of a transition to a civilian one like none seen since the July 23 Revolution, with relatively fair parliamentary and presidential elections.

What the author noticed in the course of the revolution, especially during the 18 days of demonstrations, followed by the early period of the provisional military administration in February and March, was that the Egyptian people in general trusted and felt a kind of respect for the army. These favorable feelings were in contrast to the mistrust and hostility they felt toward the police, under the jurisdiction of Egypt’s Ministry of Interior. Even when the army was dispatched in the midst of the demonstrations to maintain peace and order, the citizens’ attitude was supportive, saying, “The army will honor our demand for democratization.” Later, however, as the provisional military administration progressed, people gradually began to criticize the military administration more strongly about such matters as suppressing human rights in restrictions on demonstrations, the way civilians were being tried at military tribunals, the delay in drafting a new constitution, and the military’s retaining a number of privileges for itself.

Here is an example of the favorable attitude to the army. Hazem Kandil emphasizes the dilemma faced by the military administration after the January 25 Revolution, blocked by the enormous authority and influence of the police that had been bolstered under the Mubarak regime, and unable completely to fulfill the reforms demanded by the revolution.

...the un-politicized and inexperienced SCAF fears that the weakening of the police coupled with full transition to democracy (in a deeply impaired society) could lead to domestic instability, which would in turn drag army officers into protracted policing activities—a nightmarish scenario the SCAF is determined to avert...

Although the military was driven by its institutional interests to support the uprising, the overwhelming challenges it confronted after
coming to power—most crucially the entrenched security apparatus—have deterred it from following through on demands for reform. The price that both soldiers and citizens will pay for this timidity is likely to be dear and painful—a truly sad outcome for such a heroic episode in Egypt’s history.²)

What comes across indirectly from this statement is Kandil’s strong hopes for a democratic revolution under military leadership and his mistrust, by contrast, in the security policing system.

In a separate thesis, the author has previously attempted to analyze the Arab Spring as it occurred in Egypt during the revolutionary period (January to February 2011) and provisional military administration period (February 2011 to June 2012).³) Therefore, in the context of Egypt’s political culture, in which quite a portion of the Egyptian people have faith in the army, the author would like in the current thesis to explore the behavioral patterns and processes that led the army, which had overthrown the former Mubarak regime in the January 25 Revolution, to oust the Islamist Morsi regime after the transition to civilian rule, although it is no exaggeration to call that regime the fruit of the democratization process under the provisional military administration.

First, the author provides a simple description of the degree of influence Egypt’s military have had over the political system and how a military-led system was supported in the 60 years leading up to the January 25 Revolution, under the leadership of presidents Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, all three of whom were military men.⁴)

I. The July 23 Revolution and the Military-Led Political System

After the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, the military directly administered the country only for the first few months. The short-term provisional military administration was followed by indirect use of force by the military, and after that, a military-led political system was maintained. Plainly speaking, the armed forces largely saw themselves as
the heart and nucleus of the Egyptian state. Their national consciousness was a combination of a sense of placing a whole nation under the control of a hegemon, and also, in close connection with that, a sense of professionalism at work trying to protect the military-politico-economic rights and interests of the military. Therefore, the armed forces put their main emphasis on maintaining the political system they had built themselves under the three generations of military presidents. What must be noted at the same time, however, was that they perceived and analyzed the historical conditions of those times and the influence those had on the political system on their own terms, then tried to reflect the results of their analyses in state control and guidance and in their own professional actions. In that sense, it was not merely an effort to preserve the existing political system by whatever means possible, but had aspects of launching an audacious political overhaul from the viewpoint of state control and their own professionalism.

The political system that supported the government of the Republic of Egypt after the July 23 Revolution was put in place with the idea of the armed forces co-operating with the country’s security forces in order to maintain power and stability. The leadership committee headed by Nasser who executed the coup d’etat in 1952 did not last long, and the Free Officers were very early on stripped of their military attire. Moreover, the country’s military was not responsible for directly administering the affairs of the country during the presidencies of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. During this era, the military and the country’s security forces did co-operate to fill the ranks of state institutions with their loyal cadres, from the president of the republic all the way down to the country’s governors, mayors and heads of local authorities and ministries. Although the power and numbers of police ranks may have begun to swell during this time, ultimate authority always rested with the military.

In other words, the army previously played a primary role in Egyptian political life, and they have continued to do so even after the triumph of President Muhammad Morsi at the polls in June 2012.
II. The Perceptions and Actions of the Egyptian Military in the January 25 Revolution

Looking back on the Arab Spring, there is a real sense that the military played an enormous role in prevailing over the previous regime and persuading its leaders to resign.

In Tunisia, the expression of neutrality by the military in the final stages of popular demonstrations was very important to the success of the revolution.

In Egypt, the military dispatched armored vehicles to the streets of major cities throughout the country simultaneously, taking on the duty of maintaining order on the evening of January 28, the fourth day of the demonstrations, which began on Tuesday, January 25. It was known as the “Friday of Rage,” with large-scale demonstrations and many people killed. Between then and Friday, February 11, when Vice President Suleiman gave a televised speech announcing that presidential authority had been transferred to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), SCAF proclaimed several times that the demonstrators’ demands were justified, and the author even received such proclamations as text messages over his mobile phone. The military maintained neutrality during the 18 days of demonstrations, never aiming its guns at the demonstrators. In the context of civil-military relations, there is a big possibility that the military had taken the prerogative of initiating military administration based on its own judgment. Moreover, I think it is nearly certain that during that period, a “silent coup d’etat” had been executed by the military leadership against Mubarak in the form of resistance to the latter’s removal of Tantawi as Defense Minister behind the scenes. The people first realized this on February 10, the day before his resignation was announced, when Mubarak failed to attend the SCAF meeting which was broadcasted on national television, and the Defense Minister appeared to be presiding.

Thus the military played a huge role in the Arab Spring, and in Egypt, it maintained overwhelming ruling power afterwards, too, and has…
intervened at various junctures of the political process. The citizens have, of course, protested human rights infractions by the military, and the Islamists and other political powers have reacted strongly to military intervention. Despite such criticism of the military administration, however, the Egyptian people know that obtaining former president Mubarak’s resignation would have been unthinkable without the aid of the military. Also, in the first round of voting in the presidential elections, held in May 2012, Ahmad Shafiq, who was a former Air Force lieutenant general and served as the final prime minister of the Mubarak regime, came in a narrow second to Muhammad Morsi, the winning candidate. From this election result one can see signs of resurgent power by remnants of the former regime, and there are rumors of a coming collusion between the military and former regime.

Taking this example of the military’s provisional rule, one may say that whether it be the Islamists or elements of the former regime or activists seeking democracy or average Egyptian citizens, everyone is under the inescapable influence of the military. It is highly likely that the military will occasionally exercise its influence in future political processes, particularly during times of political unrest, and attempt to control Egyptian society overall.\(^5\)

So, the military intervened, if not completely, then at least partially, on the side of the demonstrators calling for democratization and respect for human rights in the January 25 Revolution, but how does one explain the factors that resulted in this kind of behavior by the military? Furthermore, what kind of perceptions did the military have and what actions did they take regarding various aspects of the political processes from the beginning of provisional military rule when President Mubarak stepped down on February 11, to the transition to civil administration with Morsi’s inauguration the following year on June 30, 2012, to the removal of President Morsi by Defense Minister ‘Abd all-Fattah al-Sisi on July 3, 2013, and beyond. These issues will be analyzed below in this chapter.\(^6\)
1. The Problem of Presidential Succession

In the early years of the current century, the military was extremely concerned about the succession of Mubarak’s second son, Gamal, to the presidency. Even before the mass demonstrations of January 2011, there were predictions of a mass revolt if Gamal succeeded his father, and according to the Al-Ahram newspaper, the military had drawn up action plans for political intervention in the case that mass demonstrations broke out. The military was predicting protests to occur in May or June 2011, when the announcement of Gamal’s succession was to be made. They occurred earlier than anticipated, however, in January. Gamal Mubarak and his supporters were staunch capitalists whose interests did not exactly match up with Egypt’s armed forces. The introduction of large-scale economic liberalism into Egyptian society was viewed as a hostile ideology that would chip away at their influence within the country’s bureaucracy.

2. Military Intervention on January 28

From January 28 onward, the military intervened in the revolution, taking the side of the youthful pro-democratization forces to some degree. It was much to the army’s outrage when police ranks sought to align themselves with Gamal Mubarak and support the idea of presidential succession; for this reason, the military sought to align themselves with the people after January 25. Initially the army came out onto the street to support the protesters out of their desire to prevent the presidential succession.

So upon Mubarak’s announcement in his television statement February 1 that he would no longer seek to appoint his son Gamal as his successor, the army considered the revolution, in which they had taken part, to have been a success, and as a result, over.

3. Provisional Rule by SCAF in the Transition Period and the Rise of Islamists to Power

After presidential authority had been delegated from Mubarak on
February 11, 2011, SCAF, in the course of exercising provisional rule, made changes in the roadmap for transference of jurisdiction to the civil administration. At the start of provisional rule the army made it clear it would limit the period of military rule to only six months. After January 28, it is probable that the army did not truly seek to implement democracy throughout Egypt and only gradually came around to the idea of doing so in stages.

After February 11, officially, the political process was provisional rule by the military, but in fact, it was not so much direct rule by SCAF, but closer to indirect rule, with everyday administrative duties being delegated to the provisional cabinet headed by the Prime Minister, and SCAF exercising authority over final decisions. All that followed in the way of continued clashes and strikes during the provisional military rule, ensuing for a year and a half, probably came as a surprise to the army, and was not something that they had expected. What SCAF had significant concern for as a force holding real power on the political stage during this period was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which had mobilized belatedly for participation in the January 25 Revolution.

The MB and other Islamist groups had been allowed to apply for political party formation and then run for elections. The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), which was the MB’s political arm, received slightly under 50% of the vote in the People’s Assembly (PA) election held from November 2011 to January 2012, making it the top party. Also, it is a fact that in the first vote of the presidential election on May 23, 2012, no less than 5,500,000 of the electorate voted for Muhammad Morsi, who was an FJP candidate, putting him in first place so that he beat Ahmad Shafiq by a narrow margin in the runoff on June 17, 2012.

What then led SCAF to support this rise of Islamists to power? There seem to be at least three reasons.

First, they judged that if they were to confront and suppress the country’s largest and most organized political force, it would engender a large amount of popular discontent from large swaths of the Egyptian population, posing a threat of popular revolt.
Second, “the military-led system,” with the military co-operating with the country’s security forces in order to maintain power and stability, upon which the regimes were built up had existed since 1952. The army would now pursue its inherent interests, putting in place a system that only appeared civilian outwardly, that would preserve the army’s role as the heart and nucleus of the Egyptian state, even if this meant accepting terms that it would have previously rejected. They sought to ensure the MB’s loyalty in this regard, reaching agreements between the two with a great sense of urgency. SCAF would also have been willing early on to accept an MB president such as Salim al-Awa.

Third, SCAF was under pressure from the US and EU who, from the outset of the revolution, hoped power in Egypt would be handed over to the MB whom they expected to be “moderate Islamists.” The army assumed an appeasing and accommodating attitude towards the interests of Washington.

Then, after Morsi was elected president, the transition to civil administration occurred in form, and under a political system which was led by the MB and was democratic in appearance, a constitution with an Islamic tone was forcibly adopted. At this stage, there was a personnel replacement of the military cadre, but the new constitution was one that would not attempt to interfere with the rights and interests the military had secured for itself, safeguarding the military’s economic interests, and excluding the defense budget from parliamentary deliberations. In other words, from the transition to civil administration in July 2012 to March of the next year, despite the presence of some elements of confrontation and a deteriorating relationship, a kind of collaborative SCAF-MB relationship appeared to continue, with the MB taking charge of administration during the post-revolution transition period as an extension of the preceding provisional military rule, in exchange for having the MB accept the former military-led system. However, at the same time in Egyptian society under the Morsi regime, two ideological confrontations were deepening, one, regarding the political system, between the military-led system and democratization, and the other, with respect to political thought, between
Islamism and secularism.

The question is at which point SCAF would have switched their perception of the MB from appeasing to confrontational, leading to the collapse of collaborative SCAF-MB relations. This question remains to be answered.

4. The Army’s Perception of the Old Regime Forces and the Steering of the Post-transition Period

There was one more force exerting real power on the political stage at that time, in addition to the MB forces, about which SCAF was highly concerned. That was what was being called “the previous system,” which was interests of the previous regime, consisting of judicial officials, police, security forces, the overall bureaucratic organization, industrialist groups and others with a mutually dependent relationship with the Mubarak regime, whose influence was diminished greatly by the revolution. The army’s real motive it seems was to allow the MB to rule, while restraining them so as not to allow the MB to usurp the military-led system during the post-revolution transition period, and at the point when the old regime’s influence was restored, to end the transition period, putting the former regime’s forces in front, with indirect administration by the army for a fixed period. One way of looking at this is that, in considering the political processes during the transition period, the army was concerned about the influence of both the MB and the old regime as political forces holding real power on the one hand, while assessing the influence of the youth, opposition forces and other elements of the secular liberal wing to be relatively weak on the other hand, and having the MB and old regime forces compete, restoring the old regime to power when it could be revived in the final stages of the transition process. If those who would seek to revive the old regime were successful, then the army of course would not be innocent and could be partially blamed. However this blame should not be the same as that which was leveled against the military for acts they committed after January 28, 2011, when they were in direct control of the country.
In other words the army would gain indirect control over Egypt at the post-transition stage once again, administering it from behind the scenes and putting the revived old regime forces in the front. Further examination is needed of the sequence of maneuvers by the army and how it treated the MB and old regime forces in the post-revolution transition period.

5. The Ruling Style of SCAF and a Probable Scenario after Indirect Administration by the Military

SCAF’s methods of ruling during the post-revolutionary transition period as described above could rightly be called pursuance of a balance of power among political forces in the country. Currently, Al-Sisi has assumed the presidency, beginning in earnest a period of “indirect administration by the military,” but what is the outlook for the development of a military-led system in the future? The secular liberal wing has a tendency to expect the army to take the initiative for democratic reform of the political system. They say “hopefully, upon completion of this stage (indirect administration by the military), we can begin building the foundation upon which we can establish a new, democratic regime.” They hope that the army will begin working towards real democratic reform, and that true military-civilian dialogue can be established to correct the wrongs of the past and work towards accomplishing Egypt’s national interest.8)

III. The Military’s Management of the Political Polarization under the Morsi Regime

The next part of this thesis elucidates how the military is dealing with the deepening polarization between Islamists and secularists under the Morsi regime by looking at the relationships among the four major forces, i.e., the old regime, the Islamists, the secular liberal wing and the military, particularly in the political processes during 2013 and since. The author hopes this effort leads to future prospects for a “military-led
1. The Morsi Regime and the Military

On December 8, 2012, while making an official announcement for the military, Defense Minister Al-Sisi explained the necessity for talks toward reconciliation of the country’s political forces. On November 23, President Morsi had issued a constitutional declaration and announced that, under an extra-legal measure, presidential decrees to be issued would be given immunity from judicial binding for a limited period of time. On the basis of this, on November 30, Morsi had a constitutional draft steamrollered through the constitution drafting committee that reflected Islamic norms and excluded opposing viewpoints. Furthermore, in the latter half of December he had the draft put to a national referendum, establishing the constitution officially. This unilateral constitution-establishing process drew criticism and attacks from secular-liberal forces, young activists and political parties.

As an extension of this, anti-government demonstrations broke out in various parts of the country around the second anniversary of the revolution on January 25, 2013. Among them, the Suez Canal region, which includes Port Said, Ismailia and Suez, is a region with strategic importance and an important industrial area with many laborers, and it has an anti-Islamist bent. From the end of January into February, the Morsi regime fell behind in its response to the riots in these three cities and finally turned to the military, which announced a nationwide curfew and declared a state of emergency limited to this region.

In the midst of this, in Port Said, the Egyptian people’s political culture of soliciting help from the army emerged a little. The popular slogan, “The people and army are one hand,” was back, as certain opposition circles issued calls for renewed military rule. Advocates of the military’s reinsertion into the domestic political stage were calling for the army to resume power for a six-month period until fresh presidential elections could be held. Several residents of Port Said went so far as to mount a campaign aimed at designating Defense Minister Al-Sisi as
Egypt’s new head of state. According to a secular activist in the city, those leading the campaign had hitherto been seen as former regime loyalists. Some of them were affiliated with Mubarak’s now-defunct NDP, campaigners for failed presidential candidate Ahmed Shafiq, and members of Asfeen ya Rayes, a pro-Mubarak group that had emerged in the revolution’s wake. He said the 20,000 signatures collected (by early March) were not enough to convince a wary public.

Another activist in Port Said believed the poor performance of the presidency in tackling the crisis in the city had prompted some to call for military intervention in the belief that the army would come to the aid of secular forces and hand power over to them. People in Port Said were not the first to wage a campaign to put Al-Sisi in charge. Two other underground offshoots of the dissolved NDP had collected some 15,000 signatures to this end.

Meanwhile a military expert has accused the National Salvation Front, Egypt’s largest opposition coalition under the Morsi regime, of pushing for the army’s return to politics while boycotting upcoming parliamentary elections. Military officials have yet to make any official announcements on the signature drive. All statements so far have affirmed that the army is taking the people’s side and is standing an equal distance from all political forces. A military source has affirmed that the army was not connected in any way to the signature campaign. He says, “The army can’t simply be summoned by a group of people. It’s the national security situation that determines when the army should intervene.”

Around April-May 2013, according to the vice-head of the Wasat Party, a meeting was held between leaders of the armed forces, engineer Abul ‘Ala Madi who heads the Wasat Party and former Minister of State for the Legal Affairs Dr. Muhammad Mahsub, under the guidance of Defense Minister Al-Sisi. The meeting touched on confirmations of the army leaders (1) that the military establishment had learned some lessons through the transition period, (2) that they would never rush into battles in the name of political figures who insulted the army with offensive words, (3) that the military establishment would never turn against
legitimacy, and (4) that they would never occupy the street again. The military spokesman explained that this meeting had been held within the scope of a series of meetings and contacts which the armed forces had summoned with all the political forces in Egypt without exception, subsequent to the announcement of the armed forces issued December 8, 2012. On the basis of that announcement the military establishment confirmed that “the method of dialogue is the best and only method to reach an agreement that realizes the benefits of the country and its citizens, and anything on the contrary to that leads us into a dark tunnel of disastrous results. That is what the armed forces will never allow.” The spokesman pointed out that an initiative by the armed forces to hold those meetings and contacts, on which the political responsibility required non-publication, arose from their patriotic responsibility for the defense of Egyptian national security without intervention in political matters. Their objectives were focused on an effort to create a form of agreement between the various political forces in Egypt, with the military establishment believing in the importance of supporting a serious and sincere national dialogue and democratic path for the resolution of problems and points of disagreement, in order to reach an agreement that brought together all the visions of the country.10)

We can see that the military leaders are still keeping a cautious stance at this stage on how to settle the increasing political polarization between secularists and Islamists. Viewed in another way, it seems to the author that the military is not trying to solidify a reconciliatory framework among the forces on its own initiative.

2. An Egyptian Intellectual’s Grasp of Current Conditions

By the latter half of March 2013, Egypt’s intellectual media had changed its tone, abandoning its trust in the Morsi regime’s ability to take charge of the government, and was shifting toward a search for a new order to replace it.

For example, Wahid ‘Abd al-Magid, an independent parliamentarian in the People’s Assembly (elected in November 2011 to January 2012), who
was also a member of the committee to draft the constitution, commented on the situation in Egypt at that time in a political review column titled “A New Road Map!” (kharitat tariq jadidat!)\(^1\) in the Al-Ahram newspaper at the end of March, saying, “One cannot come out of the dark tunnel in which we are stuck except with the help of candle light.” He asserted that we must agree on “the road map” and assume it as a duty to fulfill in order that we find the door through which we could get out of this tunnel. The exit road from the dark tunnel would begin with our agreement on five basic steps regarding (1) the government, (2) judicial power, (3) transitional justice, (4) human rights and (5) constitutional amendment. ‘Abd al-Magid elaborated as follows:

(1) The government

It would be easy for us to find a way to this road map, if the governing power placed the national administration above all other considerations, rose to the standard of accountability and acknowledged that the rescue of the nation would be given priority over everything. There is a pressing need for the government to be responsible mainly for stopping the economic and security downfall and improving the political atmosphere, according to a detailed action plan... An agreement should be struck on who will be designated the head and members of the government on the basis of the duties, accordingly the capabilities to implement that plan as required. There is no possibility of power-sharing. There is space, however, for the different political parties and forces to recommend capable persons who are richly endowed with the fundamental skills needed to implement their tasks, as clearly defined in the action plan.

(2) Judiciary and transitional justice

To build confidence indispensable for carrying out that action plan, it will be necessary to rectify the relationship between the executive power and the judicial power and solve the problem regarding the prosecutor general that has been a source of dispute and strain since the November 21 “constitutional” declaration was issued.

If appointment of a new prosecutor general were simultaneous with
initiation of efforts to draft a bill for transitional justice, the atmosphere would improve and the prevailing congestion would begin to be curbed. In reality, though, most of this congestion, which is attributed to the remaining incompleteness of justice in legal affairs, may be difficult to settle, the issuance of the laws for transitional justice being long delayed. Among unsettled cases are those involving the martyrs, wounded persons, conciliation, etc.

(3) Human rights

In order to complete the basis for justice, for which there is no alternative route out of the tunnel, we must agree on mechanisms that guarantee a stop to the growing human rights abuses. The foremost measure for overcoming the abuses is to exclude the police from confronting the demonstrations, which we expect to decrease gradually once we find this new road map. We must take this measure, however without resorting to militiamen or gangs in any sense as replacements for the police.

Here, ‘Abd al-Magid asserted that President Morsi had announced a constitutional declaration on November 21, 2012 to take decisive action to steamroller an Islamic-leaning draft constitution, the drafting process of which had been stalemated, through to adoption, and seized by the necessity of justifying his supra-legal presidential orders that may well have temporarily invalidated the judiciary powers; that since then, a controversy and tensions had arisen among the citizens over the issue of who would be named the new prosecutor general; that abandoning President Morsi and organizing a new government to save the nation had become indispensable; that each party and political organization involved in organizing the cabinet could recommend candidates; and that regarding protection of human rights, first and foremost those of the demonstrators since the January 25 Revolution, by the judiciary, legal cases involving the martyrs, wounded persons, conciliation, police control of demonstrations, etc., remained unresolved, so it would be necessary to make legislation immediately regarding the transitional judiciary. ‘Abd al-Magid elaborated on the normalization of relations between the executive and judiciary
branches, but on the other hand, he hasn’t discussed further the urgent issue of the structure and character of the nation-saving government.

Then, less than two months later, in mid-May 2013, ‘Abd al-Magid contributed another piece titled, “The Egyptian Army...and the Power?” (al-jaysh al-misry...wa al-sultat?) in his political opinion column also in Al-Ahram. He gave his own opinion on the army’s behavior pattern in criticizing a report in which a western research institute analyzed the possibility of political intervention by the Egyptian army at that time, and upheld the significance of a military intervention if it occurred.

‘Abd al-Magid says that the report, that Brookings Institution issued, seems to be approaching reality, maybe because the report did not focus on the situation of the army itself but on the trends in public opinion toward the army. The report started by pointing out that a steadily increasing majority of Egyptians were not satisfied with the country’s economic performance, that cries of anger were heard all over the country, and that Egypt had advanced to top place among the world’s countries in terms of social protests during recent months. It ended by indicating that the majority of these dissatisfied people would prefer if the army returned to power. Although most of what is mentioned in this report was taken from the facts at the present moment, its writer made the mistake of assessing what the Egyptians truly wanted when they waited for or hoped for the army’s intervention to rescue the country.

He asserts his own view as follows: A great many of these simple souls are not politicized. Poor performance by the power obliges them to seek any solution outside the political sphere. For this reason, they do not aspire to return the army to power but just have it intervene to prevent the country’s downfall, the terrible effects of which would rebound on their daily life.

‘Abd al-Magid concludes that this is an army that belongs to the nation and benefits the nation. The Egyptian army does not intervene in politics except when needed to fill a vacuum or rescue the country from collapse. It is part of their national duty to stop the breakdown, because they belong to the people.
His arguments as they developed from the end of March through May of 2013 were suggesting that intervention by the Egyptian army occurred only when the country was facing a political crisis, and such an economic and political breakdown was actually occurring in Egypt at the time, so there was no choice but to rely on the army to put a stop to it and rescue the nation. A military intervention would not be an arbitrary, arrogant takeover of the national mechanism, but would be executed as a minimal necessary fair action based on the citizens' demands for the stable recovery of their nation. From the author's point of view, this way of thinking reflects an over-estimation, but we must note the fact that one and a half months before the political intervention of July 3, 2013, one of Egypt’s representative intellectuals expressed hopes for the army to play a role in stabilizing the political order, as a function it was supposed to have.

3. The Tamarod(Revolt) Campaign and the Military

The Tamarod campaign was established in mid-April 2013 by five young secular-liberals. Moheb Doss, Walid el-Masry, Mohammad Abdel Aziz and Mahmoud Badr had all been leaders in the Kefaya movement, and Hassan Shahin had been friendly with the group. In this sense the campaign was derived from the Kefaya movement in the 2000s. From then until the end of June 2013, when the campaign accomplished the organization of large nationwide demonstrations against President Morsi and the MB, this campaign held a nationwide signature-collecting initiative spanning several weeks. Some in the media have pointed out that for some months before or after the June 30 demonstrations and the July 3 coup, Egypt’s armed forces and the Ministry of Interior (security police) exerted a considerable degree of influence on the campaign, including through financing.13

Moreover, since mid-May, the campaign attempted to garner the support of the old regime forces in addition to secular liberal forces, youths, and the existing political parties. In response to a call by an activist on Tamarod and the camp of the former Prime Minister and
presidential candidate Ahmed Shafiq to set aside their differences and face the “fascist regime” in the upcoming parliamentary elections, on May 17 Tamarod reversed its statement that refused the endorsement by Shafiq the day before, stressing that the campaign was aimed at representing all Egyptians. In a separate statement, Tamarod said it was the only campaign that had managed to “stir the stagnant water” in Egypt’s political scene by reviving the spirit of the opposition. “Everyone must leave their personal and ideological differences aside and consider only the interest of the nation. Everyone knows that June 30 is perhaps the last chance to oust the tyrant Morsi.”

While it claimed it had managed to secure over two million signatures up to the time for its campaign to call for early presidential elections, Tamarod was now engaged in running several campaigns outside of the country for Egyptians abroad. It operated in the US, Canada and Mexico under the Tamarod North America umbrella, and had similar campaigns in Europe, the Arab world and the Gulf. The necessary financial backing for the campaign’s overseas expansion may well have been funded through expansion of the supporting base such as the old regime forces mentioned above.

The MB, on the other hand, accused the campaign of attempting to overthrow the Morsi regime to the Supreme State Security Prosecution in mid-May. The report was filed on May 15 by an MB lawyer targeting prominent campaign members and several opposition leaders who had vocally supported the campaign, including the Al-Tayar Al-Sha’aby founder Hamdeen Sabahy, Al-Dostour Party Chairman Mohamed El-Baradei, and April 6 Youth Movement cofounder Ahmed Maher. The author wonders how Egyptians would perceive the country’s ongoing political polarization at this moment.14)

Defense minister Al-Sisi warned both Islamist forces and their secular opposition on June 23, just a week before the June 30 demonstrations, that “the armed forces invite all, without any grandstanding, to find a formula for understanding, consensus and real reconciliation in order to protect Egypt and its people and we still have a week in which much can be
accomplished,” and that it might have to intervene to arrest the slide into violence if they did not forge a consensus before the planned mass rallies on June 30. He said the army had a “moral and patriotic duty” towards the Egyptian people, which would compel it to step in to prevent “civil war,” “sectarian strife” or “the collapse of state institutions.” He also said the divisions in Egyptian society threatened national security and that the army would not “stay silent as the country slid into a conflict that would be hard to control.”

Military forces began deploying nationwide on June 25. Several protests were held in front of the Ministry of Defense calling for Al-Sisi to assume power from Morsi.

4. Regime Planning after the Tamarod Campaign

At the beginning of June 2013, with the ousting of the Morsi regime assumed nearly certain, the secular-liberal forces and youths, along with others, began planning for the post-Islamist regime building.

The Alliance of Revolutionary Forces provided its vision for a transitional government in a statement issued by the group on June 4. The group proposed assembling a transitional council for six months, made up of five people, including the Chairman of the Supreme Constitutional Court and the Minister of Defense. The remaining three would be civilian figures, including one from the Islamist political current and two others from civil currents. This council would have executive powers and be held accountable to a panel of approximately 20 constitutional judges. These judges would also be responsible for writing a new constitution. A “national salvation government,” which the statement says would be nonpartisan, would also be formed. Following the transition, the roadmap would include new presidential and parliamentary elections.

The secular-liberal forces centered around youths launched their “After Departure” campaign, saying, “The June 30 demonstrations should break out across every Egyptian province. President Mohamed Morsi will fall sooner or later, we are confident of that. The aim of this initiative is to
prevent the revolutionary youth from falling into the unknown after his departure.” They discussed the transition of power that could follow if the MB were removed from power. An independent activist stressed the need for coordination among activist groups, political parties and the National Salvation Front. Mahmoud Al-Alayli, an NSF leader, said the most likely scenario after Morsi’s removal would be for the military to take over until a presidential assembly drafted a new constitution. It appears that the regime change was taken for granted by young activists at this stage.

Meanwhile several opposition forces, which included the April 6 Youth Movement, the Revolutionary Socialists, and the Strong Egypt Party, released a statement on June 27 asserting that they would not accept the return of former Mubarak-era officials to power as an alternative to President Morsi and his regime.

The Tamarod campaign put forward a political roadmap in a press conference held in the final week of June. Tamarod co-founder Mohamed Abdel-Aziz proposed the following.

1. “The head of the High Constitutional Court will be assigned the duties of the president...whereas all executive powers will be assigned to the prime minister in a six-month transitional period that will end with presidential elections judicially supervised and monitored internationally, followed by parliamentary elections.”

2. The Shura Council would be dissolved, and suspending the current constitution and drafting a new constitution would be steps in the roadmap.

3. The prime minister would give the National Defense Council the authority to fulfill its national security responsibility towards the country.

From the roadmap proposed by the Tamarod campaign, one gets the sense that they are giving consideration to replacing the Islamic-leaning constitution and continuing day-to-day administrative functions.

Remarks

What can be understood from the above? In February and March
2013, in the midst of escalating anti-government demonstrations that started around the second anniversary of the January 25 Revolution in the Suez Canal region, both the recovering former NDP and pro-Mubarak former regime forces and the secular-liberal politicians were hoping for military intervention to get the situation under control. It is unclear whether or not they had established a clear agreement beforehand on this. The author thinks, however, that in the Egyptian people’s civil political awareness, a political culture exists where in times of extreme disorder among social forces, the military is expected to get the chaos under control and rebuild the political system.

It would be very interesting to know how the situation would have evolved if the Morsi regime had avoided the forced adoption and approval of the constitution and sincerely addressed concerns over cooptation of opposing forces. The present report is unable to examine in sufficient detail how the MB and its bases of support, which account for more than 25% of the citizens, perceived the isolation of the Morsi regime during the year after the transition from military rule to the civilian government and how they dealt with it. Facing severe oppression of the MB following the June 30 demonstrations and July 3 coup d’etat, it would be fair to say they continued with their daily lives, feeling betrayed by the military and bearing a deep-seated grudge against it. In its televised news, Al Jazeera reports on sporadic demonstrations and the severe penalties handed down by the courts.

So will the military-led system discussed in this report hold fast for the long term in Egypt, continuing to completely smother the civilian government in the future as it does at present? Or does the possibility exist that the military-led system could continue basically as it is, but whenever the current military regime fails to achieve the desired results, such as in economic development, its most important aim, the military could let the civilian government out from under its comprehensive protection, clarifying the roles to be played by both the military and the civilian government, embarking on a course of military-led democratization reforms? As mentioned above (see Section II-5), Farid Zahran, from his
stance as a secular-liberal politician, expects the army to take the initiative for democratic reform, though it may be wishful thinking. Zahran also says, in a political analysis he wrote in August 2014, that President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi is driven by the necessity to increase his own reign's support base.

...in a very short period of time since taking the presidency, Al-Sisi discovered that he was in need of more than just two forces—the armed forces and the dominant pro-Al-Sisi mood—to endorse his leadership. And so he is now attempting to expand his circle of support to include businessmen, media, and the state apparatus including the police and security services. But this phase may not be enough to build the main pillars necessary for his rule, so Al-Sisi may as well go down Abdel Nasser's path by showing interest in political parties and forces again.21)

In the June 2014 election, Al-Sisi was elected president, a civilian cabinet was organized with Ibrahim Mahlab as prime minister, and an indirect military rule began. Since then, to what extent has parliamentary government based on political parties become institutionalized? At first, when Al-Sisi was inaugurated as president, parliamentary elections under the control of the military leadership were scheduled for the autumn of 2014. The phenomenon being seen at the time was a movement by the retired generals, including former chief of staff General Sami Anan and ex-intelligence chief Morad Mowafy, to form new parties and election alliances; and an overheated battle brewed, with the al-Wafd party and former NDP elements from the days of the Mubarak regime participating with the aim of acquiring a majority of seats.22)

The elections scheduled for the autumn of 2014 were postponed, but the government announced in September 2015 that they should take place in October through November of the same year. Registration of candidates began from September 1. Compared to the People’s Assembly elections of 2011-12, which gave rise to the Morsi regime, proportional representation
Egyptians’ Consensus Formation Checked against Their Political Culture

has been reduced from about 65% of all seats to about 20%, and a different constituency system (fixed numbers for each ward of one to four seats) has had its share increased from about 30% to about 75%. This would be the current state of military-led democratization.

1) This paper is a revision, with additions, of a paper titled, “Egyptians’ Consensus Formation Checked Against Their Political Culture,” presented by the author at the 4th World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES), Session 314: “What did happen in Egypt?” held at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara on August 21, 2014. The author received funding from the Sakurada-kai Foundation’s 32nd Grants-in-Aid for Political Studies (2013) to promote this research. He offers his sincere appreciation to them.


4) Daily News Egypt (March 20, 2013) Farid Zahran,“Has the army truly withdrawn from Egyptian politics?”

5) See Note 3, pp. 16–17.

6) See Note 4.


8) See Note 4.


11) Al-Ahram (March 25, 2013) “kharitat tariq jadidat(la new road mapl)” (Dr. Wahid ‘Abd al-Magid).

12) Al-Ahram (May 14, 2013) “al-jaysh al-misry...wa al-sultat?(the Egyptian army... and the power?)” (Dr. Wahid ‘Abd al-Magid).


 **Daily News Egypt** (April 30, 2013) “Kefaya says Tamarod campaign is not under auspices of Kefata movement” (Hend Kortam).


15) **Financial Times** (June 24, 2013) “Egyptian army warns of intervention” (Heba Saleh). In contrast to this article, the **Daily News Egypt** carried an article saying that the army had resolved as of June 23 to intervene politically to put an end to the confrontation. **Daily News Egypt** (June 23, 2013) “Army intervention a possibility: Defense Minister” (Hend Kortam), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/23/al-sisi-vows-not-to-stay-silent-amid-political-conflict/, retrieved on 24/06/2013.

16) **Ahram Online** (June 29, 2013) “Ahram Online breaks down the playbook for 30 June anti-Morsi protests” (Lina El-Wardani), http://english.ahram.org.eg/, retrieved on 07/01/2013.


19) See Note 16.

20) See Note 16.

21) **Daily News Egypt** (August 20, 2014) Farid Zahran, “What are the forces that

