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After Fukushima: New Public, NHK and Japan’s Public Diplomacy

By YAMAMOTO Nobuto*

Introduction

The age of globalization has witnesses various challenges to citizens as well as the state. The state used to provide security for its citizens. For this purpose, it is understood that the state holds the authority to exercise its power in the name of national interest. But in the globalized world, pursuing national interest sometimes brings a state into conflict with growing transnational interests. And in some case, transnational issues may need to be prioritized over the national interest of a given country. In discussing globalization, Anthony McGrew notes:

The growing extensity, intensity, and velocity of global interactions is associated with a deepening enmeshment of the local and the global in so far as local events may come to have global consequences and global events can have serious local consequences creating a growing collective awareness or consciousness of the world as a shared social space, that is globality or globalism [italics in the original] (McGrew 2009: 18).

Thus if a growing collective awareness or consciousness of the world has created a shared social space, one may find “public interest” in it. Based on this assumption, this article explores how public service media relates to and contributes to newly emerging public interests.

The Fukushima’s nuclear crisis since March 2011 has led to the emergence of concerned citizens on energy issues in Japan. The phenomenon echoes what Ulrich Beck names a “risk society.” He explains it as “a systemic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself” (Beck 1992: 21). Arguably Fukushima has for now stood for the birth of a new order of risks and public interests because it has triggered the birth of a new public in Japan as well as Asia and beyond – a public for whom energy also represents risk.

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As the epicenter of nuclear crisis in the twenty-first century, Japan bears the responsibility to deal with current and future issues of nuclear power. Reporting how Japan – both the government and citizen – has been dealing with the problems and situation may satisfy and provide secure feeling the people in East Asian neighbors where the number of new publics grows. The media as expected plays a central role for this purpose. In particular, the media of international broadcasting holds a significant position. In the case of Japan, it would be the NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyokai) International Broadcast. By saying this, however, I do not mean that NHK International Broadcast should commit to Japan’s public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy as generally understood is “the promotion or communication between peoples as opposed to governments” and is designed to “build agreement based on common values” (Ninklovich 1996: 3). It is a two-way communication process; it has on the one hand efforts to project a nation’s image and values to other countries and people, and on the other hand to receive information and to understand culture and values of other countries and people. With this understanding, public diplomacy may be distinguished from soft power and cultural diplomacy, both of which tend to be a one-way communication in international society to gain a certain state’s influence over the other.

In the field of public diplomacy, international broadcasting serves as one important conduit in projecting one’s image and information to others. Historically, it has been the case in which public service media has involved in providing international broadcasting. Public service media like NHK World has been designed for domestic audience and foreign publics abroad. And, though rarely acknowledged, international broadcasting service has another significant audience – that is, the citizens abroad. The spread of social media and increasing mobility of citizens however have blurred the distinctions between domestic and international audience. In particular, nationalistic discourses on the Internet and social media sometimes create new challenges to a country’s diplomatic activities. Societal and technological evolutions thus have an impact on foreign policy, while the domestic dimension of public diplomacy increases its significance. Needless to say, diplomatic practice faces transformational developments, that is the so-called “societization” and democratization, which then require a redefinition of the publicness or the public value of public service media.

Public service media have been in a process of transition since the early 2000s. Its transition is obvious if one remembers the different role and value of public service media in the last two decades of the twentieth century and those of the twentieth-first century. The 1980s and 1990s viewed public service media
as declining forces due to the proliferation of channels, tightened public funding, and the loss of a once-clear sense of mission (Tracey 1998). To the contrary, thanks to a series of technological innovation in the field of broadcasting and the Internet, public service media has reinvented media convergence and multiplatform content delivery (Brugger and Burns 2011). Observing such transformations, Stephen Coleman argues that public service media has shifted its mission of serving the nation through broadcasting to public service media organization contributing to more diverse public (Coleman 2004).

In this context, there has been a high expectation for public service media to change its role in bridging domestic and international audiences. Using examples taken from NHK’s World Radio Japan, I argue that NHK needs to reconsider its audience/market-oriented approach and turn itself into a more public-oriented agency, adjusting itself to an emerging public and/or diplomatic environment. In the wake of a series of disasters in March 2011 in Japan, there has emerged an urgent call for putting East Asia’s regional interests on the diplomatic agenda. It has been a while, however, since the NHK’s World Radio Japan on a daily basis provided a commentary section called “Insight,” dealing mainly with regional issues. This section reflects the ways in which NHK perceives its role as an unofficial part of public diplomacy, garnering both domestic and foreign publics to see the East Asian region through its lens. My article traces the changing public role of NHK international radio broadcasting by examining the transformation of its idea of public value in Japanese and East Asian societies, and offers some policy recommendations for NHK’s international broadcasting.

Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy appears not to be a major topic in the field of public service media. So this section starts with a definition of public diplomacy within a broader sense of diplomacy. Then it summarizes the transformation of international environment where public diplomacy operates, and touches upon the role of international broadcasting in the context of public diplomacy.

Nicholas Cull (2009) gives a general definition of diplomacy, encompassing all kinds of actors and all the potential goals pursued through it. He broadly defines diplomacy as “the mechanisms short of war deployed by an international actor to manage the international environment.” As for traditional diplomacy, he describes it as an “international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with another international actor” (Cull 2009: 12). Since the end of the twentieth century, due to the penetration of globalization, diplomacy
has transformed to involve various kinds of non-state actors. Jan Melissen (2005) identifies this recent trend of diplomacy with effects on international relations.

It is the growing recognition of the significant role played by foreign publics in the international society. He argues that foreign public opinion has indeed gained influence on the events and the conduct of foreign policies through the development of mass media and new technologies of information and communication (Melissen 2005: 3). Unlike in the age of traditional diplomacy where a small number of states’ representatives behaved as primary actors, in the era of “new public diplomacy” (Melissen 2005) ordinary people may influence the formation and execution of state’s foreign policies. Concerns over how therefore international actors may interact with foreign publics in a positive way in order to produce a favorable context for their own interests has paved the way to the development of public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy in a typical statement would be “direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments” (Malone 1985: 199). According to Cull, public diplomacy is a subset of diplomacy which may be defined as “an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public” (Cull 2009: 12). This definition identifies the main distinction between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy operates between the representatives of states, or international actors. To the contrary, public diplomacy targets the general public in foreign countries.

In a sense, public diplomacy sounds close to the concept with soft power. Soft power, according to Joseph Nye (2004), is the ability of the state to get favorable international environment rather than using force or money as a means of persuasion over the other state(s). This ability is supposed to originate from the attractiveness of culture of the state. Soft power and public diplomacy is not the same thing, however. Rather, public diplomacy “can be the mechanism to deploy soft power (Cull 2009: 15). It is a practical expression of the use of soft power. Yet soft power has its disadvantage in the context of international relations. Since it is a mechanism for “getting what one wants” as Nye describes, it can become overly strategic and therefore not attractive to others. In other words, a country’s over-reliance on soft power may in fact diminish its soft power.

Public diplomacy encompasses a wide range of activities. It rests on five major components: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, and international broadcasting (Cull 2009: 18-22). Although these five elements relate closely with each other, it is not realistic to assume that public diplomacy should combine all the five components at the same time. Therefore, it is natural for the state and
actors to prioritize one or two elements over the others. Other scholars such as Wyszomirski, Burgess, and Peila (2003) maintain that public diplomacy has two major elements: information policy and cultural/educational programs (2003: 1). The latter component of public diplomacy has been engaged by many Western powers. Well-known examples in the field of cultural/educational programs may be the operations run by the American Council and the British Council. The website of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office about the function of the British Council reads that the “main vehicle for cultural relations with other countries is the British Council. It works to strengthen the UK’s reputation overseas through programmes in education, the English language, the arts, science, information provision and governance and human rights. It has offices in 110 countries and territories and around the UK.”

In the era of post-Cold War and especially post-9/11, new challenges and needs of public diplomacy have emerged: structural changes of international relations, domestic politics and technological innovation of mass communication (Gilboa 2008: 56). In particular, the revolution in communication technologies paved the way to new communication styles. The Internet and the global networks have become a central source of information about world affairs as well as domestic issues. For the first time in history, since the turn of the twenty-first century, the Internet and social media have invited citizens – mostly middle class who has access to Internet – to participate and exchange ideas about world affairs, which used to be exclusively monopolized by the political and economic elites, which had access to and could function in a rigid media culture.

It is in this context one can understand the growing alarm with which the US government tries to remake its image in the world. There is no doubt that the US government has enjoyed tremendous soft power since the World War II. But in the post 9/11 era it has become necessary for the US government to turn its attention to unexpected waves of anti-Americanism from many corner of the globe. Episodes of Anti-Americanism occur not only in Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia, but also in Western nations like France. It turned out that in most cases American cultural presence and the so-called American way of life which represent the US soft power have become major targets by local citizens (Katzenstein and Keohane 2006).

In order for the US government to improve its image in the world, it has made use of international broadcasting. International broadcasting overlaps with all other public diplomacy elements. International broadcasting functions, according to Cull, as “listening in the monitoring/audience research functions, advocacy/information work in editorials or policy broadcasts, cultural diplomacy in its cultural
content and exchanges of programming and personnel with other broadcasters.”
International broadcasting could manage and secure the international environment
“by using technologies of radio, television, and Internet to engage with foreign
publics” (Cull 2009: 21).

While public diplomacy attempts to influence elites and the media in a
target state or region, international broadcasting speaks to foreign publics. The
producers and directors of program and news at international broadcasting tend to
focus on “national” issues of the country in which they reside. Even if they choose
“international” issues, they like to place the country’s political and economic stand.
They appears not be completely free from the government’s policies and practices.
By so doing, consciously or otherwise, international broadcasting inevitably takes
the side of the government’s public diplomacy. The question is how deep it is
involved in public diplomacy.

**NHK International Broadcast**

75 years ago, on 1 January 1937, the *Nippon Hosō Kyōkai* (forerunner of the present NHK) commences a one-hour daily shortwave broadcast service for
Europe, the east coast of North America and Hawai’i, South America, and Malay/
Singapore/Java under the name of *Kaiō Hōsō* (Overseas Broadcasting) with
programs in Japanese and English. Three months later in April, French and
German languages were added as the overseas service expanded its coverage.
Malay and Singapore was a British colony, while Java was under the Dutch colonial
administration. Soon the overseas broadcasting came to be known by its English
name, “Radio Tokyo.” In the late 1944 Radio Tokyo’s service reached its largest
scale with a total of over 33 hours per days in 24 languages.

The timing of the launching of Radio Tokyo coincided with the Japanese
government’s ambition to expand its politico-military influences in Asia. Japan
had already planned to advance to colonial Southeast Asia, after its military had
invaded and eventually governed the Manchuria since September 1931. Japan’s
southward advance stirred diplomatic tensions between Japan and Western
powers, in particular with the Dutch colonial government, and to some extent
with the British colonial administration. Japan’s main economic and strategic
interests lied in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and the Malay Peninsula. These regions
also had the decent numbers of Japanese residents as merchants, fishermen, and
retailers. For Japanese residents, Radio Tokyo not only delivered Japanese news,
but also signaled its government’s attitudes toward the region. But understanding
Japan’s military ambitions, both colonial governments could not overlook Japan’s
concerning regional affairs. It is clear that in the pre-war period Radio Tokyo played a significant role in Japan’s public diplomacy. Its services therefore closely correlated with the fate of the Japanese government, and therefore started to decline towards the end of the Pacific War. On 10 September 1945 Radio Tokyo announced the end of the war to its Japanese audience abroad. Upon the order of the Allied Powers, after the war, Radio Tokyo was forced to terminate its service.

For nearly eight years after the war, Japan was under the tutelage of the US government. But by the Treaty of San Francisco between Japan and part of the Allied Powers was officially signed by 48 nations on 8 September 1951, NHK was allowed to resume its international shortwave broadcast services. It started on 1 February 1952 under the name of Radio Japan in five regions – North America, North China, Central China, the Philippines, Indonesia, and India – with programs in Japanese and English for five hours daily. Unlike Radio Tokyo, however, Radio Japan was not under the direct guidance of the Japanese government, and thereby it is understood that it has been detached from Japan’s public diplomacy.

How then does Radio Japan operate? Radio Japan is a part of the NHK World which is NHK’s international broadcast service consisting of international television, radio and Internet. The aims of NHK World, according to NHK’s website, is 1) to “provide both domestic and international news to the world accurately and promptly”; 2) to “present information on Asia from various perspective, making the best use of NHK’s global network”; 3) to “serve as a vital information lifeline in the event of major accidents and natural disasters”; 4) to “present broadcasts with great accuracy and speed on many aspects of Japanese culture and lifestyles, recent developments in society and politics, the latest scientific and industrial trends, and Japan’s role and opinions regarding important global issues”; and 5) to “foster mutual understanding between Japan and other countries and promote friendship and cultural exchange.”

So Radio Japan broadcasts news, information, and entertainment programs focusing on Japan and Asia. It operates a daily total of 65 hours in 18 languages. It has two components, general service and regional service. The former broadcasts worldwide in Japanese and English, while the latter covers specific geographical zones in 17 languages: English, Arabic, Bengali, Burmese, Chinese, French, Hindi, Indonesia, Korean, Persian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Swahili, Thai, Urdu, and Vietnamese. Both services are also available on shortwave as well as online and in
Podcasts. Transmissions are directly from KDDI Yamata Transmission Station in Japan, and are relayed via 21 overseas stations.

In connection with public diplomacy, there are fundamental differences between NHK International Broadcast and BBC World Service that has been described as “the world’s best known international broadcaster.” The main difference lies in the fact that BBC World Service operates as part of the UK public diplomacy. “Broadcasting Agreement for the Provision of the BBC World Service” exists between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the British Broadcasting Corporation. It reads, “With respect to the BBC World Service, the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office] is responsible for agreeing with the BBC objectives and appropriate performance measures.” It is funded by a grant-in-aid administered by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “with a total budget of approximately £256m for 2010/11.” This grant-in-aid “ensures [that] the BBC World Service has full editorial, managerial and operational independence from” the British Government. But “the Foreign Secretary has repeatedly made clear the value” of the BBC World Service, and even maintained that “it is a fundamentally important part of Britain’s presence in the world.”

Unlike the BBC World Service, the NHK International Broadcast does not have any formal position in or ties with Japan’s public diplomacy. The Broadcasting Law defines as the special and quasi-governmental corporation. Article 7 of the law shows the purpose of NHK as “to conduct its domestic broadcasting [...] with abundant and high quality broadcast programs for the public welfare and in such a manner that these broadcasting may be received all over Japan.” NHK is not quite a public corporation funded by the national government or any other public entity.

The NHK’s regulatory framework is more complicated than BBC’s. With the Broadcasting Law, the Board of Governors oversees the Executive Board of NHK. Twelve members of the Board of Governors are appointed by the Prime Minister with approval from both Houses of the Diet. As for the budget, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications holds the position of supervising NHK. NHK is required to submit annual budget and operation plans to the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, and moreover they need to be approved by the Diet. But the government subsidy is extremely limited. 96 percent of NHK’s revenue comes from license fees (around $70US per month per household) from the public. No advertisements and sponsorships for broadcasting are allowed by law (Nakamura 2010). Therefore, unlike the BBC World Service, NHK International Broadcast does not have the kind of resources to operate as a player for national interest in diplomatic scenes. Rather, it appears that NHK International Broadcast takes the neutral position when it broadcasts news and commentaries on the wave.
NHK International Broadcasting and Soft Power

Although NHK International Broadcast does not officially operate as an instrument of Japan’s public diplomacy, its broadcasting certainly promotes positive image of Japan and the country’s products, which overall may contribute to the managing and securing international and regional environments for Japan’s diplomacy. This aspect was clear when the Japanese government employed its soft power policy, the so-called “cool Japan,” in the beginning of the 2000s.

Since the last decade, Japan has eagerly sought to employ its soft power through the allure of manga and anime in its public diplomacy. It has hoped to burnish its international image through these popular mediums. Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook 2006 noted: “Japanese culture is currently attracting attention around the world as ‘Cool Japan.’ In order to increase interest in Japan and further heighten the image of Japan, MOFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] is working with the private sector through overseas diplomatic establishments and the Japan Foundation to promote cultural exchanges while taking into consideration the characteristics of each foreign country” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2006: 208). Although in Diplomatic Bluebook 2011 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs toned down its project of promoting popular culture and the chapter of “Overseas Public Relations and Cultural Diplomacy” is deleted, it still uses the term “the Cool Japan strategy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2011: 24).

This strategy of promoting Japanese popular culture sounds rather strange because the production, diffusion and global consumption of manga and anime are driven by market forces and consumer tastes, not by the Japanese government. The major rationale for the Japanese government to harness popular culture as its public diplomacy is to polish Japan’s international image against the backdrop of the rise of China (Peng 2007: 350). As a rising power, China under the stewardship of Jiang Zemin has also begun to employ soft power as a major diplomatic tool. While Nye defines soft power as the passive attractive force of a nation’s culture, China has expanded it to include almost any non-military strategies at accumulating power (Kurlantzick 2007). The middle of the 2000s was a high time for the Sino-Japan’s competition over who’s taking initiative in building the East Asian Community. Projecting positive image towards its neighbors was a major diplomatic challenge for the Japanese government. It is mainly because Japan has sensitive historical issues with China and Korea, which right away present a challenge to its efforts. In order to overcome this challenge, it is rather natural for the Japanese government to turn its eyes to the already well-known and widely consumed Japan’s popular culture like manga and anime to promote a good international image.
In this context NHK International Broadcast played a significant role. In particular, NHK Word Premium, a Japanese-language television distribution service through cable networks and satellite television service, distributes dramas, children’s, sports, entertainment, and cultural and art programs. Through NHK World Premium, viewers are made familiar with Japanese popular culture and other types of entertainment at home. NHK World Premium even has a program called “Cool Japan” which coincides with Ministry of Foreign Affair’s official strategy. Such dissemination of cultural programs has indirectly contributed to Japan’s public diplomacy.

For instance, take a look at one cultural program, which was broadcasted on 15 January 2011. The program is entitled “In Pursuit of Perfection – Part 1: The touch of ‘hospitality’ spreading around the world.” Its introductory statement on the NHK World website reads:

Japan has its distinctive culture nurtured in the long course of history and by highly developed technologies. This two-part series is going to shed light once again on the internationally regarded magnetism and potential of Japan. part 1 will focus on Japan’s “hospitality,” which is highly valued by foreigners who know the country. In contrast to “services” that come with a price, the Japanese hospitality emphasizes solely on customers’ joy as source of satisfaction for the service providers. Citing some practical cases of Japanese- style inns as well as overseas applications, we will focus on the Japanese soft power that is based on the country’s traditional sense of values [my emphasis].

The description signals another aspect in the promotion of Japan’s soft power by emphasizing “Cool Japan.” The above-cited statement proudly maintains that Japan’s hospitality makes the difference in terms of services compared with other countries’ (presumably ordinary) services. Hospitality according to the statement “is based on the country’s traditional sense of values.” It thus suggests that “we Japanese” are not only different from other people, but the difference makes us better in some regards over others. This sense of superiority has been a hidden agenda in Japan’s promotion of soft power for the sake of the Japanese people. At the beginning of the 2000s when the Japanese government started to use the phrase “soft power,” Japan had been faced with a decade long economic recession, while its domestic politics experienced a kind of turmoil, and many Japanese began to lose their confidence about their future. At that moment, as Douglas McGray (2002) timely pointed out, “Japan is reinventing superpower – again.” He writes;

Instead of collapsing beneath its widely reported political and economic misfortunes, Japan’s global cultural influence has quietly grown. From pop
music to consumer electronics, architecture to fashion, and animation to cuisine, Japan looks more like a cultural superpower today than it did in the 1980s, when it was an economic one (McGray 2002).

Many Japanese since the 2000s have been searching for something to feel good about. Cool Japan and soft power sounded comfortable to them. Therefore, this kind of inward-looking effects of soft power cannot be overlooked when NHK distributes cultural programs.

The timing fortunately worked for NHK. In the middle of the 2000s, NHK faced a series of scandals stemming from embezzlement-related arrests of its employees. The newly appointed president of NHK, Hashimoto Gen’ichi, in January 2005, declared that he was determined to regain popular support (Rahim 2005). Under Hashimoto’s leadership, NHK turned its priority from public service purposes to audience/market-orientation. Thanks to this audience/market-oriented approach, NHK has steadily gained license fees from the public in the last several years. Thus cultural and entertainment programs work internationally as well as domestically, as the case of NHK proves. Its efforts to regain popular support have arguably paid off.

Fukushima and the New Public

Smoke or steam was seen around Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on Saturday, according to a Japanese broadcaster for NHK. Several workers were reported injured at the plant, the announcer said, adding that the exact cause of the emission was unknown. NHK reported an explosion was heard about 10 minutes before the white cloud appeared around the plant. The broadcaster cited Fukushima authorities as saying that the ceiling of the reactor building has collapsed. The Japanese authorities said the cause of the explosion was under investigation. Japanese media earlier on Saturday warned that a meltdown was possible or might already be occurring at the plant, after Friday’s 8.9-magnitude earthquake and tsunami struck Japan’s northeast coast and damaged the reactor’s cooling system [I have modified some parts of the original text] (Twaronite 2011).

On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Japan’s Tohoku region, followed by a tsunami, and a nuclear meltdown at the Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant. The accident and the continued struggle to contain radiation at the 4.7 GW nuclear facilities have plunged the country’s electricity sector into a massive crisis. Revealing the vulnerability of the country’s power system, the
disaster appears set to have shifted the fundamental paradigms of Japan’s energy policy.

The combination of natural and man-made disasters has also changed fundamentally the ways in which the people “see” Japan. The Japanese publics now consciously “see” how insecure their society is. They now are more proactive in monitoring how the government deals with the current crisis, examining what went wrong in the past, and making decisions on how to live in the future.

To “see” what is going on in the society and the world, and to “see” how insecure the world we live in, people now have many options, such as watching TV news, tuning in the radio or the iTunes, and reading the newspaper and other news outlets available on the Internet. To keep themselves informed, people rely on news via the media. However, they do not simply believe the news precisely as the media reports it. Rather, as Walter Lippmann writes, “For the most part we do not first see, and then define, [but] we define and then see” (Lippmann, 1922: 81). An audience receives news filtered through preexisting definitions or images that has already existed in their mind. Most of these preexisting elements are historically cultivated and shared with other people in the society. In other words, once preexisting definitions or imaged change, then people would have a whole new mind and “eye” in looking at the society and the world.

Fukushima is not merely an accident, but it is an accident that has changed the Japanese perception about the kinds of risks were made to support their lifestyle and living standards and how much risks they are willing to tolerate in the future. It certainly has altered how the Japanese public thinks of the nuclear power, and whether or not they can trust the information that the authorities deliver times of crisis. Before Fukushima, the country’s long-term energy strategy had revolved around an ever-increasing share of nuclear power. Less than two years before Fukushima, the Japanese government has pledged to cut carbon emissions by 25% by 2020 from 1990 levels, and by roughly 80% by 2050. It also added reduced carbon intensity to the country’s long-term goals. In this context, the Japanese energy strategy before Fukushima increasingly focused on nuclear power as a (nominally) cheap, quasi- indigenous, and low carbon power source. The Japanese public had believed what the government informed them about the safety of nuclear power. They believed that nuclear power was a solution to reducing carbon intensity, and that nuclear power would develop their future. Thus the myth of safety of nuclear power has been constructed and shared by the Japanese public.

But since the nuclear crisis last year, public opinion on this matter has significantly altered. “An NHK poll shows that public opinion is mixed when it
comes to deciding how much Japan should depend on nuclear power as a source of energy. NHK conducted the poll over the weekend and received responses from 1046 people. The respondents were asked to choose from 3 options the government has presented for the nation's dependence on nuclear energy as of 2030 – zero percent, around 15 percent, or between 20 and 25 percent. The results show that 36 percent favor the zero option – up 2 points from last month, while 39 percent chose the middle option – a drop of one point. 15 percent of respondents chose the highest option, up 3 points from last month. Nuclear power accounted for roughly 26 percent of Japan's energy supplies before last year's nuclear disaster. The government is now reviewing its energy policy and seeking public input on the nation's nuclear dependency” (NHK 2012). Depending less on nuclear power, the Japanese people now try to find alternative ways of life. Although the majority of the Japanese public favors zero dependence on nuclear power, there is no consensus on how soon this goal should be achieved.

It appears that new social activism has emerged in Japan (AP 2012). Concerned citizens on the vulnerability of nuclear power have organized massive rallies. In Japan since April 2012, encouraged by some twitter’s calls, they have conducted weekly Friday anti-nuclear protests. At the outset, the number of people who got together was small, but it grew week by week. They came to the Prime Minister’s official residence and parliaments in Tokyo and voiced their concerns on nuclear power in unorganized fashions. The number of participants has exceeded 20,000 in August 2012. The weekly protests have spread to many parts of Japan, as well.

In the wake of the nuclear incident in Fukushima, anti-nuclear protests with the theme “No to nuclear power” were also held in Taipei, Taichung, and Kaohsiung, Taiwan on 11 March 2012 (Wen and Hsu 2012) as well as in South Korea, Mongolia, and in more modest ways in China (Bird 2012), and by much smaller groups in Bangkok (Thailand) and Jakarta (Indonesia). Thailand and Indonesia have not yet built a nuclear power plant for commercial purposes, but nevertheless concerned citizens did organize anti-nuclear protests. In particular in the case of Bangkok, the protesters targeted Vietnam, which has reached an agreement with the Japanese government to build a nuclear power. It appears that, although a renaissance for nuclear power was underway in those countries (Richardson 2010), Fukushima has turned into a huge obstacle for their energy policy. The anti-nuclear movement and sentiments appear to have formulated a kind of new social norm in East Asia. As the issue of energy and nuclear power has become public interest, this new public in East Asia (brought together by the new social norm) would in effect reproduce the norm.
Radio Japan for New Publics (?)

Because of Fukushima, Radio Japan has gained new audiences. Since its main target audience lives abroad, it is natural for Radio Japan to cover wide-range of topics from Japanese politics, society, business, and culture and science. But now Radio Japan faces a new demand from new publics abroad. Along with delivering ordinary news, it now needs to find a way to speak to the people who share transnational public interests.

As public service media, Radio Japan (and NHK as a whole) needs to take new public interests into consideration for its programs. Catering to transnational public interests is indeed challenging. In this respect, I have two recommendations for NHK’s Radio Japan. One is to make use of the existing program to fulfill emerging demands from new publics abroad, while the other has to do with the contents of specific programs that can meet conscious listeners’ appetite. First, Radio Japan has a daily program called “Insight.” This is a commentary program that runs three to five minutes. It invites scholars and specialists on a particular topic that is current. Based on some 30 minutes interviews in the morning, producers usually summarize the points that guest speakers make for English translation, which would fit in the length of the program. Then the English version is to be translated into 16 other languages in the afternoon. The English program starts at 19:00 Japan time, followed by other languages. If the audience has iTunes, they can download it within 24 hours of time.

What makes this particular program intriguing is that “Insight” has unexpected outcomes. It has been reproduced in the Chinese media. I have been called up several times to be a guest speaker for this program. Topics that I made commented on were generally international politics in South/East Asia – the territorial disputes in the Spratly Islands, Japan’s Foreign Minister’s visit to Southeast Asia, and North Korea issue. The point here is that my comments on the wave have been transformed into Chinese texts and they are available on the Internet. This means that my comments would remain in the written format. If one only listens to Radio Japan’s “Insight,” one might forget or cannot cite a commentator’s point. But if those comments are available as written words, they will remain available at any time and can continue to be disseminated. In this way “Insight” can be recycled over the Internet. When I found out this fact, I called up the program directors to ask about it. Their reaction was interesting. They did not know about it at all; they were rather surprised that the Chinese media have reproduced “Insight” in Chinese.

Thus a much wider audience could access the commentaries, which are first
broadcasted on the wave, then reproduced into the written form. The unexpected audience could share the ideas that “Insight” provides and turn them into their practical behavior. I therefore recommend Radio Japan to take advantage of this peculiar situation in the age of Internet.

The second recommendation has to do with the content that “Insight” can provide for the new public. I believe that covering issues of non-traditional security can attract the attention of the new public, or even create a new public. Non-traditional security tackles new facets of security, which has grown out of the historic end of the Cold War combined with the rising tide of globalization, environmental degradation and international terrorism. The nature of threats and security discourses are incessantly changing and this expanding security agenda has gone beyond state and military security (traditional security). Non-traditional security threats may be defined as “challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of nonmilitary sources, such as climate change, cross-border environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime” (Caballero-Anthony 2010: 1).

As the above description of non-traditional security suggests, the issue concerning nuclear power is a part of it. However, the problem with non-traditional issues is that the media coverage has been limited. It only gets public attention when really serious problems occur, as is the case of Fukushima. There is a reason for it. It has to do with the high news value of such as sensational and horrific humanitarian disasters.  

Moreover, in the last two decades, East Asian nations have built various kinds of collaborations and administrative arrangements to tackle non-traditional security issues. This regional collaboration reflects the nature of non-traditional security issues, because once such issues emerge, then those should be treated regionally. Regional collaboration has been proved to be functional and effective to deal with such threats to local people. With this knowledge, for instance, Japan has provided administrative and practical aid by way of Official Development Aid and other means to Southeast Asian nations as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) (Lam 2011; Ministry of Defense 2011). As such, tackling non-traditional security threats are a major issue among various levels and compartments of official ASEAN meetings (Caballero-Anthony 2010). Considering these regional efforts concerning non-traditional security issues, consistent coverage of such threats, and developing regional arrangement to tackle them would certainly contribute to new public interests in East Asia. Therefore,
Radio Japan needs to pay more attention and reserve more time for non-traditional security issues. And in indirect ways it would contribute to Japan’s public diplomacy to its Asian neighbors.

As I have suggested above, Radio Japan has the potential to reach many kinds of audience. In particular, by taking advantage of “Insight” into consideration, it could meet new public demands as well as to advocate them. I believe this is a way to serve public interest, which is the mission of NHK as a public service media.

NOTES

1. The original version of this article was prepared for the 6th RIPE Conference, “Value for Public Money – Money for Public Value,” held at the University of Sydney, Australia, 5-7 September 2012.

2. In this article East Asia refers to East as well as Southeast Asia.


5. The languages include Japanese, English, Arabic, Bengali, Burmese, Cantonese, Chinese (mandarin), Dutch, French, Fujian, German, Gujarati, Hindi, Italian, Malay, Persian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Tagalog, Tamil, Thai, Turkish, and Urdu. The local languages in East and Southeast Asia where the Japanese military government once called “the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” were three Chinese languages (Cantonese, mandarin, and Fujian), Burmese, Malay, Tagalog, and Thai, while the colonial official languages in the region were Dutch, English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish. Siam (Thailand) was the only country that maintained its independence in colonial Southeast Asia. It is to be noted that there were four languages from the Indian subcontinent – Gujarati, Hindi, Tamil, and Urdu.


13. News value sometimes moves the government. There is the word the “CNN effect.” Television coverage, primarily of horrific humanitarian disasters, forces policy makers to take actions they otherwise would not have taken. The CNN effect means that the media determine the national interest and usurp policy making from elected and appointed officials.

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Unknown Authors’ Articles


