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AN00234610-20140101-0005.pdf
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Download
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:492.8 KB
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:Nov 1, 2021 |
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Total downloads since Nov 1, 2021 : 755
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| Title |
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予算過程における委任と予算規模
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| Kana |
ヨサン カテイ ニ オケル イニン ト ヨサン キボ
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Yosan katei ni okeru inin to yosan kibo
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Delegation in the budget process
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寺井, 公子
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テライ, キミコ
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Terai, Kimiko
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| Affiliation |
慶應義塾大学経済学部教授
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慶應義塾経済学会
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ケイオウ ギジュク ケイザイ ガッカイ
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Keio gijuku keizai gakkai
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2014
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三田学会雑誌
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Keio journal of economics
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106
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4
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2014
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1
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421(5)
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437(21)
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| Abstract |
Terai and Glazer(2013)に基づき, 予算を決定する主体をプリンシパル, その政策間配分を任されている主体をエージェントと見なし, 予算過程におけるプリンシパル・エージェント問題について考察する。初めに完全情報下でも, 均衡予算規模がファースト・ベストの水準より過大あるいは過小になり得ることが示される。情報の非対称性が存在するとき, エージェントは情報操作によって過大な予算を得る。このようなモデル分析の結果を公共事業関係費の例に適用し, 予算過程の修正によって財政規律を回復できるかどうか検討する。
Based on Terai and Glazer (2013), entities choosing the amount of budgets are considered as principals, whereas entities delegated the allocation of budgets among policies are considered as agents; here, the principal–agent problem in the budgeting process is examined.
First, even with perfect information, the budget size in equilibrium may become larger or smaller than the first-best level.
When there is asymmetric information, agents get a larger budget through manipulation of information.
This study also applies the results of this model analysis to the case of public works costs, exploring whether it is possible to restore fiscal discipline through a revision of the budget process.
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| History |
| Jan 15, 2015 | | フリーキーワード, 版, 本文 を変更 |
| Jul 31, 2015 | | 抄録, 本文 を変更 |
| Nov 1, 2021 | | JaLCDOI を変更 |
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