On the evidence of being and the hypothesis of the thing in itself

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Abstract

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1. The consciousness in *actu exercito* means the evidence of being and then in *actu signato* it becomes self-consciousness. The former corresponds to the intentio prima, i.e. the stage of conception in scholastic epistemology and the latter corresponds to the intentio secunda, i.e. the stage of judgement.

2. The evidence of being does not immediately mean the evidence that the being is the thing in itself. The thing in itself is a hypothesis which is induced through the categorical consequence "accidents → substance" in the self-consciousness, i.e. the intentio secunda in the stage of judicial cognition.

3. This hypothesis is, however, very effectively verifiable and already in the stage of judgement, we can acknowledge the objectivity of the known thing. This is an empirical-realistic approach to the scientifical objectivity.

4. Then there comes the demonstration that the stage of conception, which becomes the element of judgement must be at least a copy or "similitudo" of the thing in itself. The objectivity at last gets some metaphysical character of the thing in itself. And the subjects here treated are not only the above-mentioned precedence of the *nousse in actu exercito* to the *nousse in actu signato* in the domain of consciousness, but also the precedence of the *esse in actu exercito* to the *esse in actu signato* in the domain of being.

5. We can deduce this hypothesis of the thing in itself on the stage of conception from the hypothesis of the thing in itself on the
stage of judgement. But as the stage of conception originally precedes this stage of judgement, is it not a "circulus vitiosus"? The precedence of the stage of conception to the stage of judgement is the precedence in the sense of "in actu exercito", which is a factual precedence but not in logics. Therefore "circulus" does not stand here, though the hypothesis of the thing in itself on the stage of judgement logically precedes to the hypothesis on the stage of conception.