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The Political Thought of John Dunn and Japan

Ken Tsutsumibayashi

Abstract

The article attempts first to capture some of the core features of John Dunn’s political thought by focusing on his recent idea concerning the “great dialogue”, understood primarily as a means to “globalize the history of human political thinking”. It will be argued that Dunn’s emphasis on dialogue derives from his sober understanding of politics as inseparable from the “Cunning of Unreason”, a notion coined to reflect the inherent precariousness and intractability of things political. Recognition of the inevitability of disappointment, according to Dunn, is the first step towards understanding what we can and cannot reasonably hope. The second half of the article deals with the reception of Dunn’s thought in Japan. By introducing anecdotes concerning Dunn’s interaction with some Japanese scholars, a modest attempt will be made to show how Dunn himself is attempting to put his ideas into practice.

I. In Search of a “Great Dialogue” in the Face of the Global Challenges of Politics

To understand politics in its present and past state is one thing. To provide a viable political scheme for creating a better future (or at least for preventing fatal catastrophes on a global scale) is another. Both are exceedingly difficult tasks, and as John Dunn, the Cambridge historian and political theorist, ceaselessly reminds us, we have as yet achieved neither.

In principle, the former should be less difficult to achieve than the latter. Naturally, the present and past are far less opaque than the future. But this does not mean that the former is within hands reach. From *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future* to *The Cunning of Unreason*, Dunn has consistently called into question the explanatory force and practical influence of existing contemporary political theories. The severity of his critique is most pronounced when dealing with political theories that have exerted so much influence in the Anglo-American academia during the past few decades:

The intellectual influence of this body of thought has been singularly at odds with its depressingly modest impact upon political struggle, not least in its own heartlands [North America]. … It remains striking how little attempt has thus far been made to explain the
imbalance between its considerable intellectual appeal and its exiguous political efficacy.⁴

But is it not a trifle exaggerated to make such a sweeping remark about the practical inefficacy of contemporary political theories? After all, one could point to numerous instances (particularly in North America) where they have been linked to practical political agenda. To retort in this fashion, however, is to miss the point of Dunn’s argument. Since his intention is not to denigrate whatever insights contemporary political theories have to offer (this is hardly the case, as will become apparent in the ensuing discussion) but rather to show how most of them engage in specific issues (in themselves very important, such as distributive justice) without having to pay sufficient attention to what is of fundamental importance to politics. In his words, politics of modern liberalism “lost their strictly political nerve and exchanged the attempt to judge how moral purpose can be effectively inserted into the political world for the more comfortable topic of what that purpose would consist in if only it were to be so inserted”.⁵

Perhaps the above point can be tersely expressed as the disregard of “the political”. The theories against which Dunn’s criticisms are aimed seem to take for granted the existence of a relatively stable liberal democratic polity.⁶ This is no doubt problematic in that the relevance of these theories would severely diminish in countries or regions where such an assumption can scarcely be admitted. Dunn’s experience in Ghana seems to have strengthened his conviction that one must never forget the inherent precariousness and the destructive power of politics.⁷ What is more, the defining characteristics of the political are not something that have become more or less irrelevant to the seemingly stable industrialized liberal democracies of modern times. Even in these privileged countries, Dunn seems to be saying, one cannot naively assume that whatever benign conditions that presently exist will last indefinitely; that these conditions can be undermined if one continued to turn away from the political. Hence his unfavorable comparison of modern contractarian thought with its classical predecessor which (for all its anachronism) is far more cogent in that it is principally concerned with the issue of political obligation.⁸ Prior to addressing the issue of distributive justice, it is imperative that one understand (or at least try to understand) how it becomes possible to establish and maintain a perceivably legitimate liberal polity (in all its complexity and contradictions) without which a discussion on distributive justice or on whatever liberal policies would not even be possible. And it is this fundamental approach of inquiry that leads Dunn constantly to ask “Who is to be judge?”. (While this question was also vigorously pursued by Carl Schmitt in formulating his own distinctive understanding of “the political”, the resemblance is more apparent than real. As Dunn explains, the question “Who is to be judge?”—a question often cast aside by contemporary liberal theories, thereby making them vulnerable to a Schmittian critique—was also central to the political thought of John Locke.⁹ It seems that Dunn is much closer to Locke in that he attaches considerable importance to the notions of trust and prudence in confronting—and where possible, preventing from occurring—what Schmitt calls “the state of exception”. For
Schmitt, it was more a matter of sovereign decision in the manner of *creatio ex nihilo*, based on the friend-enemy distinction. Needless to say, both trust and prudence are fragile yet politically (and ethically) indispensable human qualities fostered through long historical traditions and human experience.\(^0\)

Now, in view of today’s ever-globalizing world with concomitant crises that threaten global human devastation and environmental catastrophe, one simply cannot afford to ignore the precarious political, economic and ecological conditions of the world outside a few privileged liberal democratic states. It is precisely this sense of shared fate and urgency to act that propels Dunn to consider how we must think in a new and imaginative way in order to overcome these crises, or at least to avoid the worst possible scenarios.

Not surprisingly, Dunn does not present a specific method as to how this might become possible. If anything, he is bent on showing us how the future must necessarily remain unpredictable and beyond human control. This, he says, is “a lesson about modern politics”, that “none of us can reasonably hope to *master* what is occurring, to somehow take it all in and fix it clearly and accurately for ourselves, and why it is quite wrong to think of what stops us from doing so as merely our limited computational capabilities”.\(^1\)

“The Cunning of unreason” was thus a term coined to capture this intrinsically intractable nature of politics.

While this outlook leaves very little room for optimism, it hardly constitutes a recommendation of defeatism or capitulation to the Goddess of Fortuna. In Dunn’s view, the fact that we cannot master our own destiny is no reason for inaction or despair. Thus it was stated in the Preface to *The Cunning of Unreason*: “You could think of it as a book about the inevitability of disappointment. But I prefer myself to think of it as a book about how (and how not) to hope”.\(^2\)

Then how are we to proceed? Dunn’s approach is most succinctly and cogently captured in the following passage:

The purpose of political theory is to diagnose practical predicaments and to show us how best to confront them. To do this it needs to train us in three relatively distinct skills: firstly in ascertaining how the social, political and economic setting of our lives now is and in understanding why it is as it is; secondly in working through for ourselves how we could coherently and justifiably wish that world to be or become; and thirdly in judging how far, and through what actions, and at what risk, we can realistically hope to move this world as it now stands towards the way we might excusably wish it to be.\(^3\)

As for the first skill, Dunn believes that the intellectual tradition of Western political thinking from Plato and Aristotle to Rawls and Dworkin still has something to offer. He argues how it is “intellectually defensible” and “educationally mandatory” to study the canon, for it “still holds strictly cognitive resources for a sound understanding of the politics of the world in which we all live, and resources for which there are no full surrogates in the insulated cultural heritage of other portions of the globe”.\(^4\)
But when it comes to the second and third skills that concern the future, it is an entirely different matter. It is different because in order to confront the impending global crises (the success on which depends the survival of human beings as a species) it is not sufficient simply to globalize the Western modes of thinking and acting. It is not sufficient because the Cunning of Unreason cannot be understood or controlled merely by resorting to existing Western political paradigms. Moreover, any meaningful attempt to steer the future away from devastation must be based on mutual cooperation of various actors from all regions of the world. And this requires that people from different cultural or civilizational backgrounds engage in a dialogue that would “globalize the history of human political thinking”. But this cannot be achieved “just by recognizing the stage on which it has taken place, nor can we hope to do so without learning how to understand the politics of the encounter itself in a less ludicrously jejune manner”. Thus, in advocating a “great dialogue”, Dunn seems little inclined to build upon the existing notions of cosmopolitanism or globalism or “dialogue among civilizations”. As with many contemporary liberal theories, he would probably consider them as too “utopian”. However, despite pushing skepticism to its logical conclusion, or because of it, Dunn appears far more ambitious than his “utopian” counterparts. While demonstrating how most or all existing theories (utopian or otherwise) cannot work, he is nonetheless stressing the urgency to excogitate a viable mode of thinking through a dynamic and thoroughly thought-out process of global dialogue. Needless to say, however, all this is not accompanied by optimism surrounding its prospective outlook. If anything Dunn is more keen on showing how various obstacles would most likely prevent us from attaining that goal. But once again, let us recall how recognition of the inevitability of disappointment could serve as a means to understanding what we can and cannot reasonably hope.

Then, what does it mean to “globalize the history of human political thinking”? And assuming that it is a worthwhile project, how should we go about pursuing it? If one is to press for clear-cut answers, one is bound to be disappointed. Dunn rarely provides specific and conclusive answers. But this is understandable if one takes into account how dialogue, by nature, must fundamentally be open-ended. Of course, it would be naïve to expect clear and definitive answers. The centrality of dialogue must imply that the process of collaborative thinking is as important as the articulation of this or that conclusion. Yet the question remains as to how and under what conditions such a dialogue can be conducted.

From Dunn’s recent works, and in particular from his unpublished discussion paper entitled “Civilizational Conflict and the Political Sources of the New World Disorder”, we can infer that he attaches some importance to the causal influence of civilization on human collective action. In his partially sympathetic reading of Huntington’s controversial thesis “The Clash of Civilizations”, Dunn explains that (according to Huntington) civilizations “are the current repositories and the historical sources of the shaping conceptions of how it makes sense for humans to live and why it makes sense for them to live in those and not other ways”. Or as Dunn states elsewhere, civilization can serve as a source of norma-
tive order, and “the discontinuities in revolutionary experience have served to demonstrate how much the capacities of any historical society to endure, and prevail over, these fear-some ordeals must come from the long civilizational past of a particular population, not from a beguilingly lit *tabula rasa* of a future”. 19

It is perhaps worth noting at this point that the above assumption will most likely not go uncontested. Some are bound to argue that civilization is too vast and vague a notion to have any meaningful explanatory force. It is always difficult to specify the precise contours and contents of different civilizations, which are in any case constantly on the move. Others may point to the practical risk of self-fulfilling prophesy arising from the very reliance on civilizational discourse. I must admit that I myself have some reservations about the use of the term “civilization”, which seems to carry too much ideological baggage. But needless to say, Dunn is fully aware of these difficulties, and his intention, it seems to me, is not to opt for a ready-made civilizational framework but rather to take into account how certain collective historical identities influence the course of collective human action in such a way as to often defy rationally identifiable interests. In this respect, “civilization” (for lack of a better word) is well worth paying attention to.

Then, how should we make use of such civilizational resources? Dunn has not as yet shown a clear method of how this can be done. But again, we should recall that it is not a question of devising a precise method. Neither is it a matter of excavating hitherto unrecognized truths or solutions from the bedrocks of different civilizations. It would be unduly optimistic to assume that such truths or solutions are somehow buried beneath the mossy surface, just waiting to be unearthed. For Dunn, then, it is not simply a discovery process but rather one of creation through communication and mutual understanding, and this is what makes his project all the more ambitious. To create new ideas (for tackling impending global crises), dialogue is indispensable, but not any kind of dialogue will do. Dunn would probably argue that dialogue, however inclusive or democratic, will most likely fail to achieve the desired end if it is not conducted in a very carefully considered and well-focused manner. It is not even certain whether the dialogue should be carried out in a democratic fashion.

However, one thing that is certain is that whatever form it may take and whatever subject it may treat, dialogue must consider at the very least the issue of democracy, since democracy, for the first time in human history, has become the all-dominating “cosmopolitan standard” of today’s world, “a single world-wide name for the legitimate basis of political authority”. 20 This phenomenon is quite unique in that no other word or notion has ever managed to attain this status. But of course, this is not to say that all is well and jolly. Even in the Post-Cold War era, the following words from *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future* still ring true: “If we are all democrats today, it is not a very cheerful fate to share. Today, in politics, democracy is the *name* for what we cannot have – yet cannot cease to want”. 21

In dealing with democracy in a dialogic context, Dunn draws attention to the impor-
tance of India, the world’s largest democracy: “a treasure trove” which can “bring fresh re-
sources to a dialogue”. As I am no specialist of India, I should like instead, in the re-
maining pages of this article, to focus on the Japanese context and attempt to show what
kind of dialogue has taken place (and is continuing to take place) between Dunn and some
Japanese scholars.

II. Dialogue with Japanese Academics

The following account is based largely on interviews with Takashi Kato and Takamaro
Hanzawa—both close friends of Dunn—conducted on 3rd and 9th of November 2007 re-
spectively.

To start with some biographical facts, Dunn has so far made five visits to Japan in
da—two of Japan’s most renowned postwar intellectuals whose democratic opinions were
subject of both acclaim and controversy. Although this turned out to be the first and the last
meeting with Maruyama (who died in 1996), Dunn was very impressed by his person and
his work, as recounted in his article “Japan’s Road to Political Paralysis: A Democratic
Hope Mislaid”, originally a speech delivered for the Maruyama Lecture at the Center for
Japanese Studies, University of California, Berkeley in 2001. As for Fukuda (who died
in January 2007), Dunn met him at almost every occasion and there was extensive intellec-
tual exchange between the two thinkers.

But let us go back to the beginning and see how Dunn’s intellectual ties with the Japa-
nese scholarly community began in the first place. It was in fact Hanzawa who started it all,
almost forty years ago in 1970. Hanzawa, at the time professor of history of political
thought at Tokyo Metropolitan University, spent his one-year sabbatical leave at Cambridge
University. Not knowing Dunn before his arrival, Hanzawa came upon Dunn’s newly pub-
lished book *The Political Thought of John Locke* at Heffers Bookstore in Cambridge. So
impressed was he with the book that he decided to get in touch with Dunn. And this fortu-
nate encounter soon evolved into long-lasting intellectual exchange and friendship. Then
Kato (one of Japan’s foremost specialists in Locke’s political thought) in 1979 followed the
footsteps of Hanzawa in spending his sabbatical leave in Cambridge and becoming an in-
tellectual companion as well as close friend of Dunn. In the decades to follow, it was Han-
zawa and Kato who served as pivots for linking Dunn with Japanese academia.

In the course of time, Japanese translations of Dunn’s work appeared. *Modern Revolu-
tions* (1972) was to be the first, translated by Naoki Miyajima and published in 1978 (from
Chuo University Press). Unfortunately, this book failed to make an impact. According to
Kato and Hanzawa, it was largely due to the excessively poor quality of the translation. But
Hanzawa also mentioned how even with a good translation it probably would not have been
favorably received by most Japanese specialists in revolutions, since a large majority of
them were at the time absorbed in by some antiquated versions of Marxism.
But the situation drastically improved when the translation (by Hanzawa) of Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future appeared in 1983 from Misuzu publishers. This book, I am told, was widely read and Dunn began to draw the attention of many Japanese political theorists. This trend was further consolidated by the appearance of the translation of John Locke (Oxford Past Masters, 1984) in 1987 from Iwanami publishers. The translator was Kato, who (together with his own studies on Locke which synchronized with Dunn’s) has contributed greatly to shift the existing interpretative paradigm of Locke’s political thought in Japan. Dunn thus became known for his works on several different topics: contemporary political theory, political thought of Locke, and last but not least, methodology for interpreting political texts. 

No doubt Dunn’s repeated visits to Japan further contributed to his becoming a household name within the Japanese political science community, and his dialogue with Japanese scholars will most likely continue into the future. Seikei University has recently started a project on “Democracy and nationalism” which will culminate in an international conference in 2009, and Dunn will play a central role throughout this project. In addition, Kato has proposed to read and study Dunn’s most recent book Setting the People Free in one of his graduate seminars. He hopes that, if all goes well, this will eventually turn into a project for translation.

As for the specific nature and contents of the dialogue that took place between Dunn and Japanese scholars, they are obviously not something that can be summarized in a few lines—in fact, I am not even sure if they can be summarized at all. But let me at least try to make an effort by introducing a couple of anecdotes (and once again, I rely heavily on what I have learnt from Hanzawa and Kato during the interviews).

Dunn’s first impression of Japan was one of astonishment. He was astonished at how a country so different from those in the West has managed so successfully to modernize and to adopt a democratic system. He was also struck by the profundity of the understanding of Western thought by some Japanese scholars (most notably, Fukuda and Maruyama). However, in the course of extensive discussions with these scholars, he began to realize why it was that they remained fiercely critical of Japan’s modernization process. While Japan has managed to establish democracy as a form of government, it was not necessarily accompanied by democracy as a political value or ethos. Dunn later described this phenomenon by stating how the initial economic success of Japan could be interpreted as “a triumph through democracy”, but not necessarily “a triumph for democracy”. Both Fukuda and Maruyama tried to tackle this problem by revealing the artificial nature of political society; by seeing nation-state as an “ideological fiction”, which in the final analysis must result from voluntary consent of autonomous individuals. Now, while Dunn was much inspired by this style of thinking (especially given the fact that it was formulated as a moral-philosophical argument, in absence of cultural premises or religious residues assumed in the Western context), he tried to extend the argument by articulating problems that not only concerned Japan but also potentially all modern democratic states.
The second anecdote is related to the first and concerns mainly Kato who followed the footsteps of Fukuda and Maruyama in theorizing about democracy while at the same time engaging in politics by way of journalism. Kato, as I mentioned earlier, is a Locke scholar, but from the second half of 1980s he began to exchange ideas about contemporary politics with Dunn. Kato, like Fukuda and Maruyama, was primarily concerned with the question of how it was possible to establish meaningful democracy in Japan. And under the assumption that Japan still had a lot to learn from the West, he often resorted to the arguments of Western thinkers (especially Locke) to criticize the state of politics in Japan. In so doing, he confessed that sometimes he felt it unavoidable to formulate clear-cut arguments (which might still leave some room for further critical examination) for achieving practical results here and now. According to Kato, this was all the more reason to appreciate Dunn’s uncompromising critical pursuit which left nothing unexamined. Dunn’s approach brings to light many important factors which are indispensable for understanding how democracy can or cannot work in a variety of settings with varying time-spans, and this insight is invaluable for Japan as well as for the rest of the world. This is why Kato believes that dialogue with Dunn, which constitutes as it were a division of intellectual labor, is indispensable and must continue into the future. Kato also mentioned how remarkable it was that scholars from such different cultural or civilizational backgrounds could communicate and share ideas about politics and democracy at such a deep level.

III. Conclusion

In the above discussion, I have attempted to adumbrate some of the core features of Dunn’s political thought by focusing on his recent idea concerning the “great dialogue”. I have also tried to illustrate very briefly how this idea is put into practice by introducing a couple of anecdotes concerning Dunn’s engagement with Japanese academia. Needless to say, one could hardly conclude from this that a “great dialogue” is well and truly on its way to producing the desired outcomes. In the face of growing uncertainties and risks that aggravate on a global scale the already strained conditions of human existence, it is hardly a consolation to acknowledge that a small number of scholars are engaged in a dialogue so as to think seriously about what can and cannot be done to ameliorate the present state of humanity (or, to put it more soberly, to steer the future away from further devastation). Once again, we are reminded of how helpless we all are before the unfathomable Cunning of Unreason. But while it would be naïve to hope that somehow some miraculous solution will present itself in the near future, it certainly seems less absurd to assume that whatever we decide here and now will affect, for better or for worse, the state of what is to come. In this respect, there still are things that can and ought to be done, and that politics will matter in the process. But what kind of politics? This remains a vital question to which an answer must be sought urgently and intelligently. But given the intractable nature of this question, it would seem prudent to widen the option by thinking collaboratively about what we can and cannot rea-
sonably hope, that is to engage in a “great dialogue”.

Notes

1 This article is based on my paper presented at the International Conference in Honor of Professor John Dunn, held on 13-15 December 2007 in Taipei, under the auspices of Academia Sinica.


5 The History of Political Theory and Other Essays, p. 5.

6 “Rights and Political Conflict,” in Interpreting Political Responsibility (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) pp. 45-60 (p. 50). Theorists in question are “well enough equipped to speak to contemporary political sentiment wherever (but only wherever) this already happens to be fairly resolutely liberal in character”. But most serious political conflicts stray “beyond the confines of liberal values”.

7 This is recounted in the discussion paper, “Taking Unreason’s Measure”, distributed at the conference. “It also taught me for the first time in my life to face up to the decisive destructive power of politics: its capacity to take rapidly, and for a time irreparably, to pieces the everyday life of virtually an entire population, not by the simple expedient of full scale war (…), but simply by incompetence, greed and ruthlessness” (Ibid., p. 9). See also Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future, p. 115.

8 The History of Political Theory and Other Essays, p. 3.

9 The Cunning of Unreason (London: HarperCollins, 2000) pp. 21-22: “How can we tell when we are in error, and need to defer to judgments more reliable than our own? The great question in politics, as John Locke painstakingly explained, following, among many others, Plato, is: ‘Who is to be Judge?’”.


11 “Tracing the Cunning of Unreason,” p. 18. He also goes on to claim the following: “For now, the one conclusion about it on which I would wish to insist is that its primal appeal, the idea of choosing freely together the terms of our collective life must be quite deeply deceptive, since one can choose freely only what one can clearly understand, and because the human world in which we live, the world I tried to sketch out in The Cunning of Unreason, is one whose most insistent and dominating practical causalities none of us can really hope to understand. This does not mean that democracy is a bad idea, still less that any particular autocratic competitor would be a better one. It merely means that democracy, like socialism, is far more appealing as an idea than it can hope to be salutary or effective as a practical experience. What you like in it (those of you who do), you are quite right to like. But don’t let the grounds for that taste lead you to expect it to prove anything like as agreeable in practice” (Ibid., p. 19).

12 The Cunning of Unreason, pp. x-xi.


14 The History of Political Theory and Other Essays, p. 3. See also The Cunning of Un-
reason, p. 11: “Why European thinkers? Well, not just for old times’ sake, but because politics is a European category and indeed a European word, and because European categories still have a dangerously privileged role within modern politics”.


16 “Taking Unreason’s Measure,” p. 19: “The principal point … is the imperative of striving to pull together and set within real intellectual reach of one another the often historically very poorly lit records of focused inquiry and interpretation of every persisting human community, so that we can learn together, as fast as we still conceivably can, just who the other human beings with whom we must share this common space really are, and how they in their turn view the challenges of that common life. That task will be made harder by the imperative to struggle together to rescue the ecological viability of the space itself; but it will also, however erratically, be driven partly by that imperative”.

17 The idea of seeking mutual understanding through certain forms of communication is already present in Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future: “To include ourselves within the same framework of understanding as other persons is a condition of rationality. To cease to set a higher priority on our own interests than that which we set on those of others is a moral achievement. What enables human beings to understand each other (to the degree that they can) is precisely the inclusion of their selves in the same framework as that in which they grasp the condition of others. As Herder put it: ‘The degree of depth in our feelings for ourselves conditions the degree of our sympathy with others; for it is only ourselves that we can project into others’. The practical skill which makes such understanding possible is the capacity to use language, a skill which sets the limits both to the possible privacy of human truth and to its intrinsic determinacy in a fashion which we do not a present at all clearly understand. It is because we can communicate in such an elaborate fashion with one another that we could in principle understand each other well and that we could in principle cooperate together as a species in a manner which did recognize our common species membership more handsomely. But language is only a natural capability. It is left to us to decide to what uses to put it. Nothing compels us to choose to recognize in practice this community of biological fate as the basis for any claims at all on one another. All that can be said is that the natural capacity to understand each other is one which we can, if we so choose, seek to foster culturally and to acknowledge morally. It is important not to set our sights too high. Mutual understanding entails the possibility of some mutual respect. But it does not entail either the necessity of any respect or the possibility of complete respect. (We are all deplorable for some of the time and some of us are deplorable for quite large proportions of it.) It is no use seeking to force ourselves to visit upon others a level and type of respect which we have no good reason to accord ourselves” (pp. 108-109).

18 “Civilizational Conflict and the Political Sources of the New World Disorder,” p. 3.


20 Setting the People Free (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), p. 15. See also “Taking Unreason’s Measure,” p. 16: “Yet, for all its ill-temper, its ready insincerity, and its unmistakable bemusement, this is now discernibly a single real conversation: perhaps a dialogue of all but deaf, and certainly one conducted in a spirit and under circumstances far from those recommended by Jürgen Habermas, but still intractably a dialogue. Democracy is ill-equipped to guide its friends and at best flimsy as an answer to any normative question. But its power as a political conception across the world has been shown, again and again, not by the clarity or stability of the authority it confers, but by its unique capacity today to
de-legitimize – to strip legitimacy, the claims to be obeyed of those who openly despise and spurn it, of all normative weight”.

21 Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future, p. 28.

22 “Taking Unreason’s Measure,” p. 17.


24 Conference entitled “The Cambridge Moment: Virtue, History, and Public Philosophy” was held in December 2005 at Chiba University. Dunn and Pocock were invited as two protagonists of “Cambridge School methodology”. I should also mention Hanzawa’s short but informative article which attempts to capture the essence of Dunn’s thought by linking its various elements. Hanzawa, “The Political Thought of John Dunn and the Cambridge School,” History of European Ideas, vol. 19, no. 1-3 (1994) pp. 179-183.

25 “Japan’s Road to Political Paralysis,” p. 7.

26 See for instance the last few pages of “Japan’s Road to Political Paralysis”.