

Title	Civil service system under conditions of low labor mobility: case study of Britain and Korea
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Abstract	<p>In recent years, many developed countries undertook the task of reforming their civil service systems.¹ These reforms are set against the changes in the government in these countries. New values that were short-term outcomes and a culture of performance and customer-oriented service came to be demanded of the public sector. The governments attempted to reform the system of appointing personnel to the civil service to cope with these changes. According to past studies, the civil service system is divided into two: career-based and position-based systems (Auer et al., 1996).² The OECD, in its analysis of the civil service systems of member countries, noted that over the past several decades, the systems tend to shift from a career-based system to a position-based one (OECD, 2004). Some academic scholars noted that there is a common tendency to move away from the traditional Weberian bureaucracy (Demmke, 2010; Lægrevind and Lois Recascino Wise, 2007). It is generally thought that the position-based system, where civil service staff are appointed through open competition from internal and external candidates, is superior to the closed career-based system.</p> <p>The purpose of this paper is to prove that the shift to a position-based system is not effective in all countries. This paper focuses on the "mobility" of the external labor market around the government. The position-based system needs high labor mobility³ to appoint staff through open competition, which calls for internal civil service applicants and external applicants from the private sector to compete for positions in the civil service. However, the competition will not occur under conditions of low labor mobility. This paper takes up two cases, Britain and Korea, to examine the hypothesis. Britain is a case of high labor mobility, while Korea is a case of low labor mobility.</p> <p>In Chapter 1, I study the models of the civil service system in the public administration systems of the past. In Chapter 2, I examine the preceding studies on the recent trends in civil service reform and demonstrate the hypothesis of this paper from the viewpoint of external labor market mobility. Chapter 3 focuses on the research methodology of this hypothesis. Chapter 4 is an analysis of the case studies Britain and Korea. Chapter 5 provides concluding thoughts of the issues examined in this paper.</p>
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Civil Service System under Conditions of Low Labor Mobility: Case Study of Britain and Korea

Yuuki Oda

Abstract

In recent years, many developed countries undertook the task of reforming their civil service systems.¹ These reforms are set against the changes in the government in these countries. New values that were short-term outcomes and a culture of performance and customer-oriented service came to be demanded of the public sector. The governments attempted to reform the system of appointing personnel to the civil service to cope with these changes. According to past studies, the civil service system is divided into two: career-based and position-based systems (Auer et al., 1996).² The OECD, in its analysis of the civil service systems of member countries, noted that over the past several decades, the systems tend to shift from a career-based system to a position-based one (OECD, 2004). Some academic scholars noted that there is a common tendency to move away from the traditional Weberian bureaucracy (Demmke, 2010; Lægreid and Lois Recascino Wise, 2007). It is generally thought that the position-based system, where civil service staff are appointed through open competition from internal and external candidates, is superior to the closed career-based system.

The purpose of this paper is to prove that the shift to a position-based system is not effective in all countries. This paper focuses on the “mobility” of the external labor market around the government. The position-based system needs high labor mobility³ to appoint staff through open competition, which calls for internal civil service applicants and external applicants from the private sector to compete for positions in the civil service. However, the competition will not occur under conditions of low labor mobility. This paper takes up two cases, Britain and Korea, to examine the hypothesis. Britain is a case of high labor mobility,

while Korea is a case of low labor mobility.

In Chapter 1, I study the models of the civil service system in the public administration systems of the past. In Chapter 2, I examine the preceding studies on the recent trends in civil service reform and demonstrate the hypothesis of this paper from the viewpoint of external labor market mobility. Chapter 3 focuses on the research methodology of this hypothesis. Chapter 4 is an analysis of the case studies Britain and Korea. Chapter 5 provides concluding thoughts of the issues examined in this paper.

I. Model of a Civil Service System

Peter Self⁴ defined the civil service system from the viewpoint of human resource management and identified the “open system” and “closed system” models. In the open system, the composition of the civil service is representative of the society in which it is situated. There is strong repulsion for closed elitism, and this model is based on the principle of civil service posts being open to people outside the government. Therefore, an appointment to a vacancy does not depend upon internal transfer or promotion. Appointments are through open competition between internal and external candidates. Therefore, a position-classification system is suitable for an open system model. The position-classification system determines and lists the exact skill and ability necessary for each post. On the other hand, the human resource management of the closed system makes the standard of the civil service appointment rigorous. In the closed system model, if applying for a senior post, the applicant had to be a graduate from a specific school such as École nationale d'administration (ENA). These systems make for a strong civil service ethos, but they also mark an elite group distinct from the rest of society.

Auer et al.⁵ described the civil service systems in terms of the position-based and career-based systems on the basis of six elements. The position-based system allowed recruitment to mid-career jobs. This model had no promotion system and the employment was on a contractual basis as in the private sector. The position-based system is almost similar to the open system. In the career-based system, recruitment is limited to entry-level positions. This implies that the career-based structure is the same as the closed system. The career-based system allows for internal promotions and life-long employment. As the names indicate, the models of the civil service system described in past studies⁶ are based on differences in the methods of appointing staff to the civil service. The appointment methods control the style of the civil service system in each country.

Table 1. Model of Civil Service System

	Career-based system	Position-based system
I. Conditions for Access	1. Recruitment only to entry positions 2. Specific diplomas and/or education for specific careers 3. Training and/or probation period at the beginning of the career	1. Recruitment also to mid-career jobs 2. No specific diplomas and/or education for a specific career, but specific skill sets as per requirements for the specific post 3. No training period and/or stage at the beginning of the career
II. Career Development	4. Set promotion system	4. No promotion system
III. Employment	5. Lifelong employment	5. Employment on a contractual basis as in the private sector; no life-time job
IV. Remuneration System	6. Statutory scheme	6. Collective agreement/ individual pay
V. Pension System	7. Statutory scheme	7. Collective agreement
VI. Labor legislation	8. Specific legislation regulating the participation of unions in the decision making concerning civil servants' working conditions	8. Civil servants' working conditions are set through negotiations between the authorities and the unions and laid down in collective agreements

Source: Auer et al. (1996), p.32–33.

II. Trend of Civil Service Reform

According to the OECD (2004), as a result of civil service reforms in the last two decades, the civil service systems in each member country gradually changed to the position-based system from the classical career-based system. As indicated by the trend of these reforms, the career-based system is under pressure in wider job markets, and therefore, countries with such systems change to the position-based system, which try to make up the collective culture.⁷ Demmake (2010) collected data from 27 EU countries through a questionnaire on the kind of reforms they would prefer in the civil service system. The results of his research revealed that while, overall, none of the countries had a single common model, most countries had moved away from the classical career system.⁸ Against the background of such a trend, it is thought that the position-based system, which closely resembles the

private sector, is more suited to cope with the environmental changes around the public sector than the career-based system. The organization structure of the private sector generally focuses on a performance-oriented and customer-oriented culture. Therefore, appointments through open competition offer the more talented personnel in the private sector, rather than those in civil service (who reach the same levels through internal promotion), an opportunity to hold posts in the government.

There is, however, a need to focus on the issues in the method adopted to appoint personnel through open competition. Preceding studies do not factor in the variable of the labor market around the public sector. The position-based system calls for talented persons from the private sector. When the labor market has low mobility, there is little incentive for a talented person to change his or her job. For-profit organizations generally have a custom of life-long employment in such environments. There are few people absorbed at mid-level positions, and internal promotions are given priority. People who change jobs mid-career face a significant disadvantage when they seek a higher salary or senior post when competing for jobs outside the organization. Even if they are confident of their skills, they hesitate to take on such a disadvantage.

Under conditions of low labor mobility, can the government appoint talented people through open competition? Will the shift to the position-based system be an effective option for all countries? The past studies were based on and argued the case of countries that had or did not have such a system. There was not much focus on the actual use of such a system, and on the career path of appointees. This paper is a case study of the civil service systems in Britain and Korea. In the last two decades, the two countries appeared to have partly shifted to the position-based system from the classical career-based system. They introduced a new appointment system that filled vacancies through open competition. The labor markets in the two countries are vastly different. Britain has a highly mobile labor market, with workers changing their jobs frequently. Korea has a custom of life-long employment, and for-profit companies employ their staff for the long term.⁹ This difference affects the policy results. I examine, through a comparative study, the actual situation of the appointments through open competition to the senior civil service in the two countries.

III. Hypothesis

This paper verifies the next hypothesis: when competing for civil service positions through open competition from the private sector, particularly from for-profit companies, low labor mobility countries experience fewer appointments to the civil sector than high labor mobility countries. To verify this hypothesis, two case studies—Britain and Korea's civil service systems—will be examined. If the hypothesis of this paper is true, it will be seen that Korea offers less opportunities for appointments from the private sector than Britain.

In the two case studies, I collect the career information of civil service staff and details on those staff appointed through open competition, and compare it with the number of

appointments from the private sector. The best approach to verify the hypothesis is to collect information about all applicants, including those who were not appointed; however, as this was a very difficult approach, this paper set a more detailed working hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: There will be more posts for “open competition” in Britain than in Korea. Under conditions of low labor mobility, it is difficult to fill civil service positions since people are less likely to change their jobs and thus fill these vacancies. If many posts are available through open competition, the transfer of the staff will become difficult, and there is a considerable risk of a rise in personnel expenses.

Hypothesis 2: Important posts will be filled by a few appointees from the private sector in Britain rather than in Korea.

If many important posts are filled by applicants from the private sector, it will be difficult to retain internal civil service staff’s motivation. Under conditions of low labor mobility, civil service candidates find it difficult to change their jobs when they are dissatisfied at work.

Hypothesis 3: There will be a few appointments from “for-profit companies” in Britain than in Korea.

Under conditions of low labor mobility, for-profit companies adopt the career-based system, and hypotheses 1 and 2 can be fulfilled in such scenarios. The important posts at for-profit companies are filled by internal promotion. Therefore, the people who take up a civil service post and after they complete this term, they find it difficult to find a job with a salary comparable to that of the previous job.

IV. Britain

1. Civil Service System in Britain

The old civil service system in Britain was classified as a typical closed system.¹⁰ Some of the candidates who had graduated from Oxford and Cambridge (known as fast-streamer) held the majority of the senior posts. The rigorous standards of appointment to senior posts are a characteristic feature of the closed system.

In 1968, the Fulton report indicated the problems in the former civil service system. The reforms of the civil service system have been in progress since then. The Fulton report pointed out the following issues: (a) over emphasis on amateurs or generalists; (b) complexity of job classification; (c) a lack of the authority of specialist staffs; (d) insufficient staff with management skills; (e) few interactions outside the government; and (f) a lack of human resource management and human skill development plan. The Fulton report pointed out many problems but most of them were not resolved.¹¹ However, the subjects of the Fulton report were treated as central agendas in later reforms.

Thatcher’s reforms changed the civil service system in 1979. The conservative

government aimed to deliver effective and efficient service with the goal of reducing expenditure. The government, therefore, accorded high priority to improving the management of the civil service.¹² Its fundamental principle was not new; rather it was the same as the Fulton report.¹³ Thatcher's reforms such as Financial Management Initiative and Next Step Initiative transferred the authority of finance and human resource management to the respective department and agency. This initiative was expected to ensure effective use of resources by transferring authority to the manager at the front. The result of Next Steps was that the appointment of chief executives for all agencies was thrown open to civil service staff and applicants outside the government. Since then, appointments from outside the government have been increasing consistently. The senior civil servants appointed from outside the government have been picked for their management skills and special skills in finance, human resource management, and IT. These professional skills are difficult to develop in the public sector.

In 1996, the Senior Civil Service (SCS) system, which is based on the white paper "The Civil Service: Continuity and Change" published in 1994, was introduced. The management framework of the senior civil service was merged with the SCS. On the other hand, the authority to manage other staff was delegated to the respective department and agency. The SCS was introduced in response to the need for strategic public management and the government's desire to make the culture across the ministries. It has been 15 years since the SCS was introduced, but the responsibility of the SCS has not changed. The Cabinet Office assigns the SCS two responsibilities:¹⁴ that (a) the Civil Service should be "led by a highly professional group of senior advisers and managers working closely in support of Ministers both in the development and implementation of Government policy and in the management of services" and (b) the SCS should form a corporate leadership cadre "whose focus and loyalty was wider than simply one Department or agency."

There were 3,050 SCS staff when the SCS was introduced in 1996. By 2010, the number increased to 4,696. The size of the SCS has increased gradually every year. The Cabinet Office offers two reasons for this rise:¹⁵ (a) Increasing demand for their skills, driven by a capability review, calls for stronger leadership, and a more strategic approach and (b) Pressures from new areas of work and initiatives that require additional staffing from both the SCS and the Civil Service.

These reforms have changed the British civil service appointment system from the classic career-based system to a position-based system over last two decades. The purpose of open competition is to introduce talented personnel from the private sector to take on civil service opportunities. Earlier, the classical civil service system was controlled by the human resource management team, and its senior posts were monopolized by applicants who were promoted internally. However, in the current system, the authority to make appointments is delegated to each department and agency and external applicants can now apply for senior civil service posts.

2. Appointment Process¹⁶

Appointment of all civil servants is according to the “Recruitment Principles” established by the Civil Service Commission. The appointment process is different for every department and agency except the SCS.

In principle, appointments are thrown open to both internal and external applicants when SCS posts become vacant. The hiring decision is made according to a “Job Evaluation for Posts (JESP),”¹⁷ which lists the job standards for the SCS position. The Civil Service Commission participates in the appointment process when it chooses to recruit from outside the government. From 2002, the authority to appoint staff for pay band-1 and 1A posts was delegated to the respective department and agency.¹⁸ Appointments corresponding to pay band-2 and 3 and permanent secretary posts required approval from the Civil Service Committee.¹⁹ The process is as follows: first, the selection committee is established in the concerned department. Members of the selection committee include a representative from the department and a person from outside the government. A member of the Civil Service Commission becomes the chairman of the selection committee. The selection committee examines applicants through a written examination, paper presentation, and interview. They decide on a candidate and make their recommendations to the minister. If the minister opposes the appointment, the recommendation is sent back to the selection committee, along with the reasons for rejection. In such an instance where there is ministerial opposition to the committee’s choice, the committee needs to obtain approval from the Civil Service Commission when a new candidate is recommended.

3. Ratio of Internal Appointees to External Appointees

The Cabinet Office opens a number of appointments for candidates outside the government. Table 2 reflects the data of new entrants to the SCS every year. External recruits average at about 30–35% of the total recruits. This data covers all SCS recruitment data including those selected through closed appointments.

Table 2. New Entrants to the SCS Per Year—Percentages of External and Internal Recruits

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
New SCS entrants recruited externally	191 (36%)	169 (35%)	172 (30%)	196 (38%)	157 (29%)
New SCS entrants recruited internally	337 (64%)	309 (65%)	404 (70%)	326 (62%)	376 (71%)
Total	528	478	576	522	533

Source: House of Commons Public Administration Committee (2010), p.8.

Table 3 is the data of new entrants to the Top 200 per year. Top 200 is equivalent to the posts above Director-General.


Table 3. New Entrants to the Top 200 Per Year—Percentages of External and Internal Recruits

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
New Top 200 entrants recruited externally	14 (40%)	22 (61%)	15 (52%)	18 (60%)	21 (54%)
New Top 200 entrants recruited internally	20 (57%)	14 (39%)	14 (48%)	11 (37%)	18 (46%)
Unknown	1 (3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (3%)	0 (0%)
Total	35	36	29	30	39

Source: House of Commons Public Administration Committee (2010), p.8.

As the grade of the post becomes higher, appointments from the outside tend to increase. Table 3 lists the number of internal and external recruits for SCS profession²⁰ posts. Appointments from outside tend to be from corporate service professions such as finance, IT, procurement, and human resource management.

Table 4. SCS Profession of Post by Internal/External (% of Total in Profession)



Source: House of Commons Public Administration Committee (2010), p.80.

The Cabinet Office information is inadequate for analysis. There is no data about the base line to classify applicants on the basis of the public or private sector. If the Cabinet

Office classifies applicants on the basis of their last posts, the person who had been in the civil service for a long time before he or she changed to his or her last post in the private sector, might be classified as an external appointment. The purpose of appointment from outside the government is to recruit a talented person who has special skills such as finance, human resource management, and IT that are difficult to develop in the public sector. The purpose will not be achieved if a person with the same skill as an internal applicant from the civil service is recruited. Accordingly, the career-path of all staff must be checked.

4. Methodology

This paper collected information about senior civil service staff who were appointed to pay band-2 and 3 and permanent secretary posts through open competition from 2005-06 to 2009-2010. The decision to throw open the vacancies through open competition or internal promotion is not predetermined; it is made every time a position is to be filled. The annual reports of the Civil Service Commission show the appointee information that lists the name of the posts, the names of the appointees, and their former posts. This paper used the data for the five-year period between 2005 and 2010. I was able to collect complete data on 101 of the 108 posts that were appointed in this term. In this research, I collected the information on the type of appointed posts, the career of appointees and type of industry that the appointees had worked in earlier. I primarily used the Internet and newspaper archives to collect this data.²¹

5. Result

First, the research confirms the number of posts that were appointed through open competition to verify Hypothesis 1. About 300 posts (50.0%) of the Top 600 posts (above the Director class) and about 72 posts²² (36.0%) of the Top 200 posts (above the Director-General class that correspond to pay band-2 and 3 and the permanent secretary level) were appointed through open competition. Further, appointments from the civil service were 35 (34.7%) out of 101 staff. Appointees from other public sectors²³ were 9 (8.9%), and 41 staff (40.6%) from the private sector were selected. The number of staff who have had a career in the public and private sector were 16 (15.8%).

Table 5. Number of Posts Open to Each Sector (Britain)

Type of career	Number	Percent
From civil service	35	34.7%
Other public sector	9	8.9%
From private sector	41	40.6%
Mixed career	16	15.8%
Total	101	100.0%

Source: original research data

Second, it confirms the kind of posts that are open, as stated in Hypothesis 2. The figures are as follows: 101 posts consist of 13 top department posts (12.9%), 12 are top agency posts (11.9%), 38 are policy-making posts (37.6%), 27 are corporate service posts²⁴ (26.7%), 7 are scientist posts²⁵ (6.9%), and 4 are other post²⁶ (4.0%).

Table 6. Posts Appointed through Open Competition (Britain)

Appointed post	Number	Percent
Top of department	13	12.9%
Top of agency	12	11.9%
Policy making	38	37.6%
Corporate service	27	26.7%
Scientist	7	6.9%
Other	4	4.0%
Total	101	100.0%

Source: original research data

In addition, I studied the types of posts given to appointees from the civil service and the private sector to determine the differences in their posts. The appointees from the private sector have taken 8 top department and agency posts (19.5%), 10 policy-making posts (24.3%), 17 corporate service posts (41.5%), 5 scientist posts (12.2%), and 1 other post (2.4%). The ratio of corporate service posts against other posts is high. On the other hand, the appointees from the civil service through internal promotion have taken over 9 top department posts (25.7%), 4 top agency posts (11.4%), 16 policy-making posts (45.7%), 3 corporate service posts (8.6%), and 3 other posts (8.6%). The appointees from the civil service have a higher ratio of the top posts when compared to private sector appointees.

Table 7. Posts Appointed to Recruits from the Private Sector (Britain)

Appointed post	Number	Percent
Top of department	1	2.4%
Top of agency	7	17.1%
Policy making	10	24.4%
Corporate service	17	41.5%
Scientist	5	12.2%
Other	1	2.4%
Total	41	100.0%

Source: original research data

Table 8. Posts Appointed to Recruits from the Civil Service (Britain)

Appointed post	Number	Percent
Top of department	9	25.7%
Top of agency	4	11.4%
Policy making	16	45.7%
Corporate service	3	8.6%
Scientist	0	0.0%
Other	3	8.6%
Total	35	100.0%

Source: original research data

Third, the background of the appointees from the private sector confirms Hypothesis 3. The figures are as follows: 34 appointees (82.9%) among the 41 persons from the private sector are from for-profit companies; 17 of them (50.0%) were appointed to corporate service posts. They experienced similar types of posts in multiple private enterprises before they were appointed to the current post.

Table 9. Backgrounds Appointed to Recruits from the Private Sector (Britain)

Backgrounds	Appointed post	Number	Percent
From for-profit company	Top of department	1	2.4%
	Top of agency	7	17.1%
	Policy making	8	19.5%
	Corporate service	17	41.5%
	Other	1	2.4%
Scientist	Policy making	1	2.4%
	Scientist	4	9.8%
Doctor	Policy making	1	2.4%
	Scientist	1	2.4%
Total		41	100.0%

Source: original research data

Britain has many appointees from the private sector led by for-profit companies. These appointees are concentrated in corporate service. The appointees from the civil service are concentrated in policy-making posts. Because the job in the private sector is similar to that of the corporate service, an applicant from the private sector has a better advantage in an open competition. As there is no policy-making job in the private sector, many appointments to policy-making posts will be from the civil service.

V. Korea²⁷

1. Civil Service System in Korea

The Korean civil service system is based on the pre-World War II Japanese civil service system.²⁸ The recruitment of personnel to the civil service is restricted to entry-level positions. The civil service staff develop their careers mainly in one department.²⁹ They rotate through different positions every one or two years to experience a variety of work. There are nine grades in the civil service system. There are three grades of examinations³⁰ to join this service. Only staff who pass the grade 5³¹ examination can hold senior positions. The options to achieve senior positions are limited. The Korean civil service system has traditionally been a career-based system and is the same as Japan's civil service system. Moreover, the labor market in the private sector followed the custom of providing lifelong employment until the IMF crisis in 1997.³² After 1997, the traditional system of lifelong employment gradually disappeared. However, at present, in large companies³³ where office workers become candidates for the senior civil service, the custom of lifelong employment and internal promotion has been widely adopted. Therefore, both the public and private sector followed the closed career-based system in Korea.

In 1999, the Open Position System was introduced in the central government. This system throws open some senior civil service posts for open competition. The posts appointed through open competition are set at a maximum of 20% of all Director-General class posts and a part of the Director-class post. The purpose of introducing this system is to cope with the demands of efficiency and effectiveness in civil service, retain a talented person appointed through open competition, and regenerate the closed culture of the public sector by drawing specialists from the private sector. Furthermore, the senior civil service system was introduced in 2006. This system is a framework to manage and unify the staff equivalent to former grades 1–3.³⁴ Since 2000, the Korean civil service system has changed from a traditional career-based system to a position-based system, which is similar to Britain.

2. Appointment Process

The appointment to the civil service is restricted to entry-level positions that correspond to grades 9, 7, and 5, in principle. Applicants join the civil service after they graduate from university, and are trained in the functions of their department. Vacancies are filled internally through transfer and promotion. The Open Position System, which is the system to appoint a percentage of senior posts through open competition, was introduced in 1999. Some senior civil service posts corresponding to former grades 1, 2, and 3 are appointed through open competition. The purpose of the Open Position System is to select and appoint, through open competition from the public and private sector, the most competent persons to the posts that call for expert skill in improving the public sector and devising efficient

policies.³⁵ The environmental change around the government, the demand for effectiveness and efficiency, the necessity to acquire talented personnel through open competition, and the need to revolutionize the closed public sector were all factors that drove the introduction of the Open Position System.³⁶

The chief executive selects the positions for open competition. This selection is decided through a discussion with the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS). The standards of open position selections should give priority to the position where specialty, importance, democracy, and the need for change is required. However, the position that requires an adjustment between organizations in each department is not designated. Designation and cancellation are carried out as the occasion demands. The status of open positions is changed frequently.

Every position has preset job descriptions that list the qualifications and skill requirements. The selection committee³⁷ examines the applicants through a preliminary and final examination. The primary examination covers the examination of all relevant documents. Applicants who meet the requirements are deemed to have passed the primary examination. The second examination covers a further scrutiny of documents, a written examination, and an interview. Finally, two or three candidates are chosen, and the list of candidates is submitted to the chief executive of the organization concerned. The chief executive prioritizes the candidates list and submits it to the committee for senior civil service appointment in MOPAS. The president finally carries out the appointment after the MOPAS committee screening.

3. Ratio of Internal and External Recruits on the Basis of Existing Documents

On April 1, 2010, 161 positions³⁸ were designated as open positions. The number of senior civil service staff at that time was unknown. The ratio of open position is approximately 10% when it assumes the number of senior civil service to comprise 1,500³⁹ staff members. The open position system can designate open positions up to 20% of the total positions. In the interview with the researcher of public administration, it was suggested that there was little appointment from the private sector.⁴⁰ MOPAS shared the data about the appointment necessary to verify the hypothesis. However, the MOPAS data is too raw. It is possible that the staff with a long career as civil service staff in the central government, and other staff who were seconded to other organizations and returned to their original department, are also included in the list of staff from private sector in this set of data. The data of MOPAS is not substantial to explain the content of the required career. Therefore, as in the case of Britain, I collected the data on the type of qualifications required for the appointed post, and the past career and industry in which the staff were employed.

4. Methodology

I examined 161 posts that were specified as open positions on April 1, 2010. In Korea, it is necessary to specify the date when the post will be open for open competition.⁴¹ I collected

information on 117 of the 161 posts. The posts that were vacant and filled through the army were not considered. In the case of Korea, I collected the information primarily from newspapers.⁴²

5. Result

First, the research confirms the number of posts that were appointed through open competition; hence, Hypothesis 1 is verified. Open positions up to a maximum of 20% from among 1,500⁴³ posts were allowed. In reality, 161 posts (10.7%) from among about 1,500 posts were specified as open. Appointees from the civil service by internal promotion comprise 99 (84.6%) and 18 (15.4%) staff from the private sector. There is no appointment from the local government.

Table 10. Number of Posts Open to Each Sector (Korea)

Type of career	Number	Percent
From civil service	99	84.6%
From private sector	18	15.4%
Total	117	100.0%

Source: original research data

Second, the findings confirm the kind of posts that are open, thus verifying Hypothesis 2. The figures are as follows: 117 posts consist of 2 top agency posts (1.7%), 46 are policy-making posts (39.3%), 18 are corporate service posts (15.4%), and 51 are posts (43.6%) in organizations outside the central department. The organizations outside the central department consist of 20 research institutes, 9 hospitals, 6 cultural centers, 5 museums, 4 training institutes, and 7 other organizations. Most of the posts in the organization outside the central department are at the level of chief officer.

Table 11. Posts Appointed through Open Competition (Korea)

Appointed post	Number	Percent
Top of agency	2	1.7%
Policy making	46	39.3%
Corporate service	18	15.4%
Organization outside the central departments	51	43.6%
Total	117	100.0%

Source: original research data

Further, I compared the posts of appointees from the civil service and private sector to see if the type of posts were different. The appointees from the private sector were selected for 4 policy-making posts (22.2%), 4 corporate service posts (22.2%), and 10 posts (55.6%) in organizations outside the central government. The appointees from the civil service through internal promotion comprise 42 policy-making posts (42.4%), 14 corporate service posts (14.1%), and 43 posts (43.4%) in organizations outside the central government.

Table 12. Posts Appointed to Recruits from the Private Sector (Korea)

Appointed post	Number	Percent
Top of agency	0	0.0%
Policy making	4	22.2%
Corporate service	4	22.2%
Organization outside the central departments	10	55.6%
Total	18	100.0%

Source: original research data

Table 13. Posts Appointed to Recruits from the Civil Service (Korea)

Appointed post	Number	Percent
Top of agency	2	2.0%
Policy making	42	42.4%
Corporate service	14	14.1%
Organization outside the central departments	41	41.4%
Total	99	100.0%

Source: original research data

Third, the research findings confirm the career information of the appointees from private sector, and thus verify Hypothesis 3. There are 8 staff (44.4%) from for-profit companies,⁴⁴ 2 scientists, 4 social scientists, 2 lawyers, 1 doctor, and 1 politician. The type of posts appointed from the private sector is 4 corporate service posts, 1 policy-making post, 2 museum posts, and 1 other post.

Table 14. Backgrounds Appointed to Recruits from the Private Sector (Korea)

Type of career	Appointed post	Number	Percent
From for-profit company	Policy making	1	5.6%
	Corporate service	4	22.2%
	Museum	2	11.1%
	Other	1	5.6%
Scientist	Research institute	2	11.1%
Social scientist	Policy making	1	5.6%
	Cultural center	1	5.6%
	Research institute	2	11.1%
Lawyer	Policy making	2	11.1%
Doctor	Hospital	1	5.6%
Politician	Museum	1	5.6%
Total		18	100.0%

Source: original research data

The majority of open positions in Korea are for posts in organizations outside the central government. Appointees from the private sector are at the same level as those in the posts of policy making and corporate service. On the other hand, appointees from the civil service are in many policy-making posts. There is relatively little appointment from the for-profit company, while the figures of scholars, lawyers, or doctors recruited tend to be higher. The for-profit company follows the custom of providing lifelong employment, and it is a risky attempt for an applicant to change his or her job. Therefore, it can be argued that it is relatively easier for specialists to change their jobs.

VI. Conclusion

This study verifies Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 on the basis of a comparison of the civil service model in Britain and Korea. First, it compares the ratio of the posts filled through open competition in both countries. The ratio of recruitment for the open position is higher in Britain than Korea, although a simple comparison is difficult because the role of the Korean Director-General class is not at the same level as that of the British Director-General class. Hypothesis 1 is true.

Second, this study compares the distribution of the important posts. The top department and agency posts are appointed through open competition in Britain. In Korea, most of the posts appointed through open competition are for organizations outside the central government. However, it is a common trend in both countries for talented people

from the private sector to be appointed in corporate service posts. It has no relation to the differences in labor market mobility. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is almost true.

Third, this study compares the appointments from for-profit companies. The ratio of appointment from the civil service is low in Britain as compared to that of Korea. There are many appointments from other public and private sector organizations. On the other hand, Korea draws its staff from various professions such as education, politics, and law with relatively few people from for-profit companies. There are many appointees with careers that call for special skills, which makes it easier for them to change jobs, and there are only a few people from for-profit companies who are bound by closed human resource management styles that hold them to lifelong employment. Hypothesis 3 is true.

As a result of this case study, Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 in this paper are almost true. It is difficult for Korea to produce good results through the position-based system.

This paper compared Britain and Korea and showed that the environment of the external labor market around the government has an important influence on the appointment system of staff to the civil service. However, there are at least two problems that I cannot prove in this paper. The first is the influence of variables other than the external labor market. I chose Britain and Korea as case studies as they had followed the career-based system earlier, and in order to control the influence of the external variable as much as possible. However, I cannot control the difference in variables such as the history and corporate culture of the public employee system of the two countries, which could have had a huge influence on the recruitment model of civil service staff. The second problem revolves around indexes. I compared the number of appointees selected from the outside government to those who were internally promoted. This paper makes it clear that the appointment from the private sector did not go well in Korea. However, this figure is not synonymous with the failure to introduce the management skills from the private sector. The purpose of the change to the position-based system is to introduce management skills and a performance-oriented and value-for-money culture. The degree of the introduction might not be related to the appointee number. It is necessary to clarify these problems in a future study.

Notes

¹ The word “civil service system” implies an institution for human resource management in the central government. In this paper, it does not cover political appointees. Political appointees are different from the civil service staff who are recruited on merit. They are appointed in response to a political demand. They are not expected to be objective, possess special skills, and be noted for their effectiveness and efficiency. Therefore, it is difficult to discuss political appointees and civil service recruits on the same standards. I argue only about the civil service staff appointed through merit in this paper.

² The details of the model refer to table 1 of the following chapter.

³ Under labor market conditions of high mobility, people often change their jobs. However, under low labor mobility conditions, people customarily prefer long-term employment in a single organization.

⁴ Self, Peter, *Administrative Theories and Politics*, 2nd Edition with a New Introduction, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1982, pp.228-233.

⁵ Auer, Astrid and Christoph Demmke and Robert Polet, *Civil services in the Europe of fifteen: current situation and prospects*, Maastricht: European Inst. of Public Administration, 1996, pp.32-33.

⁶ Like other studies, Silberman (1993) also divides the civil service system into two models on the basis of the differences of human resource management. His dichotomy is similar to that of Self (1982) and Auer et al. (1996).

⁷ OECD, "Public Sector Modernization: Modernizing Public Employment," *OECD Policy Brief*, July 2004, pp.2-3.

⁸ Demmke, Christoph and Timo Moilanen, *Civil Services in the EU of 27, Reform Outcomes and the Future of the Civil Service*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, 2010, pp.243-246.

⁹ Hwang, Su-gyong, "Wage Structures in Korea," *Journal of Ohara Institute for Social Research*, No.571, June 2006, pp.1-15.

¹⁰ Self, Peter, *Administrative Theories and Politics*, 2nd Edition with a New Introduction, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1982, pp.228-233.

¹¹ Burnham, June and Robert Pyper, *Britain's Modernised Civil Service*, London: Macmillan, 2008.

¹² Gretton, John and Anthony Harrison, *Reshaping central government*, New Brunswick. NJ: Transaction Books, 1987, p.68.

¹³ Kimimura, Akira, "The Change and Issues of British Civil Service in the Thatcher Government," *The Doshisha Law Review*, No.39 (5-6), 1988, p.68.

¹⁴ Cabinet Office, *Senior Civil Service Workforce and Reward Strategy*, 2008, p.16.

¹⁵ Cabinet Office, *Ibid.*, p.18.

¹⁶ This section on appointment process is sourced from Inatsugu, Hiroaki (2008).

¹⁷ JESP is the standard to evaluate the difficulty of a job.

¹⁸ Civil Service Commissioners, *Annual report 2002-2003*, 2003, p.27.

¹⁹ Civil Service Commission, *Recruitment Principles*, 2010, p.7.

²⁰ Profession implies the type of post that is determined by "Professional Skills for Government" (PSG). PSG is the framework that establishes the skills pursued in each post. The PSG role is a guide for staff to develop their skills. PSG was introduced to SCS and grades 6 and 7 from 2005.

²¹ In the case of Britain, I collected most of the information from the homepages of each department. If the person moved jobs, in the case of appointees from internal civil service, their new department's homepage displayed the career information. In the case of appointees from other public or private sector organizations, I collected their information from newspapers. Appointees from outside the civil service moving to a senior civil service position seem to attract attention. In addition, the person from the outside often placed the details regarding his/her career on the homepage when changing jobs. Of course, the career information listed in the homepage is not complete data. However, I thought that the accuracy afforded through this

source was adequate for the purpose of this paper, which is to confirm the main career path of the senior civil service staff.

²² It assumed that the average term of office is three years, and I have calculated the number of posts on the basis of an average time period of 5 years.

²³ Other public sector organizations refer to the NHS, World Bank, and local government.

²⁴ Corporate service posts correspond to finance, human resource, procurement, performance management, IT, and PR.

²⁵ There is no social scientist appointed through open competition.

²⁶ Other posts include statistician, solicitor, and actuary.

²⁷ The details of this research are sourced from Oda (2010).

²⁸ Tanaka, Seiichi, *Kankoku Kanryousei no Kenkyu: Seiji Hatten tono Kanren ni oite*, Osaka: Publications Division in Osaka University of Economics and Law, 1997, p.111.

²⁹ There are some exceptions such as the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea.

³⁰ Examinations for grade 9, 7 and 5 are carried out. Tanaka, Hideaki, "The Meaning and Challenges of the Basic Act on Reform of National Public Service System, –From the Seniority-based System to an Achievement-based System–," *Quarterly Journal of Public Policy & Management*, Vol.4, 2008, p.12.

³¹ Grade 1 is the highest grade in the Korean civil service system.

³² Hwang, Ibid., p.4.

³³ Ibid., p.2.

³⁴ Grade 3 corresponds to the Director-General class.

³⁵ Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 개방형직위 및 공모직위 운영 매뉴얼–개방형, 공모직위제도 실무담당자용– (Manual for staff to operate the appointments of open position system), 2009, p.3.

³⁶ Choi, Seok Chung, "Redesigning Korea's Open Competitive Position System," *국가정책연구*, Vol.19, No.2, 2005.

³⁷ The committee consists of five members. The committee must select more than half its members from the private sector. The chairman is selected from among the members of private sector. Furthermore, one-third or more of the members from the private sector should be women.

³⁸ Refer to Government Jobs homepage.

³⁹ Tanaka, Hideaki, Ibid., p.14.

⁴⁰ Tanaka, Hideaki, Ibid., pp. 20-21.

⁴¹ The list of open positions is listed on the homepage of the Senior Civil Service.

⁴² Although the career information does not often appear on the homepage, all information about the move and appointment of the senior civil service staff appears in the newspapers. The person from the outside is only appointed to the open position. Details on their careers were taken by newspapers when they were appointed. In addition, I collated information from different sources such as official government documents, articles and the Internet, and then classified this information on the basis of whether the person was an internal or external appointee.

⁴³ The number of posts referred to Tanaka Hideaki, Ibid..

⁴⁴ According to newspaper articles, three staff from for-profit companies were reportedly appointed illegally as political appointees by the president.

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