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Basic Income and Justice: 
Revisiting Van Parijs’s Idea of Job as Assets

Shin Osawa

I. Introduction

Philippe Van Parijs’s *Real Freedom for All* (1995) puts forward the most detailed, sophisticated and provocative moral arguments for unconditional basic income. According to Van Parijs, justice requires providing people with leximin real freedom through unconditional basic income. Van Parijs claims that the strict requirement of liberal neutrality concerning the conceptions of the good requires us to respect ‘not to work’ as a legitimate life-choice, and to distribute the benefits of social cooperation not only to those who work but also to those who choose not to work. This requirement amounts to establishing the scheme of unconditional basic income as the basis of leximin real freedom. Van Parijs further considers that job/work generates many benefits in both pecuniary and non-pecuniary dimensions and, in a non-Walrasian world where the number of jobs are limited, those who appropriate this scarce resource need to pay for the unconditional basic income which benefits all people including those who do not work. Van Parijs’s account is rich in insights and provides various moral viewpoints that allow us to reflect on the moral nature of income and job/work. As such, *Real Freedom for All* is truly worthy of our serious consideration.

Needless to say, many have been drawn to the arguments of basic income through Van Parijs’s opus magnum, and have developed their theories for/against unconditional basic income by critically considering his arguments. The topics paid attention to so far include the idea of real freedom, the meanings and implications of undominated diversity, the place of responsibility and reciprocity in social justice and so forth.¹ Among various issues concerning basic income dealt with in *Real Freedom for All*, I investigate the place of the ‘job-as-assets’ argument (Van Parijs 1995: ch.4) in Van Parijs’s account of basic income as a whole.² The job-as-assets argument is obviously one of the most striking features of Van Parijs’s arguments: it tries to cast away our doubt that unconditional basic income is unfair because it feeds those who do not carry out their due in social cooperation. Given this
doubt, Van Parijs’s job-as-assets argument is geared to justifying unconditional basic income both to those who prefer working in social life and those who do not. The crux of this preference-free justification is Van Parijs’s resource egalitarianism that regards jobs as external assets of which values people should share equally: if the value of external assets should be shared equally and jobs are part of such assets, then those who appropriate jobs need to pay back to society the value of the jobs that exceeds their due as work independent income for all. This job-as-assets argument is indeed interesting and worth considering, and critical arguments have been provided. I also take the job-as-assets argument seriously, and in this paper, I argue that this argument is not properly developed within Van Parijs’s case for unconditional basic income such that it cannot justify unconditional basic income as a distinct moral demand of justice for job/work. The central points of my argument are as follows: (1) Van Parijs’s case for basic income can be categorised into two groups of distinct nature: the real-freedom-for-all argument and the job-as-assets argument; (2) in an important place where Van Parijs is finally to justify a social scheme of unconditional basic income, he takes the former argument whereas the latter argument is effectively abandoned; (3) provided that job/work fundamentally determines how citizens can live in a social world as Van Parijs himself recognises, justice for job/work as common assets should be fully considered in arguing for unconditional basic income, and the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice should operate in tandem with such an argument. Note that by arguing as such, I do not express my support to any idea of basic income including Van Parijs’s and his arguments for justice. However, in this paper, I will show how Van Parijs’s insights developed in arguing for unconditional basic income can allow us to delve deeper into the issues of job/work morality by pursuing this project in a different manner.

II. Real-Freedom-for-All Conception of Justice and Unconditional Basic Income

What does justice require us to do, when we arrange the structure of society? To this fundamental question, Van Parijs (1995: ch1) holds that justice requires that society provide leximin real freedom, or in other words, real-freedom-for-all. Van Parijs’s real freedom, in contrast to formal freedom which only includes security and self-ownership as its core values, consists of three major values: security, self-ownership and opportunity (Van Parijs 1995: 21-24). In a just society, so Van Parijs claims, opportunities to do what one might want to do (that is, real freedom) is leximin in the sense: ‘If the opportunities of the person next on the scale of opportunity-holders can be increased without diminishing those with fewer opportunities they should be; if not, they should not be’ (Reeve 2003: 5). Van Parijs further adds: ‘I take it for granted that this leximin (or “lexicographic maximin”) formulation is better … to express the idea that the members of a (maximally) free society are all as free as possible’ (Van Parijs 1995: 25). Hence Van Parijs calls his conception of justice ‘real-freedom-for-all’ (Van Parijs 1995: 27).

Given this demand of justice, Van Parijs (1995: ch.2) claims that unconditional basic
income is needed to realise real-freedom-for-all. The idea of real freedom that contains ‘opportunity’ as its constitutive component should enable a person to make a choice not only concerning how to consume but also how to live, when this idea is put into social practice (Van Parijs 1995: 33-34). As such, this idea leads us to unconditional basic income. Unconditional basic income does the following jobs. First, it increases citizens’ purchasing power for the greatest benefit of the least advantaged: ‘real-freedom-for-all requires us to leximin people’s purchasing power ... our ideal requires us to raise the lowest income as much as is compatible with a ban on forced labour’ (Van Parijs 1995: 33). Second, the non-conditionality of basic income enables people to have greater discretion on how to use their time, and thus, how to live. Basic income releases us to a significant extent from the need to engage in work and to give up time in this way. After all, unconditional basic income provides all people with greater freedom in life-opportunities in terms of consumption of things and time. Van Parijs argues:

... we here [in the scheme of the unconditional basic income] have something on which a person can safely count, a material foundation on which a life can firmly rest, and to which another income, whether in cash or in kind, from work or savings, from the market or the State, can legitimately be added. (Van Parijs 1995: 35)

Given this foundation provided by unconditional basic income, even the least advantaged in a society can enjoy the best possible living defined by the idea of real freedom.

As such, the scheme of unconditional basic income incorporates the three important values of egalitarianism: liberty, equality and efficiency (Van Parijs 1995: 28-29). First, the non-conditionality of basic income represents the value of liberty. The provision of unconditional basic income gives people better opportunities concerning how to consume and how to live, and in this way, it expands freedom of all. Second, the value of equality can be found in the equivalency of the amount of basic income each person receives. Each person receives exactly the same allocation and, at least to the extent that this equal income enables each person to do things he/she might want to perform, each person obtains equal real freedom. Third, given that this equal baseline is met, inequality in income and life-course opportunities is allowed for the sake of efficiency which makes leximin real freedom possible. Through the market mechanism that provides each person with what he/she wants to use or is qualified to use beyond basic income, no resource is wasted, and it generates further values to boost the baseline income.

The above is the crux of the argument for unconditional basic income by way of real-freedom-for-all conception of justice; unconditional basic income is called for in order to realise the ideal of real-freedom-for-all in the midst of social practices and institutions and it is justified for this purpose.
III. Job-as-Assets Argument

On the other hand, Van Parijs provides an argument for basic income that stems from a different context. The core of this argument is Van Parijs’s claim that jobs are scarce assets that yield various benefits to which all people should have equal entitlements (Van Parijs 1995: ch.4). This job-as-assets argument thus provides a normative argument for unconditional basic income that is distinct from the real-freedom-for-all argument.

The job-as-assets argument stems from the following moral suspicion: if we provide basic income unconditionally, it amounts to favouring those who unreasonably prefer not to work. Given this suspicion, Van Parijs argues that there is a “‘neutral’ point’ (Van Parijs 1995: 90) from which we can argue for unconditional basic income. The moral point is provided by the recognition of equal entitlement people have to the value of external assets (Van Parijs 1995: 98-99). That is, if people should have equal entitlements to the value of external assets, those who appropriate the value of these assets more than an equal per capita share must pay the rent acquired in this way back to those who gave up the value of the per capita share. The value of the external assets is identified by their competitive equilibrium price in a hypothetical market where people have equal purchasing power (Van Parijs 1995: 99-100). This rent-transfer equalises the value people get from the external assets of society and it is justified by people’s equal entitlement to the value of the external assets, independently from their preference concerning work. This means that in a society there should be ‘work independent income’ (Van Parijs 1995: 100) for all, that is, unconditional basic income. Therefore the rent acquired through appropriating a surplus value of the external assets should be used to finance unconditional basic income. This is the argument for basic income that is neutral to the preference concerning work.

Note that furthermore, Van Parijs holds that this rent-transfer brings about envy-freeness between people which, he considers, ‘a necessary condition for equality of external-resource-based real freedom’ (Van Parijs 1995: 54). Envy freeness, according to Van Parijs, requires ‘that no one should prefer someone else’s opportunity-set to her own’ (Van Parijs 1995: 53). When the value each person acquires from the external assets are equalised by way of basic income as work independent income, they will not envy each other’s share of the value. In such a way basic income fulfils the condition of envy-freeness as to the value of external assets.6

Van Parijs (1995: 106-109) further develops his arguments to meet the demand of resource equality to the job. Van Parijs first considers that, in a non-Walrasian world, the labour market never gets clear and jobs are scarce resources from which people derive various benefits. Van Parijs here recognises that work brings two distinctive benefits to the job-holders. The first is income and this constitutes the pecuniary benefit of holding a job. The second is non-pecuniary/intrinsic benefits of work, such as enjoyment of working, which helps differentiate the various types of jobs from each other (Van Parijs 1995: 109,
Both benefits are important for us to pursue our life-plans and our job serves as the source of these benefits. Recall that Van Parijs considers each person having an equal entitlement to a per capita share of the value of society’s external resources; Van Parijs counts jobs as one such resource that calls for equal sharing of value. Therefore, when people appropriate the value of job-resource more than their per capita share, the rent acquired in this way needs to be taxed away to finance unconditional basic income (Van Parijs 1995: 108). Note that the rent is defined as the difference between the income (and other advantages) the employed derive from their job, and the (lower) income they would need to get if the market were to clear’ (Van Parijs 1995: 108). Given all the people’s equal entitlement to the value of social job-resource, this employment rent acquired by those who successfully obtain jobs should be shared by all other people as part of the unconditional basic income.

Further, even if there is no involuntary unemployment, the fact that there are various types of jobs warrants that basic income must be in order, so as to compensate the envy caused by people’s holding jobs they do not prefer: ‘What is crucial to my argument is the existence of large employment rents, as manifested by the presence of envy over job endowments, and not the fact that many people are without a job at all’ (Van Parijs 1995: 109). Van Parijs (1995: 113-115) then proposes measuring the value of each type of job: this is defined by its competitive value measured by an imaginary auction for the job where people have equal purchasing power. And the prices of jobs reveal the employment rent attached to various types of jobs. Van Parijs (1995: 113-114) then holds that in order to achieve full equality and thus remove envy, the employment rents need to be subtracted from people’s income and provided to all as basic income.

IV. The Basic Income and Justice

Thus far we have seen two types of arguments for basic income in Van Parijs’s Real Freedom for All. And indeed, the two arguments are distinct in their nature. While the real-freedom-for-all justification need not be sensitive to the morality of job/work, the job-as-assets argument stems from this morality.

1. Real-Freedom-for-All Argument

In Real Freedom for All, Van Parijs first provides his conception of justice as real freedom for all: for a society to be just it must provide leximin real freedom. It is said that, by doing this, the three cardinal components of ‘real freedom’, that is, security, self-ownership and opportunity, are reasonably realised for all. Given this, Van Parijs provides arguments for unconditional basic income as ‘institutional implications’ (Van Parijs 1995: 30) and ‘the best institutional expression of the ideal captured by the slogan “real-freedom-for-all”’ (Van Parijs 1995: 32). Then Van Parijs argues how unconditional basic income helps us attain the conditions of justice defined by real-freedom-for-all: unconditional basic income does this
by providing leximin purchasing power that serves as a solid basis of social life of all and allows people to take various ways of life. These are the points of arguments reviewed in the last section.

It is important to note here that the demands of the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice as criteria for a just society are conceptually independent from demands for institutional justice. The demands of the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice are derived from moral values (such as self-ownership, security, equality and efficiency) that are important in themselves apart from actual social institutional settings. Therefore, the social scheme of basic income is not inherent in the demands of justice: basic income is not implied by the moral values that constitute real-freedom-for-all conception of justice. It rather realises the demands of this conception of justice as an institutional tool and it is justified as such.

As such, the justification of basic income predicated upon the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice need not be sensitive to the morality of job/work in the end. The morality of job/work is delicate. As one can easily recognise, there are various aspects in doing one’s job that significantly affect human life interests: income, leisure as off-time, human relationship, skill-development, sense of dignity, social recognition and so on. But, however important they may be, inasmuch as a proposed scheme of basic income is considered to achieve the demands of the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice, theses aspects of doing a job will not be considered or even be disregarded when justifying the proposed scheme. This line of argument can lead us to consider that the scheme of basic income is what social justice is all about\(^7\) and in this way, our further discussion can be focused solely upon pragmatic strategies by which we can provide leximin real-freedom to people. And finally, the moral circumstances of job/work will be judged according to its relationship to their contribution to the basic income scheme despite the complexity of the moral nature of job/work.

2. **Job/Work Morality Argument**

Van Parijs provides different sorts of arguments for basic income. These arguments are derived from the considerations of the morality of sharing the benefits of job as common assets between people. These arguments consist of three claims. First, Van Parijs considers that the value of external assets needs to be distributed in a manner that achieves equal share of the value between people and thus envy-freeness. Second, according to Van Parijs, jobs can be regarded as external assets when we try to distribute their values and attain envy-freeness. Third, the value of job as assets lies in its pecuniary benefits (income) and other non-pecuniary benefits and both of these are relevant to the moral demands of equalising value and envy-freeness. Given these claims, Van Parijs concludes that *as a matter of the morality of the job-value sharing*, work independent income, that is, unconditional basic income is required.

We should notice here that these arguments for basic income are endogenous to the
morality of job/work. In the arguments for basic income according to the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice, the value of income lies in the usefulness of income in providing lexicmin real freedom outside the context of job/work. On the other hand, in the second sort of argument for basic income, the value of income is understood as one of the values attached specifically to job/work. The idea of evaluating employment rent of each type of job and redistributing it as basic income to equalise citizens’ share of the value of job/work consists of three views. First, each type of job as a labouring activity has its inherent values to people. Second, such values of work can be understood in pecuniary terms in the hypothetical auction. Third, redistributing income attached to each job can equalise the value of jobs of different kinds and thus eliminate the envy between the holders of jobs of different kinds. These views signify the understanding that income can function as a value-balancer of job/work in relation to other factors, such as inherent enjoyment of doing a job, that make the value of job/work. As such, income is one of the factors which consists the moral value/meaning of job/work: job/work makes a domain in which moral value/meaning is given as a whole, and income should be understood as one of the components of this domain. Therefore, arguments for income redistribution cannot be detached from the overall morality of job/work. Due to this structure of argument, Van Parijs’s second sort of argument for basic income is sensitive to the morality of job/work: indeed basic income is inherent in the justice concerning the morality of job/work.

3. Priority of the Real-Freedom-for-All Argument
Given such a classification of Van Parijs’s arguments for basic income, it is crucial to notice the relationship between them. These arguments are not of equal value: the argument based on the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice has priority over the job/work-morality arguments for basic income.

In finally determining how employment rent should be calculated and redistributed as unconditional basic income, Van Parijs in the end gives up the idea of redistributing employment rent according to type-difference of jobs. Van Parijs explains:

In practical terms, however, the idea of organizing a large independent set of auctions, each matched to a particular type of job, does not make much sense. Indeed, jobs differ along so many dimensions and their value can be dramatically affected so many changes (from mood of the supervisor to the schedule of the public transport network) that the very notion of a ‘type of job’ is rather problematic. (Van Parijs 1995: 115)

In such a way, Van Parijs nullifies the idea of bringing justice to intrinsic values of jobs by redistributing employment rent. Instead, Van Parijs proposes that we distribute wages according to the criteria of the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice: now Van Parijs claims that, ‘wages should be taxed up to the point at which the tax yield, and hence the
basic income financed by it, is maximized’ (Van Parijs 1995: 116). However, Van Parijs (Van Parijs 1995: 115) still claims that this is to redistribute employment rent stemming from inherent values of job on the ground that employment rent stemming from intrinsic values of job/work is *also* captured and redistributed in this strategy, although imperfectly. This is misleading; indeed, as he does, the only thing Van Parijs can say about employment-rent redistribution through this strategy is this: since there is basic income and no one is forced to work involuntarily, there is no one who suffers from negative employment rent (Van Parijs 1995: 115).8 It should be observed here that this strategy is no longer geared to bringing justice for the values of job/work; it rather establishes priority of the real-freedom-for-all argument for basic income over the job-as-assets argument. This is because in justifying a certain scheme of basic income for all, the morality of job/work only puts an external constraint on it (that is, no negative rent condition) rather than serving as a constitutive component of the justification.

Putting such a priority is possible because these two arguments provided by Van Parijs are not necessarily related to each other. On the one hand, the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice has nothing to do with the justice directed towards the morality of job/work per se. Surely, this conception of justice aims to provide people with opportunities not to work and allows them to have better discretion with regard to how they use their time. However, in such a context of arguments, the value of income is found in its function of creating time usable for activities other than work, and the value of income in relation to the morality of job/work per se is not recognised. On the other hand, the morality of job/work argument puts forward its *own* demands of justice for job/work. This may require some sort of unconditional basic income, but it is done independently from the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice.9 As such, these sorts of arguments are distinct.

To see this point, Van Parijs’s ‘need-to-swell’ argument helps: it shows how he is hovering around the two distinct sorts of arguments. The argument of job as assets starts from the need to explain why basic income does not favour those who unreasonably prefer not to work. And a morally neutral point from which we can argue for work independent income, i.e., unconditional basic income, is provided: value-equalisation and envy-freeness as to people’s shares of the value of the job as external assets. On the other hand, in a different context of argument (Van Parijs 1995: 102-106), Van Parijs claims that it is necessary to find a financial source by which we can swell the amount of unconditional basic income which each person will receive. Van Parijs considers that ‘the total of what is donated and bequeathed’ (Van Parijs 1995: 90) cannot carry out this job. However, happily enough, Van Parijs finds jobs conceived as external common assets can successfully swell unconditional basic income. Note that this is simply a happy coincidence that job as assets can increase the amount of unconditional basic income to the extent that the idea of basic income becomes practically non-trivial. Given the above, we can see two lines of arguments are mixed up in Van Parijs’s account of unconditional basic income: one is that regarding job as assets for value-equalisation and envy-elimination justifies basic income, and the
other is that job as assets can increase the amount of basic income which is justified not by the job-as-assets argument but the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice. Note that, in the end, even this swelling function of job-as-assets argument could become unnecessary because leximin real freedom can require a certain manner of income distribution out of its own concern.

Now it should be clear that the real-freedom-for-all argument and the job-as-assets argument are distinct, and Van Parijs gives priority to the former. However, such a strategy would become problematic for Van Parijs because it will make the job-as-assets argument non-essential in the attempt to justify unconditional basic income.

V. From Job-as-Assets Argument to Justice

Given the priority above, the job-as-assets argument could become trivial and pointless; the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice will do the entire job required to justify unconditional basic income. That is, in the end, certain social outcomes that are realised by granting unconditional basic income can justify a scheme of basic income as providing leximin opportunities. This justification passes over the morality of job/work and the job-as-assets argument ceases to attract our attention. Even worse, the priority could prevent justice for job/work from getting full attention, if our craving for social justice is to be satisfied with basic income.

However, pursuing this line of argument is problematic if, as Van Parijs himself does, we recognise the morality of job/work and take it seriously. Indeed, the morality of job/work is not trivial for most of us, as work fundamentally determines how we can live in a social world, and this is the very reason why Van Parijs wants to provide unconditional basic income that will allow people to attain better freedom. So the undervaluation of the morality of work/job does not really fit Van Parijs’s original intention.

Note that from this viewpoint, even Van Parijs’s job-as-assets argument is problematic because it is not fully sensitive to the morality of job/work. Recall that Van Parijs puts forward job-auction where the values of various types of jobs are calculated in pecuniary terms. Whatever the motivation for such method of evaluation, it reduces the values of job/work into that of income and makes our concern for justice focused solely on the social scheme of income distribution. However, the moral values of job/work could not be evaluated so simply; these values include non-pecuniary values. Although Van Parijs recognises this crucial point, his approach directed towards the justification of basic income ultimately keeps it undeveloped in his conception of justice. Indeed, due to such pecuniary-term-simplification of the morality of job/work, this morality is paid only partial attention: it matters only to the extent and in the manners that it can be related to income distribution.

If the job-as-assets argument should play a crucial role in justifying basic income as a demand of justice, it should be developed in a manner that (1) pays full attention to the
morality of job/work, including those aspects that cannot be taken into account in pecuniary terms and (2) clarifies the relationship between the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice and the morality of job/work.

First, the job-as-assets argument should be able to show how the distinct values we can find in job/work require basic income in order to realise justice for job/work when jobs are conceived as common assets. This first requires us to clarify how income is related to other values of work in non-pecuniary terms, that is, not through hypothetical auction. Rather, the relationship should be accounted for by referring to the distinct values themselves. Then it should be further explained how regarding job as common assets requires unconditional basic income to achieve justice for job/work given such accounts. For example, consider a case where we argue for introducing basic income in order to make the value of, say, human relationship in workplaces reasonably realised in society. Income distribution could have a distinct impact on how the value of human relationship in workplaces are realised in society, and with regard to this point, basic income could be required to attain justice for job/work. In such arguments, the idea of job as assets puts a prima facie demand for justice that the values of job/work including the value of income and human relationship should be shared equally. Given this, basic income would be called for reasonably to realise these values in each person’s share. Note that in this context, we need to introduce other moral values that are not included in the job-as-assets argument, such as efficiency and sufficiency, to explain how certain basic income scheme reasonably realises the distinct values of job/work to each person. At any rate, if we are to argue for basic income through the morality of job/work, the above is the route we need to take: this is indeed to develop arguments for justice as to the social morality of job/work and make basic income fully stemming from it.

Second, it is important here to bridge the two distinct arguments for basic income (real-freedom-for-all argument and morality-of-job/work argument) and make both of these essential in justifying basic income. The most promising way to do this seems to be making the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice serve as a justifying moral force when arguing for basic income according to the morality of job/work. As I pointed out above, when arguing for basic income from the job-as-assets argument, it is necessary that they are supplemented by moral values that can explain how a certain scheme of basic income most reasonably realises values of job/work. The real-freedom-for-all conception of justice could provide the source of this reasonableness from the arsenal of its supporting moral values such as efficiency and liberty. This is to combine the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice and the job/work-morality based conception of justice, and make both of these essential components of arguments for basic income.

If such attempts described above succeed, then we can see a coherent argument for unconditional basic income within Van Parijs’s conceptions of justice. This may require a too complex argument in the end and may not be very fruitful in practical terms. However, if we are to make the most of Van Parijs’s deep philosophical insights, it seems this is worth
VI. Conclusion

In this paper, I examined the place of Van Parijs’s job-as-assets argument for unconditional basic income within his account of basic income. On Van Parijs’s account, there are two distinct sorts of arguments: the real-freedom-for-all argument and the job-as-assets argument. Having clarified their contents, I argued that the former is given priority over that latter, and this priority renders the latter superfluous in justifying basic income. In order to overcome this problem, I proposed that the job-as-assets argument for basic income should be developed in a manner that pays full attention to the morality of job/work and so will be able to bridge the morality of job/work and the real-freedom-for-all conception of justice.

Notes

1 Most of the important topics of arguments for/against Van Parijs can be found in Reeve and Williams 2003. On the reciprocity problem, see also McKinnon 2003; White 2003; 2006.
2 In the considerations on Van Parijs’s arguments below, I do not delve deeper into his argument of ‘undominated diversity’ because this does not cause any problem for the purpose of this paper.
3 For example, see Williams 2003.
4 Notice here that the idea of real freedom is not attached to people’s actual preference or what people want to do. Real freedom is rather concerned with the idea of ‘whatever one might want to do’ (Van Parijs 1995: 19) as the criterion. Thus real-freedom-for-all adopts hypothetical preference to consider the fair share of the opportunities to pursue people’s conceptions of the good. For the arguments on this point, see Barry 2003; Van der Veen 2003; Arneson 2003.
5 Note that the following is a rational reconstruction of Van Parijs’s view; his argument here is not very clear.
6 Williams (2003) points out the ambiguous relationship between value-equalisation and envy-freeness as moral criteria and questions the validity of job-as-assets argument. Arneson (2003: 105-109) also criticises Van Parijs’s reliance on the idea of envy-freeness.
7 Consider this statement: ‘a real-libertarian, a believer in the claim that real-freedom-for-all (as explained) is all there is to social justice’ (Van Parijs 1995: 5).
8 I suspect the validity of this claim because Van Parijs (1995: 35) holds that basic income is not tied with the idea of satisfaction of human basic needs.
9 For example, justice for occupational choice might demand unconditional basic income. On this point, see Williams 2006; McKinnon 2006.

Bibliography


