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Towards the New Democratic Accessibility: 
The Politics of Mis-Communication and 
Democracy 2.0

TERAOKA Tomonori*

Introduction

Deliberative democracy both in theory and practice has been passé in contemporary society. The idea of politics through deliberative communication within enlightened citizens of rationality has been a traditional ideal since ancient Greece and has been centered on Western political thoughts. This ideal, however, is becoming more unrealistic in today’s complicated society. There are two kinds of problems with deliberative democracy: the idea of the public sphere and accessibility.

The grand ideal of deliberative democracy assumes that all the participants must be familiar with the topic of discussion, know how to use their rationality, and be socially motivated for open discussion in the public sphere. Most notably, Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas have developed the idea of the public sphere where socially and politically motivated human beings, as speaking beings, gather and participate in public deliberation. Hannah Arendt argues, “[to] live an entirely private life means above all to be deprived of all things essential to a truly human life… a life without speech and action… is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men” (Arendt 1988: 58 & 176).

However, in today’s complex society, the more people’s interests become diverse and society becomes fragmented, the less a unified public sphere—where humans truly become genuine humans, as social beings—is likely to emerge. People

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have become more unsocial and apolitical animals. On the one hand, being satisfied with the status quo, people in contemporary society have a nihilistic attitude toward politics and their interests are diversely segmented. On the other hand, fragmented groups of people exercise fierce violence and terrorism, rejecting deliberation. In this situation, deliberative democracy only within educated and politically motivated citizens accelerates limited accessibility and the fragmentation of society since it also tends to create exclusive elite hermeneutic circles.

The advent of the Internet and the entailing discourse of e-democracy and e-government appear to have overcome the limitations of traditional deliberative democracy. However, this “techno-populist discourse” (Crawford 2002: 90) of radical democratization does not solve the fundamental problem of deliberative democracy since it is a simple expansion of the traditional idea. Due to the Internet, accessibility has increased within certain groups of people, but most opinions of those who are politically un-motivated are still left out: accessibility is still greatly limited.

Grounded on the difficulty to achieve the simple yet implausible ideal of deliberative democracy, Japanese philosopher and cultural critic Hiroki Azuma’s latest work, General Will 2. 0: Rousseau, Freud, and Google (2014), suggests a provocative alternative idea of democracy 2.0. Azuma’s “democracy 2.0” aims to incorporate the database of people’s unconscious desires and private opinions accumulated on a Web platform (i.e., Google) into deliberative democracy, producing a new form of democracy. He argues that deliberation must be conducted within the restricted condition determined by people’s unconscious desires that are now visualized, as a database, on Google.

By contextualizing the theory of democracy 2.0 into Azuma’s earlier philosophical and cultural studies works, the paper argues that democracy 2.0 generates a new concept of and practice of radically enhanced accessibility, which overcome the critical flaw of limited accessibility under deliberative democracy. It also argues that this enhanced accessibility is conceptualized and practiced in what I would like to call “the politics of mis-communication.” While some might mistakenly take Azuma’s democracy 2.0 as a techno-populist democratic discourse, his theory, on the contrary, is reflected upon the limited capacity of deliberative democracy even on the Internet. In deliberative democracy, what’s valued is people’s voluntary contribution to deliberation through direct communication with others in an open platform. However, the supposedly “equal” accessibility in deliberative democracy automatically entails the systematic exclusion of unsocial or politically inactive people. The enhanced accessibility in democracy 2.0, on the other hand, values the accidental contribution of unwilling participants’ unconscious desires, as one of the legitimate sources to decision-making. This accidental contribution is mis-communication since communication through unconscious desires is not deliberate. It is only possible and effective in contemporary hyper-
postmodern society where a grand narrative is lost and people produce and consume small narratives on the Web database, without seeking ultimate meaning. It should not be considered the rejection of deliberation, but rather as a supplement that maximizes deliberation through the enhanced accessibility.

As Azuma’s General Will 2.0 alone does not provide a comprehensive picture of how the enhanced accessibility and the politics of mis-communication is conceptualized, an objective of the paper is to make a clear theoretical connection between General Will 2.0 and his earlier works (Otaku: Japan’s Database Animal [2009] and Ontological, Postal, About Jacque Derrida [1998]). This theoretical connection will allow the readers to understand the process in which the paper develops the argument on the enhanced accessibility in the politics of mis-communication.

The Problem of Deliberative Democracy and E-Democracy: Accessibility

Accessibility and deliberative democracy have an intimate relationship. The usual understanding of that relationship is that the more open access people have, the better democracy becomes. Habermas’ ideal public sphere implicitly embraces bourgeois spirits, limits accessibility, and creates inequality. There have been many feminist critiques on the issue of systematic exclusion in the Habermasian public sphere (Fraser 1990). The concept of counter-publics emerged against this unified understanding of the public. Counter-publics emphasize their “oppositionality, [and] a dialectic retreat from and engagement with other publics” (Brouwer 2006: 197). This leads to the idea of multiple publics according to each race and gender (Squires 2002). Therefore, multiple public spheres have arisen to resist the systematic exclusion of minorities’ accessibility and deliberation.

However, with the advent of the Internet, there has been the optimistic discourse of the ubiquitous public sphere where equal accessibility and deliberation is guaranteed, e-democracy and e-government being the most notable. José María Moreno-Jiménez and Wolfgang Polasek (2003) claim that in e-democracy, the “central mission of the web should be favouring the creation and diffusion of knowledge through discussion and the inclusion of citizens in the public decision-making process” (164). This suggests two kinds of accessibility: access to knowledge and access to the political system. A premise behind e-democracy is that on the Web, every citizen has an equal voice based on his/her equal access to knowledge (e.g., free online knowledge sources) and the system (e.g., electronic voting systems). In a more radical line, the idea of government 2.0 attempts not only to guarantee citizens’ equal access, but also to consider government as an open platform, which only serves to supply service according to the demands of each citizen (Eggers 2005).

The growing accessibility to democratic opportunities on the Web is also
represented by the blogosphere. For instance, Damien Smith Pfister (2011) claims the potentiality of the blogosphere as a place where new arguments are invented with speed, agonism, and copiousness, while resisting “the homogeneity of the institutional press” (142). Those who advocate the blogosphere’s potential democratic accessibility argue that Web-based knowledge and information hyperlinked and diffused facilitate the emergence of various publics and deliberation, which could possibly overthrow the dominant power of the traditional media.

However, this idea of “a level playing field” of the Web has been criticized as optimistic techno-populist discourse. Alice Crawford (2002) argues that people’s language and discourse are socially embedded in their real socio-cultural environments and that even discourse on the Web cannot eliminate their socially embodied language. Her argument is that citizens’ access to a more democratic system does not necessarily guarantee that each voice is equally weighted. In a similar vein, Jodi Dean (2005) claims that what seems like democratic possibility on the Web with great accessibility only serves to alleviate citizens’ feelings of guilt about non-commitment to politics. Drawing from Žižek’s concept of “inter-passivity,” Dean argues that one’s lost faith in politics now produces citizens’ technology fetishism, which acts on their behalf and makes them feel that they contribute to some political actions (e.g., clicking a button on a petition page). Web technology gives numerous democratic opportunities in which citizens can send their messages but their messages are never received by actual politicians and merely contribute to the abundance of message circulation. Therefore, according to Dean, equal access to the democratic system on the Web may even deprive citizens of actual democratic potential that could change the actual material reality.

Thus, arguments with regard to accessibility are of two kinds. The first is that democracy on the Web greatly increases citizens’ access to both the political system and knowledge. The second is that democracy on the Web perhaps increases access to the system and knowledge but does not increase access to real politics. The difference between the two lies in a different understanding of the arrival of citizens’ messages to the targeted place.

However, there is an accessibility issue that the two arguments ignore: the voices of people disinterested in politics or a certain political issue. This accessibility of people disinterested in politics may sound like an oxymoron, especially to Hanna Arendt, because these people reject the idea of being social animals. However, there are two oppositions to the Arendtian argument. First, even though these people are confined to their private spheres and refuse to be social animals with others in public, this does not directly lead to the conclusion that these people’s opinions or desires can be dismissed under the idea of democracy. This dilemma seems to come from the Greek tradition of deliberative democracy sustained by slavery, which is a system of exclusion. Second, in today’s complicated and fragmented society, in
which social and political issues have become so diversified, it might be the case that people’s disinterest in politics is socially structured. If this is the case, the dismissal of these people’s voices cannot be legitimised and their disinterest in politics should not be blamed on them.

I argue that it is in this context of accessibility that Azuma’s *General Will 2.0* can offers a new concept of the enhanced accessibility under democracy 2.0, albeit not explicitly stated in the work. This paper, thus, attempts to emphasize the concept of the enhanced accessibility through the theoretical examination of *General Will 2.0* and his earlier works.

**Democracy 2.0**

In *General Will 2.0: Rousseau, Freud, and Google*, Hiroki Azuma proposes the theory of democracy 2.0 based on the general will 2.0. The general will 2.0 is an updated version of Rousseau's original idea that people’s general will is visualized on the Web (known as the general will or the general will 1.0). He argues that for Rousseau, the most important element of social construction is the collective will of people, and the system of polity (the government system) is not an issue whether it be democracy, aristocracy, or monarchy. Thus, “the government is merely the instrument of the general will” (Azuma 2014: 19). This is because Rousseau's social contract does not produce the relation between the ruler, or the government, and the ruled, or its subject, but instead a social community whose will the government must follow.

Rousseau distinguishes between two kinds of collective will: the general will and the will of all. On the one hand, the will of all is the collection of individuals’ particular wills, or the sum of particular wills, which sometimes fails. On the other hand, the general will is defined by Rousseau as the sum of differences, which never fails. Azuma argues that these two kinds of the collective will can be understood in mathematical terms: the former as *scalars* and the latter as *vectors*. Due to the fact that Rousseau uses mathematical expressions to explain his social contract theory, Azuma re-interprets Rousseau’s general will as a mathematically computable entity.

Besides the general will, another important aspect of Rousseau’s theory is that in his favor of direct democracy, he denies the necessity of citizens’ exchanges of opinions for the formation of the general will. According to Azuma, this claim is based on Rousseau’s idea that the accuracy of the general will depends on the number of differences. Therefore, as Rousseau (1997) insists, if citizens do not communicate with each other and do not try to coordinate their opinions, the general will emerges with perfect accuracy.

From this radical claim, Azuma concludes that Rousseau’s general will does not belong to the order of men or conscious communication, but rather to the order of things. Thus, Azuma calls politics with general will “politics without [conscious]
He suggests that the general will should be loosely translated and understood as the general desire. The mathematical collection of people’s desires does not need deliberation to be expressed. In this sense, Azuma-Rousseau politics without communication would be strongly rejected by Habermas’ or Arendt’s formation of public deliberation, only through which healthy democracy is possible.4

Azuma, then, argues that contemporary society already possesses “the mechanism for collecting and systemizing the wills and desires of people without the need for conscious communication” (2014: 56): Google. For Azuma-Rousseau, the general will in contemporary society is a database on the Web, which is the general will 2.0. In a society of ubiquitous documentation, past records of people’s desires and wills are forgotten by themselves, but the social architecture on the Web such as Google, keeps accumulating and visualizing these records. Google, therefore, materializes the abstract general will 1.0.

The conscious deliberation through the exchange of language presented by Habermas and Arendt assumes that participants in deliberation are, at least, willing to construct a point of compromise among different opinions and they must have a certain level of knowledge and rationality. However, in the current society with an overload of information, people do not have a common space for discussion and the unified public sphere does not exist to begin with. Azuma claims that we have to abandon the Kantian paranoiac ideal that “the possibility of a universal ethic and politics is located in overcoming private interest and empathy” (2014: 77).

Azuma, however, does not advocate the elimination of deliberative democracy. He claims, “if such [a claim that conscious communication is necessary for politics] is the case, shouldn’t a terrain of politics without communication be now put in place precisely for its realization?” (2014: 75). The real problem in politics right now lies not in that the government refuses to take up the people’s desires, but in that the government does not know the people’s desires.

In conclusion, he suggests a new model of the relation among state, society, and database. “The contemporary society has two means of knowing itself: state and database” (2014: 105). The conscious and the unconscious produce conflicts and struggles in this model5. Through the model, he suggests employing the masses’ unconscious desires as the limited condition for deliberation, which will supplement the long-coveted ideal of deliberative democracy.

He takes niko-niko douga [smile video] as a primitive prototype of democracy 2.0 where users’ comments generate “kuuki” [air/atmosphere] or the orientation of discussion that deliberators must take into their consideration; therefore, they must “read the air” or be able to perceive what is appropriate in a given situation. The system of niconico douga well explains how “noises/kuuki” of the masses function as the limiting condition of deliberation. Although it is not the objective of this paper, the theoretical and practical connection between Japanese kuuki theory (Ito
2009) and people’s unconscious desires are worth examining.

Azuma’s argument has two kinds of theoretical significance: 1) the idea of democracy 2.0 collapses the Arendtian traditional dichotomy between the private, or the animal realm, and the public, or the human realm, in which only the public is regarded as the political realm; 2) the theoretical work of democracy 2.0 can be expanded to an actual social architecture that utilizes a visualized presentation of people’s unconscious desires for a better governance system. Combined the two points together, his suggestion of incorporating private/invisible people’s voices into political decision provides an alternative solution of the aforementioned problems of accessibility. His suggestion on this enhanced accessibility, however, is not fully elaborated on in General Will 2.0. In order to comprehend it from a deeper theoretical and philosophical perspective, now the paper have to turn to his earlier works, Ontological, About Jacques Derrida (1998), Animated Otaku: Japan’s Database Animal and Postal (2009). By examining these texts, the paper will focus on the two points: 1) the relationship between the database on the Web and people’s unconscious desires; 2) social conditions in which the theoretical model of democracy 2.0 functions. The two points will help clarifying the concept of the enhanced accessibility, the condition in which it should be considered, and how the politics of mis-communication works through it.

The Freudian and Lacanian Unconscious and Database Animal

In Ontological, Postal-About Jacque Derrida, Azuma’s thorough examination of Derrida presents two kinds of deconstruction. The first deconstruction, logical-ontological, appears mostly in Derrida’s early works, upon which Anglo-Saxon scholars have developed and most famously represented in Yale school. The second one, postal-psychoanalytical, appears in his middle works in less logical forms. Azuma attempts to theorize Derrida’s middle works, which have always been dismissed or undervalued by Derridean scholars and other philosophers, as more or less performative texts. He claims that deconstruction is a form of innovative philosophical thinking after Friedrich Nietzsche, which attempts to find and describe the non-experiential realm without relying on transcendent metaphysical concepts (1998: 215). The first deconstruction aims to point out the indeterminacy of signifiers and create the single lack of ultimate meaning as something beyond the linguistic field. Azuma calls it “negative theological thinking” (1998: 215), frequently seen in the early works of Derrida as well as in those of Martin Heidegger and Jacque Lacan. The second deconstruction is meant to open up plural communication space with various materialistic flows of desires. As opposed to the first deconstruction where the non-experientiality of the impossible (or the unconscious desire) is reduced to the signifier of the single lack, in the second deconstruction the non-experientiality of the impossible has a different postal/
communication space. This creates a dead-stock postal space where plural and impossible experiences are stocked and reappear at random, generating numerous rhythms of temporality (See "Pcpt.-Cs. with rhythm" in Figure 1). In other words, while in the former the experience of the impossible is reduced to the chain of signifiers going around the lack through a single solid path, in the latter the experience of the impossible is not necessarily reduced to a signifier, following various postal paths, with some un-symbolized remnants in more materialistic forms. Therefore, the second deconstruction always embraces the possibility of miscommunication through which accidental encounters with others occur. Azuma calls the second deconstruction “postal deconstruction,” featured in the middle and later Derrida, particularly in his works on Freud. Postal, Ontological is about Derrida’s theories, but it could be read as a re-interpretation of Freud as opposed to a Lacanian understanding of Freud. I argue that the difference between the first and second deconstructions accurately reflects the difference between the tree model and the database model, which I will elaborate on later.

Figure 1: The Mystic Writing Pad Model.

(Note. Figure is from Hiroki Azuma (1998: 322) and Sigmund Freud (1923: 1915 &1925).

Lacanian psychoanalysis focuses on the movement of the desire in which the subject is formed through language acquisition (Fink 2004: chap. 4). As Fink (2004) articulates, the subject is comprised, at the level of the unconscious, of a collection of master signifiers; therefore, it cannot take itself as the object. This alienated subject ($) has already lost its being (a), as “that of living being, the life of the body, our animal existence, and thus the immediate pleasure taken or obtained from the body” (Fink 2004: 116). The immediate pleasure is called jouissance (libido or
affect) and is different from Freudian pleasure. The object 

\( a \)

, “the basis upon which symbolization works” (Bracher 1993: 40), is introduced for one to experience the lost jouissance. It functions as the cause of all desire. The object 

\( a \)

, which is to fulfill the lack of the un-symbolized Real, can be expressed as imaginary number 

\( i \) (Žižek 1989: 158). 

\( i \) does not exist in the experiential realm, but the signifier of 

\( i \) makes its existence possible. This 

\( i \) represents Azuma’s first logical-ontological deconstruction because Lacanian psychoanalysis attempts to ontologize the non-experiential impossible (or the unconscious).

Fink argues that Lacan’s graph of desire deals with “the difference between the unconscious and the id” (Fink 2004: 127). Lacan’s interests in both Freudian first topography and second topography lead him to separately consider the unconscious as thought and the id as materialistic drives in the field of non-thought (Žižek 1998). However, ultimately, his strong emphasis on speech and signification process seems to place the unconscious primary over the id (Fink 2004: chap. 2). This is where Azuma-Derrida take a different departure and a more materialistic focus on communication/signifiers and desires.

Freud (1923) states, in “The Ego and The Id,” “the real difference between the \( \text{Ucs.} \) and the \( \text{Pcs.} \) idea (thought) consists in this: that the former is carried out on some material which remains unknown, whereas the latter (the Pcs.) is in addition brought into connection with word-presentations” (3954). Here, Freud assigns the material to the unconscious and the thought/idea to the preconscious. For the material in the unconscious to come into the preconscious, it must be connected with the word-presentation. In another essay, “The Unconscious,” Freud (1915) also argues, “conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone” (3022). Then, Freud (1915) continues, “word-presentations are residues of memories…only something which has once been a \( \text{Cs.} \) perception can become conscious” (3022). Later, Freud (1923) suggests that other than feeling all the origins of knowledge and perception lie in interactions with external stimuli. He claims, “thoughts are actually perceived” (1923: 3958). This ego development model was initially developed in his essay “Beyond The Pleasure Principle.” In the essay, Freud argues that human beings primarily have only the id, which develops through interactions of libidos with external stimuli. The ego and the super-ego are derivatives of the id (Freud: 1917). The idea of death instincts, which was introduced first in this essay, came from his observation of veterans’ war trauma and children’s play with a toy. Freud (1920) argues that the compulsion of repetition, which seems against the pleasure principle, is caused by the failure of “the task of mastering or binding excitations” (3738). The compulsion of repetition emulates the occurrence of the excess of excitation, which once happened in the past.

Once the binding of excitation is accomplished, the ego can establish the pleasure principle. Freud’s ego development model and his assignment of the
unconscious as the thing-presentation are critical because they propose a diversion from the Lacanian thought. Azuma-Derrida consider that Freud’s unconscious has non-symbolic/material spaces that constantly influence the ego. To illustrate this point, Azuma-Derrida highly evaluate Freud’s perception model introduced in his essay, “A Note Upon The ‘Mystic Writing-Pad.’” In the essay, Freud (1925) explains how perception and memory function by drawing an analogy with the mechanism of the mystic writing pad (Figure 1). The outermost layer is a transparent piece of celluloid, which functions as a protection sheet from a pointed stylus; the middle layer is a waxed paper, which is pressed by the pointed stylus and produces writing on a waxed slab, which is the third layer. In order to erase writing, one has to detach the waxed paper from the waxed slab. What is significant about this model is that even after erasing writing, traces are always left on the waxed slab, which is analogous to the data accumulation function of the unconscious. Like the unconscious, only “thing-presentation” remains on the waxed slab. Freud (1915) writes in another essay, “the Ucs. is also affected by experiences originating from external perception. Normally all the paths from perception to the Ucs. remain open, and only those leading on from the Ucs. are subject to blocking by repression” (3016). Thus, while in the conscious-preconscious register, external data and stimuli openly flow, in the unconscious register the trace of the data and stimuli coming from the conscious-preconscious register is always accumulated and some data are returned back to the conscious-preconscious register as the word presentation.

Azuma-Derrida’s theoretical contrast of the Freudian materialistic unconscious and Lacanian symbolic unconscious in Ontological, Postal underlies his cultural analytical models of Japanese subculture consumption in Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals. In this work, he analyzes Otaku a (nerds) culture and their unique consuming behaviors, which feature extremely post-modernized society. He suggests two different consumption model structures: a modern world consumption model and a postmodern world consumption model. He calls the former the tree model and the latter the database model. In the tree model, on the surface-layer, there are multiple representations of a single grand narrative such as God and the State. The database model has, on the other hand, a “double-layer structure” (Azuma 2009: 31), in which the two layers are juxtaposed in parallel. However, the database model is not the rhizomatic model of immanence (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009), in which the deep layer disappears and there is only an assemblage of signs on the surface outer layer. In the database model, on the one hand, the subject reads up and reconfigures elements of the deep layer (database) on the surface layer to produce and consume small narratives comprised of various arrangements through the subject’s reading-up activity. Azuma calls this consumption pattern in postmodern society database consumption. In the tree-model, on the other hand, the subject is elicited or desired by the grand narrative through an endless consumption of small narratives. In the tree model of modern society, people consume small narratives on the surface to
gain some transcendent meaning behind them.

In the database model of postmodern society, people consume small narratives, become immediately satisfied, and no longer seek ultimate deeper meaning because the database of the deep layer does not have any meaning: the database only provides fragmented elements for arrangements of small narratives. In other words, Otaku people never seek for ultimate meaning of a story line in their cultural consumption, but enjoy their own reconfiguration and immediate consumption of fragmented story lines.

Azuma calls this structural transformation in postmodern society “animalization” (2009: 86) based on Alexandre Kojève’s distinction of humans and animals. According to Kojève, humans have both needs and desires, but animals have only needs (Azuma 2009: 86). Animalization means that a human loses desires for other’s desires and confines oneself in the circuit of private needs. Azuma (2009) calls post-modernized human beings who are entrenched in the needs-based database consumption behavior a “database animal” (87). This database animal is not driven by the grand narrative any longer. In relation to his understating of the Freudian and Lacanian unconscious, I argue that the animal needs should be understood as the id-based desires, as opposed to the completely symbolized Lacanian desire: The animal needs in human beings eschew symbolization.

Analogies of his theoretical models become clear at this point: the Lacanian symbolic unconscious/the tree model and the Freudian materialistic unconscious/the database model. Lacan’s negative theological thinking is the opposite side of the modern-world or metaphysical world structure (Azuma 1998). A metaphysical understanding of the world and the Lacanian lack (i or the object a) function as the grand narrative, which elicits people’s desires for ultimate meaning. All the narratives (object a) in this model are subject to symbolization. On the other hand, the Freudian materialistic unconscious/the database model explains how un-symbolized database desires produces and arranges small fragmented meanings that are instantly consumed. Unlike the former in which the deep and surface layers always have a mutual channel, the latter does not: it is only one-sided going from the deep layer to the surface layer. Database animal have the Id-based needs, rather than symbolized desires, for an immediate consumption of small narratives. The deep layer does not have grand meaning; it is there to provide segments for the arrangement of small narratives.

In this respect, the database model is better understood from the mystic writing pad model. The unconscious register (the deep layer) under the waxed slab does not have word-presentation and meaning. Rather, it has only thing-presentation. Meaning is given only in the conscious-preconscious register (the surface layer), which reflects the arrangement and random rhythm of the unconscious database. The current mode of human beings in postmodern society is better understood as the Freudian database animal as opposed to the Lacanian narrative subject.
The Unconscious Desires and Google: Functional Similarities

An understating of Azuma’s database animal and the Freudian materialistic unconscious enriches an understanding of the democracy 2.0 model. The idea of deliberative democracy is understood in the tree/the Lacanian unconscious model since participants are motivated by the grand narrative, or the Lacanian desire of the unattainable good unified public.\textsuperscript{12}

On the other hand, the democracy 2.0 model works in the parallel structure of the database model. Democracy 2.0 has both access to conscious deliberation and unconscious database. Deliberation in the database model does not work in the same way as the tree model.

Deliberation represents small fragmented publics, which are not sustained by the grand desire of the unified public sphere. Deliberation is confined in a small group and functions to immediately satisfy the group’s interests and desires. At the same time, Democracy 2.0 has access to a visualized database on the Web, which includes people’s unconscious desires. Providing a minutely divided data-space in which people express private tweets and sometimes gibberish, Google accumulates all the fragmented data. Similar to the database model, the two, deliberation and database, do not represent each other, but the database of people’s unconscious desires provide a platform for deliberation.

Freud articulates the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious in a similar way that democracy 2.0 functions. Humans cannot escape the influence of the unconscious, but they are at least capable of instructing it on the right path with rationality or conscious thought (Freud 1927). Rather than either entirely depending upon conscious deliberation or succumbing to the power of the unconscious, humans must exercise their rationality in the limit of the unconscious. This is the basic principle of Azuma’s democracy 2.0.

Interestingly enough, Google demonstrates very similar characteristics of the Freudian unconscious. Freud (1925) claims that the unconscious is “timelessness” (3010). Google is timeless in that individuals’ forgotten statements, emotions, and desires remain as data forever. Azuma mentions a similarity between the system of Google’s algorithm and the non-existence of “negation” in the unconscious. In Negation, Freud (1927) argues that “no” does not exist in the unconscious. Negation exists only in the judgment register to repress what should be kept repressed. Google’s algorithm, unlike Yahoo’s (Hamano 2008: chap. 2), does not have “no” in terms of the content. Its page-ranking system is based on the quantity rather the quality of the content.\textsuperscript{13} Finally, Google’s meta-data reflects the slip of the tongue of people. It reflects people’s unconscious desires that slipped out of their conscious control of the content of a speech (Azuma 2014: 93).
Towards the New Accessibility in the Politics of Mis-Communication

So far, I have elaborated on 1) the relationship between the database on the Web and people’s unconscious desires; 2) social conditions in which the theoretical model of democracy 2.0 functions, through the reading of Azuma’s earlier works. Azuma’s philosophical work on Derrida rescued the Freudian materialistic unconscious desires from the Lacanian symbolic unconscious desire. An understanding of the Freudian unconscious as the thing-presentation in the database gives rich functional analogies with Google. Moreover, the contrast between the tree and database model helps to understand the critical differences between deliberative democracy and democracy 2.0 and how democracy 2.0 best functions in contemporary post-modern society: While deliberative democracy works in society where people are driven by a grand narrative of the unified public sphere and the public good, democracy 2.0 functions best in contemporary postmodern society where a grand narrative is lost and people are confined by private animalistic needs.

The three works combined, it becomes clear how we should understand the new enhanced accessibility that Azuma seems to make a gesture in General Will 2.0. Since, society is composed of both the conscious and the Freudian (not Lacanian) unconscious, therefore, the conscious/deliberative communication and the unconscious/database communication. Thus, I argue that accessibility in deliberative democracy is only based on people’s conscious political wills. In democracy 2.0, on the other hand, accessibility must also include people’s unconscious desires that involuntarily contribute to democratic politics. The democratic possibility of this involuntary contribution that the new accessibility makes possible is what I would like to call the politics of “mis-communication.” I call it “miss”-communication since it differs from deliberative communication in that while the latter aims to deliver intentional messages to the addressed, the former relies on the complete contingency in which messages are sometimes delivered to strangers. The new accessibility of democracy 2.0 makes citizen’s wider contribution to politics possible through both deliberation and unconscious database. If a legitimacy of democracy is guaranteed by all citizens’ voices, there should be no exclusion of any of their voices. Therefore, the truly equal accessibility of democracy is only possible by incorporating unconscious desires and voices of the people, who are systematically excluded in deliberative democracy.

In the aforementioned Dean’s argument on technological fetishism, citizen’s individual messages on the Web contribute to the circulation and are not heard by actual policymakers, giving individuals satisfactory democratic feeling and eventually preventing them from participating real collective political actions. She argues that a letter or message in communicative capitalism never actually arrives, or perhaps even never be sent, by modifying Lacan’s adage “a letter always arrives at its destination” (2006: 30). In other words, in communicative capitalism,
everyone believes that a letter posted is sent and arrives to its a targeted destination.

In democracy 2.0, however, this mechanism is much more complicated in the politics of mis-communication. A letter does not necessarily have any destination, and it is not necessarily sent with intention, or more accurately, everyone is unaware of the fact that a letter is sent and stockpiled somewhere on the Web. It is highly likely that most of them will be fed into an endless circulation and become just noises. But democracy 2.0 opens up the new space and accessibility of a more contingent, plural, and complex network, which Azuma-Derrida calls the postal space. In this postal space, a letter sometime gets lost, goes somewhere not intended by a sender, and reappears at random. Regardless of whether a letter arrives (Lacan) or it is not sent (Dean), both theories only presuppose a single communicative space sustained by the unified desire in the same way as the Lacanian unconscious functions. In deliberative democracy, messages or the meaning of messages should not be mistaken and should not be lost. Dean’s theory becomes compelling in this model of the single communicative path. In Dean’s account, deliberative message exchange never happens in communicative capitalism. However, democracy 2.0 shows a possibility of another communicative path in which people’s unconscious desires are unintentionally exchanged or mis-communicated, randomly influencing others. Democracy 2.0 considers the importance of accidental mis-communications. Needless to say, one cannot completely bank on these accidental communications to bring about social and political change. However, while deliberation can be all reduced to circulation noises in communicative capitalism, democracy 2.0 could produce unintentional access and impact on real politics. The new accessibility and the politics of mis-communication in democracy 2.0, therefore, are grounded on people’s unconscious desires on the Web, which accidently and involuntarily contribute to real politics.

Conclusion

The paper has argued that Azuma’s new democracy model, democracy 2.0 generates a new concept of and practice of the enhanced accessibility, which overcome the critical flaw of limited accessibility under deliberative democracy. In deliberative democracy, people’s voluntary contribution through direct communication with others in an open platform is valued. But, at the same time, the supposedly “equal” accessibility in deliberative democracy necessarily entails the systematic exclusion of unsocial or politically inactive people. The new accessibility in democracy 2.0, on the other hand, values the accidental contribution of unwilling participants’ unconscious desires, as one of the legitimate sources to decision-making. This miscommunication-based political contribution also responds to Jodi Dean’s critique of e-democracy in a different way. Democracy 2.0 should not be considered the rejection of deliberation, but rather as a supplement that renders
deliberation maximize through enhanced accessibility.

The idea of democracy 2.0 is still in a developing stage and there are some theoretical and technological problems, such as procedural legitimacy. As Rousseau’s general will can be utilized to legitimize the emergence of a dictatorship and a totalitarian regime, in democracy 2.0 there always remains the risk of surveillance and arbitrary manipulation. These problems need to be explored in another opportunity. However, its prominent potential that supplements and further develops deliberative democracy should be taken seriously.

NOTES

1. Habermas argues, “participants in communication can act communicatively only under the presumption of inter-subjectively identical ascriptions of meaning” (1990: 198).

2. The great increase of “NEET” (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) in Japan and around the world is a clear example.

3. Friedrich Nietzsche and José Ortega present two types of the masses. The former is unified based on the slave morality and the latter is variously segmented, self-enclosed, and complacent. For Nietzsche, democracy diminishes the will to power, leading up to nihilism. On the other hand, Ortega claims that liberal democracy is “the loftiest will towards life common” because in democracy, people are urged to communicate with others. However, neither Ortega’s call for liberal democracy and Nietzsche’s call for a charismatic leader with noble morality function properly in the current relation between the masses and democracy (Nietzsche 2009; Ortega y Gasset 1985).

4. Azuma also touches upon Carl Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction and his idea of the political and argues Azuma-Rousseau politics does not fit into Schmitt’s idea of politics as struggles either (Azuma 2014: 51-53).

5. For a better understanding, please refer to the visual model in Azuma (2014: 105).

6. A unique Japanese expression, “kuuki wo yomu [read the air]” does not have an exact translation in English. Ito (2009) explains it as “the atmosphere of a situation to which all those involved are expected to pay respect” (573). Since it does not have any exact equivalence in foreign language (Ito 2009), it is a very useful expression to describe invisible power dynamics in communication in general. From the Lacanian psychoanalytic point of view, it describes the situation in which all the participants in deliberation must become the subject-supposed-to-know with a shared understanding of the O/other’s desire to the greatest degree. If one breaks “the air (or the atmosphere of a situation),” she or he loses respect from others and is ostracized from a community because she or he “cannot read the air,” or what the Japanese calls “KY” (Kuuki Yomenai [someone can’t read the air]).
7. Azuma claims that the most of scholarship on Derrida is about either his early works (logical deconstruction) or late works (political engagement) and ignores the theoretical implications of his middle works.

8. “We have decided to relate pleasure and unpleasure to the quantity of excitation that is present in the mind but is not in any way ‘bound’; and to relate them in such a manner that unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a diminution” (Freud 1920: 3715).

9. Oxford Dictionaries defines Otaku as follows: “(In Japan) a young person who is obsessed with computers or particular aspects of popular culture to the detriment of their social skills.”

10. For a better understanding, please refer to the visual model in Azuma (2009: 32&55).

11. For a better understanding, please refer to the visual model in Azuma (2009: 33&55).

12. Christian Lundberg, in Lacan in Public, connects the study of rhetoric and Lacanian psychoanalysis and claims, “that rhetoric is both signifying in a condition of failed unicity and a way of feigning unicity in the context of failed unicity...Rhetorical artifice—tropes, modes of address, imaginary commitments, and the labor of investment—underwrites these practices, feigning unicity in the context of its failure” (Lundberg 2012: 3). This claim exactly reflects the negative theological thinking of the Lacanian unconscious desire as the opposite side of the same coin of metaphysics.

13. Although a page linked by a more-viewed page is valued more than one linked by a less-viewed page, content is not considered for ranking.

14. Barbara Johnson states, more precisely, “a letter always arrives at its destination since its destination is wherever it arrives” (Johnson 1985: 145).

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